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ABSTRACT 
Pharmaceutical Patents Retard Pharmaceutical Invention and Therapeutic 
Intervention 
Patents on pharmaceuticals have emerged from an industry engendered 
mythology as the sacred heart of pharmaceutical innovation; without 
patents on pharmaceuticals there will be no new medicines, no wonder 
drugs and no life saving medical devices. 
Mansfield might be cited as the All-Father of the dependence theory of 
pharmaceutical innovation on pharmaceutical patents, but his survey 
indicates nothing more than government reliance on an industry grown 
dependent on government fiat for its great profitability. In fact an industry 
that owes its origins and sustainability to government assistance rather 
than any adeptness at what society perceives as the moral basis for its 
privileges - that is the innovation of new pharmaceuticals. 
This thesis indicates that the pharmaceutical patent fails to stimulate 
innovation in medicines. Indeed, the empirical indication is that medicine 
innovation is greatly slowed and inhibited by pharmaceutical patents. 
These failings of the pharmaceutical patent can be seen within the 
institutions that distinguish pharmaceutical innovation from other species 
of innovation and patenting activity. 
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Moreover, the effect of patents on pharmaceuticals extends much further 
than simply slowing or denying innovative activity. Pharmaceutical patents 
are the basis of the extraordinary prices that patented medicines 
command, which can bar access to existent pharmaceuticals. Innovation 
and improvement of patented medicines is statistically significantly lower in 
patented medicines than for generic medicines. Therapies for indications 
that are not deemed profitable are not investigated. The above normal 
returns on patented medicines results in those medicines being knowingly 
designated for people with indications in which they are harmful. Less 
than one fifth of a big research and manufacturer's revenue is spent on 
research, development and clinical testing; that is less than half the 
revenue devoted to marketing. 
That elements of the pharmaceutical patent system do not work have been 
recognised and addressed in a growing body of work. However, very few 
commentators have admitted that the pharmaceutical patent is the cause 
of the systemic failings. Thus, most suggested remedies have addressed 
only particular symptoms, whilst ignoring or aggravating other problems. 
After an examination of the problems and reform proposals, the solution to 
the present retardation of pharmaceutical innovation and the artificial 
barriers to access of pharmaceuticals is recognised as far more complex 
than merely tweaking the system. It is concluded, that the solution is to 
restore pharmaceutical knowledge as a public good utilising contemporary 
technological platforms to increase the proliferation and quality of 
21 
pharmaceutical knowledge and to disjoin the manufactured good from the 
public good, thereby subjecting the manufactured good to competition. 
22 
INTRODUCTION 
"Perhaps no issue touches as many lives as the cost of medication ... ,,1 
This thesis is concerned with the availability and accessibility of 
medicines. 2 It is only concerned with pharmaceuticals3 and not with other 
areas of patentable activity. We take as our standpoint that the objective 
of society is to better life for its members. It is a utilitarian standpoint to the 
same extent as the justification of the modern patent system applied to 
pharmaceuticals: Limited resources are available to society and 
combating disease is an essential value of society; thus society must 
allocate some of its resources to combat disease. Patents are a legal 
fiction4 that, in their modern form, are posited to encourage innovation. 
We contend that innovation and access to medicines are retarded by the 
existence of patents over pharmaceuticals. In short, we argue that for the 
same allocation of resources that occurs in the current patent system, in a 
system where pharmaceuticals are excluded from patents more 
pharmaceutical research could be conducted, with greater safety, and a 
Significant reduction in the dramatic difference between the price of new 
1 Stolberg, S. G., 'A Drug Plan Sounds Great. but Who Gets to Set Prices?' New York 
Times, 9 July 2000 
2 By availability we refer to whether drugs are existent, thereby encompassing the 
development of new medicines (i4) and by accessibility we refer to the opportunity for as 
many people as possible to benefit from existent medicines (is). 
3 Pharmaceuticals are defined in depth at i.1 . Pharmaceuticals 
4 
Patents for invention are, in Aristotelian terms, accidents of substances and exist only 
as aspects, properties, or relations of substances by virtue of legal stipulation. 
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pharmaceuticals and their marginal cost. Since deficiencies in the patent 
system for the generation of new pharmaceuticals have been evident for 
some time, there are other concurrent proprietary rights schemes for 
pharmaceutical inventions, such as data exclusivity,S that are also 
addressed by this thesis. 
There is a need for this thesis because, despite rapid technological 
advances in research and manufacturing capability and a wealth of 
historical lessons concerning research, particularly pharmaceutical 
research, we are not achieving our potential in combating disease. Where 
resources are scarce society ought be looking towards systems that can 
aspire to an optimum return on allocated resources yet achieve dynamic 
efficiency in the cause of eradicating disease. That means taking account 
of both contemporary technologies and historical lessons. As well as 
preventing resources allocated to research being diverted to rent-seeking 
activities. 
i. Crisis 
Love and Hubbard succinctly state part of the problem that the patent 
system imposes as a pharmaceutical innovation incentive. 
"In 2005, prices were $400 to $480 billion higher due to patent 
monopolies, in return for $51 billion in private sector R&D, and 
5 Section 1.5.5. 
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probably one-half to two-thirds of the R&D investments were 
directed towards projects of almost no medical significance. Jl6 
With the rising costs of health care provision, the dearth of medicines for 
the treatment of some diseases, and the prohibitive prices of patented 
medicines, it is of utmost importance that we realise the limitations of the 
current system of patents on pharmaceuticals and initiate more innovative, 
safer and more accessible new medicine creation. 
"Improvements in health care and life sciences are an important 
source of gains in health and longevity globally."? 
However, there are currently insufficient resources available to develop all 
the medicines required by human beings. This shortage of resources is 
further exacerbated by the existent incentive systems. There are 
phenomenal allocations of resources that are not directed towards 
therapeutic advances in pharmaceuticals or improvement of 
pharmaceutical safety, 8 but rather to making sales,9 keeping prices high, 
6 Love, J., and Hubbard, T., The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines' 
(2007) 82 (3) Chicago-Kent Law Review 1519-15461524 
7 U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration. Pharmaceutical 
Price Controls in OECD Countries: Implications for U.S. Consumers, Pricing, Research 
and Development, and Innovation [Washington, December 2004], vii 
8 These misallocations are discussed in Chapter 3: Misallocation and Assembly of 
Pharmaceutical Knowledge. 
9 Sections 3.3.7 and 3.38 
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paying competitors to delay market entrance 10 and of course strengthening 
of property rights over medicines. 
Whilst patents on pharmaceuticals are the key component on which the 
present regime of pharmaceutical innovation and distribution is based, it is 
in itself only one aspect of a complex system. Thus, for our examination to 
be both meaningful and useful it must extend beyond the patent right and 
examine the incidence of the pharmaceutical patent in context. To do this 
we must also consider: related rights,11 the organisation of pharmaceutical 
and medical research, regulatory approval for pharmaceuticals, and 
pharmaceutical safety as part of the complex system of effect that 
pharmaceutical patents have on the availability and accessibility of 
medicines. 
Let us introduce the problems in their general form, provide a few 
examples, and clarify our terms. 
Although pharmaceutical innovation is a global issue, this thesis has tried 
within the scope of resources and where it is reasonable to do so, to be 
based on the situation in the United Kingdom (UK). Thus, we will begin 
there. 
10 Thomas, J., 'Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Settlements: Implications for Competition 
and Innovation' (2010) U.S. Congressional Research Service (RL33717) Available at: 
<http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/574> (Last accessed 18th August 2011) 
11 For example, Data Exclusivity (see, 1.5.5. Post Approval Monitoring, 1.5.6. 
Evergreening, 1.5.7. Generic Medicines) and Orphan status. 
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In the UK a system for the regulation of prescription drug prices 12 has 
been in operation since 1956 and although it has kept down the price of 
prescription medicines in comparison to many other countries, it has failed 
to deliver cost effective drugs for the National Health Service (NHS).13 
Each year the NHS spends about £11 billion Great Britain Pounds (GBP) 
on medicines prescribed in primary care and in hospitals. 72 per cent 
(about £8 billion GBP) 14 of this expenditure is spent on patented 
medicines. 15 
12 §261 to §268 National Health Service Act 2006. Prior to 1 March 2007, §33 to §38 of 
the Health Act 1999 provided the statutory basis for the regulation of prescription drug 
prices. 
13 Office of Fair Trading. The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme. An OFT Market 
Study. OFT. London: 2007. Available from: 
< http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oftlreports/comp_policy/oft885.pdf> (Last Accessed: 1 st 
July 2009) 
14 2008 estimates by the Department of Health place NH spending on patented medicines 
at £9bn per annum. See Department of Health, Consultation on a statutory scheme to 
control the prices of branded NHS medicines. (Launch date: 18 June 2008.) At 13 
Available from <http://www.dh.gov. uklen/Consultations/Liveconsultations/DH _ 085523> 
15 According to Danzon and Furukawa's estimates from IMS Health MIDAS 2005 data, 
patented pharmaceuticals in the UK comprise 31.3 per cent of sales volume and 63.3 per 
cent of medicine costs. Whilst in the USA, patented pharmaceuticals comprise 28.7 per 
cent of sales volume and 80.6 per cent of medicine costs. Danzon, P., and Furukawa, 
M., 'International Prices and Availability of Pharmaceuticals in 2005' (2008) 27(1) Health 
Affairs 211-233, at 227. However on the limitations of IMS Health data see, Gagnon, M-
A., Lexchin, J., 'The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of Pharmaceutical Promotion 
Expenditures in the United States,' (2008) 5(1) PLoS Med. Available at: 
<http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/1 0.1371 /journal,pmed.0050001 > (Last 
Accessed 7th April 2010). 
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Patented medicines are typically 20 to 90 per cent greater in price than 
unpatented bioequivalents (generics),16 with the result that patients have 
reduced access to both drugs and other forms of healthcare until 
alternatives are available, even though the needed pharmaceuticals are 
existent. This is because a patent over the pharmaceutical invention 
temporarily converts pharmaceutical knowledge, which is naturally a public 
good, into a quasi-private good. The difference between public goods and 
private goods is that public goods are not diminished by one person's 
use,17 whereas private goods are. This means that private goods have a 
cost once obtained, whilst public goods do not. Since knowledge is not 
depleted by another person learning it, then it is naturally a public good. 
However, if there is a patent on that knowledge, although the knowledge is 
not diminished when shared, the patent entitles the owner to charge a rent 
for exploitation of the knowledge. That is, the patent owner has no right 
over the fact of knowing the knowledge but they have a right in almost 
anything 18 constructed or grown that embodies that knowledge. 
16 EGA FAQ. Available at: <http://www.egagenerics.com/FAQ-generics.htm> (Last 
Accessed: 1st July 2009); Also see United Nations - Millennium Development Goal 8 Task 
Force Report 2008, 'Delivering on the Global Partnership for Achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals.' At: 42. Available at: 
<http://www.who.intimedicines/mdg/MDG8EnglishWeb.pdf> (Last Accessed: 1 st July 
2009) 
17 Diminished in the sense of its worth in terms of its purpose, not in money, though 
changes to monetary might follow diminishment of purpose. For example an apple, 
partially eating it will diminish its ability to satisfy another's hunger. Or a chair: When you 
sit in the chair you exclude another from doing so. Knowledge however cannot be 
diminished by sharing. 
18 'Almost anything' because in the UK ownership of patent rights in a human being are 
prohibited §4A(1 )(a) Patent Act 1977. In the USA the 13th Amendment still prohibits 
slavery, but does it encapsulate resistance to all the facets of ownership raised by today's 
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Pharmaceuticals possibly comprise a more diverse category of patentable 
subject matter than any other type of invention since they have 
jurisprudentially and regulatory evolved sui generis from chemical 
patents. 19 
i.1. Pharmaceuticals 
Pharmaceuticals are a genus of substances that affect the physical or 
mental functioning of a living organism, particularly chemicals used for the 
treatment or prevention of an ailment or disease. By reference to the 
scope of technologies for which patents are available and the 
requirements precised in the Patent Aceo it is more or less clear what a 
patent might be. That is at least in essence. However, defining a 
pharmaceutical patent is trickier. The definiendum of pharmaceuticals and 
the products of pharmaceutical companies are quite broad and therefore 
technology and the extent to which patent rights are granted, consider US Patent 
6211429 (which is for an animal cloning process) in conjunction with 35 u.s.c. 271 (g) 
(which extends process claims to cover materially unaltered products of the patented 
process). Thus, what is the status of the child who grows from an embryo cloned using 
the patented process? They cannot be a slave, but can they donate blood, take part in a 
clinical trial, or be an organ donor, and if they win a competition do they have to endorse 
the owner of the patent for the process that birthed them? 
19 The requirements for a pharmaceutical patent or chemical patent application are the 
same, which would suggest that pharmaceutical patents are not sui generis, but are 
rather a subcategory of chemical patents. This is also a description which works as well. 
However, there are factors which apply to pharmaceuticals which effect the manner and 
cost of pharmaceutical patent infringement cases compared to chemical (not 
pharmaceutical) infringement cases and also to the application of competition law to 
cases where a pharmaceutical patent is involved. Due to these characteristics and others 
that will be described I prefer to consider pharmaceutical patents as emerging sui generis 
patents. 
20 Patent Act 1977 (as amended) and patent Regulations. 
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vague. Spilker21 identified eighteen business areas related to ethical 
pharmaceuticals. These are: cosmetics; contract manufacture; 
pharmaceutical distribution; speciality chemicals; exercise equipment; 
surgical supplies; medical devices; medical supplies; health foods; 
generic-drugs; over-the-counter-drugs; diagnostics; pesticides; other drug 
products; bulk chemicals, dyes and pigments; animal products; agricultural 
products; bio-technology products. From this list, this thesis is only 
concerned with generic-drugs; over-the-counter-drugs; other drug 
products; and biotechnology products. 
Further clarification of the definiendum of the interchangeable terms 
medicine, pharmaceutical and drug are provided by the five elements in 
Article 1 of Council Directive 65/65/EEC. 
Article 1 Directive 65/65/EEC22 
"For the purposes of this Directive, the following shall have the meanings 
hereby assigned to them: 
1. Proprietary medicinal product: any ready-prepared medicinal product 
placed on the market under a special name and in a special pack. 
2. Medicinal product: any substance or combination of substances 
presented for treating or preventing disease in human beings or animals. 
Any substance or combination of substances which may be administered 
21 Spilker, S., Multinational Pharmaceutical Companies: Principles and Practices 
[Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 1994, Philadelphia] 
22 (Official Journal L 22. 9/2/1965: 369) 
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to human beings or animals with a view to making a medical diagnosis or 
to restoring, correcting or modifying physiological functions in human 
beings or in animals is likewise considered a medicinal product. 
3. Substance: Any matter irrespective of origin which may be: 
- human, e.g. human blood and human blood products; 
- animal, e.g. micro-organisms, whole animals, parts of organs, animal 
secretions, toxins, extracts, blood products, etc.; - vegetable, e.g. micro-
organisms, plants, parts of plants, vegetable secretions, extracts, etc.; 
- chemical, e.g. elements, naturally occurring chemical materials and 
chemical products obtained by chemical change or synthesis. 
4. Magistral formula: any medicinal product prepared in a pharmacy in 
accordance with a prescription for an individual patient. 
5. Officinal formula: any medicinal product which is prepared in a 
pharmacy in accordance with the prescriptions of a pharmacopoeia and is 
intended to be supplied directly to the patients served by the pharmacy in 
question." 
For the patent itself we need to look further than the textual grace of the 
Patent Act, and briefly consider the synonymic conjurations of a 'patent'. 
Patents are assumed to encourage inventive genius.23 Indeed the number 
of patents registered is often taken as being synonymous with 
inventiveness.24 There is no empirical support that demonstrates that the 
23 Obiter dicta per Lord Salmon LJ, in Ethyl Corporations Patent [1972] RPC 169 at 193 
24 This is a stance frequently used by government statisticians for showing the vitality of 
national research. For example consider Sainsbury Review. The Race to the Top: A 
Review of Government's Science and Innovation Policies. [HMSO, October 2007]: and 
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patent is a statistically significant form of innovation encouragement. Just 
as there are no studies to demonstrate that the absence of patents is a 
statistically significant innovation encouragement with respect to 
innovation under a patent regime. 25 As this is the case it is incorrect to 
consider 'patents' as synonymous with invention. In some cases a patent 
might be regarded as an invention in the sense of the English dictionary 
meaning of the term, but this when it occurs is anecdotal. It is anecdotal 
because not all patents are inventions within the usual meaning of the 
English language, some are registrations of not widely know techniques, 
or the chemical formula of a substance existent in nature, or a different 
application of a well known technology. 
i,2. Difficult Inferences 
Studies that do purport to compare innovation inside and outside of a 
patent system fail methodologically, as they compare different time or 
geographical localities. At best these comparisons may provide anecdotal 
indications, but not methodologically valid statistical inferences. Indeed, 
innovation is the result of a complexity of factors and all the comparable 
sample populations are homogeneous - either there is a patent system in 
operation or there is not. In consequence this means that a direct 
Griffith. R. 'How important is business R&D for economic growth and should the 
government subsidise it?' (2000) Briefing Note No. 12. The Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
Available at: <http://www.ifs.org.uk/bns/bn12.pdf> (Last Accessed 1st July 2009) 
25 There are however. indications that pharmaceutical industries have historically 
developed faster where patents were more or less abolished. For example Switzerland 
until 1978 and India until 2004. 
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statistical comparison of innovation within systems with patent regimes 
and without patent regimes is not possible. 
Whilst not as convincing as statistical inferences from large populations 
with very limited variables, anecdotal examinations can provide useful 
information. However it has to be remembered that anecdotal information 
applied directly to other regimes is as much vitiated by fallacl6 as direct 
statistical comparison of different regimes. This is particularly aggravated 
in an area of study that is so difficult to quantify and which possesses as 
many variables and technological cross migrations as innovation. The 
essential difference between the direct comparison and the constructed 
comparison is that whilst the former employs deduction to reach a 
conclusion the later is a creature of inference. By studying trends, cases 
and data available on innovation that would be unacceptable material to 
use in direct comparison, we are able to formulate hypothesise that permit 
a comparison, but in each case it is necessary to bear in mind that the 
constructed comparison is a suggestive indicia not an inequality 
evaluation. In areas where a statistical analysis is unavailable then 
identifying indicia and formulating a conclusion based on an assessment 
of the overall weight of those indicia is the accepted methodology. Thus, 
because the number of patents registered is not necessarily an indication 
of the extent of innovation -in the normal sense of the English language-
taking place. Just as the absence of patent registration is not an indication 
- in the same sense - that innovation was not occurring. If however, we 
26Frequently through committing an argumentum ad ignorantiam 
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restricted our use of 'innovative' to the meaning within the Patent Act we 
would use the concept less frequently, but every year we would see 
statistically that innovation had increased. 
i.3. Empiricism 
In practise this is exemplified by the life of technology sectors. In newer 
areas of technology, it is a noticeable trend that innovation has little 
dependence on patents. However, as a technology area ages, it becomes 
less innovative-in the normal sense of the English language- and a greater 
dependence on patents to exclude competition becomes evident - the 
technology progresses less rapidly and yet the patent thickets thicken. 27 
Consider for example antibiotics. We know that antibiotics were employed 
by Ancient cultures as early as 1500 BCE, although knowledge only 
allowed moulds to be applied to treat infections, rather than mould 
metabolites such as we have used since the 1940s.28 Moulds continued to 
be used to treat and prevent infections until the 1940s, when a 
methodology to isolate stable mould metabolites was identified and many 
antibiotics were characterised including penicillin and streptomycin. If we 
consider antibiotics as a technology sector starting in 1941, then the 
number of antibiotic product patents increases almost exponentially from 
27 This can be seen in the history of computers from 1935 to the present day or the 
history of medicines from ancient times to the present day. 
28 Edwin Smith Papyrus, which is considered to be an incomplete copy of a much older 
reference manuscript from the Egyptian Old Kingdom. Translation in, Allen, J., The Art of 
Medicine in Ancient Egypt [Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2005, 1st Ed., New York] 70-72 
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then until now.29 During the 1940s and 1950s there is correspondence 
between the number of new antibiotics isolated and the increase in patents 
filled. From 1967 to 1984 the number of antibiotic product patents 
accelerates compared to a reduction in the introduction of new antibiotics. 
Form 1985 to present day new antibiotic introductions have dwindled. 3o In 
the last two years January 2010 to January 2012 there has been only one 
new antibiotic agent, but 85 product patents on antibiotics. 31 
This trend could be viewed in another way: The increase in reliance on 
patents to retain market presence or dominance correlates to a decrease 
in innovative output. Thus, more patents reflect less innovation. It is 
necessary to note that perhaps innovative activity would diminish as the 
technology area aged in the absence of the patent. Therefore the role of 
the patent in the diminishment of innovation within a technology area may 
be negligible. Studies within many technology areas need to be 
undertaken to identify if as a general proposition increased patenting does 
retard innovation. 
29 USPTO data; DrugPatentWatch. Available at: <http://drugpatentwatch.com!> 
30 For example, from 1970 to 1980 there were 55 new antibiotics, from 1980-1990 there 
were 29 new antibiotics, from 1990 to 2000 there were 22 and from 2000 to 2010 there 
were only 12. Maryn Mckenna presents a good visual summary of some of this data, 
see, McKenna, M., 'New antibiotics: Not many and fewer all the time' Wired Science Blog 
Superbug' (11 th February 2011). Available at: 
http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2011/02/not-many-antibiotics (Last Accessed 11 th 
February 2011) 
31 The macrocyclic antibiotic Fidaxomicin, which gained USA market approval on the 27'h 
May 2011. FDA News release. Available at: 
<http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm257024.htm> 
(Last Accessed 13th January 2012); USPTO data 
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However, within the pharmaceutical technology area there are many 
indicia to suggest that the patent and related rights are significant factors 
in the retardation of pharmaceutical innovation. These indicia will be 
examined in this thesis. 
Whether patents on pharmaceuticals do stimulate or retard innovation is 
quite irrelevant in the absence of a policy objective. Thus, it is necessary 
to emphasise that the indicia in which we are interested are considered 
with respect to the achievement of specific policy goals. These policy 
goals are increasing the availability and accessibility of medicines, through 
improved deployment of resources and use of technologies. It is also 
necessary to point out at this stage that as part of our perspective 
medicines ought to be safe and objectives should be addressed in a way 
that also promotes safety. 
i.4. Availability 
By availability we refer to whether drugs are existent, thereby 
encompassing the development of new medicines. Thus, this work 
considers the indicia of whether the pharmaceutical patent system's 
presence or absence is favourable to the availability of pharmaceuticals. 
This work is an inference from indicia and where reasonable a constructed 
comparison between a regime that is pharmaceutical patent free and a 
regime where pharmaceutical patents are available. 
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According to the First Optimality Theorem,32 if an equilibrium exists at all, 
and if all commodities relevant to the costs or utilities are in fact priced in 
the market, then the equilibrium is necessarily optimal in the precise terms 
of Pareto.33 Consumers and producers guide prices through pursuit of 
self-interest and thereby establish an allocation of the economy's 
resources such that no other allocation of resources can make all 
participants in the market better off. The pharmaceutical patent intervenes 
in the establishment of Pareto-efficiency by blocking the effectiveness of 
the Invisible Hand supposition in favour of the patent holder and thereby to 
the detriment of all other participants in the market. The detriment is 
visible, but tolerated because there is a presumption that this is the only 
way to stimulate pharmaceutical research and development. 
The most obvious result of the pharmaceutical patent's intervention in the 
establishment of competitive preconditions for the supply of 
pharmaceuticals is a reduction in welfare below that which can be 
obtained from existing technologies and resources. 34 Clearly if future 
technologies are dependent on the price of current technologies, then the 
pharmaceutical patent may constitute a tool for attaining future 
32 It should be noted that there is another fundamental theory of welfare economics, that 
is more expansive than a Pareto efficient allocation of resources. This second theorem 
holds that any efficient allocation of resources is sustainable through competitive 
equilibrium. Since both theories support our point then Pareto, the narrower theory, was 
chosen as if it applies so too does the more general theory. 
33 This is necessarily theoretical, because a preCise statement of Pareto must be written 
mathematically. 
34 Efficient uptake of technologies and productive research organisation is the focus of 
Chapter 5. 
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pharmaceutical technologies. However, there is no indication that the 
pharmaceutical patent is the only method for obtaining the capital 
necessary to achieve future technologies or most importantly that it 
facilitates the acquisition of future pharmaceutical technologies. Thus, we 
have two main points of inquiry. Firstly, is there indication that the 
pharmaceutical patent is the most advantageous method, with respect to 
future welfare, of obtaining future pharmaceutical technologies? Secondly, 
is it necessary to find the capital for the invention of pharmaceuticals in the 
future in the price of present pharmaceutical technologies? Both 
questions go to the root of the pharmaceutical patent system's validity as a 
desirable facilitator of pharmaceutical invention. 
We can see this clearly in the arguments purportedly used for the 
protection of pharmaceutical inventions through patents, which follows the 
syllogism. 
• Pharmaceutical innovation is desirable. 
• Pharmaceutical innovation can only be realised by private 
enterprise. 
• Pharmaceutical innovation has to be funded through the sales and 
manufacture of pharmaceuticals. 
• Without a promise of profit, investors would not speculate on the 
activity of pharmaceutical companies. 
• Without investors pharmaceutical companies would not invest in 
pharmaceutical innovation. 
• Pharmaceutical patents provide a promise of profit to investors. 
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• Dissemination of pharmaceutical knowledge is desirable. 
• The patent, by the requirement of a sufficient specification35 , 
facilitates technology transfer. 
• Trade secrets and other forms of protection either prevent the 
dissemination of know-how, or provide insufficient lead-time for 
investors to realise a return on their investment. 
Thus, pharmaceutical patents results in pharmaceutical innovation. 
This is the core of most statements concerning the necessity of the 
pharmaceutical patent for pharmaceutical innovation to occur. As 
exemplified by the U.S. International Trade Administration (U.S. 
Department of Commerce) in 2004: 
"To encourage the continued development of new drugs, economic 
incentives are essential. These incentives are principally provided 
through direct and indirect government funding, intellectual property 
laws, and other policies that favor innovation. Without such 
incentives, private corporations, which bring to market the vast 
majority of new drugs, would be less able to assume the risks and 
costs necessary to continue their research and development." 36 
35 §14(3} Patent Act 1977 
36 U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration. Pharmaceutical 
Price Controls in OECD Countries: Implications for U.S. Consumers. PriCing. Research 
and Development. and Innovation [December 2004]. vii 
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Statements such as this are taken as the most important assessment of 
the pharmaceutical patent innovation regime. This is especially the case 
when dealing with the general public and where the negative impacts the 
pharmaceutical patent system are represented and therefore seen as 
localised phenomena and not a system of problems resulting from the 
pharmaceutical patent regime. For instance it is rarely publicised that -
unfortunately the majority of 
"[pharmaceutical r]esearch spending is misdirected into products 
which add little therapeutic value to the medicine chest; and high 
prices for patented drugs are preventing access to life-saving drugs 
and distorting international trade.,,37 
The problems or failings of the present system to provide availability and 
access are too rarely recognised. This results from our dependence on 
institutions (companies rather than the NIH), which have evolved in 
symbiosis with the pharmaceutical patent regime's artificial scarcity. We 
rely on these institutions that require monopolies to carry out 
pharmaceutical innovation and which conduct that research according to 
their own agenda. In consequence being aware of the situation, we 
should not expect efficient research efforts, or treatments for severe 
diseases that affect poor populations. What we can expect is that, if we 
37 Hollis A. An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation. (2005) Online 
document. At 1. Available at: <http://econ.ucalgary.ca/fac-files/ah/drugprizes.pdf> (Last 
Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
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are shareholders of these institutions, the value of our investment will 
grow. 
i.5. Accessibility 
However, when we or those close to us are unwell and there is no cure or 
the remedy is beyond our purchasing power, then we question the system: 
Why should it be so expensive? Why are substantial funds allocated to 
cosmetic therapies38 or lifestyle drugs rather than to chronic or mortal 
diseases? Indeed why should we pay for the future development of 
cosmetic pharmaceuticals, amongst other things, in the cost of 
chemotherapy drugs we purchase now? 
By accessibility we are referring to the opportunity for as many people as 
possible to benefit from existent medicines. In other words, by 
38 The usual distinction between cosmetics and drugs is the (USA) Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act §201(i). Which defines cosmetics by their intended use, as "articles 
intended to be rubbed, poured, sprinkled, or sprayed on, introduced into, or otherwise 
applied to the human body ... for cleansing, beautifying, promoting attractiveness, or 
altering the appearance." 
Drugs are defined in §201 (g), as "articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease" and "articles (other than food) intended to 
affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals." 
UK law suggests a similar intention for the definition as the USA wording, but the wording 
is more precise. The Cosmetic Products (Safety) Regulations 2004, consider cosmetics 
to be n[a]ny substance or preparation intended to be placed in contact with any part of the 
external surfaces of the human body (that is to say, the epidermis, hair system, nails, lips 
and external genital organs), or with the teeth and the mucous membranes of the oral 
cavity with a view exclusively or mainly to cleaning them, perfuming them, changing their 
appearance, protecting them, keeping them in good condition or correcting body odours 
except where such cleaning, perfuming, protecting, changing, keeping, or correcting is 
wholly for the purpose of treating or preventing disease." 
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accessibility we are considering the degree to which supply of a therapy 
approaches demand. 
Consider that approximately 20 to 30 per cent of women with breast 
cancer have amplification and over expression of the HER2 gene. 39 In 
HER2-positive metastatic disease trastuzumab (Herceptin) is observed to 
achieve a clinical response in approximately 35% of patients as first line 
treatment40 and significantly prolongs survival when used in combination 
with Docetaxel41 and Paclitaxel42 .43 Patients with HER-2 positive invasive 
breast cancer who receive trastuzumab treatment have a 50 per cent 
decrease in the risk of breast cancer recurrence compared with patients 
39 Siamon OJ, Clark GM, Wong SG, et al. Human breast cancer: correlation of relapse 
and survival with amplification of the HER-2/neu oncogene. Science 1987 Jan 9; 235 
(4785): 177-82.; Ross JS, Fletcher JA. HER2/neu (c-erb-B2) gene and protein in breast 
cancer. Am J Clin Pathol. 1999; 112 (suppI1):S53-S67.; Harries M, Smith I. The 
development and clinical use of trastuzumab (Herceptin). Endocr Relat Cancer 9: 75-85, 
2002. 
40 Vogel, C. L., Cobleigh, M. A., Tripathy, D., et a/. Efficacy and safety of trastuzumab as 
a single agent in first-line treatment of HER2-overexpressing metastatic breast cancer. J 
Clin Onco12002; 20:719-726. 
41 Extra J-M., Cognetti F., Maraninchi, D., et a/. Long-term survival demonstrated with 
trastuzumab plus docetaxel: 24-month data from a randomised trial (M77001) in HER2-
positive metastatic breast cancer. American Society for Clinical Oncology (ASCO) 2005; 
Abstract 555. 
42 Siamon, D. J., Leyland-Jones, B., Shak, S .• et a/. Use of chemotherapy plus a 
monoclonal antibody against HER2 for metastatic breast cancer that overexpresses 
HER2. (2001) 344 NEJM 783-792 
43 National Cancer Research Institute. 'UK Clinical Guidelines for the Use of Adjuvant 
Trastuzumab (Herceptin®) With or Following Chemotherapy in HER2-positive Early 
Breast Cancer.' (14 December 2005). Available at: 
<http://www.dh.gov.uklassetRooU04/12/63/84/04126384.pdf> 
42 
who receive the same chemotherapy without trastuzumab. 44 However, A 
150mg vial of Herceptin powder costs the NHS £407.40 GBP and a private 
buyer considerably more. 2mg per kg of the patient's body weight are 
required each week for the course of the treatment. 45 In 2005 the annual 
cost of Herceptin treatment was around £20,000 GBP per person46 and 
who should pay for provision of the drug has raised some controversy.47 
Roche, who market Herceptin internationally, reported a 48 per cent 
increase in Herceptin sales for 2005 with Herceptin sales generating 2.15 
44 National Cancer Institute. 'Herceptin® Combined With Chemotherapy Improves 
Disease-Free Survival for Patients With Early-Stage Breast Cancer.' Available at: 
<http://www.cancer.gov/newscenter/pressreleases/HerceptinCombination2005> (Last 
Accessed: 1st July 2009); Piccart-Gebhart M, Procter M, Leyland-Jones B, et al. A 
Randomized Trial of Trastuzumab Following Adjuvant Chemotherapy in Women with 
HER2 Positive Breast Cancer. New England Journal of Medicine 353:16 2005. 
45 MIMS May 2005, 351 
46 BBC.co.uk. 'Drug refusal "a death sentence'" Available at: 
<http://news.bbc.co.ukl1/hi/health/4677086.stm> (Last Accessed: 1 st July 2009) 
47 Trastuzumab has continued to demonstrate significant improvement in disease free 
and overall survival in women with surgically removed, high-risk HER-2/neu-positive 
breast cancer. However, Trastuzumab is expensive, it is additive, and although it 
produces statistically significantly improved therapeutic outcomes compared to other 
pharmaceuticals for treating breast cancer, those other pharmaceuticals are cheaper. 
Thus, in most countries, including those where pharmaceutical prices are substantially 
controlled (including the UK), Trastuzumab is not considered cost-effective. For a good 
review consider Neyt M., Albrecht J., Clarysse B., Cocquyt V. Cost-effectiveness of 
'Herceptin: A standard cost model for breast-cancer treatment in a Belgian university 
hospitaL' (2005) 21 Int J. of Technology Assessment in Health Care.132-137. (Belgium 
follows UK pharmaceutical pricing.) The significant exception is Canada where 
Trastuzumab is considered cost effective. Hedden L., O'Reilly 5., Lohrisch C., Chia 5., 
Speers C., Kovacic L., Taylor 5., Peacock S., 'Assessing the real-world cost-
effectiveness of adjuvant trastuzumab in her-2/neu positive breast cancer.' (2012) 17(2) 
Oncologist. 164-171. However, Canadian drug practice guidelines limit Trastuzumab to 
one treatment cycle. Thereafter recurring breast carcinomas can only be treated with 
Trastuzumab at the patient's own expense. 
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billion Swiss francs (£0.94 billion GBp48). 49 Together with oseltamivir 
(Tamiflu), Herceptin sales were responsible for a large portion of Roche's 
2005 profits. 50 By 2009 the annual cost of Herceptin treatment had risen 
to around £87,000 GBP per person.51 Its high price is morally repugnant 
considering the input of government funds into the breakthrough research 
and some phase trials. 52 
By 2006 the price of prescription drugs for the treatment of cancer 
increased by nearly 16% from the 2005 prices.53 However, cancer drugs 
are not the only pharmaceuticals to have undergone a phenomenal price 
increase. 54 
48 1 Switzerland Francs;;:; 0.435518 GBP. Mid-market rates as of 26 February 2006 
21 :39:29 UTe 
49 Roche Annual Report 2005, Part2 : Financial Report. Page 6. 
http://www.roche.com/fb05e.pdf; Greil, A. 'Roche Posts Strong Sales, Operating Profit for 
2005.' DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, 1 February 2006. Available at: 
<http://www.natap.org/2006/newsUpdates/010206_03.htm> (Last Accessed: 1st July 
2009) 
50 Roche Annual Report 2005, Part 2: Financial Report. Page 6. Available at: 
<http://www.roche.com/fb05e.pdf> (Last Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
51 MIMS May 2010,357 
52 See, Love, J., 'NIH funded research involving trastuzumab (marketed by Roche under 
the trade name Herceptin), Knowledge Ecology International 13th December 2010. 
Available at: <http://keionline.org/node/1 031 > (Last accessed 22 February 2011) 
53 Szabo, L., 'Prices soar for cancer drugs' (10 July 2006) USA TODA Y. Available at: 
<http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2006-07-10-cancer-costs_x.htm> (Last 
Accessed: 1 sl July 2009) 
54 Government Accountability Office (USA), Brand-Name Prescription Drug Pricing: Lack 
of Therapeutically Equivalent Drugs and Limited Competition May Contribute to 
Extraordinary Price Increases [Government Accountability Office, December 2009, 
Washington] 9. Congressional investigators found that amongst the 416 branded 
medicines they reviewed from 2000 to 2008, 357 increased in price between 100 to 499 
per cent and 26 pharmaceuticals underwent price increases that exceeded 1,000 per 
44 
" ... drug makers have typically defended high prices by ... the cost of 
developing new medicines. But executives ... are now using a 
separate argument - citing the inherent value of life-sustaining 
therapies. If society wants the benefits, they say, it must be ready to 
spend more for treatments ... ,,55 
i.6. Incentive as Impunity 
The vast profitability of pharmaceuticals creates considerable expectation 
amongst shareholders, whom are the principal concern for all companies. 
As a result of the specialist knowledge, research and clinical trailing 
required to arrive at a pharmaceutical product, coupled with the way the 
present investigative and regulatory system interlinks with these process 
there is a large degree of trust in the data that is provided by parties with a 
cent. Note: the report is focused on Branded rather than patented medicines and some of 
the medicines considered were out of patent. However all of the pharmaceuticals 
exceeding 1,000 increases achieved those increases whilst under patent. In particular 
the nine drugs that achieved 2,000 per cent price increases between 2000 and 2008 were 
under patent. 
" ... price increases for common brand name and specialty prescription drugs continued to 
increase substantially despite a negative rate of general inflation for all consumer goods 
and services. In contrast, prices for common generic drugs have declined, albeit at a 
slower rate than in the previous year." at page 5 in, AARP Public Policy Institute. Rx 
Watchdog Report: Drug Prices Continue to Climb Despite Lack of Growth in General 
Inflation Rate (2009). E-Publication. Available at: 
<http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/health-care/i3S-watchdog.pdf> (Last Accessed: 15 
January 2010) 
55 Berenson, A., 'A Cancer Drug Shows Promise, at a Price That Many Can't Pay' (15 
February 200S) New York Times. Available at: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/200S/02/15/business/15drug.html> (Last Accessed: 1 st July 
2009) 
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great bias in the outcome. In consequence, this engenders vast risks, 
questionable decisions and secrecy with deplorable consequences. The 
vast risk, however, is most poignant for the person taking the medicine 
and economically perhaps the insurer.56 
For example, for years Merck insisted that the cardiovascular risks posed 
by its arthritis drug,57 Vioxx, were small. Vioxx was a blockbuster drug 
with annual sales of $2.5 billion USD. All of this was despite the fact that 
Merck's researchers had reported, in internal company e-mails and 
documents, that Vioxx increased the risk of cardiac events. 58 It was not 
until August 2004, when Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and other 
researchers59 reported the increased cardiovascular risk posed by Vioxx 
56 Art 7(e) European Council Directive (EEC) 85/374 imposes strict liability for defective 
products, through the enabling act §4(1)(e) of the Consumer Protection Act 1987; see 
European Commission v United Kingdom (Case C-300/95). The 'defence of the state of 
scientific and technical knowledge at the time when the product in question' is retained as 
an objective defence. In contrast liability in the USA for pharmaceuticals is absolute on 
the part of the producer. However, considering the burdens this has placed on the 
insurance sector there has been a swing towards the European standard of strict liability 
and the former USA position. See Priest, G. L. The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern 
Tort Law' (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 1521 at 1589; Olson v. Artic Enter., 349 F. Supp. 
761, 765 (D.N.D. 1972). 
57 Drug, medicine and pharmaceutical are used synonymously. Drug does not refer to 
illegal narcotic substances taken otherwise than medicinally. 
58 Mathews, A. W.; Martinez, B., "Warning Signs: E-Mails Suggest Merck Knew Vioxx's 
Dangers at Early Stage; As Heart-Risk Evidence Rose, Officials Played Hardball; Internal 
Message: 'Dodge!'; Company Says 'Out of Context'" Wall Street Journal (Eastern edition), 
November 1,2004: A1 
Martinez, B. 'Merck's Woes Grow As Credit Rating Is Put on Watch' The Wall Street 
Journal. November 2, 2004: A3 
59 Memorandum from David J. Graham, MD, MPH, Associate Director for SCience, Office 
of Drug Safety to Paul Seligman, MD, MPH, Acting Director, Office of Drug Safety 
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and suggested that Vioxx could be responsible for as many as 27,000 
heart attacks, that Merck withdrew its drug.5o Unfortunately, this is not an 
isolated occurrence.51 It would be in the interest of society, i.e. natural 
persons, if all data on a medicine being administered or about to be 
administered to people were made available to the public. Unfortunately, 
such a requirement might allow competitors to develop competitive 
treatments based on the same chemical or substantially improve the 
chemical's performance, and might also reduce the size of a market by 
preventing companies from selling drugs to people who do not need 
them.62 
Surprisingly drugs are too frequently sold to people who do not need 
them.63 The FDA approved Neurontin for the treatment of epilepsy. 
entitled, "Risk of Acute Myocardial Infarction and Sudden Cardiac Death in Patients 
Treated with COX-2 Selective and Non-Selective NSAIDs," September 30,2004 
60 Cafferty, P., Families USA, Big PhRMA Behaving Badly: A Survey of Selected Class 
Action Lawsuits Against Drug Companies [Families USA, January 2005, Washingtonj2 
61 For example, when Eli Lilly's internal Zyprexa documentation was ordered disclosed 
following many thousand of time bared legal actions and a class action, the documents 
show that Lilly had promoted a drug against the advice of their experts. whom warned 
about its toxic effects, in particular Zyprexa's propensity to induce acute weight gain 
triggering metabolic syndrome and diabetes. See UFCW Local 1776 and Participating 
Employers Health and Welfare Fund v. Eli Lilly and Co., No. 05-CV-4115, (U.S. District 
Court, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn. 25 August 2005); The grounds of the suit 
were Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (Federal District Court Fillings and 
Dockets. Available at: <http://dockets.justia.com/docket/court-nyedce/case_no-
1 :2005cv04115/case_id-247732/> (Last Accessed: 1 st July 2009) 
62 In 2005 Pfizer withdrew Bextra and agreed to pay $2.3 billion USD for the fraudulent 
marketing of Bextra and three other drugs. See. Harris. G., 'Pfizer Pays $2.3 Billion to 
Settle Marketing Case' (3'd September 2009) New York Times B4 
63 For an interesting example of drugs that have been marketed for people to whom they 
convey no therapeutic benefit consider, Pfizer's medicine Lyrica designated as a 
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However, Parke-Davis64 may have considered the epilepsy market too 
small for Neurontin to generate desired profits. Thus, Parke-Davis 
surreptitiously promoted Neurontin for many other conditions including Lou 
Gehrig's disease, bipolar disorder, seizures, attention deficit disorder, drug 
and alcohol withdrawal seizures, migraine headaches and restless leg 
syndrome.65 Minor considerations, such as the placebo being more 
effective than Neurontin, could be ignored where off-label uses increased 
Neurontin sales by 90 per cent to over $1 billion USD per annum.66 Where 
use of a medicine for a specific condition is not approved by the FDA it is 
contrary to USA law to misbrand a drug, 67 id est include information about 
a drug's unapproved uses, 68 which would include advertising off-label 
uses to consumers. Physicians, however, are able to prescribe a drug for 
treatment for Fibromyalgia, a pain condition that is unresponsive to traditional analgesia 
medicines, such as asparin. Fibromyalgia is a disease whose existence is questionable. 
See Berenson, A., 'Drug Approved. Is Disease Real?' (14 January 2008) New York 
Times. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/14/health/14pain.html?> (Last 
Accessed: 1 st July 2009) 
64 Which was acquired by Pfizer in the purchase of Warner-Lambert in 2000. See, Pfizer 
History. Available at: <http://www.pfizer.com/aboutlhistory/pfizer _ warneUambert.jsp> 
(Last Accessed Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
65 Farrell, G., 'Pfizer settles fraud case for $430 million' (13 May 2004, updated 14 May 
2004) USA Today. Available at: 
<http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/drugs/2004-05-13-pfizer_x.htm> (Last 
Accessed: 1 st July 2009) 
66 Pfizer's reported revenue for 2001 on Neurontin sales was $1.75 billion USD. Which 
placed it as Pfizer's 4th best selling drug. In 2002 Pfizer's reported revenue for Neurontin 
sales was $2.27 billion. Reports available at: 
<www.pfizer.com/files/annualreportl200 1lfinancial/financial200 1. pdf> and 
<www.pfizer.comlfiles/annualreportl2002/financiallfinanciaI2002.pdf> 
67 § 331(a); § 352(a); see Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 348-50 (1948) 
68
21 U.S.C. §§ 331(z) Prohibited acts; 360aaa Requirements for dissemination of 
treatment information on drugs or devices; et sequentiB. 
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off-label uses.59 Aware of this, Parke-Davis concealed and misstated 
clinical information concerning the ability of Neurontin to treat off-label 
conditions. Furthermore, it sponsored ghost written medical articles, and 
paid millions of USD to physicians to promote Neurontin.7o 
"Warner-Lambert's promotional efforts were a highly organized and 
deliberate attempt to circumvent federal restrictions on 
marketing,,,71 
In January 2011, Pfizer was ordered to pay damages of $142.1 million 
USD for the illegal promotion of Neurontin for unapproved uses.72 
Surprisingly taking account of Pfizer's payouts for improperly marketing 
off-label uses from August 2008 to February 2011, including the $2.3 
billion USD settlement in 2009,73 these fines are less than 0.3 per cent of 
69 Physicians may prescribe legal drugs for any purpose that they consider appropriate, 
regardless of whether the drug has been approved for that purpose by the FDA. See 
Citizen Petition Regarding the Food and Drug Administration's Policy on Promotion of 
Unapproved Drugs and Devices, Request for Comments, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,820, 59,821 
(1994). 
70 Cafferty, P., Families USA, Big PhRMA Behaving Badly: A Survey of Selected Class 
Action Lawsuits Against Drug Companies [Families USA, January 2005, Washington] 1 
71 Associate Attorney General McCallum, reported in: Anonymous 'Pfizer to Plead Guilty 
to Illegal Marketing' (14 May 2004) Los Angeles Times C-3 
72 Feeley, J., Lawrence, J., 'Pfizer to Pay $142.1 Million Over Neurontin Marketing' (28th 
January 2011) Bloomberg. Available at: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-
28/pfizer-ordered-to-pay-142-1-million-in-damages-over-neurontin-marketing. html> (Last 
Accessed 12'h March 2011) 
73 Pfizer's $2.3 billion USD settlement of criminal and civil damages for illegally marketing 
Bextra amounted to less than three weeks of Pfizer's sales. See, Harris, G., 'Pfizer Pays 
$2.3 Billion to Settle Marketing Case' (3rd September 2009) New York Times B4 
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the revenue those products generated.74 With an estimated net profit 
margin of between 16.82 and 14.84 per cenes in amoral terms it is easy to 
see the incentive for expanding markets beyond those who can benefit 
from medicines.76 
i.7. Property as Incentive 
Illicit practices are frequent in the pharmaceutical industry and, where 
substantial profits are involved, a fine or compensation can be little 
deterrent. 77 Perhaps further expansion of criminal sanctions to corporate 
law imposing culpability on the directors, chairman and chief executive 
officers of companies for the manslaughter and disability engendered by 
their company's behaviour might be appropriate. 78 Fines against the large 
74 Some of these fines derive from the companies acquired by Pfizer after the illegal 
marketing practices began. 
75 EBIT Financial Analyses Center, Pfizer Profitability Analysis from December 2007 to 
December 2011. 
76 For more examples see, Evans, D., 'Pfizer Broke the Law by Promoting Drugs for 
Unapproved Uses' (9th November 2009) Bloomberg. Available at: 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a4yV1 nYxCGoA> (Last 
accessed 22nd November 2009) 
77 It is difficult to find an example of where a pharmaceutical company is fined and where 
the fine is greater than the profits that the illegality engendered. 90 per cent of profits 
seems to be the largest penalty relative to profit publicly reported. The fines amounted to 
$634.5 million USD. Reported in: Meier, B., 'Big Part of OxyContin Profit Was 
Consumed by Penalties' (19 June 2007) New York Times. Available at: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007106/19/business/19drug.html> (Last Accessed: 1st July 
2009); Also reported at: Lohr, K., and Siegel, R., '$634 Million Fine, No Jail For 
OxyContin Executives' (10 Spetember 2008) NPR. Available at: 
<http://www.npr.org/templates/storylstory.php?storyld= 12131233> (Last Accessed: 1 st 
July 2009) 
78 Corporate manslaughter as a doctrine has grown significantly in importance over the 
last three decades, and has been formalised into some legal systems through legislation. 
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pharmaceutical companies probably do not make economic sense; as 
such actions are demanding on government (or state and federal budgets) 
and add to the coslof health care as the pharmaceutical company recoups 
its costs through other product monopolies, some of which will be financed 
by government and insurance companies. In consequence it could be 
inferred that it is the consumer who loses out three-fold, that is from the 
cost of the governmenUconsumer action, the harm of the illegal practice 
and the fine. 
If society has a normative morality, which the existence of legislation 
aimed at safety suggests, then the pharmaceutical patent as an incentive 
to self-interest is in contention with that morality. This can be seen 
through Hume. 
Hume held self-interest to be the motive for inventing property and the 
principal reason for human action?9 In Hume's opinion the mutual interest 
of individuals, and thus society, lay in the formulation of strategies that 
channel passions in directions deemed socially constructive. Through 
social rules, conventions and customs that are internalised to a society by 
For example, in the UK: Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. 
However, the effectiveness of enacted corporate manslaughter provisions curbing 
dangerous illegal practices, in the presence of the large incentives available from 
pharmaceutical profits, is unlikely and remains to be demonstrated. 
79 Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature: Being An Attempt to introduce the 
experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. Book III: Of Morals, Part I: Of 
virtue and vice in general, Section II: Of the origin of justice and property. ~£N ,-
its members, can activity be directed towards socially useful objectives.8o 
Without a concerted construction of a social order Hume considered that 
there would be murderous chaos. 81 By contrast, Rousseau recognised the 
need for social order,82 but was also a passionate advocate of individual 
freedom. He rejected the notion of final sovereignty of the individual will 
and saw legislation as the product of the general will of the moral person 
rather than an aggregation of separate wills.83 Thus, according to 
Rousseau civilisation, most notably the introduction of property is 
responsible for introducing evil into the world. 84 Hume shared Rousseau's 
view by holding that the human nature is a vessel of strife; a conflict of 
humanity on the one hand and 'avarice and greed' on the other. 85 This 
conception should be held in mind throughout the thesis as the problems 
80 Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature: Being An Attempt to introduce the 
experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. Book III: Of Morals. Part I: Of 
virtue and vice in general. Section II: Of the origin of justice and property. 
81 See Hobbes. who held that since there are no natural bonds of unity between 
individuals orderly life is only possible when all become subject to a supreme and 
absolute authority. Leviathan. Pt. Ch 13. 
82 For different reasons than Hobbes, in that Rousseau considered by giving oneself to 
all, one gives oneself to no one. Thus, each member of a sovereign becomes an 
indivisible part of the whole, whereas, Hobbes' absolute Leviathan exists as a separate 
body politic from those whom it governs. 
83 Du Contrat Social, Books I-II 
84 Both Russeau and Hume's writings indicate a link between ethics and feelings. Kant 
rejects their position by advocating objective 'pure moral law.' which is independent of all 
inclinations or feelings. The difficulty with Kant's proposition is the question of identifying 
the 'pure moral law.' Kant contends that only by rationality devoid of all sentiment and 
feeling can the 'pure moral law' be found. The difficulty I see with the Kantian perspective 
is proving rationality can be pure. After all. how were the first principles of rationalism 
derived? 
85 Hume. Enquiries concerning human understanding and concerning the prinCiples of 
morals, (Re-printed) [Clarendon Press. 3rd Ed .. 2002, Oxford] 
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of the patent system are raised and the interests of the parties resisting 
improvement to the availability and accessibility of medicines are 
identified. Indeed pharmaceutical innovation and the pharmaceutical 
patent present a clear instance of the conflict between societal morality 
and avarice. Moreover, if social morality ought to be indicated by 
legislation then considering the extent of legislators' vested interests in 
property rights over pharmaceutical inventions there is a serious need for 
political reform to allow legislation to converge with morality. Rousseau's 
view of civilisation is not entirely pessimistic. He believed that the product 
of the general will of the moral person, i.e. civilisation, could be a 
progressive force capable of elevating the ethical life of the individual. 
Thus, it can be hoped that the current political bias towards avarice and 
greed is transient. 
i.8. Without Incentive 
It is possible that there are many medicines that we do not have as a 
consequence of channelling pharmaceutical innovation through the patent 
system and thus the creation of artificial scarcity. The artificial scarcity, or 
in the case of most pharmaceuticals a monopoly, permits inefficient 
methods of innovation to be sustained. The monopoly distorts allocation 
and increases expense. In a very simplistic description, if the total money 
available for innovation within the system had been put into research in the 
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absence of monopolies, i.e. in a system of greater efficiency, it follows that 
more innovation would result. 86 
In some areas a comparatively small investment might yield considerable 
gains to human longevity and quality of life. For the diseases and 
conditions endemic to the World's poorest populations there are in many 
cases no available medicines. Between 1975 and 1999, about 1393 new 
chemical entities (NCEs) were marketed.87 Only 13, less than 1 % of these 
medicines have been for tropical infectious diseases. 88 Moreover, most of 
these 13 were developed to satisfy military or veterinary applications of 
interest to developed nations. 89 Only three were the result of a genuine 
86 Evidently more capital in the absence of improved or stable efficiency does not 
guarantee greater quantities of useful research. It has been shown however that historic 
lessons applied even within the constraints of the patent system can generate efficiency 
gains. Thus although we cannot use increases in research funding within the USA to 
demonstrate that more investment in research and development means more NCEs, we 
can use European data. See Light, D., 'Global Drug Discovery: Europe Is Ahead' (2009) 
28(5) Health Affairs 969-977. By historic lesson we refer to the change in research 
paradigm of the Nineteenth Century German Dyestuff Industry and the move from the 
highly skilled individual researcher to the collaborative efforts of many less experienced 
researchers. See Section 1.2.1 New Research Paradigm. 
87 Torreele, E. (Free University of Brussels, Belgium) "crisis of neglected diseases" 
conference 14 March 2002 New York, USA. See, Nelson, K. 'Stimulating research in the 
most neglected diseases' (2002) 359(9311) Lancet 1042; Smith, D., Binet, L., Bonnevie, 
L, Hakokongas, L., Meybaum, J., Fatal Imbalance: The Crisis in Research and 
Development for Drugs for Neglected Diseases' [DND Working Group, 2001, Editions 
Europeennes, Brussels, Belgium] 11 
88 Trouiller, P., Olliario, P., Torreele, E., Orbinski, J., Laing, R., et al. 'Drug Development 
for neglected diseases: A deficient market and a Public health-policy failure' (2002) 
359(9324) Lancet 2188-2194 
89 Torreele, E. (Free University of Brussels, Belgium) "crisis of neglected diseases" 
conference 14 March 2M2 New York, USA. See, Nelson, K. 'Stimulating research in the 
most neglected diseases' (2002) 359(9311) Lancet 1042; Smith, D., Binet, L., Bonnevie, 
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effort to create drugs for neglected diseases.9o The diseases of the world's 
poorest people seem to have little significance in the scheme of current 
innovation priorities. A survey in 2000 by the Pharmaceutical Research 
and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) indicates that out of the 137 
medicines in development for infectious diseases, sleeping sickness and 
malaria were only mentioned once.91 In Africa over 60 million people are 
at risk from sleeping sickness and 500,000 are afflicted.92 The disease is 
spread by the bites of infected tsetse flies and prevention technologies 
have not improved since before the fourteenth century. Prevention still 
' ... depends largely upon avoiding the bites of tsetse flies.'93 Who pays for 
the innovation of pharmaceuticals for the poorest populations and how that 
research ought to be undertaken is of considerable controversy.94 Whilst 
L, Hakokongas, L., Meybaum, J., Fatal Imbalance: The Crisis in Research and 
Development for Drugs for Neglected Diseases' [DND Working Group, 2001, Editions 
Europeennes, Brussels, Belgium] 11. 
90 Above. 
91 Smith, D., Binet, L., Bonnevie, L, Hakokongas, L., Meybaum, J., 'Fatal Imbalance: The 
Crisis in Research and Development for Drugs for Neglected Diseases' [DND Working 
Group, 2001, Editions Europeennes, Brussels, Belgium] 12 
92 Smith, D., Binet, L., Bonnevie, L, Hakokongas, L., Meybaum, J., 'Fatal Imbalance: The 
Crisis in Research and Development for Drugs for Neglected Diseases' [DND Working 
Group, 2001, Editions Europeennes, Brussels, Belgium] 8 
93 Wyatt, G., 'Sleeping Sickness' in Dawood, R. (ed.) Travel/er's Health: How to Stay 
Healthy Abroad [Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed., 1 st Reprint, 1992, Oxford] 132-133 
94 Increasingly over the last decade there have been initiatives by governments, industry, 
and organisations such as the World Health Organisation, World Bank and United 
Nations Development Program to stimulate interest in tropical disease research. 
Jamison, T., Breman, J., Measham, A., Alleyne, G., et al. (Eds.) Disease Control Priorities 
in Developing Countries [The International Bank for Reconstruction I The World Bank, 
2006, 2
nd 
Ed., Washington DC] 146. In the USA, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) Amendments Act of 2007 introduced drug vouchers for companies that developed 
pharmaceuticals for infectious diseases that disproportionately affect poor populations in 
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this thesis addresses the issues of accessibility of medicines in the least 
economically wealthy countries, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
resolve all the issues concerning availability of medicines within those 
countries. 95 Although it is hoped that the suggested reforms in Chapter 5 
will facilitate the establishment of local pharmaceutical research that would 
prioritise local diseases.96 
So far we have defined our essential terms and raised the moral issue of 
how the pharmaceutical patent system skews legislation and innovation 
initiatives from morality towards self-interest.97 However, we have not 
illustrated the cost of that self-interest. We shall do that now with a few 
examples. 
i.9. Health is Important 
Kaletra is a protease inhibitor that can be used to treat people with HIV. In 
2002, Abbott, Kaltera's owner, was rapidly losing share of the protease 
inhibitor market to competitors. Norvir, another of Abbott's drugs, was 
developing countries. A voucher entitles the company to one expedited FDA review of 
another of its new drug applications. 
95 It is notable that pharmaceutical industries have seeded and developed more quickly in 
countries where pharmaceutical patents were weak, unenforced or inexistent. See, 
Boldrin, M., and Levine, D., The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly, Chapter 9' 3-5 
96 Even if disease endemic to the poor people were not the subject of research, 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capability may develop locally. Consider the situation in 
India prior to 2003. See, Lanjouw, J. 0., The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product 
Patents in India: "Heartless Exploitation of the Poor and Suffering?'" (1998) NBER 
Working Paper No. W6366: at 9. 
97 Examples of the vested interests of significant political figures and parties are given in 
Section 3.3.11. Hired Help Or Insiders. 
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beset with very serious side effects if used by itself as a protease inhibitor. 
However, it was found that when administered concurrently in small doses 
with other protease inhibitors that the combination dramatically improved 
the antiviral effect against even very resistant HIV strains. As a result, 
Norvir quickly become an important component in most protease inhibitor 
therapies. Which Abott saw as an opportunity to use Norvir to raise the 
cost of Kaltera's competitor medicines, thereby improve the attractiveness 
of Kaletra. Abbott implemented its strategy in December 2003,98 when it 
raised the wholesale price of Norvir from $205.74 to $1,028.71 USD for 
120 100mg capsules, a 500 per cent price increase.99 The results were 
dramatic. 10o Table 1. presents the price increases of annual Norvir doses 
required in conjunction with other protease inhibitors. 101 
98 A useful collection of documents relating to Norvir is available at the Consumer Project 
on Technology. Available at: <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/aids/norvir.html> 
99 Which would no doubt have a great impact on profits. See The Advocate, 'Industry 
analysts say Norvir price hike will double profits.' June 10, 2004. Available at: 
<http://www.advocate.com/new_news.asp?ID=12732&sd=06/11/04> (Last Accessed: 1st 
July 2009) 
100 See <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/aids/norvir.html> (Last Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
101 Pharmaceutical prices outside the USA are more constrained because of price 
controls. Nevertheless there was widespread fear that a European price increase would 
follow the American one. 
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TABLE 1. Annual increase in the price of Norvir, as a booster for protease 


















Kaletra's appeal with regard to pricing was considerably improved against 
competitor therapies. Many patients unable to afford the new prices were 
forced to switch from competitors' therapies to Kaletra. 103 Abbott 
increased its profits. However, changing an antiviral therapy in mid-course 
can have serious health risks, as well as undermining the effectiveness of 
a treatment. 104 In November 2004 the Illinois state court dismissed a class 
102 Alcorn, K., 'Ritonavir price increase: what are the consequences in 2004? 
Consequences for competitors,'18 December 2003. Avaiable at: 
<http://www.aidsmap.com/en/news/1 E63C821-27 5E-45C2 -95BC-6F6B99F38D54. asp> 
(Last Accessed: 1st July 2009); Cafferty, P., Families USA, Big PhRMA Behaving Badly: A 
Survey of Selected Class Action Lawsuits Against Drug Companies [Families USA, 
January 2005, Washington] 2 
103 "Price of AIDS Drug Soars Fivefold" Seattle Times,S January 2004. 
104 For example see, Levin, L., 'Changing antiretroviral therapy in paediatric patients' 
(2005) 6(4) Southern African Journal of HIV Medicine 38-42 
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action challenging the price increase,105 holding that the patent for Norvir 
essentially entitled Abbott to charge any price it wished. 106 
i.10. Research is Important 
Perhaps, commercial research and development and clinical testing are 
not the most effective method of generating and enabling access to new 
medicines. If the majority of funds, after manufacture, obtained from the 
sale of a pharmaceutical were re-allocated to research and development 
and clinical testing then there may be an argument for the present 
innovation regime. However, since there is substantial allocation of funds 
to activities unconnected to research and development and clinical testing 
that significantly increase the cost of a medicine, and therefore access to 
that medicine, there is a strong argument for regime change. 
"In 1994, estimates of [research and development] spending as a 
percentage of sales were 12 - 19 per cent in the pharmaceutical sector, 
compared to an overall U.S. industrial average of 3.5 percent. ,,107 
105 Nelson, R., 'Debate over the ritonavir price increase gains momentum: Critics seek to 
reverse the fivefold price hike through legal action and boycott of Abott's products' (24 
April 2004) 363 The Lancet 1369 
106 Gingreau v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 04 CH 8202, Memorandum and Order (Cook 
County Circuit Court, Nov. 12,2004). This is interesting because the price difference of 
Norvir between Abbott's Kaletra and when used in combination with competitor therapies 
could have constituted monopoly leveraging with respect to 15 U.S.C.§2 Sherman Act. 
Following Schor v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 05-3344 (7th Cir. 2006) and the Supreme 
Court decision in Pacific Bell Telephone Co v. Linkline Communications Inc. (2009) this is 
no longer likely. 
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Where R·D·CT represents research, development and clinical testing 
Figure 1. Depicts a historical relative allocation of revenues by several of 
the world's largest pharmaceutical companies. 109 As will be seen 
107 The Boston Consulting Group, Sustaining Innovation in U.S. Pharmaceuticals: 
Intellectual Property Protection and the Role of Patents (Jan. 1996) at 22. Requested 
from: http://www.bcg.com/ 
108 Data derived from the USA Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings for the 
companies: Pfizer Inc, Johnson & Johnson, Merck & Co. Inc., Abbott Laboratories, 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, Wyeth, and Eli Lilly and Company. Sectors represent the 
mean expenditures by these companies over a four year period. 
109 My assessment is supported by Gagnon and Lexchin, who used 2004 data sourced 
from the market research company CAM (part of the Cegedim Group) and the consulting 
group IMS Health on the companies Merck, Pfizer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly, Aventis, 
Sanofi-Synthelabo, AstraZeneca, and Wyeth to compare marketing and research 
allocations. See, Gagnon, M-A., Lexchin, J., 'The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate 
of Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States,' (2008) 5(1) PLoS Med. 
Available at: 
<http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/1 0.1371 Ijournal.pmed.0050001 > (Last 
Accessed 7th April 2010). Another report using 1996-2004 data that considers revenue 
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research, development and clinical testing has the least allocation of 
revenues. Marketing receives at least twice the allocation of revenues as 
research, development and clinical testing. 11o Revenue allocations to 
Research and Development within the large pharmaceutical companies 
may be further reduced by the dearth of new blockbuster drugs as 
companies direct more resources to diversifying assets, purchasing 
companies or patents and rent-seeking behaviour. For example in 
February 2011, Pfizer reduced its research budget to 6.5 billion USD, 
which is estimated to be between 10 to 11 percent of Pfizer's 2012 
revenue. 111 
allocation to more activities is, Lauzon, L-P., Hasbani, M., 'Analyse economique: industrie 
pharmaceutique mondiale pour la periode de dix ans 1996-2005. Montreal: Chaire 
d'etudes socio-economiques de I'UQAM, 2006. Available at: 
<http://www.cese.uqam.ca/pdflrec_06jndustrie_pharma.pdf> (Last Accessed: 13th 
February 2011) 
110 2005 to 2010 data is not included due to a discontinuity in the trend data resulting from 
the increased tendency of pharmaceutical companies to outsource research and to 
purchase smaller pharmaceutical companies with marketable product portfolios. As a 
result this data may be unreflective of current revenue allocation. To produce an 
equivalent table for the period 2005-2010 requires data that is not available from the USA 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings for the companies: Pfizer Inc, 
Johnson & Johnson, Merck & Co. Inc., Abbott Laboratories, Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Company, Wyeth, and Eli Lilly and Company. Further complications include the creation 
of subsidiaries as unlimited companies, which can be used to effectively hide financial 
information. For example, Janssen Pharmaceutical, a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, 
which has been re-registered as an unlimited company. Carswell, S., 'Janssen move 
keeps financial affairs private' (16th August 2008) Irish Times. Available at: 
<http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/finance/2008/0816/1218748038117.html> (Last 
Accessed: 1 st July 2009). 
111 Pfizer Press Release 1st February 2011: Pfizer Reports Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year 
2010 Results; Provides 2011 Financial Guidance and Updates 2012 Financial Targets. 
Available at: 
<http://www.pfizer.com/news/press_releases/pfizer _press _releases.jsp#guid=20 1102010 
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i.11. Others can do it 
In addition to the cost of pharmaceuticals a substantial proportion of the 
breakthrough science, and development of new drugs is achieved by 
government, university, non-profit, and public/private groups. However, 
the structure of the pharmaceutical market, the requirements for the 
presentation of data for safety approval, and the cost of litigation contrive 
to place the majority of new drugs in the hands of private pharmaceutical 
companies. Given, the tendency of private research funds to be allocated 
to research on pharmaceuticals with relatively little incremental therapeutic 
value, but large profitability, publicly underwritten research remains 
extremely important. However, if government, university, non-profit, and 
public/private groups assign pharmaceuticals with great therapeutic value 
into private hands then many potential users will be excluded from life 
saving medicines developed by public funding. 
In 1967 a team working at the Research Triangle Park, in the USA, 
isolated an active ingredient from the bark of the Pacific Yew tree, Taxus 
Brevifolia. Assays of this active ingredient lead to the important results 
06166en&source=RSS:"2011 &page=17> (Last Accessed: 13th February 2011); Cressey, 
D., 'Pfizer slashes R&D - Drug-maker plans to cut jobs and spending as industry shies 
away from drug discovery' (2011) 470 Nature 154-155. Available at: 
<http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110209/fuIl/470154a.html> (Last Accessed: 13th 
February 2011) 
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published by Wanni, et al., in 1971.112 The active ingredient Dr. Wall 
named Taxol.113 It was to become an extremely effective anticancer 
agent. Public funding underwrote a substantial part of the Taxol research 
and the USA's National Institutes of Health (NIH), a publicly funded body, 
sponsored the three phase clinical trials necessary if the chemical was to 
have therapeutic application. 
In January 1991, during Phase III of its clinical trials the USA government 
signed a co-operative research and development agreement (CRADA) 
with Bristol Myers-Squibb for taxo!. The CRADA granted Bristol Myers-
Squibb the exclusive rights to all NIH funded Taxol research. In return 
Bristol Myers-Squibb agreed to provide the NIH with 17 kilograms of Taxol 
and use its 'best efforts' to commercia lise Taxo!. Bristol Myers-Squibb 
promptly entered into another CRADA with the USA Secretary of 
Agriculture granting Bristol Myers-Squibb exclusive rights to harvest 
Pacific Yew trees from Forest Service lands. The USA Department of the 
Interior entered a similar CRADA with Bristol Myers-Squibb for Pacific Yew 
trees on Bureau Land Management lands. By August, Bristol Myers-
Squibb had also established a contract with Hauser, the former 
government contractor, in which Hauser agreed to supply bulk Taxol to 
Bristol Myers-Squibb for about $0.25 USD/mg. 
112 Wani, M. C., Taylor, H.L., Wall, M. E., Coggon, P., McPhail, A. T. Plant antitumor 
agents. VI. The isolation and structure of taxol, a novel antileukemic and antitumor agent 
from Taxus brevifo/ia. (1971) 93(9) J Am Chern Soc. 2325-2327. 
113 Robinson, J., Prescription Games. [Simon and Schuster, 1st Ed., 2001, London] 108 
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By 1993, Bristol Myers-Squibb was demanding a wholesale price of $4.87 
USD/mg, which was about 10 times the price the NIH had been paying its 
contractor, and 19.5 times the amount Bristol Myers-Squibb was paying 
Hauser for bulk Taxol. Added to the mark-up by distributors and doctors 
this meant that some patients were paying more than $8 USD/mg for 
Taxol; 32 times Hauser's bulk supply rate. With its Taxol market 
exclusivity due to end in 1996 Bristol Myers-Squibb sought to prolong its 
control through a diversity of means. In 1997 two of these came to fruition 
when Bristol Myers-Squibb was awarded an exclusive right to a method of 
administering Taxol114 and Taxol orphan designation 115 for Kaposi's 
sarcoma indications. 116 
Orphan designation brought Bristol Myers-Squibb three major advantages: 
it granted Bristol Myers-Squibb seven years of marketing exclusivity for the 
orphan drug product; 117 tax incentives for clinical research undertaken; 
and funding to defray costs of qualified clinical testing expenses incurred 
in the development of the orphan prodUCt. 118 
114 USA Patent 5641803 
115 Orphan Medicinal status is available to medicines capable of providing benefit to 
especially rare conditions termed orphan diseases. It grants tax incentives and clinical 
research subsidies, as well as extended patent protection, data exclusivity extension and 
marketing rights. Regulation (EC) No 141/2000. 
116 Susannah Markandya, S., Love, J. 'Timeline of Paclitaxel disputes.' 23 August 2001. 
Available at: <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/taxolltaxol-timeline2001.html> (Last 
Accessed: 151 July 2009) 
117 Orphan Medicinal status marketing exclusivity is for 10 years in the European Union. 
Article 8(1) Regulation (EC) No 141/2000. 
118 USA Orphan Drug Act 1983 
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In September 2000, Bristol Myers-Squibb quoted $6.09 USO/mg as the 
Red Book average Taxol wholesale price. Less than a month earlier a 
Taxol producer had revealed that manufacturing Taxol cost $0.07 
USO/mg. For the same year Bristol Myers-Squibb reported annual Taxol 
sales of $1.592 billion USO.119 Given these figures it has been estimated 
that Bristol Myers-Squibb earnings on Taxol were $4 to $5 million USO per 
day.12o 
i.13. Where To Go 
The commercial regime of pharmaceutical innovation is in contrast to the 
'open source culture' in other fields that have clearly demonstrated the 
possibility of organising the work of thousands of collaborators and 
organisations across the globe to create and run large projects 
successfully. World health for both the rich and the poor may benefit from 
a global 'open source' research and development and clinical testing 
network. 121 High purchase costs may yield high profits to the patent 
holder, but pursuit Of profit engenders many problems. This thesis is 
essentially concerned with the misallocation that limits pharmaceutical 
availability and pharmaceutical access. At the root of the resource 
misallocation, and the key inhibitor of 'open source' pharmaceutical 
119 BMS SEC 10-K form for the year 2000. Available at: 
<http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/14272/000001427201500006/r10k1231.htm> 
(Last Accessed: 15t July 2009) 
120 Susannah Markandya, S., Love, J. 'Timeline of Paclitaxel disputes.' 23 August 2001. 
Available at: <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/taxol/taxol-timeline2001.html> (Last 
Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
121 This is discussed in Chapter 5 
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research is the pharmaceutical monopoly, of which the pharmaceutical 
patent is a key component. 122 
ii. Objectives and Parameters 
Our objective is to persuade that the patent system for pharmaceutical 
innovation poses significant problems for the availability, accessibility and 
safety of medicines. It will become clear that the adjustive purpose 123 of 
the pharmaceutical patent misallocates resources and retards innovation 
and availability of pharmaceuticals. It will also become apparent: that 
pharmaceutical patents impose a chaotic regime of drug development that 
is detrimental to global health strategies; that the pharmaceutical patent 
encourages development of drugs that sell in preference to drugs that 
pose therapeutic advances; that the pharmaceutical patent, i.e, innovation 
as property, is contrary to the objective of pharmaceutical innovation, and 
122 A criticism of the patent-is-monopoly arises from a perceived discrepancy "between 
theory and reality," It is suggested that a patent cannot generate a monopoly in reality 
because "hundreds of patents related to the very same topic would emerge in most 
cases," For pharmaceuticals this objection is difficult to sustain: Firstly, few chemicals 
posses bioequivalence and even when they do present differing responsivity in patients, 
Secondly, the "hundreds of patents" is the norm in the context of pharmaceuticals, 
Because of the potential value, both strategiC and monetary in potential products there is 
a strong interest in firmly closing off a "topic" to competition, Almost all of the significant 
patents will be held by relatively few firms and either by the corporate architecture of 
those firms or by their contractual undertakings will effectively be held by one hand, If the 
significant patents are distributed amongst competitive firms this is manifested on the 
market by the presence of me-toos. For an objection to the patent-is-monopoly consider, 
Pretnar, B" "Two sources of persisting patent controversy," 2005, Working Paper. 
Available at: <http://www,intertic,org/Policy Papers/Pretnar,pdf> (Last Accessed: 2 
December 2009) 
123 The patent restricts the application of patented knowledge, permitting the patent holder 
to demand rents for employment of the knowledge. Such rents would not otherwise be 
available. 
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thus is an inappropriate response to externalities; that the patent function 
statements are incoherent; that the patent system is an unnecessarily 
expensive method of generating innovation; and that recovery of 
innovation costs through the price of a manufactured drug is not a 
necessary condition of pharmaceutical innovation. 
We also search for justifications for the continued use of the present 
pharmaceutical patent system, which we identified above as a perceived 
dependence on a private pharmaceutical industry to innovate medicines. 
This perception must have an origin, either in history,124 practicality 125 or 
doctrine. 126 
On the subject of doctrine, as this is a legal thesis and we have already 
mentioned the economic properties of a right over the use of knowledge 
(patent) it is time to introduce the legal notion of a patent - the actio ius ius 
ad rem. In the Hohfeldian 127 sense the imposition of a patent grants the 
patent holder a right and imposes a duty on everyone else. The right 
granted to the patent holder is a quasi-property right in the inventive step 
of the patented pharmaceutical. The duty imposed on everyone else is to 
respect the patent holder's ownership of the inventive step. As a result the 
patent holder may have a degree of control over all pharmaceuticals 
124 Sections 1.1 to 1.3 
125 Sections 1.4 to 1.5 
126 Chapter 2 
127 Hohfeld, W. N., Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Juridical Reasoning 
and Other Legal Essays. Cook, W. W. (Ed.) [Yale University Press, 4th Printing, 1966, 
New Haven] 36 et sequentia. 
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incorporating the patented inventive step (product patent) and specified 
methods of utilising or producing the pharmaceutical (process patent). 128 
The control exerted is an actio ius ius ad rem, a right over the ius utendi 
fruendi abutendi. Thus, the patent is not a right over a physical or material 
object, but a right over a right, and is applicable whenever the patent 
imposed duty is breached, i.e. the patent is infringed. 
iii. Background Theory 
Surprisingly, the classical literature on patents is remarkably thin and of 
limited utility. As Priest quite bluntly and succinctly comments. 'The ratio 
of empirical demonstration to assumption in this literature must be very 
close to zero.'129 
The literature referred to is that of: Bentham (1795};130 Say (1834);131 Mill 
(1862};132 Clark (1907);133 Taussig (1915);134 Pigou (1920);135 Plant 
126 A clear practical example is Abbott's use of Norvir, see Gingreau v. Abbott 
Laboratories (2004); Schor v. Abbott Laboratories (2006). 
129 Priest, G. L., What Economist's Can Tell Lawyer's About Intellectual Property: 
Comment on Cheung. (1986) 8 Law and Economics 19 
130 Bentham, J., The Works of Jeremy Bentham. Volume 3. Bowring, J. (ed.) [William Tait, 
1843, Edinburgh] 
131 Say, J. B., A Treatise on Political Economy: Or the Production, Distribution, and 
Consumption of Wealth. Prinsep, C. R. (trans.) [Grigg and Eliot, 6th American Ed., 1834, 
Philadelphia] 
132 Mill, J. S., Principles of Political Economy with some of their Applications to Social 
Philosophy Ashley, W. J. (ed.) [Longmans, Green and Co., 7th Ed., 1909, London] 
133 Clark, J. B., Essential of Economic Theory [Macmillan, 1st Ed., 1927, New York] 
134 Taussig, F. W. Inventors and Money-Makers [Macmillan, 1930, New York] 
135 Pigou, A. The Economics of Welfare [Macmillan, 1924, 2nd Ed., London] 
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(1934); 136 and Arrow (1962).137 This literature despite its empirical 
shortcomings still forms recurrent bedrock in contemporary pharmaceutical 
patent debates. Thus, it has instructive advantage with regard to later 
material and reveals many of the difficulties that patent debates conceal. 
The core of Bentham, Say, Mill and Clark's conviction regarding patents 
was the 'something-for-nothing thesis.'138 As Clark states, 
'If the patented article is something which society without a patent 
system would not have secured at all- the inventor's monopoly 
hurts nobody ... his gains consist in something which not one loses, 
even while he enjoys them.'139 
Bentham's view, later also articulated by Say, Mill, and Clark, was that the 
patent system was indispensable to innovation, because an 'inventor who 
has no hope that he shall reap will not take the trouble to sow. ,140 The 
patent was a way to grant the inventor a necessary reward for their labour. 
We might notice a similarity with Locke's notion that since a person's 
labour is their own then the product of that labour is also theirs. However, 
136 Plant, A., 'The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions,' (1934) N.S. 1 
Economica 30-51 
137 Arrow, K. J., "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," R. R. 
Nelson (eds.) The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors 
[Princeton University Press, 1st Ed., 1962, New York] 
138 Cheung, N. S., Property Rights and Invention. (1986) 8 Law and Economics 5-18 
139 Clark, J. B. Essentials of Economic Theory [Macmillan, 1st Ed., 1907, New Yorkj360-
361 
140 
Bentham, J., The Works of Jeremy Bentham. Volume 3. Bowring, J. (ed.) [William Tait, 
1843, Edinburgh] 71 
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Locke was concerned with rights over real property, not rights over the 
rights over property.141 Bentham as an advocate of the patent system 
considers that intellectual labour should yield material fruit as physical 
labour yields material fruit. However, the direct fruit of innovation is 
immaterial and Bentham neglected to notice that through the patent the 
material advantage gained by the inventor must arise from the material 
labour of others. The difficulties arising from treating real and intellectual 
property in the same fashion continue today. 
Say concerning the patent system stated that, '[p]rivelages of this kind no 
one can reasonably object to; for they interfere with, nor cramp any branch 
of industry, previously in operation. Moreover, the expense incurred is 
purely voluntary; and those who incur it, are not obligated to renounce the 
satisfaction of any previous wants.'142 
Plant remarked on this short-sightedness of the something-for-nothing 
thesis by noting Say and Clark's failure in considering that patents draw 
scarce resources into the acquisition of patents. 143 He also noted that 
patents increase the scarcity of resources. 
"Patents ... make possible the creation of scarcity of the products 
appropriated which could not otherwise be maintained .... [W]e 
141 Locke, J. P., Two Treatises on Government Laslett, P. (ed.) [Cambridge University 
Press, 1st Ed., 1988, Cambridge] 
142 Say, J. B., A Treatise on Political Economy [1834] [Augustus M. Kelley, 1964, New 
York] 182 
143 Plant, A., Economic theory concerning patents, (1934) N.S. 1 Economica 30, 40-41 
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might expect that public action concerning private property would 
normally be directed at the prevention of the raising of prices, in [the 
case of patents] ... the object of the legislation is to confer the power 
of raising prices by enabling the creation of scarcity.,,144 
With retrospective acuity we may remark that Clark also tentatively noted 
patents lead to an overall increase in the scarcity of resources. 145 
If innovation would not occur in the absence of a patent then a patent is a 
required, if not necessarily sufficient, condition to that innovation. Thus, to 
have innovation one would have to have a patent system. However, if 
innovation occurs in the absence of a patent system then the patent 
system is not a necessary condition of innovation. Taussig believed 
innovation would occur in the absence of a patent system, as history 
demonstrated, thus proposed that the patent system was a contrivance 
that gained nothing and thus was a huge mistake. 146 
"One thing stands out conspicuously ... ," he wrote. " ... [T]he race of 
contrivers and inventors does obey an inborn and irresistible 
impulse. Schemes and experiments begin in childhood, and persist 
144 Plant, A., Economic theory concerning patents, (1934) N.S. 1 Economica 30,31 
145 Clark, J. B. Essentials of Economic Theory [Macmillan, 1st Ed., 1907, New York] 265-
266 
146 Taussig, F. W. Inventors and Money-Makers [Macmillan, 1930, New York] 18 
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so long as life and strength hold. It matters not whether a fortune is 
made or pecuniary distress is chronic.,,147 
Taussig considered it humankind's nature to invent, thus humankind would 
invent even in the absence of a patent system. Humankind's invention 
prior to 1471, and for the majority of the world until the last two decades, 
provides plenty of support for Taussig's view. Moreover, some of the 
most significant modern inventions were created without the intention of 
securing patent monopolies.148 
Pigou also held that since the majority of invention is spontaneous, 
encouragement to invent is superfluous. Though he also suggested that 
the patent system can focus invention towards that which society 
desires. 149 
Plant certainly recognised the effect of patents in channelling resources. 
He warned that the channels which the patent's artificial monopoly 
encouraged diverted scarce resources to what was deemed patentable 
and most profitable under the patent rules. 15o What Plant does is to 
147 Taussig, F. W.lnventors and Money-Makers [Macmillan, 1930, New Yorkj21 
146 For example, penicillin, polio vaccine and the internet 
149 Pigou, A. C" The Economics of Welfare [Macmillan, 4th Ed., 1932, London] 185 
150 Plant, A., Economic theory concerning patents, (February 1934) Economica 30, 31. 
This statement aptly describes the allocation priorities of resources into pharmaceutical 
innovation under the current patent system. See, Mannan, A" and Story, A., 'Abolishing 
the Product Patent: A Step Forward for Global Access to Drugs.' In Illingworth, P., Cohen, 
J., and Schuklenk, U. (eds.) The Power of Pills: Social, Ethical and Legal Issues in Drug 
Development, Marketing and PriCing Policies. [Pluto Press, 2006, London] 179-189 
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recognise that although each patent creates scarcity each patent does not 
necessarily create a reward. 151 In consequence there would be a rush to 
invent those things that were most profitable, with many allocating 
resources to that same endeavour, but only one able to benefit. Given a 
finite pool of resources, multiple expenditure on the same purpose would 
reduce the resources available for other purposes. Furthermore, if rapid 
expenditures of resources are more wasteful than more steady 
approaches to innovation then the resource pool will be further depleted 
for other projects. 
Arrow, building on the work of Hotelling 152 and Samuelson,153 considered 
that although property rights for ideas may be useful they are inferior to 
direct government investment in inventive activities. His conclusion 
stemmed from a belief that with or without a patent system there would be 
under investment in some areas of innovation that are simply not 
profitable. Other writers have suggested that public policy actions can 
have a strong effect on the rate of technological progress in the 
pharmaceutical industry.154 
151 Plant, A., Economic theory concerning patents, (February 1934) Economica 30,38 
152 Hotelling, H., The General Welfare in Relation to problems of Taxation and of Railway 
and of Utility Rates. (1938) 6 Econometrica 242-269 
153 Samuelson, P. A., The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. (1954) 36 Review of 
economics and statistics 387-389 
154 Adrian Towse (ed.), Industrial Policy and the Pharmaceutical Industry [Office of Health 
Economics, 1st Ed., 1995, London) 
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Studies have suggested that the pharmaceutical industry, more than any 
other industry, places the highest importance on patents. 155 
" In addition, typical drug innovation today costs companies almost a half-
billion dollars and requires more than a decade of research, testing, and 
FDA marketing approval time to get to the market. Finally, since many new 
compounds can be copied at a fraction of the original cost, without 
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights, through 
patents, trademarks, and proprietary business information protection, it 
would be illogical for investors to sink money into new drug discovery and 
development. The consequences? Since industry--not academia or 
government--is responsible for the large majority of new drug 
discoveries,156 there would probably be far fewer research projects and 
products in the future to help prevent strokes, cure cancer, Alzheimer's 
disease, heart disease, and serious infectious diseases such as AIDS.,,157 
155 Levin, R, Klevorick, A. K., Nelson, R, Appropriating the Returns from Industrial 
Research and Development (1987) Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 783-820; 
Cohen, W., Nelson, R R and Walsh, J. P .. Appropriability Conditions and Why Firms 
Patent and Why They Do Not in the American Manufacturing Sector. Working Paper 
[Carnegie-Mellon University, 1997, Pittsburgh] 
156 Whilst technically true, this statement is in fact misleading. Industry is responsible for 
the majority of NCEs that receive market approval each year, however as will be 
described in Chapter 3, almost all of the NCEs that pose significant therapeutic 
breakthroughs originated from research conducted in publicly funded or charitable 
research institutions. 
157 Bale, H. E. (1997) Patent Protection and Pharmacutical innovation. New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics. 95-107 
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Without patent protection, or an institution which protected innovators, 
then imitators would be able to free ride the innovator's research and 
development and clinical testing by duplicating the innovative 
pharmaceutical compound for a fraction of the innovator's cost. Edwin 
Mansfield from a survey of the research directors of 100 U.S. corporations, 
across twelve industries, concluded that out of all the industries that 
completed questionnaires the patent was most important to 
pharmaceutical companies. 158 He suggested that 65 per cent of 
pharmaceutical inventions would not have been introduced by the 
pharmaceutical industry in the absence of patent protection. For the other 
eleven industries he studied, this percentage was only 8 per cent. Whilst 
being nearly 30 years old and thus not necessarily reflective of how 
today's pharmaceutical CEOs would complete a questionnaire, Mansfield's 
research is still mentioned in the context of pharmaceutical innovation and 
pharmaceutical patents and must be mentioned. What the survey showed 
was that the pharmaceutical industry placed more importance on 
pharmaceutical patents than other industries according to their directors. 
It did not show that pharmaceutical innovation was greater in a system 
with pharmaceutical patents. 
However, pharmaceutical research companies' interest in monopolising 
therapeutic markets is easily understood. It is suggested that 
158 Taylor, C.T., Silberston, lA, The Economic Impact of the Patent System. [Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge, 1st Ed., 1973, England]; Silberston, l.A., The Economic 
Importance of Patents (The Common Law Institute of Intellectual Property, 1st Ed., 1987, 
London]; Mansfield, E., Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study. (1986) 32 
Management Science 175. 
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pharmaceuticals are expensive to innovate, and that a medicine that is 
approved for the market will have cost $802 million USD.1s9 Industry 
explains that this is because less than 1 per cent of compounds examined 
in pre-clinical trials make it into human testing. Then only 20 per cent of 
compounds entering clinical trials are approved for treatments. 160 
Moreover, the cost of pharmaceuticals is suggested to increase rapidly as 
research and development and clinical testing costs are held to have 
increased at an annual rate of 7.4% above general inflation when 
compared to the pharmaceutical introduction costs of the 1980s. It is 
suggested that a major factor in the increase is the significant increase 
during the 1990s in the size and number of clinical trials compared with an 
earlier period. 161 
Since life has greater value in the contemporary world than in passed ages 
past pharmaceuticals have greater significance than ever before. It is 
159 DiMasi, J. A., Hansen, RW., Grabowski, H. G., The Price of Innovation: New 
Estimates of Drug Development Costs [Tufts University Centre for the Study of Drug 
Development, 1st Ed., 2002, Boston] 
160 DiMasi, J. A., Success Rates for New Drugs Entering Clinical Testing in the United 
States (1995) 58 Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics 1-14. There may be 
significant cost inflation in the model arising from the data used. The data on which 
DiMasi bases his findings are not publicly available. 
161 DiMasi, J. A., Hansen, RW., Grabowski, H. G., The Price of Innovation: New 
Estimates of Drug Development Costs [Tufts University Centre for the Study of Drug 
Development, 1st Ed., 2002, Boston]; For newer and older reports respectively, see 
DiMasi, J. A., Hansen, RW., Grabowski, H. G., The price of innovation: new estimates of 
drug development costs (2003) 22 Journal of Health Economics 151-185; DiMasi, J. A., 
Hansen, R W., Grabowski, H. G., Lasagna, L., The Cost of Innovation in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry. (1991) 10 Journa/ofHealth Economics 107-129. 
76 
undeniable that medicines are important determinants of longevity and 
quality of life. Thus, we are increasingly willing to dedicate more of our 
labour to their purchase. 
'It is hard to think of many industries that have contributed as much to 
human welfare as the pharmaceutical industry.,162 
However, although the pharmaceutical industry may have made an 
important contribution to world health, is it more than would have been 
achieved in the absence of the pharmaceutical patent? Is it more than 
would have been achieved through another mechanism? There are an 
overwhelming number of indicia suggesting that the present system of 
pharmaceutical innovation holds back pharmaceutical progress. These 
indicia will be presented in detail in Chapter 3. They are in summary, 
• Less than a fifth of revenue is invested in research and 
development. 
• Knowledge is a public good, thus it is very expensive and difficult to 
keep others from using it. 
• There is a correlation between an increased use of intellectual 
property rights and a decline in inventive activity. 
162 Levy, R., Wickelgren, A., Competition Policy Issues for Regulators: A U.S. Perspective 
on Pharmaceutical Industry Cases Before the Federal Trade Commission. Kettler, H. 
(ed.) Consolidation and Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry [Office of Health 
Economics, 1st Ed., 2001, London] 106-117. 
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• When a pharmaceutical is patented, there will usually be 40-50 
patents registered. These patents act as deterrents to future 
market entrants and innovation. 
• Intellectual property is expensive. 
• Profit is the purpose of a company, thus the most profitable 
objective is pursued. 
• Monopolies are less productive and far more expensive than 
competition. 
• Modern technologies for data collaboration and information sharing 
are not used. 
• Safety issues are masked within the system. 
• Clinical trials and or the data generated by them are not impartial. 
• Empirically profits always outweigh penalties and pharmaceutical 
companies are frequently convicted of racketeering and misleading 
public authorities. 
• The majority of therapeutic breakthroughs originate in publicly 
funded or subsidised research institutions. 
• Many diseases and conditions are neglected as they are 
considered unprofitable. 
It is likely that the price the pharmaceutical patent system of innovation 
levies on 'human welfare' is greater than its contribution. The problem of 
reduced availability of medicines is further exacerbated by the limitations 
on accessibility that the pharmaceutical monopoly permits. If a medicine is 
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available but access is denied, when that access might be achieved 
through competition, ethical justification is difficult. 
"Moreover even if we could determine on principle what is the 
product of anyone's labor it would be very doubtful morality if one 
could keep it all when others, the sick, the infant, or the very aged, 
were to perish because of the exercise of this right.,,163 
iv. Methodology 
This thesis Questions the boundaries of knowledge; especially natural and 
social science distinctions that conceal the conventionally decidable nature 
of conclusions in both domains. Knowledge types are suggested as 
ontological (foundationalism), rationalism (epistemological) and empiricism 
(epistemological). Rationalism (logic) and empiricism (coherentism) are 
identified as intersubjective methods of establishing conventions. The 
reconsideration of the institutions of objectivity are an important part of the 
methodology of this thesis as many of the key theories relating to 
pharmaceutical patents are embedded in foundationalism guised as 
objectivity. 
'The world must be understood culturally in terms of the significance 
it is given by social groups who perceive, categorise and act upon it 
according to socially conventional structures of language and 
meaning. Human beings never speak in the name of the real, or 
163 Cohen, M. R., Positivism and the Limits of Idealism in the Law (1927) 27(3) Columbia 
Law Review 240 
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grasp the world objectively, because the realities we recognise are 
shaped by the cultural contexts that enable our very cognisance of 
the world itself. Cultural categories provide the very possibilities for 
perception. What we experience as social reality is a constellation 
of cultural structures that we ourselves construct and transform in 
ongoing practice.,,164 
I ndeed for intellectual property there is no other way to understand its 
value other than as it arises out of cultural categorisation. Bereft of 
physical identity, we struggle to perceive its value in real terms. For it has 
none, save that whi"ch it is accorded by our cultural descriptions of our 
existence. 
By creating conventions we rely on and format the interchange of 
experience between people, or between our senses and our actions. 
Providing that the outcome of the combination is predictable or consistent 
then we treat the information or experience as a truth. Thus, the object of 
conventional truth becomes a quasi fact, given the status of fact or truth 
until inconsistent with convention or experience. Through the method of 
convention we can build on quasi facts, hereafter facts, and share 
information described in terms of conventional truth. As a result we are for 
the most part comprehensible to one another and seemingly disconnected 
objects and impenetrable mysteries sometimes become an interconnected 
and comprehensible system. 
164 Coombe, "Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics," in Law and Anthropology: A 
Reader. Falk, S. (Ed.) [Blackwell, 1st Ed., 2005, London] 112-113 
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One set of intersubjective tools is economics. Like any wisdom generating 
tool, no matter how sophisticated, economics can only be applied to a 
model and that model is only a caption or reality. Use of the economist's 
tools can generate very useful insights into the deployment of resources 
and it would be foolish not to consider their import in a study concerning 
an institution that has been a subject of economic writing for nearly three 
hundred years. Indeed, the principal system adopted for the examination 
of intellectual property has been economic theory. There are however, a 
number of pitfalls in employing economics. These potential difficulties 
arise from the construction of economic theory and are contained in the 
constituting assumptions. To apply economic theory we must move from 
reality into a model, and then we must understand that model in terms of 
the categorisations of economic theory. To do otherwise is to render fact 
incomprehensible to our analysis. 
For example, in economics law is an instrument of securing economic 
gain.165 As a result the power relations engendered by law are transformed 
into terms comprehensible to an economic model. Far more than law and 
far less law are incorporated into the economic analytic framework than a 
law model. The transformation of secondary and higher orders of 
perception involves reducing empirical observation with at least three 
categories of assumptions the majority of which arise from the theorist's 
primary perceptions. 
165 Th' b . . 
IS 0 servation is applicable to descriptive economiCS, economic theory, and applied 
economics. 
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The first set of assumptions concerns the behaviour of individual human 
beings. The second set concerns the physical structure of the world and 
the third relates to the economic and social institutions. Like any set of 
conventions, such as physics or mathematics, economics is a 
simplification, a skeleton or framework that helps us understand the 
complexity of our world. In Rosemary Coombe's words, it is a 'cultural 
categorisation.,166 
Evidently, assumptions must playa decisive role in the outcome of all 
models and it is extremely important to identify the assumptions involved. 
Identifying the propositions comprising syllogisms is an important part of 
how this thesis approaches the theories, sometimes disguised in economic 
terms, concerning pharmaceutical patents. 
Sensitivity to foundationalist assumptions arising from my methodology 
required me to adopt a novel perspective when examining literature on 
patent theory. Literature considering the availability of resources for 
pharmaceutical innovation often considers the patent as synonymous with 
invention. Thus, the patent is an end in itself rather than simply a means 
to an end. However, all laws are a means to an end. Law is constructed 
of rights, which exist, but are not self-existent: it is the imposition and the 
observance of a right that gives rights their esse. Human beings, 
166 Coombe, "Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics," in Law and Anthropology: A 
Reader. Falk, S. (Ed.) [Blackwell, 1st Ed., 2005, Londonj113 
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however, are an end in themselves and never a means to an end. 167 
Therefore, this investigation of the patent's effect on pharmaceutical 
innovation differs radically from previous works as it focuses on the human 
being as an end and considers the patent and the non-health interests 
bundled into the fabric of the patent institution as subservient to human 
health. 
v. Plan 
The project is directed towards identifying the incidence of the patent on: 
a) pharmaceutical knowledge assembly, and 
b) access and utilisation of pharmaceutical technologies. 
Chapter 1 - The objective of this chapter is to demythologise the 
pharmaceutical patent. To do this the chapter is divided into two parts. 
The first part provides a history of the patent for inventions and the 
pharmaceutical industry's origins and development. The second part 
details the factors that distinguish pharmaceuticals from other types of 
inventions and explains the factors involved in the existence of 
pharmaceutical patents and their use as exclusionary tools. 
The chapter shows that modern patents on pharmaceutical inventions 
arose, not out of their favourable stimulation of innovation, but rather from 
167 According to Kant's moral philosophy [hu)mans possess moral dignity because they 
are an end in themselves.; "The production of wealth is but a means to the sustenance of 
man; to the satisfaction of his wants; and to the development of his activities, physical, 
mental, and moraL" Marshall, A., Principles of Economics [Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 9th 
Ed., 1961. London) 173 
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national protectionism and then reinforcement through the political 
lobbying of an industry grown powerful and dependent on them. The 
second part demonstrates a feedback or feed through relationship 
between the patent and the pharmaceutical industry; in that the particular 
characteristics of the pharmaceutical patent are largely the product of 
industrial design, and that the pharmaceutical industry as presently 
constituted is a product of the patent system. This is necessarily 
described by a characterisation of patent life cycles and the significance of 
each stage on a pharmaceutical patent owner. 
Chapter 2 - This chapter's objective is an examination of the theoretical 
coherence of patent doctrine. It is based on material that has gone 
through a number of expansions, which began with a mathematical 
investigation of legal relations within patent doctrine to which economic 
theory and philosophical considerations were applied. The symbolic logic 
has been relegated to footnotes, but not removed because of its succinct 
explanatory power of complex relations. 168 
It is the most theoretical chapter of the thesis and can seem a dense as it 
is a distillation of formidable numbers of papers, all of which are found 
within the bibliography. We categorise the justifications from patent 
literature into four function statements - Invention Incentive, Disclosure 
168 A key to both the definitions and a brief summary of the symbolic logic terminology 
used are presented for your convenience in the appendices. To increase accessibility 
and to make the chapter readable, rather than requiring study, only the bare minimum of 
symbolic description been retained. 
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Incentive, Investment Incentive, Organised Derivative Innovation. Each of 
which we explain and then analyse. Our analysis considers the 
components of each function statement particularly the assumptions on 
which the function statements are based. We then test coherence 
between the function statements on the basis of their underlying 
assumptions. 
We find that foundationalism guised as objectivity has become deeply 
entrenched in patent discourse and that many of the function statements 
are incoherent. These findings are significant for the rest of the thesis as 
arguments for pharmaceutical patents typically rely on patents 
simultaneously satisfying several function statements. 
Chapter 3 - The objective of this chapter is to build on the theoretical 
revelations of chapter 2 by providing practical examples of how the 
pharmaceutical patent system of innovation is problematic and the 
reasons why. It describes the empirical indicia of the pharmaceutical 
patent system's poor productivity in delivering new medicines, and also the 
pharmaceutical patent system's incidence on access to medicines. 
Empirical examples are given for the problems that the misallocation of 
resources by the patent system creates. 
The examples reinforce that the core assumption of pharmaceutical 
innovation is that the cost of research, development and clinical testing 
must be recouped through the cost of accessing medicines. The chapter 
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illustrates why linking pharmaceutical innovation to the price that can be 
recovered from one of its products is undesirable for both the assembly of 
pharmaceutical knowledge (availability) and the use of pharmaceutical 
knowledge (accessibility). Moreover, the chapter reveals the parameters 
within which change to the pharmaceutical patent occurs and the power 
relations determinative of that change. It is shown that regulation is 
determinative of industry structure and funds from industry flow into the 
political machinery and lawyers that are ultimately responsible for the laws 
that govern access to medicines and knowledge about them: 
Misallocation of resources begets further misallocation of resources and 
thus the system propagates and entrenches itself. 
Chapter 4 - The objective of this chapter is to consider proposals for 
reform of our method of encouraging pharmaceutical innovation. There 
are a lot of proposals for patent reform and supplementary pharmaceutical 
innovation incentives to the pharmaceutical patent incentive. However, 
many share common themes or merely require additional funding to be 
invested in parallel incentive schemes. We consider the more detailed 
proposals that seek to address the problems of the current patent system 
and where they share common traits categorise them which permits a 
more detailed analysis than would have otherwise been possible. 
Our criteria for assessing the proposals are the proposal's likely incidence 
on accessibility, availability and safety of medicines. We find that the 
majority of the proposals aim to remedy or curtail a particular symptom the 
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pharmaceutical patent system of innovation's malaise, but ignore or 
exacerbate others. Which reveals how complex reform has to be if a 
pharmaceutical patent is retained, but the problems are addressed. 
We also notice, with respect to pharmaceutical knowledge assembly and 
use of that knowledge, that almost none of the proposals try to employ 
historic lessons about pharmaceutical innovation or modern systems of 
organisation and knowledge exchange. Thus, the proposals tend to 
eschew considerable potential for pharmaceutical invention. 
Chapter 5 - Is a response to the perceived failings of the proposals in 
chapter 4. Its objective is to envisage, based on historic lesson and 
modern systems of organisation and knowledge exchange, a system of 
pharmaceutical innovation that approaches optimum availability and 
accessibility. It does not take into account the strong interests of the 
political elite in maintaining the profitable misallocations of the current 
patent system. Thus, it is less constrained than the proposals of chapter 
4. Nevertheless the proposal is otherwise pragmatically based. It begins 
with a brief description of legislative changes and then explains how the 
removal of patent rights and exclusory rights in conjunction with organised 
knowledge exchange can lead to greater availability, accessibility and 
safety. It draws on historic examples and current information exchange 
technologies. 
The mechanism suggested is a decoupling of the pharmaceutical product 
from pharmaceutical research and development. This would involve 
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abolishing patents for pharmaceuticals, or hereafter not granting them and 
extinguishing eXciusory rights like market or data exclusivity. Research 
would be placed into an open global database in author attributed entries. 
Funding for that research would come from savings on the price of 
medicines. It is unclear if this degree of funding will be sufficient to meet 
societal needs. However, even with savings on accessibility and no 
increase in spending this level of funding could be the same as the current 
allocations to research and development by Industry and government. 
Moreover because the cost of accessing pharmaceutical knowledge is 
decreased and available expertise is increased drug discovery should be 
swifter and cheaper. Moreover, many of the institutional structures for the 
research (Universities) and clinical testing (teaching hospitals) are already 
in place and already significantly subsidised by governments. Use of 
these institutions would provide a larger, cheaper workforce and provide 
education and employment advantages. Industry funding to these 
institutions would have to be replaced, but there may be sufficient savings 
in accessing medicines to satisfy the loss of industry funding. 
Since manufacturers are able to compete to produce pharmaceuticals then 
we would expect the development of more pharmaceutical industries, 
including within less wealthy populations, and a greater diversification and 
expansion in the numbers of manufacturers. This should lead to better 
stability and supply of medicines, and remove inefficient producers from 
the market. Since safety is desirable then we do not suggest any changes 
to product liability or tort, but we do suggest a good practice requirement 
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for pharmaceutical manufacturers that requires a detailed disclosure of 
manufacturing processes and quality controls. These changes could be 
easily incorporated into the pharmaceutical manufacturer's licence that is 
currently required in the European Union and USA. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT 
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Patent law, as originating from statute, applies to a broad spectrum of 
technologies and with little exception statute initially treated the different 
areas of technology with uniformity. However, the different technology 
areas can display highly diverse characteristics. 169 These differing 
characteristics have been increasingly recognised and patent law has 
been modified through many vehicles; including patent regulations, 
decisions in patent cases, and the economics of patent practice. Thus, 
there is a growing divergence in the real characteristics of patent law 
between some technology sectors. 
Formally, that is by statute or by case law, there is no definition of a 
pharmaceutical patent as distinct from patents in other technology areas. 
Nevertheless, statutes (as amended), treaties and some case law do 
169 For example, the rapidity and expense of innovation, but also consider differences in 
the desirability of competitive pursuit of a better product. With respect to healthcare a tiny 
difference in quality has a significant effect on consumer choice. With respect to 
physician performance indicators see, Cheng, S .. -H .. ; Song, H .. -Y., Physician 
performance information and consumer choice: a survey of subjects with the freedom to 
choose between doctors (2004) 13(2) Quality & Safety in Health Care 98-101. 
This is also illustrated through consideration of tool setting costs. With mechanical 
technologies, because of the interface of the component that is the subject of the patent 
with other components the high aggregate cost of tool sets in creating the finished 
ensemble that employs a mechanical patent is very high with respect to the cost of raw 
materials. Thus, where the embodying result of the patent requires this high initial 
investment in aggregate tool setting, combined with the costs associated with assembly 
of the embodying product there is an interest for the manufacturer of a product to have a 
time lag between each successive competing innovation so that they may recoup the cost 
of tool setting and enter into profit. The same is true in the manufacture of 
pharmaceuticals, but with pharmaceuticals it is important that the market prefers 
medicines of the highest quality and performance. In the case of mechanical inventions it 
may not be the case that the latest product of highest quality is available, the 
performance indicators may not be significantly different. 
91 
indeed treat pharmaceuticals differently from other technology areas. (For 
example, a longer patent term is available for pharmaceuticals. 170) 
Furthermore, there are two other very strong reasons for lifting this 
narrowed group of patents, relating to pharmaceuticals, from patents in 
general. As will been seen, both the role that pharmaceuticals play in 
society and the legal framework surrounding the creation of 
pharmaceuticals and their use, are different from many other technology 
areas. 
Pharmaceutical patents have not always been singled out for different 
treatment and this has come as a relatively recent phenomena. In the first 
part of this chapter (1.1) we briefly outline the history of the patent thereby 
demonstrating how its present form grew out of national protectionism, 
opportunism by patent practitioners and the burgeoning socio-political 
dominance of large concerted industry. One of those quickly growing 
industries comprised the pharmaceutical companies and the origins and 
growth of the pharmaceutical industry are described (1.2). The Second 
part of this chapter examines the factors, both SOCially (1.3) and legally 
(1.4.) that can be used to distinguish pharmaceutical patents from the 
patents of other technology sectors. More importantly this second part 
provides useful background information on the social issues and legal 
frameworks surrounding the use, development, marketing and exploitation 
of medicines (1.5). As a result the chapter is mostly descriptive but 
170 Patents (Supplementary Protection Certificates for Medicinal Products) Regulations 
1992, S.1. 1992 No. 3091, reg. 5 
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provides a useful background for the later theoretical and empirically 
based chapters. 
1.1. The Origins and Evolution of the Patent for Invention 
Monopoly grants encompassing an industry or commodity are a very old 
institution. The grant of protective monopolies or franchises was 
practised in Western Europe as early as the Fourteenth Century.171 
Monopoly grants gave a power to both the grantor and the grantee. On 
one hand, the grantor gained the advantage of another award; one that 
they may give as a reward for service or to favourites, or sell or rent for 
profit. 172 Moreover, the grantor also gained a powerful tool of censorship 
against activities they wished policed or limited. 173 On the other hand, the 
grantee received an incentive to perform a specific function, which was 
generally lacking in society and would benefit the ruling class. 
171 For evidence of its frequency in England see the Calendar of Patent Rolls. Amongst 
the records the most striking examples are the protections offered to clothiers and those 
engaged in the textile industries. Amongst these is the broader framing of the monopoly 
grant to Johanne Kempe of Flanders in 1331 (Calendar of Patent Rolls 5 Ed III, p. I, m. 
25), by statute in 1337 to 'all clothworkers.' Like grants to Kempe's were issued in 1336 
(Calendar of Patent Rolls 10 Ed. III, Dec. 12) and 1368 (Calendar of Patent Rolls 42 Ed. 
III, p. I) 
172 Machlup, F., An Economic Review of the Patent System: Study of the Subcommittee 
on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Committee of the judiCiary (1958) US 
Senate, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, Study Number 15, Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office 2 
173 Cornish, W., Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright. and Allied Rights [Sweet and 
Maxwell, 4th Ed., 3'd Impression, 1999, London] 340 
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An English franchise dated 151 May 1291 174 reads, 
" ... [T]hat men may have the greater will to labour in the making of 
cloth in England, Ireland, and Wales, We will that all men may know 
that We will grant suitable franchises to fullers, weavers ... who work 
in this mystery so soon as such franchises are asked of us. ,,175 
A particular form of the protective monopoly grant or franchise is the 
patent for invention; though, as will be seen, that the monopoly be 
addressed to inventors or limited to their inventions were not necessary 
conditions for this patent to be granted. 
1 .1 .1 From Italy 
The origin of patents for invention is attributed to fifteenth century 
Renaissance Italy. Where in 1421, the State of the Republic of Florence 
made the first known grant of a monopoly in an invention to an inventor. 176 
The monopoly, bestowed on Filippo Brunelleschi architect of the cupola of 
the Cathedral Santa Maria del Fiore,177 was granted for the invention of 
'some machine or kind of ship' beneficial to the interests of 'merchants and 
others.' The text of the patent holds that Brunelleschi refused to disclose 
174 From internal evidence the 'Athenaeum' suggests that the document more likely dates 
from the 1 st of May 1327. 
175 Hist. MSS. Comm. Xiv. pt. Viii. 7 
176 New Encyclopredia Britannica, [1987, 15th Ed., Chicago, Auckland, Geneva. London, 
Manila, Paris. Rome, Seoul, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto] Volume 26. Macropredia. 200 
177 Prager. F. D .. and Scaglia, G., Brunelleschi: Studies of his Technology and Inventions 
[MIT Press Cambridge. Massachusetts, 1 st Ed .. 1970) 111-123 
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his machine to the public unless he was granted a prerogative so that he 
could reap the 'fruit of his genius.' The lords considering the potential 
benefits for both the State and Brunelleschi created and conveyed a right 
to Filippo 'so that he may be animated more fervently to even higher 
pursuits and stimulated to more subtle investigations,' as well, we presume 
disclose his invention. For three years the right enabled Brunelleschi to 
burn any other ship on any water within the Republic of Florence that had, 
held, or used in any manner his design. 178 History does not recall whether 
Brunelleschi exercised the power afforded by his patent, or whether the 
monopoly term was extended over the seven more years it took the 
eminent inventor to realise his invention. It does, however, inform us, 
without reason, that the Badalone or aeque vola sank in May 1428 without 
completing the invention's 'claim.'179 Nevertheless, Brunelleschi's patent is 
interesting since it is the first record of a monopoly addressed to the 
originator of an invention rather than a mere importer of an invention. 
The number of patent grants in the State of Florence is not clear though 
the award of prerogatives to inventors continued. Indeed, half a century 
following Brunelleschi's patent, Venice seeing the prosperity of the 
Florentine Republic was quick to establish many of the institutions it 
178 Prager, F. D., "Brunelleschi's Patent," (1946) 28 Journal of the Patent Office Society 
109-135, 109 
179 Prager, F. D., and Scaglia, G., Brunelleschi: Studies of his Technology and Inventions 
[MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1st Ed., 19701111-123 
For a good, though brief account see 
<http://www.stanford.edu/-broich/tamingnature/brunelleschLhtm> (Last Accessed: 1 sl July 
2009) 
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deemed the root of Florence's success. Amongst these institutions was 
the award of patent monopolies for inventions. Thus, in 1474 the Republic 
of Venice passed, as far as we know, the World's first patent ordinance, 
which granted an inventor a ten-year monopoly in the exploitation of their 
invention. 180 This patent law ensured the monopoly by conveying to the 
inventor a right to destroy objects incorporating their idea. An important 
objective of the legislative act was to attract foreign inventors, including 
Florentine engineers. 
With the Reception of Roman law well underway and the technical 
superiority of reasoning thereby available 181 it is appealing to think of the 
early patent system as an entity of noble intellectual birth. Moreover, 
given the proximity of Florence and Venice to Bologna it is more than likely 
that both affluent city-states had access to the doctores. However, the 
part played by the law masters of the era remains uncertain and it is highly 
probable that the idea of monopoly grants to inventors was a progeny of 
the existent grants of land and mineral rights prevalent at the time being 
extended to a newly growing mercantile class of trade folk. In short the 
patent was at its debut guided by pragmatism rather than a superiority of 
reasoning based on the intrinsic nature of (European) human society. 
180 Mandich, G., Venetian patent (1450-1550) (1948) 30(3) Journal of the Patent Office 
Society 166-224. Provides a list of Venetian patents from 1475 to 1549. The list is also 
presented on-line at Wolfgang Pfaller's website. Available from: <http://www.wolfgang-
pfaller.de/venpat.htm> (last Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
181 There was much potential for the development of an incentive system from the 
available texts of the day. See Stein, P., Roman Law in European History [Cambridge 
University Press, 1999, Cambridge] Part III, 43-52 
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Targeted as the patent grants were on attracting those skilled in particular 
crafts for the pragmatic benefits conferred on a state's ruling classes,182 
the intellectual justifications for patent grants would be invented later. 
1 .1 .2. Migrating Know-How 
During the next century, or so, the practice of granting patents spread from 
the Italian City States to other Western European countries. 183 It is clear 
that European progress in the manufacturing arts was a product of the 
slow migration of superior technological achievements from the advanced 
civilisations of the East; 184 civilisations to whom the notion of patent grants 
for inventions were alien. The patent or monopoly grant was a way of 
stimulating a more rapid acquisition of the industrial arts by attracting 
those skilled in respective crafts to settle in the franchise granting state. 
An examination of early patent grants is exemplary of this and little 
importance is placed on the idea of the 'inventor' as the first originator of 
an invention. The essential requirements for a grant to be made were the 
importance of the industry and that the invention was new within that 
kingdom. 185 Geographically isolated, technological migration to England 
182 For example in 1507, the Council of Ten, Venice, granted an exclusive twenty-year 
privilege for the introduction of the 'secret art' of mirror making to the city state. Nesbit, A., 
Glass. With numerous woodcuts [Chapman & Hall,1878, London1 90 
183 In 1467, a monopoly was granted in Berne for the manufacture and sale of paper. See 
Kohler, J., Handbuch des deutschen Patentrechts in rechtsvergleichender Darstellung 
[Verlag, 1900. Mannheim) 21. citing: Zeitschrift fOr schweizerisches Recht. N. F. xv. pp. 6 
ft.; also see Renouard, A-C, Traite des brevets d'invention [Guillaumin, 1844, Paris) 79-80 
184 Prager, F. D .. and Scaglia, G .. Brunelleschi: Studies of his Technology and Inventions 
[MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1st Ed., 19701141-142 
185 In England for examples see: Calendar of Patent Rolls 5 Ed. III, p. I, m. 25; 10 Ed. III. 
p. I; 42 Ed. III, p. I; 18 H. 6. Franc. 18. m. 27. We might draw parallels with this notion of 
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from the East was slower than on the Continent. As a result throughout 
the Middle Ages the English industrial achievements were considerably 
inferior to the Continental Kingdoms 186 and the Low Countries. 187 Thus, to 
increase the rapidity of industry skilled immigration it was during this 
period that England began to make patent grants for inventions. 
1.1.3. In England 
The first record of a patent grant to the introducer of a newly invented 
process in England dates from 1440.188 It was granted to John of 
Sheidame for the introduction of a method of manufacturing salt on a scale 
previously unattempted in England, Ireland, Wales and Scotland. 
During the Tudor period (1485-1603) the patent system became a tool of 
the Crown for encouraging skilled foreign artisans to enter into Crown 
service. 189 As clandestine negotiations replaced open letters and 
monopolies of production permitted the hoarding of skills essential to 
fledgling industries the objective of entering knew knowledge into the 
crafts and artisans of England underwent a radical change. Moreover, 
some royal patent privileges were granted, not to convey exclusive rights, 
'inventor' to the Patent laws of certain modern countries, For example Japan - see 
Japanese Patent Law Act 1959. Consolidated English translation is available at WIPO 
186 The disparate nations today subsumed into the modern France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain 
187 Wyndham Hulme, E., 'The History of the Patent System under the Prerogative and at 
Common Law' (1896) 12 L.Q.R. 141,141 
188 18 H. 6. Franc. 18. m. 27 
189 Wyndham Hulme, E., 'The History of the Patent System under the Prerogative and at 
Common Law' (1896) 12 L.Q.R. 141,144 
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but to permit the addressee to do that which was otherwise prohibited. 19o 
Royal patent privileges were also increasingly used to award lucrative 
monopoly rights to court favourites and those capable of buying royal 
favour. 191 
In England during the reign of Elizabeth I (1533-1603), her minister, Lord 
Burghley (1520-1598), granted a series of patents with a view to 
encouraging foreign inventors to import their inventions and work them in 
England. Realising the potential of letters patent to unfetter manufacture 
from local custom and the jurisdiction of the established trades, the letters 
patent also served to diversify and establish new industries, in some cases 
ousting former local monopolies. 192 Industry, however was rapidly 
outgrowing local regulation and against the will of Parliament becoming 
national. 193 Thus, national policy for regulation was needed, but this 
brought about resistance. Nevertheless, England with its 
190 Malapert, F., Notice historique sur la legislation en matiere des brevets d'invention 
(1878) 3 Journal des Economistes 100; see Machlup, F., An Economic Review of the 
Patent System: Study of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of 
the Committee of the judiciary (1958) US Senate, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, Study 
Number 15, Washington: United States Government Printing Office 2 
191 Machlup, F., An Economic Review of the Patent System: Study of the Subcommittee 
on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Committee of the judiciary (1958) US 
Senate, 85th Congress, 2
nd 
Session, Study Number 15, Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office 2 
192 Price W. H., The English Patents of Monopoly [Harvard University Press, 1913, 
Cambridge] 6 
193 For example, 5 Eliz. c. 4, statute of apprentices; For earlier statutes against migration 
of artisans from towns to the countryside see: 14 & 15 Hen. VIII, c. 1, country weavers 
are not permitted to deal with foreigners; 14 & 25 Hen. VIII, c. 3, the protection of Norwich 
artisans against neighboring competition. 21 Hen. VIII, c. 12, the protection of Bridport 
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" ... fair degree of economic unity, with the narrower guild 
regulations and local exclusiveness already declining, with a 
sovereign who in practice was well-nigh absolute, who surrounded 
herself with ministers possessing at least the best practical 
economic ideas that the time afforded, and who was interested in 
the industrial..,,194 
was well placed to lay the seed for the development of a national patent 
policy. 
However, Elizabeth I also continued the use of letters patent as a form of 
political capital to privilege favourites and assuage creditors. 195 Moreover, 
whilst the original patent grants had conveyed a ten-year privilege, the 
duration had gradually grown becoming twenty, twenty-one, and thirty. 
Worse yet for the burgeoning desire for greater liberty in commerce, some 
monopolies to favoured individuals 196 became renewable. 197 
artisans against neighboring competition; 25 Hen. VIII, c. 18, the protection of Worcester 
artisans against neighboring competition; 5 & 6 Edw. VI, c. 24, the protection of Norwich 
artisans against neighboring competition; 2 & 3 Ph. & M. c. 7, the weavers' act. 
194 Price W. H., The English Patents of Monopoly [Harvard University Press, 1913, 
Cambridge] 7 
195 See starch patents: Pat. 3 Eliz. pt. 9 (15 April 1588); Pat. 36 Eliz. pt. 13 (6 July 1594), 
and Pat. 40 Eliz. pt.16 (20 May 1598); and their enforcement: Hist. MSS. Com. Cal. 
Salisb. Pap. v, at 532 & 533 
196 See Pat. September 1, 1585, which granted the lucrative monopoly on salt 
manufacture to Thomas Wilkes. Hughes, E., The English Monopoly of Salt in the Years 
1563-71 English Historical Review (1925) 40 (159) 334-350 
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Considerable pressure eventually persuaded even the "illustrious"198 and 
"well-neigh absolute,,199 Elizabeth I, on 28 November 1601, to issue the 
Proclamation concerning Monopolies.2oo The proclamation was directed at 
the reform of "many abuses and misdemeanours committed by patentees 
of certain privileges and licenses, to the general good of all her Majesty's 
loving subjects. ,,201 The reform was in effect the annulment of all the 
letters patent Elizabeth I had granted. The proclamation commands that 
no assistance be given to enforce the letters patent she had granted and 
that instruments that had been issued for enforcement of patents granted 
prior to the proclamation also be ignored.202 
Elizabeth I continued to grant monopolies as privileges to political creditors 
until the end of her reign.203 James I, In spite of his proclamation on 7 May 
1603 suspending all letters patent, and his speech at the opening of 
Parliament the following year,204 followed his predecessor's trend granting 
creditors monopolies through letters patent as an exercise of his 
197 Wyndham Hulme, E., 'The History of the Patent System under the Prerogative and at 
Common Law' (1896) 12 L.Q.R. 141. 
198 Cornish, W., Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright. and Allied Rights [Sweet and 
Maxwell. 1999. London] 111 
199 Price W. H., The English Patents of Monopoly [Harvard University Press, 1913. 
Cambridge] 7 
200 Brit. Mus. Proc. Coil. (G. 6463-388) 
201 Price W. H .. The English Patents of Monopoly [Harvard University Press. 1913. 
Cambridge] 156 
202 Proclamation concerning Monopolies 1601, Brit. Mus. Proc. Coil. (G. 6463-388) 
paragraph 7 
203 Darcy v. Allin (1602) 11 Co.Rep. 846 
204 ParI. Hist. i, pp. 977 ft. 
prerogative powers. This was to end with the Statute of Monopolies in 
1624. 
In the second session of Parliament, January to May 1606, patents of 
monopoly were a major cause of parliamentarian concern205 resulting in 
the Petition of Grievances.206 Before the issue of the patents of monopoly 
was brought to a confrontation, James I dissolved Parliament. By this time 
there was much uncertainty and speculation as to the value of a patent. 
After all James I had made strong declarations of his unwillingness to 
grant new patents and yet continued to do so; that the courts of common 
law had been set to administer some patents, but not others; commingled 
with the murky legacy of patents of monopoly from Elizabeth I's day. By 
1614, following the loss of a £100,000 pounds per annum revenue, James 
I found himself short of funds. 207 To replenish his monies he embarked on 
a series of patent of monopoly grants. The result was an incredible failure, 
with losses of many thousands of pounds in schemes such as the alum 
and glass monopolies, that made no net profit. 208 Whilst other schemes 
such as the licensing of inns, of ale-houses, the gold and silver thread 
205 Journals of the House of Commons, 9 April 1606 
206 See Journals of the House of Commons, 9 April 1606 316-318; State Papers 
(Domestic) 7 July 1610; Russell, C., Unrevolutionary England, 1603-1642 [Hambledon 
Press. 1990, London] 44-46 
207 Prothero G. W. Statutes and Constitutional Documents Illustrative offhe Reigns of 
Elizabeth and James 11558-1625 [Oxford University Press. 1894. Oxford] at Ixxxiii 
208 Gardiner S. R. History of England 1603-42. volume 4 [Camden Society, 1893, London] 
21; Somers, Tracts, ed. Scott, W .. [. ii. pp. 364-400. and Sloane, 2904; Harl. 3796; State 
papers (Domestic) 27 August 1619 
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monopoly, and subsidy of the new draperies yielded a mere nine to fifty 
pounds per annum209 depending on the account. 
1.1.4. New Statute 
When in 1621 a new Parliament had to be called, the abusive monopolies 
were at the forefront. 21o By the end of the year a bill against the 
monopolies had already been put before both Houses.211 The Lords 
rejected the bill. But threw it out, not because of its objective, but rather 
due to its language which was deemed unflattering of the king. 212 A joint 
committee of both Houses drew up another bill that was finally passed by 
both Houses in May 1624. The Statute of Monopolies213 brought a radical 
change to the allocation of monopolies, their durations and the right by 
which they were granted and challenged. 
Until the Statute of Monopolies, in spite of James I's contrivances to 
distance himself from the grant of some patents, all patents had stemmed 
from the prerogative power of the monarch. The Statute changed that, 
subjecting "forever hereafter" the force and validity of patents of monopoly 
209 Gardiner S. R., History of England 1603-42. volume 4 [Camden Society, 1893, 
London] 33 
210 Gardiner S. R. History of England 1603-42. volume 4 [Camden Society, 1893, London] 
33-35 
211 Journals of the House of Lords December 1, 1621 
212 Journals of the House of Lords December 3, 1621 
213 21 Jac. I, cap. 3. A. D. 1623-24. An act concerning monopolies and dispensations 
with penal laws and the forfeitures thereof. 
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to the common law.214 Moreover, the Statute declared the duration of 
patents was limited to a 
" ... term of fourteen years ... to be made of the sole working or 
making of any manner of new manufactures within this realm, to the 
true and first inventor and inventors of such manufactures ... , so as 
also they be not contrary to the law nor mischievous to the state, by 
raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally 
inconvenient, the said fourteen years to be accounted from the date 
of the first letters patents ,,215 
Considering James I belief in the absolute power of kings,216 that the 
monarch was dependent on parliament to raise funds, and the potential 
power and wealth that the ability to grant monopolies brought the king, 
then the Statute of Monopolies was also a measure weakening the 
monarch. However, the Statute of Monopolies is far more significant than 
an attrition of prerogative powers, it set the foundations for a modern law 
of patents. Monopolies in manufacture and craftsmanship were now the 
sole purview of the first person to petition as inventor.217 Gone were the 
monopolies renewable add infinitum that served as barriers to industry and 
in their place, the monopolies on new arts and crafts were limited to a term 
corresponding to two terms of apprenticeship. There were substantial 
214 Statute of Monopolies 1624, §II 
215 Statute of Monopolies 1624, §VI 
216 See Tanner, J. R., Constitutional Documents of the Reign of James I: A. D. 1603-1625 
[Cambridge University Press, 1930. Cambridge] 4-22 
217 See §7(3)Patents Act 1977 
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derogations and exceptions,218 but §VI, Statute of Monopolies 1624, would 
be of significant effect in determining the parameters of new patent grants. 
1.1.5. Protectionism 
The Eighteenth Century was an era of strong national protectionism with 
increasing competition in international trade, each nation's technological 
secrets were their advantage and so many regimens attempting to prevent 
technology transfer were put in place.219 The industrial driving force 
however, and the source of England's prosperity was the wool trade. In 
1700, cloth constituted approximately 70 per cent of English exports. It 
continued to comprise more than half of England's exports until the 
1770s.220 Without the strength of the wool trade and the protectionism 
afforded it,221 the British industrial revolution might have been impossible, 
or very nearly SO.222 
Patents on the other hand although they had served to attract new 
methods of manufacture and new industries, were as Britain was 
becoming more technologically advanced in comparison to other nations, 
218 See Statute of Monopolies 1624 §§: V, VII, IX, XI, XII, XIII, XIV 
219 Mantoux, P. The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century [MacMillan Company, 
1961, New York] 237-238 
220 Musson, A., The Growth of British History [BT Bratsford Ltd, 1978, London] 85 
221 Chang, H-J., Kicking away the ladder: Development strategy in historical perspective. 
[Anthem Press, 2004, 1st Ed., 2nd Reprint, London] 19-24 
222 Davis, R. English Foreign Trade, 1700-1774 (1962) 15(2) Economic History Review 
285-303 
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becoming a hindrance.223 Towards the end of the 18th Century the courts 
began to impose a requirement that patentees make a sufficient 
statemenf24 about their invention in return for the upholding of their 
monopoly?25 Around this time there was a realisation that patents could 
be used to glean information about the technical specifications of an 
invention and thereby permit competitors to improve their own methods. 
The requirement for an adequate description of the invention became 
more of an issue within the courts, with competitors claiming that the 
specification was inadequate or that the invention was useless. Whilst 
disclosure of a specification may have been useful to some members of an 
industry, they also made prevention of technology export more difficult. 226 
223 Boehm, K., The British Patent System, Volume I: Administration [Cambridge University 
Press, 1967, Cambridge] 22-26; also see Boldrin, M. & Levine, D. K., Economic and 
Game Theory: Against Intellectual Monopoly [e-publication 2008] available at: 
<http://ievine.sscnet.ucla.edu/general/intellectuallagainstnew.htm> (Last Accessed: 1 st 
July 2009) Chapter 1. Appraises the use of patent monopoly by Watt and its effect on the 
technological advancement of steam engine technology. " ... [T]he evidence suggests that 
Boulton and Watt's patent retarded the high-pressure steam engine, and hence economic 
development, of about 16 years." At 15 
224 Liardet v. Johnson (1780) 1 Y. & C.C. 527. The defendant claimed that they had not 
infringed the plaintiffs patent on a method of making of stucco, because the specification 
did not properly describe the making of stucco. The case came before Lord Mansfield, 
who left deliberation of whether stucco could have been made by a workman from the 
specification. 
225 Adams, J., Intellectual property cases in Lord Mansfield's court notebooks (1987) 8(1) 
Journal of Legal History 18-24 
226 Cornish, W., Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, and Allied Rights [Sweet and 
Maxwell, 4th Ed., 3rd Impression, 1999, London] 112 
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1.1.6. Patent Reform 
For patents to become workable significant changes were needed; the 
difficulties in obtaining patents, the uncertainty of a patent's validity, the 
difficulties in deriving revenues from a patent, and the demands of the 
manufacturing industry, needed to be addressed. In 1883 substantial 
changes were made to the English patent system:227 Fees were reduced, 
a modern patent office was introduced in place of the Commissioners and 
applications were examined for formal defects and sufficiency of 
description.228 There was however, great reluctance in England to 
introduce a patent administration who would examine applications with 
respect to the prior art, even though this had been done by the USA patent 
office since 1836.229 Moreover, patent texts became available, suggesting 
that the concept of patent law had moved from sporadic and obscure acts 
to an accessible body of law that could begin to take a more concrete and 
coherent form. 23o With the ratification of international treaties231 requiring a 
reciprocation of patent protection232 the utility of the patent as an 
227 Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act 1883 
226 Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act 1883 
229 Cornish, W., Intel/ectual Property: Patents, Copyright, and Allied Rights [Sweet and 
Maxwell, 4th Ed., 3rd Impression, 1999, London) 112 
230 For example, Terrell, T., The Law and Practice Relating to Letters Patent for 
Inventions [Sweet & Sons, 1889, London); Frost, R., A Treatise on the Law and Practice 
Relating to Letters Patent for Inventions [Stevens & Haynes, 1891, London). Patent texts 
were also appearing in other jurisdictions: Bert, E., Brevets d'invention et marques de 
fabrique (Supplement au Genie Civil) [Societe des ingenieurs civils, 1891, Paris) 
(France); Walker, A. H., Text-Book of the Patent Laws of the United States of America [L. 
K. Strouse & Co., 1889, New York] (USA) 
231 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 20th March 1883 
232 Article 2, Paris Convention 1883: National Treatment for Nationals of Countries of the 
Union - the so-called principle of national treatment. 
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instrument of national market protectionism was almost ended.233 These 
significant changes were supplemented by progressive administrative 
reforms that led to the creation of the Patent Office in 1852.234 
Nevertheless, between 1883 and 1949, policy in the courts remained 
disfavourable to the grant of patent monopolies, as the monopolies were 
seen as being "generally contrary to the public interest.,,235 However, from 
1949 onwards the courts stance changed and policy once again became 
favourable to the grant of patent monopolies.236 This substantial change in 
attitude may have been the intellectual result of several factors. In 
particular the economic conditions prevalent in a post war torn Europe, 
and the growth of large corporations with an expansionist agenda were 
most likely important. For the corporations provided employment and the 
potential of economic recovery, they also had the means to convey their 
desire through a language appreciated by the judges. 
"It was the patent profession rather than the corporations 
themselves who saw the potential benefits of the patent system to 
the corporate sector. ,,237 
233 Little effort was made to reduce the extra costs of infringement actions brought against 
infringers in other member states of the Convention, with respect to the costs that would 
be incurred if the infringement and patent holder were of the same jurisdiction. 
234 Bently, L., and Sherman, B., Intellectual Property Law [Oxford University Press, 2004, 
2nd Ed., Oxford] 326 
235 Obiter dicta per Lord Salmon LJ, in Ethyl Corporations Patent [1972] RPC 169 at 193 
236 Obiter dicta per Lord Salmon LJ, in Ethyl Corporations Patent [1972] RPC 169 at 193 
237 Drahos, P; Braithwaite, J., Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge 
Economy? [Earthscan Publications Ltd, 15t Ed., 2002, London] 43 
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1.1.7. Dominion Comes 
Patent professionals, perhaps foremost of which was Edwin J. Prindle 
(New York Bar, Secretary of the Patent Committee of the National 
Research Council, President of the New York Patent Law Association, 
Chairman of the Patent Committee of the American Chemical Society), 
who saw the patent system as a powerful and fundamental tool of 
business.238 Prindle principally attributed the USA's ascent to global trade 
dominance as a result of the patent system.239 He advised businesses 
that the patent was the most effective method of controlling competition,240 
and enunciated the disadvantages of not making use of the patent 
system.241 
Corporations were quick to seize on a vehicle that could help them hold 
their lead-time and exclude others from what they perceived as their 
markets. In the larger corporations departments of intellectual property 
lawyers came into existence whose role was to strengthen the corporation 
through strategic management of intellectual property I to police the work of 
the corporation's research scientists so that none of their valuable 
238 Drahos, P; Braithwaite, J., Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge 
Economy? [Earthscan Publications Ltd, 1st Ed., 2002, Londonj44 
239 Prindle, E. J., 'The marvellous performance of the American patent system' (1927-28) 
10 Journal of the Patent Office Society 255, at 258; Prindle, E. J., Patents as a factor in 
manufacturing [The Engineering Magazine: Works Management Library, 1908, New York] 
13 
240 Prindle, E. J., Patents as a factor in manufacturing [The Engineering Magazine: Works 
Management Library, 1908, New York] 14, 81 
241 Prindle, E. J., Patents as a factor in manufacturing [The Engineering Magazine: Works 
Management Library, 1908, New Yorkj102 
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technologies could be taken up by competitors and to look for weakness 
and opportunity in their competitor's intellectual property. 
It was not the patent system as such that gave the USA rapid global trade 
dominance, but rather the economic hardships the European powers 
suffered during World War I. Once the USA corporations had emerged 
onto these markets and begun to cater to the demands their reeling 
European competitors were unable to supply, the patent became an 
effective tool for baring competitor's recovery and preventing entry to the 
new technology markets the growing corporations were able to buy up or 
create. 
Once this dominant equilibrium was established the patent served as a 
buffer between the market incumbent and any would be competition. 
Indeed the foresight of Prindle and his colleagues in promoting the use of 
intellectual property to business had placed USA business on a good 
footing to enter foreign markets with impunity. Cartels were illegal but the 
patent presented a legal means of dividing up markets. Moreover, it was a 
device recognised in most of the industrial nations, even if it had fallen into 
disfavour as it had in Britain. Corporations and the USA patent profession 
saw the opportunity to expand the benefits of their control and intellection 
property agreements were pushed into the international forum. Better still 
the problems of enforcement previously experienced by commodity cartels 
can now be dealt with in the public forum as government granted 
monopolies. The technology cartels having experienced the monopoly 
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power that their intellectual property walls granted, pressed for the 
establishment of international treaties favouring their interests. Europe, 
particularly Germany,242 readily followed in the USA's wake. After all it 
had corporations of its own and the developing countries moving towards 
their own semi-liberation from colonial military dominance were rich with 
resources and ripe for technological feudalism. 
1.2. Rise of the Pharmaceutical Industry 
The pharmaceutical industry owes its origins to a chemical industry that 
developed out of the demands of other industries. The beginning of the 
chemical industry might be linked with the changes in philosophy and the 
development of an approach that could be termed scientific to the 
production of sulphuric acid, which occurred during the Eighteenth 
Century.243 
By the Nineteenth Century, discoveries and dissemination of theories 
concerning organic compounds244 were chiefly responsible for the rise of a 
242 Despite the severe attenuation of its industrial power as a result of two world wars still 
retained its industrial expertise. 
243 Aftalion, F. A., History of the International Chemical Industry. Benfey, O. T. (Trans.) 
[University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991, Philadelphia) 10-11 
244 Laboratory synthesis of organic compounds that had previously only been obtained 
from the nature became possible. For example the industrial synthesis of ethanol: "By 
heating carbon (coke or charcoal) in the electric arc surrounded by an atmosphere of 
hydrogen acetylene C2H2 is formed. By an easy process acetylene can be made to 
combine with more hydrogen so as to produce ethylene, C2H4. Ethylene disolves in 
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new industry concerned with the manufacture of synthetic dyestuffs. 245 
Driven by certain factors such as the demand for new and durable colours, 
the need to dispose of coal tar and trends in pure chemistry research, 
fashion and medicine, the industry grew quickly.246 
1.2.1. New Research Paradigm 
German dyestuff companies initially on no stronger footing than those in 
Britain and elsewhere realised the benefits of highly organised industrial 
research.247 The degree of testing necessary to achieve a successful dye 
disfavoured the single chemist. A large team of unskilled chemists under 
the direction of a skilled chemist could, if working systematically, perform 
many more tests than a single far more skilled chemist ever could. 248 
Once a candidate for a successful dye was discovered, its refinement and 
the careful organisation of its production could be passed on to a 
dedicated team of experienced scientists. Indeed with this model of 
concentrated sulphuric acid, and the compounds thus formed when mixed with water and 
distilled, yields alcohol, CeH20. The alcohol formed is identical in every respect with 
alcohol produced by fermentation of sugar." Tilden, W. A., Chemical Discovery and 
Invention in the 2dh Century [George Routledge & Sons Ltd, 1917, 2nd Ed., Revised, New 
Yorkj834 
245 Dutfield, G., Intellectual Property Rights and the Life Science Industries: A Twentieth 
Century History [Ashgate, Aldershot, 1st Ed., 2003]73-87; For a detailed account see: 
Travis, A. S., The Rainbow Makers: Origins of the Synthetic Dyestuffs Industry In 
Western Europe [Lehigh University Press, 1st Ed., 1993, Lehigh]mm 
246 Travis, A. S. (Ed.). "150 Years of the Coal-Tar Dye Industry, 1856-2006," special 
issue of History and Technology, 22(2) (2006) 115-118, 131-224 
247 Drahos, P; Braithwaite, J., Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge 
Economy? [Earthscan Publications Ltd, 1 st Ed., 2002, London] 40 
246 Beer, J. J., 'Coal Tar Dye Manufacture and the Origins of the Modern Industrial 
Research Laboratory' (1958) 49/sis 123-131 
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industrial research and production the chemists came into contact with 
many more discoveries than a lone investigator could, and thereby gained 
experience phenomenally faster. To the rest of the dyestuff industry it 
seemed that within a relatively short time the German dye manufactures 
had the formulations for an enormous number of dyes and experts 
unmatched by any other dye producing nation. By combining this mode of 
research savvy with skilful use of secrecy and patents to maintain and 
prolong their lead-times German dye manufactures were able to dominate 
the global dye market. 
1.2.2. Dominating Colour 
Patents are likely to have played a key role in control of the organic 
dyestuff market, especially in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The 
German Patent Law of 1877249 provided a common patent regime for the 
German states and equipped the burgeoning organic dyestuff 
manufactures with a process patent valid across the whole of Germany?50 
Between 1877 and 1904 approximately fifty per cent of the total number of 
chemical patents in Germany were related to the dyestuff industry. Out of 
the 12,128 chemical patents granted in Germany during this period, 
249 The act was responsible for the creation of the Kaiserliches Patentamt (the Imperial 
Patent Office) in Berlin. Auspiciously, the first German patent granted was a process 
patent (product patents were not available under the Act) for a red ultramarine colour by 
the inventor Johann Zeltner of NUrnberger Ultramarin-Fabrik. Retrieved from Deutsches 
Patent und Markenamt history. Available at: 
<http://www.dpma.de/english/the_office/history/index.html> (Last Accessed: 151 July 
2009) 
250 Marsh, U., Strategies for success: Research organisations in German chemical 
companies and IG Farben until 1936 (1994) 12(1) History and Technology: 223-232 
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approximately 3447 patents were for processes of bleaching and dyeing, 
and 3733 patents were related to processes for preparing colours, 
lacquers and varnishes.251 Through these patents the German dyestuff 
manufacturers were able to systematically exclude competitors from 
German territories and influence the dyestuff trade in other countries. 252 In 
fact by the end of the Nineteenth Century ownership of sixty-six per cent of 
chemical patents in the USA were distributed between three German 
companies - Hoechst, Bayer, and BASF.253 The world's dye market was 
also German dominated, with German firms controlling sixty per cent. 254 
As mentioned patents were not the only tool successfully exploited by the 
fledgling German chemical industry. Secrecy was also employed to 
advantage in the lengthening of lead times, and particularly potent where 
misleading patents were taken for processes that were in reality kept 
secret. Many German companies skilfully employed a combination of 
patents and secrecy against potential imitators.255 
251 Haber, L.F., The Chemical Industry During the Nineteenth Century [Clarendon Press, 
1958, Oxford] 293 
252 Liebenau, J., 'The management of high technology: The use of information in the 
German chemical industry, 1890-1930.' In Kudo, A, and Hara, T., (eds.) International 
Cartels in Business History [University of Tokyo Press, 1992, Tokyo] 65 
253 Liebenau, J., 'The management of high technology: The use of information in the 
German chemical industry, 1890-1930.' In Kudo, A, and Hara, T., (eds.) International 
Cartels in Business History [University of Tokyo Press, 1992, Tokyo] 65 
254 Muller Thurow, G., 'Industrialisation of Invention: a Case Study from the German 
Chemical Industry' (1982) 73/sis 363-368 
255 Hounshell, D. A., and Smith, J. K., Science and Strategy: DuPont R&D, 1902-1980 
[Cambridge University Press, 1988, 1st Ed., Cambridge] 89-90 
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With dyestuffs composed of different compounds, as many of the 
compositional compounds as possible were patented. Those compounds, 
which could not be patented, were kept secret, as was the precise quantity 
of each compound in the dyestuff. Moreover, to further confound imitators 
misleading patents were registered. Sometimes an entire class of 
compounds would be patented, with only a few possessing the necessary 
properties for the dyestuff. Thus, imitators had a difficult and expensive 
task in discovering the correct composition of a marketed dye. Even when 
they were able to recreate a close imitation there was usually a significant 
delay between the availability of the original dye and the imitations. The 
most lucrative time for a new dye was its first entry to the market and the 
lead-time derived from this combination of patents and secrecy 
strengthened the profitability of new dyes. Typically those dyes whose 
composition remained undiscovered by imitators commanded prices of 40-
50 per cent more than the standard colours of known composition.256 
Traditionally doctors had produced their own medicines,257 however as 
extraction of alkaloids became increasingly complex in the Twentieth 
Centur/58 some chemical manufacturers saw the opportunity to produce 
256 Arora, A.. 'Patents, licensing and market structure in the chemical industry,' (1997) 
26(4-5) Research Policy 391-403 
257 Poynter, F. N. L., The Evolution of Pharmacy [Pitman Medical, 1965, Londonj131-149 
258 Crellin, J. K., 'The Growth of Professionalisation in Nineteenth Century British 
Pharmacy' (1967) 11 Medical History 215-227 
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standard packages of chemicals from which doctors could continue to 
produce their medicines.259 
1.2.3. Dyes and Medicine 
The dyestuff manufacturers diversified their production by converting dye 
intermediates into chemicals that could be used to treat human conditions. 
Within the academic-industrial symbiosis dyes themselves also found a 
direct application to medical research with Paul Ehrlich's utilisation of dye 
tone changes to demonstrate reduction and oxidation in living cells. 
Ehrlich was thus able to develop a cellular surface model. Dyes found 
further application in medical research, as did the paradigm of research 
occurring in the German dyestuff manufacturers. Ehrlich's research team 
seeking a chemical that exhibited anti-microbial activity began a 
systematic screening of the chemical derivatives of atoxyl, a dangerously 
toxic chemical reported by Antoine Bechamp and used to treat skin 
illness.26o Their coordinated examination of the biological activity of a lead 
compound through systematic chemical modifications was a first, and has 
since been the basis for most modern day pharmaceutical research. 
Arsphenamine, later trade named Salvarsan, was reported in 1908 by 
Jordan Wilson as a discovery resulting from the systematic screening 
method advocated by Ehrlich. An analogue of an azo dye and arsenic, 
Salvarsan is both a good example of the closeness of the dyestuff industry 
to the manufacture of medicines; and of the developing understanding of 
259 Sneader, W., Drug Discovery: the Evolution of Modem Medicines [John Wiley, 1985, 
London] 41-42 
260 Ihde, A. J. The Development of Modem Chemistry [Dover, 1984, New York] 697-698 
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medicines, since it is an artificial chemical compound containing arsenic 
that does not produce the ordinary effects of arsenic poisoning, but is still 
toxic to Spirochoota pal/ida. 
Until the mid Nineteenth Century the approach to drug therapeutics had 
remained entirely empirical. However, with the first chemical analyses of 
naturally occurring drugs the mechanism of drug action could be 
understood in physiological terms. What emerged was a new paradigm to 
the invention of medicines. Chemical and physiological knowledge, rather 
than trial and error, became the foundation of medicine development. As 
the eminent chemist Sir William Tilden noted in 1917, 
'".[t]he discovery of new remedies depends more and more on a 
combination of chemical and physiological knowledge. ,261 
1.2.4. Consequence of War 
World War I instigated a significant change to the German domination of 
the synthetic dye industry in the United States. With the British blockade of 
Germany, German dye exports could not reach the USA which suffered a 
dye shortage. With the loss of German chemical products not only the 
USA was to suffer a shortage of chemicals, but also other countries such 
as Britain. Which caused recognition of the paucity of skilled chemists and 
261 Tilden. W. A.. Chemical Discovery and Invention in the 20th Century [George 
Routledge & Sons Ltd. 1917. 2nd Ed .. Revised. New York] 339 
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a renewed consideration of the academic-industrial symbiosis instituted in 
Germany at the beginning of the Nineteenth century.262 
Unlike Britain, the production of organic chemicals in the USA prior to the 
war had been very limited, with most of the market supplied by European 
companies. For example, chemicals for use in university and industrial 
research laboratories were imported from Germany (Kahlbaum's 
Chemicals) and Great Britain (Boots Ltd.).263 DuPont, a manufacturer of 
gunpowder and the largest supplier of gunpowder to the United States 
military, had been diversified after rulings against it under the Sherman 
Act. 264 It saw potential in the USA's dye shortage for the development of 
one of its diversified branches and found itself well placed in infrastructure 
and facilities to assume the supply deficit resulting from the German 
dyestuff manufacturers' inability to get their products to the USA's market. 
262 Johnson, J. A., 'the academic-industrial symbiosis in German chemical research, 
1905-1939' in Lesch, J. E. (Ed.) The German chemical industry in the twentieth century 
[Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000, new York] 15-56; For a detailed treatment see 
Johnson, J. A., The Kaiser's Chemists: Science and Modernization in Imperial Germany 
[Chapel Hill Press, 1990, Chapel Hill] 
263 Fisher, H. L. "Organic Chemistry. 1876-1951," in "Chemistry: Key to Better Living," 
Diamond Jubilee Volume, American Chemical Society, WaShington, DC. (1951) 52- 57 
264 15 U.S.C. §1-7. The impact of the Sherman Act's provisions were significant for 
business, as hereto the objective of business had been to grow to monopolise markets 
and thereby control and direct trade. This was no longer overtly possible. 15 U.S.C. §1: 
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be 
illegal." And, 15 U.S.C. §2: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
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part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony ... " For earlier UK control over monopolies see, 51 & 52 Hen. 3 
Stat. 1 ; 51 & 52 Hen. 3 Stat.6; 23 Edw. 3; 27 Edw. 3, Stat.2, c.25; 25 Hen. 8 c.2 
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Collaborating with a British firm that had taken over a confiscated Hoechst 
factory, DuPont quickly invested $11 million USD to develop expertise in 
the dyestuff manufacture.265 
Moreover following World War I, Dupont's prosperity continued. As a 
result of the hyperinflation in Germany and also more directly from the war 
reparations266 DuPont was able to obtain from the Chemical Foundation 
Incorporated non-exclusive licenses, on a royalty basis, for all German 
patents in the USA.267 Thus, DuPont was well positioned to develop its 
global chemical presence. However Germany still possessed 
considerable chemical expertise and DuPont. despite the difficulties 
engendered by trade secrecy laws, undertook recruiting German chemists 
from their German companies by offering ten to fifteen times their 
salaries.268 To further insulate the USA's markets from foreign companies, 
trade agreements and extremely high import tariffs269 were put into place, 
thereby ensuring the growth of national corporations. 
265 Hounshell, D. A., and Smith, J. K., Science and Strategy: DuPont R&D, 1902-1980 
[Cambridge University Press, 1988, 16t Ed., Cambridge] 94 
266 Treaty of Versailles 1919, articles: 231-248 
267 See Steen, K., 'German chemicals and American politics' in Lesch, J. E. (Ed.) The 
German chemical industry in the twentieth century [Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000, 
New York] 334-345 
268 Hounshell, D. A., and Smith, J. K., Science and Strategy: DuPont R&D, 1902-1980 
[Cambridge University Press, 1988, 16\ Ed., Cambridge] 96 
269 On the USA's import tariffs see Irwin, D. A., 'From Smoot-Hawley to Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements: Changing the course of US Trade Policy in the 1930s' in Bordo, M. D., 
Goldin, C. D., and White E. N. (eds.) The Defining Moment: The Great Depression and 
the American Economy in the 2dh Century [Chicago University Press, 1998, Chicago] 
327-333 
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The post war period 1916 to 1923 was also marked by substantial 
industrial support for the production of chemical literature and research 
organisations. Most importantly the emergence of industry funded 
organisations constituted of an academic-industry symbiosis.27o Britain 
having found itself during the war short of trained chemists able to produce 
the essential intermediates it had previously imported from Germany for its 
industries undertook a serious program of chemistry instruction.271 
As a result of these changes significant breakthroughs in knowledge 
occurred272 and the synthetic dyestuff manufacturers, like DuPont, trading 
in the developing pharmaceutical market, were well placed to take 
advantage of the new knowledge. 
Competition was eschewed in favour of cartels both national and global. 
These cartels employed contracts, patent licenses, and economic force to 
270 Kohler, R., 'A Policy for the Advancement of Science: the Rockefeller Foundation 
1924-1929' (1978) 16 Minerva 480-515; Johnson, J. A., 'the academic-industrial 
symbiosis in German chemical research, 1905-1939' in Lesch, J. E. (Ed.) The German 
chemical industry in the twentieth century [Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000, New York} 
16 
271 Matthews, L. G., History of Pharmacy in Britain (E. & S. Livingstone (Longman Books), 
1962, Edinburgh and London] 118-127 
272 For example, the creation of organic compounds increased exponentially after 
Marcellin Berthelot demonstrated how, from starting with minerals, carbon can be 
combined step by step with hydrogen, oxygen and nitrogen to produce organic 
compounds. One example of the importance of Berthelot's work is the synthetic 
formation of ethanol, C2HeO. From his hypotheses Berthelot was able to design a 
synthesis. 
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maintain and increase their market shares and to deter competitors from 
entering the market.273 
Following the miracle successes that Howard Florey and Ernst Chain were 
able to demonstrate from penicillin, the immediate benefit of penicillin to 
the war effort was realised. Fledgling pharmaceutical companies received 
enormous government funding in order to scale up their production 
facilities and create penicillin manufacturing plants. Ironically, Florey 
believed it would be inappropriate to patent penicillin.274 
A sustained demand for penicillin arose from the civilian population, 
ensuring that penicillin manufacturers did not need to downsize. 
Moreover, with the reception of penicillin a burgeoning demand for more 
wonder drugs was stimulated. 
The post war reception of science and technology was far more favourable 
than ever previously. Technology had provided the decisive elements to 
the engagements and thus was the key to future advantage. As such 
policy needed to be adapted to promote science and innovation, but it also 
273 Good accounts of this period can be found in: Haber, L.F., The Chemical Industry 
During the Nineteenth Century [Clarendon Press, 1958, Oxford]; Haber, L.F., The 
Chemical Industry: 1900-1930 [Clarendon Press, 1971, Oxford]; Haynes, W., 1954, 
American Chemical Industry, Volumes 1-6 [Van Nostrand, 1954, New York]; and 
Hounshell, D. A., and Smith, J. K., Science and Strategy: Dupont R&D, 1902-1980 
[Cambridge University Press, 1988, 1 st Ed., Cambridge] 
274 Doherty, P., 'Howard Florey' (November 3,1999) Time Magazine. Available at: 
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/O.9171.33700.OO.html> (Last Accessed: 1 st 
July 2009) 
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had to favour the growth of national industries and favour national interests 
overseas. 
1.3. Role of Pharmaceuticals in Society 
Pharmaceuticals are intrinsically linked to the longevity and welfare of 
humans. As a result they are an important part of a complex web of 
interactions: both social and economic in nature. Linked to human health, 
pharmaceutical demand is generally irregular and unpredictable. This is 
especially illustrated by the dearth of vaccines at the outbreak of 
pandemics275 and the number of medicines disposed of each year.276 
Moreover, pharmaceuticals are not necessarily available or researched 
even if large populations suffer from an illness or condition. This is 
illustrated by the observation that a large proportion of diseases, perhaps 
ninety per cent, occur in the tropics but only five per cent of global health 
resources and research investment are directed towards those 
diseases.277 Within Healthcare the role a pharmaceuticals is diverse. 
275 Lopez, R A., and Zorzopulos, J., 'Vaccine shortage for pandemic influenza: Can it be 
solved?' (2006) 24(15) Vaccine 2701; Cinti, 5., 'Pandemic Influenza: Are We Ready?' 
(2005) 3(3) Disaster Management & Response 61-67; Daems, R., Del Giudice, G., 
Rappuoli, R, 'Anticipating crisis: Towards a pandemic flu vaccination strategy through 
alignment of public health and industrial policy' (2005) 23 (50) Vaccine 5732-5742 
276 Jesson, J., Pocock, R, Wilson, K., 'Reducing medicines waste in the community' 
(2005) 6(2) Primary Health Care Research and Development 117-124 
277 Godal, T., 'Fighting the Parasites of Poverty: Public Research, Private Industry and 
Tropical Diseases' (1994) 264 Science 1864-1866 at 1864 
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Pharmaceutical therapies can substantially reduce or substitute for 
hospitalisation, surgical intervention and enable quicker recovery times. 
1.3.1. Subjective Effect 
Medicines can also very individualistic in terms of the pharmacodynamics 
and pharmacokinetics that a particular user might experience. This 
complexity arises because an individual may be more or less sensitive to a 
medicine's active ingredient. Which may result in a range of responses 
that differ from other people undergoing the same pharmaceutical therapy. 
A wide variance of differences can arise from particularly adverse 
reactions leading to death to complete unresponsiveness to the drug. The 
most likely explanation for these variances is the extent of our 
physiological and biochemical knowledge. Thus, over time as our 
knowledge of physiology and biochemistry improve the responsivity of 
given patient to a medicine should become foreseeable. 
This difference in the performance of medicines is particularly visible when 
competing patented pharmaceuticals for the same condition are available 
on the market. Poignant examples of the variance in effectiveness of 
active ingredients that differ very minimally can be seen amongst 
statins.278 Where it is critical the administration of a pharmaceutical will 
immediately exhibit effectiveness it is especially important that sufficient 
information is available to permit informed selection. Within the context of 
statins, post-acute myocardial infarction in elderly patients is extremely 
278 Franco, 0., Peeters, A., Looman, C., Bonneux, L., 'Cost effectiveness of statins in 
coronary heart disease' (2005) 59 J Epidemiol Community Health 927-933 
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illustrative of this.279 As such it is important that medicines are made 
available with sufficient information to allow informed choices to be made 
in their selection, whether this is by a qualified healthcare professionals or 
a health care professional in conjunction with the consumer. 
1.3.2 Patient Choice 
Unlike most other areas of consumerism, the patient (consumer) has little 
choice with regard to most contemporary pharmaceuticals and there are a 
number of ways in which this distinguishes pharmaceuticals as a product 
from other objects of consumerism. Unless a medicine is out of patent, or 
has been extremely successful economically and the originator did not tie 
down all opportunities for market entry, there will be no other medicines on 
the market with bioequivalence. Moreover, the person choosing the 
medicine is usually a physician and not the consumer.280 Another factor is 
that in some cases the consumer pays indirectly through insurance 
premiums or national health contributions and these collective schemes 
will set choice limiting parameters for payouts. 
279 Zhou, Z., Rahme, E., Abrahamowicz, M., Pilote, L., 'Survival Bias Associated with 
Time-to-Treatment Initiation in Drug Effectiveness Evaluation: A Comparison of Methods' 
(2005) 162 (10) American Journal of Epidemiology 1016-1023 
280 Since an institution or individual can be decisive in which medicines are purchased for 
a large number of people, incentives to that institution may playa larger part in product 
validation than the superiority or price of a medicine. For example see, US Department of 
Justice, 'U.S. Files Suit Against Johnson & Johnson for Paying Kickbacks to Nation's 
Largest Nursing Home Pharmacy,' (15 January 2010) Available at: 
<http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/January/10-civ-042.html> (Last Accessed 13th April 
2011. Omnicare Inc. v. UnitedHealth Group Inc., PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc., and 
RxSolutions, Inc., d/b/a Prescription Solutions 629 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2011) 
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Legal access to pharmaceuticals is controlled by national policy, which is 
usually implemented for drugs which are not considered illegal or 
dangerously unviable, through two modes of distribution: prescription 
drugs and pharmaceuticals which can be purchased in licensed outlets 
and are referred to as over-the-counter medicines. 
Prescription pharmaceuticals tend to be more expensive and newer than 
over-the-counter drugs. This is a result of two factors. Firstly prescription 
drugs tend to be more expensive because almost all the active ingredients 
of the prescription drug will be patented, whilst the patents on active 
ingredients of over-the-counter medicines will have expired or lapsed. 
Secondly, over-the-counter pharmaceuticals are usually weaker 
formulations of older prescription drugs that have been deemed safe and 
effective for over the counter sales. 
1.3.3. Safe Choice 
For safety reasons prescription medicines are only available for a specific 
person, specified by the prescription and by then by a label attached to the 
packaging of the medicine. The person to whom the prescription is 
addressed is not legally authorised to share their prescription medicine 
with anyone else. By doing so they not only initiate tortuous liability, they 
may also be committing a criminal act, and be guilty of breaching their 
license to use the medicine from the patent owners. However,Over-the-
counter medicines that are purchased by one person may be utilised by 
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another providing that the instructions on the enclosed information are 
complied with. 
There is a sensible reason for the restricted use pedantry on prescription 
medicines. Prescription formulations of medicines are invariably much 
more potent than their OTC counterparts. As a result misuse of 
prescription formulations of medicines poses a greater risk to the user than 
an OTC formulation. As a proportion of autopsies examination findings 
prescription medicines are responsible for three times as many deaths as 
chemicals classified in law as narcotics. For example, an analysis of 
168,900 autopsies conducted in Florida in 2007 found cocaine, heroin and 
methamphetamines resulted in 989 deaths, whilst prescription medicines 
killed 3,071 people (2,328 by opioid painkillers and 743 by 
pharmaceuticals containing benzodiazepine). 281 
In the USA, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 1938 empowered the FDA 
to undertake some regulation of food, cosmetics and pharmaceuticals, but 
did not provide clear guidelines on which medicines could only be sold 
following recommendation by a qualified physician and which would be 
OTCs. Subsequent amendments in 1951 and 1962 required that 
medicines could only be categorised OTe iff they were effective and 
281 Gutierrez. D., 'Prescription Drugs Kill 300 Percent More Americans than Illegal Drugs' 
(November 10, 2008) Natural News. Available at: 
<http://www.naturalnews.com/024765.html> (Last Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
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safe.282 Which is why for some prescription medicines a weaker OTe 
formulation is available. 
Declassification presents serious health considerations, as there are no 
organized systems for reporting the side effects and adverse indications 
which over-the-counter medicines might cause. As a result regulatory 
authorities and pharmaceutical manufacturers have no expedient method 
or clear indication of how widespread adverse incidents of over-the-
counter drugs are. Frontline practitioners, particularly physicians 
undertaking research involving some observation of the over-the-counter 
medicines, and thereby medical journal publications are usually the first 
indications that an over-the-counter medicine posses a health care risk. 
Another aspect of pharmaceutical labelling is an expiry date indicating a 
time after which it is unadvisable for the medicine to be used. The expiry 
date, in addition to health warning, and listing contents are traits medicinal 
packaging shares with processed foods. In the case of medicines an 
expiry date exists because the active components of medicines may 
degrade with time.283 
1.3.4. Consequential Choice 
Pharmaceuticals possess another important characteristic that defines 
their role in society. It is the nature of pharmaceuticals to provide 
282 Wax, P. M., 'Elixirs, Diluents, and the Passage of the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act' (1995) 122(6) History of Medicine 456-461 
283 Expiry dates may also serve the function of discouraging parallel importing. 
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satisfaction only in the event of a perceived reduction or elimination of 
illness. Moreover because of the complex web of interactions and 
dependencies in contemporary society the effects of a successful 
pharmaceutical therapy or the absence of such a therapy may have 
considerable effects for other human beings. 
Indeed, not developing a cure for a debilitating or lethal ailment has 
economic ramifications to the productivity of an industrious individual. For 
society in toto prevention of a debilitating illness will have an economic 
significance as the debilitated individual will become partially or totally 
dependant on other providers. Death or debilitation of a friend or loved 
one is likely to have serious social effect, especially where those directly 
affected are aware that death or debilitation were likely avoidable. Caring 
for debilitated people, particularly by their friends or loved ones is well 
documented to cause psychological trauma.284 Moreover, regardless of 
whether the carer is vocational or professional, caring results in a loss to 
net social productivity; as labour, and therefore productivity, must be 
diverted to care for the unnecessarily debilitated individual. Premature 
dead also present a grave attenuation of social productivity through loss of 
284 Most standard guides for carers include sections on how to deal with the 
physchological burdens of caring and how to recognise symptoms that they may be 
suffering as a result of their caring activities. There are a formidable number of 
publications on the subject, two recent journal publications are: Noble, A. J., and Schenk, 
T., 'Posttraumatic stress disorder in the family and friends of patients who have suffered 
spontaneous subarachnoid hemorrhage' (2008) 109(6) Journal of Neurosurgery 1027-
1033; Barton, K., and Jackson, C., 'Reducing symptoms of trauma among carers of 
people with psychosis: pilot study examining the impact of writing about care giving 
experiences' (2008) 42(8) Australian and New Zealand journal of psychiatry 693-701 
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their skills and experience, as well as their contributions to social 
networks. Consider, for example that between 1996 and 1998 
" ... insurers and health maintenance organizations spent 16.8% 
more on prescription drugs.,,285 
Over a twelve-year period, encompassing 1996 to 2008, this rise has been 
around 27% depending on the source of data, despite a greater spending 
in volume on unpatented medicines.286 This rise reflects only a small 
portion of the cost both socially and economically of having high prices 
with respect to the cost of pharmaceuticals. Where a pharmaceutical is 
too expensive or the success of treatment to low to meet insurers 
parameters, neither insurers nor health care organisations will pay for that 
pharmaceutical. 
There are also the consequences for personal integrity associated with 
illness. Certain illnesses have a social impact and therefore although not 
life threatening or debilitating these illnesses can inflict serious social 
consequences again leading to a loss of social welfare and net productivity 
for a society. 
Yet there is a cost involved in creating a cure and making it available to 
those who need it. The method of meeting those costs successfully and of 
285 Wall Street Journal, 29 June 1999, 84 
286 Composite data, sources: National Association of Health Underwriters; America's 
Health Insurance Plans; Australian Health Insurance Association. 
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providing an infrastructure for research, development and education must 
be considered. There are decisions to be made about the priority of 
medicine development. There are a plethora of questions that need to be 
resolved on moral and practical levels: lN11o, ought/can have access to a 
medicine? For example how much time or productivity does successfully 
treating an individual with a medicine save when without treatment that 
individual would otherwise be unproductive due to sickness or death? 
How can we ensure availability and accessibility of medicines? Or 
recognise when administering medicines will lead to a successful 
outcome? What is the economic cost of creating an accessible supply of 
medicines? What is the economic cost of limiting access to medicines? 
What is the social cost of limiting access to medicines? What is the most 
efficient manner to balance the social and economic costs of providing 
access to medicines? Is there a conflict between efficiency and equity? Is 
there a priority to the allocation of resources to medicines and if so then 
how can it be determined? What scheme of morality should we adopt for 
deciding answers to these questions? Indeed if there are answers then 
they will come from policy that must be decided from the prevalent 
relations and values within a society. 
The pharmaceutical possessed of its own special niche in the life of 
humankind has been given a unique legal identity. These distinguishing 
characteristics are essential to an understanding of the complexity of 
issues surrounding pharmaceutical innovation and its relation to 
pharmaceutical patents in the present system. 
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1.4 Characterisation of Pharmaceutical Patents 
The patent resulting from the agenda of patent lawyers, industry leaders 
and post-war national protectionism is a complex creation of political 
agenda and pragmatic, if policy driven, decisions by courts287 and trend 
setting repeat players.288 It is a legal creation. It is a construct that does 
not share the attendant natural characteristics of real property, such as the 
physical limitation of real property to be used by a physically limited 
number of persons. As a result the principal demarcation of what 
characterises a pharmaceutical patent comes from the interpretation of 
legislation and the appreciation of scientific literature, and by institutions 
qualified to award or rescind patents. Together these institutions decide 
what can qualify as a patent on pharmaceutical subject matter. 
1.4.1. Patentable Subject Matter 
In the United Kingdom only the UK Intellectual Property Office and the 
European Patent Office (EPO) have jurisdiction to grant patents. Patents 
granted by the EPO are treated as if issued by the UK Intellectual Property 
287 For example consider, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303. 100 S.Ct. 2204. 65 
L.Ed.2d 144; discussed in, Lumelsky, A., 'Diamond v. Chakrabarty: Gauging Congress's 
Response to Dynamic Statutory Interpretation by the Supreme Court' (2005) 39 (3) U.S.F. 
L. Rev. 641-692 
288 For example consider the frequency of mentions within the UK patent practice manual 
that are derived from cases involving the following companies: Bayer, Ciba-Geigy, Eli 
Lilly, Glaxo Group, Kirin-Amgen Inc, Merck & Co Inc, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Pfizer, and Schering. The UK Intellectual Property Office Manual of Patent Practice is 
available from: <http://www.ipo.gov.uklp-manual-practice.htm> (Last Accessed 22 
February 2010) 
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Office.289 For the most part the shared jurisdiction to grant patents is 
unproblematic.29o UK regulations, practice directions and statutory 
implementing amendments closely follow the frequent European 
regulations on patents. It is from these regulations that the scope of 
patentable pharmaceutical subject matter in the UK is defined. 
At present pharmaceutical patents may be held on almost any chemical or 
biological material. There are procedural considerations such as the 
formalities of application, revocation or invalidated and up to date payment 
of renewal fees, but these are less interesting than the actual scope of 
what is legally, as opposed to administratively, permitted to be a valid 
pharmaceutical patent. 
With respect to biological material291 Patents Act 1977 Schedule A2, which 
implements Directive 98/44/EC, provides that although biological products 
and processes are not excluded from the class of patentable objects per 
se, certain biological subject matter cannot constitute a patentable 
invention. For example, the human body or the simple discovery of one of 
its elements292 are not patentable per se, nor are animal and plant 
269 Patents Act 1977, §77(1} as amended. 
290 UK patent decisions exert an important influence on other jurisdictions, especially the 
European Union. Consider 'purposive construction,' Lord Diplock in Catnic Components 
Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd [1982] RPC 183, 243; Kirin-Amgen v. Hoechst Marion Roussel 
Limited [2004] UKHL 46; [2005] R.P.C. 9 
291 " ... any material containing genetic information and capable of reproducing itself or 
being reproduced in a biological system." Directive 98/44/EC Art.2(1 )(a) 
292 Patents Act 1977 Sch. A2 para. 3(a). See Directive 98/44/EC Art.5(1) 
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varieties.293 However, the technical process used to isolate or produce 
elements from the human body, including genes, may be patentable. For 
example Nuclear Factor KB, which is a key regulator of the human immune 
response to infection, is patented.294 Furthermore, with regard to the 
narrow scope given to the definition of 'variety' by the EPO it is possible 
through careful drafting of patent claims to in effect patent animal and 
plant varieties.295 This will only be possible where the distinctive 
characteristic of the variety is the product of a patented modification or 
gene that is not naturally expressed. For example, a seed plant that is 
capable of reproducing the distinctive characteristic would not be capable 
of being a 'patented variety.,296 The patent on the modification or gene 
that gives rise to the distinctive characteristic of the variety however would 
be valid. For a patentable 'animal variety' there is a further hurdle that the 
genetic modification of the identity of the animal is not 'likely' to cause the 
animal suffering without any substantial medical benefit to humans or the 
animal.297 As such actual manifestations of animal and plant varieties that 
293 Patents Act 1977 Sch. A2 para. 3(f). See Directive 98/44/EC Art.4(1) 
294 Garber, K., Patently absurd? (2006) 24 Nature Biotechnology 737-739 
295 European Directive 98/44/EC Art.4(1). Also consider the European Patent Convention 
1973 (as amended and revised in 2007) which states in Article 53 "Patents shall not be 
granted in respect of biotechnological inventions which, in particular, concern: (d) 
processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them 
suffering without any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also animals 
resulting from such processes." 
296 Consider, Patent Act 1977 §60(5)(a)(b), or in a commercial context for plants 
§60(5)(g), or §60(5)(h) for an animals. 
297 European Patent Convention 1973 Article 53(d) 
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can legally only be obtained by licence from the patent holder of the 
genetic modification are relatively few. 298 
1 .4.2. Patent Strategy 
Pharmaceuticals are obtained either by extraction of chemicals from 
organisms, through chemical synthesis, or a combination of both. The 
biologically active substance is called the active ingredient. The active 
ingredient is the most important component of the medicine and the most 
valuable. Patents will be filed on as many different aspects of obtaining, 
refining, testing and administering an active ingredient as possible. If an 
organism is the source of a chemical or gene needed for the formulation of 
an active ingredient then it is advantageous if either the organism or the 
components essential to the creation of the desired extract within an 
organism can be patented.299 
The method of extracting the desired component of the active ingredient 
from an organism might in some cases, where it is novel and capable of 
industrial application even on a small scale, yield other patents. The 
processes of combining chemicals are another possibility for a patent. 
The combinations of one, two or three chemicals might in itself seem 
obvious. Particularly, if the mechanism is one that is well documented. 
However, if there is a chain of reactions, which will of course involve 
specific conditions, such as temperature and pressure, then it is possible 
298 Examples would include organisms incorporating genetic use restriction technology 
299 Moore v. Regents of the University of California (51 Cal. 3d 120; 271 Cal. Rptr. 146; 
793 P.2d 479) 
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through careful drafting to remove most vestiges of obviousness. 
Furthermore, many reactions proceed more expediently in the presence of 
a catalyst. The use of that catalyst and all similar catalysts, even if well 
known, might be describable as finding a new application in the particular 
reaction at hand providing it is not explicitly documented in the state-of-
the-art. Whilst not 'new' or 'novel' in the ordinary meaning of the English 
language, the new use might readily qualify as 'novel' in patent terms. As 
a general rule, the more well known the function of a catalyst is, then the 
tighter the claim needs to be and the more complex the specification. 
Sometimes a reaction or catalyst will be too well known to make patenting 
attempts economically viable. 
There are other components of the pharmaceutical that are necessary for 
it to work. As we mentioned, methods of administering the active 
ingredients are also possible patentable components of a pharmaceutical. 
Active ingredients are generally incorporated into a vehicle, such as a 
liquid, crystal, or cream, so that the active ingredient can be injected, 
swallowed or applied. Depending on the importance of the vehicle, 
particularly with respect to its impact on the effectiveness of the active 
ingredient. as many aspects of the vehicle as possible will be patented. 
Patents on the vehicle may also be on the method by which it is 
synthesised, or on the way it is combined with the active ingredient. 
However, the majority of vehicles for pharmaceuticals are standard 
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formulations and thus, the opportunities for patents300 as well as the scope 
of preventing the use of other vehicles, viable with the active ingredient, 
are very limited. 
1.4.3. Patent Form 
Having pOinted out that there are many opportunities in the process of 
arriving at a medicine to register patents, let us consider the forms those 
patents can take. The patents that are obtained can be divided into three 
categories. These are the product, process and product-by-process 
patents. 
A product patent means that the end result, the product, is patented. This 
type of patent is concerned only with the end chemical and not the process 
by which it is made. Product patents will be secured, where possible, on 
every reagent throughout every stage of the manufacturing process. 
300 Older formulations for vehicles fail to satisfy Patent Act 1977 §2. Since the claim in 
the application for new vehicles is as encompassing as possible it will generally be 
difficult to show later that a new use for that vehicle, as per Patent Act 1977 §2(6), has 
been found. 
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The process patent refers only to invention within the method or process 
by which a product is obtained. For a process patent to be valid only the 
process needs to be novel. The novelty of the product is irrelevant.301 
A product-by-process patent is a patent where the claim on a product is 
made by virtue of the process by which that product is obtained. In the UK 
a distinction is drawn between two product-by-process patent claims: The 
first is where the patentee has defined the scope of the monopoly claimed 
by the process; in this case the monopoly is defined by claiming products 
made by a particular process. The second is where the patentee disclaims 
products which do not have the features of products made by the process 
which has been claimed; in this case the monopoly is defined by claiming 
products with features that result from the particular process used. Only 
the first type of product-by-process patent is considered permissible. 
According to the Court of Appeal" ... If a person invents a new method of 
extracting gold from rock, he can obtain a claim to the process and as 
Article 64(2) [EPC] makes clear, he can also monopolise the gold 
produced directly by the process.,,302 
This is a very different position to the EPO, where a product-by-process 
patent will only be considered novel if the product itself is novel. The USA 
301 Kirin-Amgen Inc ("Amgen'J v Transkaryotic Therapies Inc ("TKT'J & Ors. [2003] RPC 
31 
302 Kirin-Amgen Inc ("Amgen'J v Transkaryotic Therapies Inc ("TKT'J & Ors. [2003] RPC 
31, para 33 
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follows a similar line to the EPO, in that a product-by-process patent will 
only be valid in the product is new or that the particular product resulting 
from the process is expected to have imparted as a result of the process 
distinctive non-obvious characteristics. 303 
1.5. Pharmaceutical Patent Life Cycles 
Now that it is clear how heavily staked with patents what we simply refer to 
as a 'patented pharmaceutical' is, let us consider how the patents on that 
pharmaceutical fit into the life cycle of the pharmaceutical. That is the 
stages through which a NeE goes from registration of the first patents, 
through development and clinical testing to the grant of market approval. 
Followed by the employment of different stratagems to prolong market 
exclusivity.304 Which leads eventually to the expiry of the patent and other 
instruments of market exclusivity and the entry of generics to the market. 
303 See Ex parte Gray, 10 USPQ2d 1922 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1989). Where the claim 
was directed to b-NGF produced through genetic engineering. Whereas the prior art had 
disclosed the human nerve growth factor b-NGF. Whilst the applicant questioned the 
purity of the prior art factor they failed to evidence concrete indication that the engineered 
b-NGF was not substantially the same whether isolated from tissue or produced through 
genetic engineering. Thus, the dispositive issue was held by the Board to be whether the 
claimed factor exhibits any unexpected properties compared with the factor disclosed by 
prior art. 
304 The period of market exclusivity is deemed the most significant part of a patented 
pharmaceutical's existence. As a result most works that discuss strategy and patent life 
cycles for pharmaceuticals will focus on prolonging the period of market exclusivity for the 
patented pharmaceutical. 
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Pharmaceutical patent life cycles are typically regarded as a tension 
between patented and generic drugs. As a pharmaceutical patent ends, 
the originator tries to extend their market monopoly against the entrance of 
a generic manufacturer. However, other patented drugs might also 
compete for the same market, during the life of the first comer's patented 
medicine and after its expiry. Which means that the pharmaceutical patent 
life cycle refers to a more convoluted and interesting series of events than 
a period when a pharmaceutical was in patent and a period when it was 
not. 
1.5.1. Terminology 
Since there may be many players, each of which enters the market at a 
different point in time and not necessarily through the same formalities, 
precise descriptive terminology has evolved. We will explain and use the 
terms as they are used and understood in the pharmaceutical industry.305 
Of course some of the terms have also been adopted by popular press 
and used in news articles with a variety of meanings and little consistency. 
As stated earlier, a patented medicine usually precedes generic entrants 
to a new therapeutic area. There are occasions when unpatented 
medicines have created new therapeutic areas. However, the first 
medicine of a class must undergo full clinical trials to gain market approval 
and thus cannot be a generic medicine. This first medicine in a 
therapeutic area, patented or not, is termed an originator medicine. 
305 Based on my observations when conducting interviews, and as explained to me during 
informal discussion with industry representatives (2004-2005). 
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Originator is a term that is applied loosely to the patent holder of the 
originator medicine. Or if there was no patent on the medicine, whoever 
was responsible for attaining market approval is termed an originator. 
Subsequent entrants to the market that do not fit the legal requirements for 
being a generic are also termed originators, because they usually 
introduce another member of a chemical class or new chemical class into 
a therapeutic area. It is possible for same company to be both an 
originator and generic manufacturer in the same market. 
Popular media and some journal articles tend to use the term 'branded' to 
signify originators and then consider all other market entrants as 
generics.306 This is an incorrect usage of the term generic. Law through 
the different regulatory requirements that apply to a generic medicine 
defines the category of generic. When the MHRA or FDA approves a 
pharmaceutical, the medicine receives a non-proprietary name and 
optionally a brand or proprietary name. 307 Thus, the popular use of 
branded and generic distinctions arises from the fact that generic 
medicines must be labelled with the non-proprietary name of the medicine, 
306 For an example of confusion creeping into academic literature, consider: Cool, K., and 
Schendel, D., 'Strategic Group Formation and Performance: The Case of the U.S. 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 1963-1982' (1987) 33(9) Management Science 1102-1124 
307 Manufacturers of generic medicines, unless they are producing a medicine whose 
non-proprietary scientific name is well known, must expend resources in order to have 
consumers associate their product with its function. This is a small but effective tool in 
maintaining customer fidelity for originators and I am not aware of where a branded name 
has not been taken. 
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but lack the brand name. 308 E.g., generic versions of Zantac are labelled 
with the non-proprietary name Ranitidine. 
There is a further objection to the loose employment of 'branded and 
generic' as categorisations. This finds its form within the incorporation of 
fallacies into statements and premises connected with appeals to 
emotion,309 to pity,310 and to force311 depending on the perspective of the 
commentator. 312 The employment of 'patented and generic,' or 'originator 
and generic manufacturer,' facilitate eschewing the incorporation of these 
fallacies. Since originator and generic are terms employed within official 
pharmaceutical literature, such as the Official Journal of the European 
Union, they are the terms that we will use. 
However, there are two other nominatives that are useful and part of 
pharmaceutical industry jargon. Drugs that follow an originator into a new 
308 Medicine labelling requirements for the European Union are contained in Title V of 
Directive 2001/83/EC 
309 argumentum ad populum 
310 ad misericordiam 
311 ad baculum 
312 The fallacies of relevance are frequently used in popular press with the intention of 
portraying generics or 'branded' medicines as good or bad depending on the 
commentator's point of view. With respect to appeal to emotion and appeal to pity, as well 
as an clinician's perspective consider Eban, K., 'Are generic drugs a bad bargain? All of 
us want cheaper medicine - but not if it costs us our health' May 26, 2009 Today 
MSNBC.com. Available at: <http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/30940044> (Last Accessed: 
15t July 2009) 
For an example of an appeal to force - 'pay up or there will be no more' - see: Public 
Citizen, Rx R&D Myths: The Case Against The Drug Industry's R&D "Scare Card" 2001. 
Available from Public Citizen at: <http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACFDC.PDF> (Last 
Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
141 
therapeutic area and are patented are referred to as Me-too drugs. These 
are distinct from medicines that follow the originator medicine, but are not 
patented which are termed copycat. Within the pharmaceutical industry 
copycat refers exclusively to medicines that do little more than copy an 
existent, usually out of patent medicine. As such all generic medicines are 
termed copycat medicines. 
Deliberate misuse of a term can convey derogation to members of the 
industry, but would mostly go unnoticed by the media and general public. 
For example, referring to a me-too as a copycat would suggest that the 
work which went into engineering that drug was trivial, even though 
patenting might have required demonstration of significant therapeutic 
improvemene13 or another form of novelty.314 
1.5.2. Patent Thicket 
Now that we are clear on the terminology we can start describing the life 
cycle. The struggle for a particular pharmaceutical market begins with the 
illumination of that market. This usually occurs following the publication of 
scientific research paper or publication of a patent. Either publication will 
indicate the existence and potential profitability of a new market, or that a 
313 §2(6) Patent Act 1977 
314 Which would most likely be a new pharmaceutical that was not foreseen and closed off 
by the originator. 
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new mechanism or different application of an existing pharmaceutical 
works. 315 
Immediately after discovery of an interesting drug a company will employ a 
defensive patenting strategy where they patent around their invention tying 
down market entry and creating misleading impressions about their active 
ingredients to prospective reverse engineers. This strategy involves the 
investigation and patenting of all closely related groups of compounds 
whether or not these compounds are likely to be successful candidates. 316 
As many aspects as possible important to the manufacture and use of the 
pharmaceutical are patented as well. Thereby creating further difficulty for 
competitors. These aspects can include: 
" 
• basic composition, including new or alternative compounds; 
• method of treatment, including new use of known compounds, 
different 
• dosing, and therapies in combination with other drugs; 
• synthetic production; 
• formulation and drug delivery; 
• prodrugs releasing active ingredient; 
315 Lowe, D., Now Your Liver Doesn't Have to Make It For You (2008) Chemistry and 
Pharma Blog. Available at: <http://pipeline.corante.com/archives/me_too_drugs/> (Last 
Accessed: 1 sl July 2009) 
316 Smith, M. C. Principles of pharmaceutical marketing. [Haworth Press, 3rd Ed., 1983, 
Philadelphia] 173 
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• substances resulting from metabolism in body; 
• different crystalline or hydrated structures; 
• gene-markers showing response to drug therapy; 
• ... devices ... for administering the drug . ..317 
As a result, pharmaceutical inventions are regularly enclosed by 30 to 40 
patents and sometimes more. 318 Where it is judged that the 
pharmaceutical product and potential competitor products are securely 
blocked from competitors and that the manufacturing processes for the 
medicine can be kept reasonably secret, key stages in the manufacturing 
process are kept secret and neither patented or publicised through 
research publications. These secret manufacturing stages will be 
patented, as the patents on the product near expiry. Thereby extending 
the monopoly on the product and maintaining some barriers to market 
entry by competitor molecules. Should another company discover the 
manufacturing process, then the company holding the patents on the 
pharmaceutical will, either immediately patent the manufacturing 
317 European Generic Medicines Association, 'Pharmaceutical Patents' Available from: 
http://www.egagenerics.com/gen-phrmapatents.htm (Accessed: 7'h February 2005) 
318 Patent Attorney Interview (2005); EGA FAQ available at: 
<http://www.egagenerics.com/FAQ-generics.htm> (Last Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
Sometimes a large number of patents are used in conjunction with secrecy in order that 
the product cannot be obtained even if each individual patent in the process is 
understood. Moreover, should the secret part of the information be disclosed the patents 
would provide a barrier to competitors entering the market. Moreover, once the patents 
on the disclosed information near expiry then some further information previously kept 
secret can be patented. 
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process,319 or where the other company has sought to patent, either 
oppose registration of the patent or claim prior use exception. 32o 
Good patenting strategy requires meticulous closing down of all possible 
points of entry for competitors, whilst providing the competitor with little or 
no guidance on how to obtain the pharmaceutical. A famous early 
example from the chemical industry is the Haber-Bosch process for the 
manufacture of ammonia, which was enclosed by over 200 patents. 
These patents covered the apparatus, temperatures, and pressures 
necessary to the process, but provided no details about the necessary 
catalysts or the preparation of such catalysts. Since the catalysts were 
critical to the process for synthesising ammonia the information disclosed 
in the patents was redundant to other industrial engineers trying to 
manufacture ammonia. Moreover, by keeping the catalyst information 
secret Haber-Bosch significantly increased their lead-time and the 
319 Which might involve a claim under §37 Patent Act 1977 
320 For example see Genzyme's patents on the manufacturing of Cerezyme. Whereas, 
Genzyme's monopolies, patents on the product and their Orphan Status, have expired 
Genzyme still holds patents on the manufacturing methods until 2022. Would be 
competitors no longer barred by a monopoly on the chemical can not produce the 
chemical anyway, unless they can circumvent through alternative manufacturing 
processes the patents on Cerezyme's manufacturing. USA Patent number 5,549,892, on 
a method of treating a human subject with Gaucher's Disease expires 27 August 2013 
(USA Patent and Trademark Office database); A patent on the process by which CHO 
cells are used to manufacture Cerezyme (pharmaceutical product patent filed in 1980 
(USA Patent and Trademark Office database) was granted a patent in September 2002, 
which will last until 2022 and encompasses several chemical products also produced 
from CHO cells, including Cerezyme, Fabrazyme, Thyrogen, and Aldurazyme. (USA 
Patent and Trademark Office database; Genzyme Corporation 10-0 Securities and 
Exchange Commission Filing: 11 August 2005) 
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expense for competitors seeking to circumvent Haber-Bosch's patent 
rights. 321 
Once the patents are granted and the pharmaceutical is deemed secure, a 
company may, depending on the type and market presence of the 
company and the economic conditions, publicise the NCE to investors. 
Generally, when a company's development pipeline contains few 
prospects, potential new drugs are revealed very early. Possibly before 
clinical trials have even begun. Thirty years ago when large 
pharmaceutical companies had many more products in their development 
portfolios new medicines were not revealed until they were in the later 
phases of clinical trials, i.e. it was more certain that they might be viable. 
1.5.3. Supplementary Protection Certificate 
With the patents granted, attempts at regulatory approval can also begin. 
These are preferably run alongside research on the pharmaceutical. As 
the delay to market entry caused by conducting research required to gain 
market approval provides eligibility to a supplementary protection 
certificate (SPC).322 An SPC can extend the life of a pharmaceutical 
321 Haynes, W., American Chemical Industry, Volumes 2 [Van Nostrand, 1954, New York] 
86-87 
322 European Regulation No. 1768/92/EEC instituted Supplementary Protection 
Certificates for pharmaceutical products. (UK implementation: S.1. 1992 No. 3091, Reg. 
5). Subsequent additions and amendments, such as Regulation No. 1610/96/EC creating 
Supplementary Protection Certificates for plant protection products, were consolidated 
into a codified new Regulation No. 469/2009/EC which came into force on 6 July 2009. 
Whilst, the new Regulation No. 469/2009/EC is directly applicable in all European 
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product patene23 by up to five and a half years. The term of a certificate is 
equal to the time between the filing date of the patent and the date that the 
pharmaceutical incorporating the active ingredient was granted market 
approval in the European Community less five years. For example, if 
there were a seven year interval between filing and market approval, then 
the patent on the active ingredient would be eligible for an SPC that 
prolonged its patent term by two years. 
The supplementary protection certificate only enters into force after the 
product patent it concerns expires, and it is normally limited to a maximum 
patent extension of 5 years. Which would require a delay of ten years 
between the filing date of the patent and the date that the pharmaceutical 
incorporating the active ingredient was granted market approval in the 
European Community. However, the SPC can be extended by six months, 
to a maximum of five and a half years, if it relates to a product that was 
Member States, the Supplementary Protection Certificates and extended patents only 
have effect in the State in which they are granted. 
323 SPCs are only available for the active ingredient, or combinations of active ingredients 
for pharmaceuticals (Regulation No. 469/2009/EC Art 1 (b», or the active substance or 
combination of active substances of a plant protection product (Regulation No. 
1610/96/EC Art 1.8). Plant protection products are medicines for plants construed in a 
much broader sense than we have defined pharmaceuticals. As such plant protection 
products include: chemicals that protect plants or plant products against harmful 
organisms, e.g. horticultural fungicides and insecticides; that influence plant life 
processes, but are not simply nutrients, e.g. growth regulators; that preserve plant 
products, but are not subject to Community law on preservatives; or that destroy 
undesired plants, plant parts, or prevent undesired plant growth, e.g. herbicides. Plant 
protection products other than this mention are not considered in this thesis. 
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delayed market approval because clinical trials for paediatric applications 
were conducted. 324 
In the UK, all medicines must be directly approved by the Medicines and 
Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA),325 which will then issue 
a 'marketing authorisation' and product licence specifically for the 
approved product. 326 
1.5.4. Clinical Trials 
To gain market approval the MHRA requires results from 3 phase trials 
demonstrating that the advantages a product possess outweigh its 
disadvantages. The MHRA require that the design and conduct of the 
phase trials provide acceptable levels of protection for participants. 
However, when the phase trial data is submitted the research 
methodology is not examined by MHRA with the objective of ascertaining if 
there were acceptable levels of protection for partiCipants. Since, what is 
deemed an acceptable level of protection for a participant establishes a 
basis for a duty of care and because of lower costs and penalties in the 
324 Regulation No. 1901/2006/EC Article 36 
325 The MHRA is a new authority, established in 2003 to bring together the functions of 
both the Medicines Control Agency (MeA) and the Medical Devices Agency (MDA). 
326 Within the European Union marketing authorisation can, depending on the subject of 
the application, be sought from the European medicines Agency (EMA) and is valid in all 
European Union and EEA-EFTA states. Application to the EMA is obligatory for 
medicines based on biotechnology, high-tech processes, or designated for treatment of 
HIV/AIDS, cancer, diabetes, neurodegenerative diseases, auto-immune and other 
immune dysfunctions, and viral diseases. 
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case of negligence, the phase trial data is often gathered from amongst 
populations in countries with low GOP. 
India is particularly attractive as it has the largest pool of patients suffering 
from diabetes, cancer, heart disease and many other diseases that are 
profitable research objectives. Moreover, India is stable, has extremely 
poor populations, and fewer restrictions on clinical testing than Europe or 
North America. 327 
The phase trials or clinical testing328 consist of three stages that are 
designed to progressively test the effectiveness of a therapy and its 
safety.329 
Phase I trials are usually conducted on a small group of healthy 
volunteers, and are designed to determine the pharmacokinetics and 
327 Global consultants McKinsey & Co estimate that by 2010 about 1-1.5 billion USD will 
be spent on clinical trials in India and that by 2015 India's pharmaceutical market will 
reach $20 billion. See, Kumra, G., Mitra, P., Pasricha, C., 'India Pharma 2015: Unlocking 
the Potential of the Indian Pharmaceutical Market' (2007) McKinsey and Company 
Report. 10, 13 Available from: 
<http://www.mckinsey.com/locations/ind ia/mckinseyonindia/pdfllndia _Pharma_ 2015. pdf> 
(Last Accessed: 5 February 2010) 
328 With the increased public interest in pharmaceuticals there has been a growth in 
information available concerning the processes involved in their safety testing, regulation 
and approval. For example, for an account on clinical trials addressed to the general 
public see NIH, 'Understanding Clinical Trials.' Available at: 
<http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/info/understand> (Last Accessed: 1 st July 2009) 
329 For a guide to clinical trials consider, Kerr, D., Knox, K., Robertson, D., Stewart, D., 
Watson, R., (eds.) Clinical Trials Explained: A Guide to Clinical Trials in the NHS for 
Healthcare Professionals [Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006, 1st Ed., Oxford] 
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pharmacologics of a drug. That is, dose dependent responses and early 
indications of effectiveness are sought. 
Providing Phase I generates promising results, studies move to Phase II. 
Where data on the effectiveness of the drug in patients with a specific 
disease or condition are sought. This sample group usually consists of a 
few hundred individuals. 
Phase III trials expand the Phase II through uncontrolled and further 
controlled trials amongst a much bigger sample group. The objective of 
Phase III is to generate additional data concerning effectiveness and 
safety, which is needed to evaluate the benefits and risks of the drug. The 
pharmaceutical manufacturer may eventually distribute selective data from 
Phase III to physicians. 
The clinical trial data must also be accompanied by supporting 
documentation sufficient to assure the MHRA that the pharmaceutical 
company and any wholesalers are able to manufacture, distribute and 
supply the product to required safety and quality standards. 
1.5.5. Data Exclusivity 
Once the new medicinal product application is completed and approved by 
the MHRA,330 the pharmaceutical product is considered to enter a period 
330 In the USA this is the FDA. Apart from duration Data Exclusivity is remarkably similar 
in the USA and Europe. However, in Europe in addition to domestic market approval 
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of data exclusivity.331 Data exclusivity is available even if the applicant 
does not have a patent. The requirement for data exclusivity is that the 
new medicinal product application contains an active ingredient that has 
not been approved before by the MHRA.332 Since new medicinal product 
applications require clinical trial data then the applicant will have also 
conducted trials on the pharmaceutical. The effect of data exclusivity is 
that during the specified period no applications for market approval can be 
referenced by the regulatory authority to the data in the originator new 
medicinal product application. The data exclusivity therefore, applies to 
both medicines that claim bioequivalence or bio-similaritl33 to the NCE 
and medicines that claim a new use for the NCE.334 The period of data 
exclusivity is an exclusory regime almost disconnected from the patent 
system,335 and although not a property right it does have important impact 
there is also the EMA's centralised process. Approval by the MHRA approves the 
medicine by the principle of mutual recognition across the whole of the European Union. 
331 Article 10 Directive 2004/27/EC 
332 If the active ingredient has only been approved in combination then it is still 
disqualified from Data Exclusivity. 
333 Article 10.4 Directive 2004/27/EC 
334 New use is considered a new invention in UK law §2(6) Patent Act 1977 as amended. 
A New Use requires clinical trial data to support the New Use, but certain 
pharmacological traits, such as toxicity for the same dosage and method of delivery, 
might be referenced to data submitted in an early application. That is, unless Data 
Exclusivity applies. In the USA new indications are covered by 21 U.S.C. §355(b)(2) and 
termed 505(b)(2) applications, see 505(b)(2) Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act 1984 (USA). 505(b)(2) applications are only eligible for three years of 
market exclusivity. 
335 In the USA if the originator's patent on the FDA approved product is invalidated, then a 
second entrant (generic) can obtain a 'certification of patent invalidity' which reduce 'E.N /" 
5 year period of data exclusivity by 1 year. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) 
on the introduction of cheaper bioequivalents to a market and therefore on 
accessibility. 
Article 10 of Directive 2004/27/EC (amending Directive 2001/83/EC) 
harmonised EU data exclusivity to eight years with an additional two-years 
of market exclusivity.336 An additional year of market exclusivity is 
available for NCE applicants providing that within the first eight years, the 
NCE applicant obtains authorisation for one or more new therapeutic 
indications, which are held to bring a significant clinical benefit in 
comparison with existing therapies. 337 Market exclusivity differs from data 
exclusivity in that during market exclusivity the MHRA can reference new 
application to the data in the new drug application for the relevant NCE. 
However, even if the MHRA finds concordance in the reference it will not 
issue regulatory approval until the expiry of the market exclusivity period. 
336 Data Exclusivity was introduced to many countries by Article 39(3) TRIPs, which 
requires protection of 'data against unfair commercial use.' Whilst the UK and USA have 
developed extreme approaches to protecting data against 'unfair' commercial use, not all 
TRIPs signatories consider reference to originator test data an unfair commercial use. 
§55.2(1) Canadian Patent Act 1985 as amended provides an early working exception for 
a subsequent manufacturer to use a patented invention for the purpose of obtaining 
regulatory approval for a product. It states: "It is not an infringement of a patent for any 
person to make, construct, use or sell the patented invention solely for uses reasonably 
related to the development and submission of information required under any law of ... a 
country ... that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of any product." 
However, to prevent copycat medicines being sold on the market before relevant patents 
have expired a Notice of Compliance is required. See, Canadian Patented Medicines 
(Notice of Compliance) Regulations [S.O.R.l93-133] as amended. Consolidated text is 
available at: <http://www.wipo.intlwipolex/en/details.jsp?id=9380> 
337 This is known as the 8+2+1 formula 
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1.5.6 Post Approval Monitoring 
Whenever a new medicinal product is marketed, then the person 
marketing that drug is required to set up a system to monitor the safety of 
the product on the market. At random intervals the regulatory authority 
may perform an inspection of the monitoring system. Monitoring systems 
are not required for older medicines, such as weaker formulations of 
prescription medicines that are sold as over-the-counter drugs. 338 
The MHRA can command the removal of a drug from the market, and 
order suspension of its manufacture if necessary. To assist in the 
gathering of post-approval data the MHRA requires that new chemicals 
and vaccines are labelled with a black triangle for up to two years following 
approval. The black triangle symbol must be displayed on all advertising 
material, product information, and prescribing manuals associated with the 
new medicine. This marking helps to make healthcare practitioners aware 
of the need to monitor the new medicine more carefully than older 
chemicals or vaccines and to report side effects to the MHRA. The 
objective of the black triangle and the feedback on the new medicine that 
the MHRA receives is to enable the MHRA to perform continuing 
assessment on the medicine and to take action if the chemical or vaccine 
is deemed to have too high level of side effects for its therapeutic benefit. 
338 See MHRA Good Pharmacovigilance Practice. Available at: 
<http://www.mhra.gov.uklHowweregulate/Medicinesllnspectionandstandards/GoodPharm 
acovigiiancePractice/index.htm> (Last Accessed: 1st July 2009); MHRA, Good 
Pharmacovigilance Practice Guide [Pharmaceutical Press, 1st Ed., 2008, London]; NICE 
new medicine monitoring guidelines (2008). Available from: 
<http://www.nice.org.uklguidance/index.jsp> (Last Accessed: 1 sl July 2009) 
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In other words, an assessment of whether the advantages outweigh the 
disadvantages of taking the drug. Potentially, the MHRA can require 
continued use of the black triangle in relation to a product until the MHRA 
is satisfied that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages of taking the 
medicine. 
In some circumstances a medicine approved over two years ago may be 
required to display the black triangle if the combination of active 
ingredients is different, if it is being used in a new way, at a substantially 
different dosage, or for a different condition. Annually, the MHRA receives 
around 25,000 applications for changes to the use, or dosage, or method 
of application of a medicine.339 
Where a medicine, post-approval, is deemed unsafe or there are serious 
concerns about the risks that it poses then the MHRA's Defective 
Medicines Report Centre will alert340 healthcare authorities, NHS trusts, 
healthcare practitioners and wholesalers, professionals, hospitals, GP 
surgeries, and wholesalers notifying them of the risk and where necessary 
ordering the product recalled. 
339 MHRA, Medicines and Medical Devices Regulation: What you need to know, 2008, at 
8. Available at: 
<http://www.mhra.gov.uklhome/groups/comms-
ic/documents/websiteresources/con2031677.pdf> (Last Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
340 The Defective Medicines Report Centre's alert has four classes, ranging from an 
immediate recall, because the product poses serious risk or danger of mortality (class 1) 
to the product poses not risk to patient safety, but there is a reason for caution (class 4). 
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1.5.7. Evergreening 
Now that we have explained the patents that are available and some ways 
in which they can be extended, as well as how a medicine acquires and 
retains market approval in the UK, let us consider the strategies employed 
to maintain the patents and extensions, and to delay competition. 
Evidently policing of both patent applications and competitor medicines for 
infringement or discovery of information the originator wishes to keep 
secret are important. A pharmaceutical company will have employees or 
contract one of the many companies that watch patents to stand sentry 
over its patents. It will also use publicity and communications with health 
care practitioners to make its product well known. However, to ensure the 
high returns on its investment are prolonged as long as possible the 
pharmaceutical company also needs to utilise all the regulatory, marketing, 
and innovation encouragement schemes that are available. 
Keeping market exclusivity requires the timely creation of market barriers 
and sufficient market uncertainty to delay or discourage competition. The 
general methodology of creating barriers to competition are: 
• FDA for approval of a new chemical entity (five years), 
• Reacquiring three-year regulatory data exclusivity through new 
indications and alterations to the active ingredient (three years), 
• Paediatric exclusivity (six months) - paediatric studies that may reap 
six month regulatory patent extensions under a paediatric 
exclusivity (Note: multiple paediatric exclusivities may be possible 
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for the same pharmaceutical, but they must each be on a different 
active ingredient), 
• Orphan drug status (up to ten years). 
• Developing and seeking patent protection for product line 
extensions, which may include changes in form, dosage or strength 
that have convey significant therapeutic improvement (twenty 
years) 
• Bioequivalence and pharmaceutical equivalence challenges against 
generic equivalence applications. 
• Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (UK) or 
Environmental Protection Agency (USA) issues, British National 
Formulary (UK) or Pharmacopeia-National Formulary (USA) 
entries, and safety and labelling issues. 
The term used to describe these attempts to prolong a pharmaceutical's 
monopolistic existence is Evergreening. The European Generic medicines 
Association states, evergreening, 
" ... aims to prevent or delay competition from generic medicines by 
extending market protection through patents on minor changes to 
the original product.,,341 
Indeed, 
341 EGA FAQ. Available at: <http://www.egagenerics.com/FAQ-generics.htm> (Last 
Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
156 
" ... a patent on a new use ("indication"), formulation, salt or ester 
can block the registration or marketing of a generic medicine for 
treatments where the base patent has already expired.,,342 
This is because, in addition to the new patent term for the sampled claims 
of the originator patent. the new patent will also reinstate data exclusivity 
for information that may have been contained in earlier drug approval 
applications. 
In 2008, the Canadian Supreme Court faced with Evergreening addressed 
the issue directly. It concluded that, 
"Evergreening is a legitimate concern and, depending on the 
circumstances, strategies that attempt to extend the time limit of 
exclusivity of a patent may be contrary to the objectives of the 
Patent Act. The Act aims to promote inventiveness by conferring 
exclusivity for a limited period of time while providing for public 
disclosure of the invention to enable others to make or use it after 
expiry of the period of exclusivity. 
However, a generalized concern about evergreening is not a 
justification for an attack on the doctrine of selection patents for two 
reasons. First, a selection patent may be sought by a party other 
342 EGA FAQ. Available at: <http://www.egagenerics.com/FAQ-generics.htm> (Last 
Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
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than the ... [originator]. In such a case, anticipation or obviousness 
may be an issue, but evergreening does not arise ... 
Second and more importantly, selection patents encourage 
improvements by selection. The inventor selects only a bit of the 
subject matter of the original genus patent because that bit does 
something better than and different from what was claimed in the 
genus patent. ,,343 
The Canadian Supreme Court's judgement follows the same patentee 
friendly course as the English courts in their recent decisions.344 However, 
as yet the House of Lords has avoided addressing Evergreening 
directly.345 
Minor changes to the product that may alter the effect of the active 
ingredient entitle the pharmaceutical to three years, in effect three more 
years, of data exclusivity. These minor changes can be effected through 
alterations in the strength of the dosage, the form in which it is taken, or 
the frequency with which it is taken. 
343 Apotex Inc. v. Sanofi-Synthe/abo Canada Inc., 2008 SCC 61 
344 Consider: Actavis v Merck [2008) EWCA Civ 444; Con or v Angiotech [2008) UKHL 49; 
Dr Reddy's v Eli Lilly [2008) EWHC 2345; Generics (UK) v Daiichi [2008] EWHC 2413; 
Generics (UK) v Lundbeck [2008] EWCA 311. However in Actavis UK Limited v Novartis 
AG [2010] EWCA Civ 82 the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court's finding (Actavis UK 
Limited v Novartis AG [2009] EWHC 41) of obviousness in the evergreening patent. 
Which may indicate a changing attitude to evergreening. But once again the court did not 
address evergreening directly. 
345 Conor v Angiotech [2008] UKHL 49 
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Moreover, changes in the time of administration and drug delivery systems 
might also have an impact on the active ingredient, as will changes in 
metabolites, intermediates, polymorphs and isomers. New 
pharmacokinetic data will also qualify for three more years of data 
exclusivity. 
Maintaining data exclusivity is of great importance, because it prevents 
generic drug applications on the originator pharmaceutical from being 
considered by the regulatory authority, which can extend barriers to 
market entry after drug patents have expired. 
1.5.8. Generic Medicines 
Generic drugs are copies of originator drugs and should have exactly the 
same pharmacological effects as the originator medicine. Thus, at the 
same dosage and method of administration, the generic will poses the 
same effectiveness, safety, side effects and risks as the copied 
pharmaceutical. Generic medicines may even utilise the same chemical 
entity as the drug they are copying. Thus competitor manufacturers will, 
as the patent on the drug they are copying is expiring and providing the 
eight years of data exclusivity are still not in operation, make an 
application for regulatory approval. 346 The application is addressed to the 
346 In the USA the data exclusivity may soon be extended from 5 to 12 or perhaps 14 
years, which would have ramifications for the UK data exclusivity term. Engelberg, A., 
Kesselheim, A., Avorn, J., 'Balancing Innovation, Access, and Profits - Market 
Exclusivity for Biologics' (2010) 361 N Engl J Med 1917-1919; Musselwhite, L., and 
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same authority from which the originator obtained approval. Thus, the 
authority is able to compare the data in the generic application with the 
data submitted by the originator, which the authority will have retained. In 
the UK this regulatory authority is the MHRA and in the USA the FDA.347 
Originator pharmaceutical companies are popularly considered to be 
innovators, whilst generics are regarded almost as free-riders who make 
serious inroads into markets created and developed by the originator. 
Thus, the generic entrant is seen as inhibiting the research potential of the 
originator by reducing the originator's revenue and therefore the resources 
available for research reinvestment. This is an argumentum ad populum, 
as society has already defined the extent of the originator's privilege and 
originator's market behaviour often seeks to undermine the market control 
of originators in other therapeutic areas during the term of the patent 
privilege. 
There is also a misconception, that once the first drug in a class creates a 
market that it is easy for subsequent drugs of the same class to also gain 
market entry. In some cases the cost of developing an unpatented 
competitor drug (Copycat) can be almost as expensive as the cost for the 
Andrews, J., 'Protect Pharmaceutical Innovation' (2010) 328(5984) Science 1354; 
Knowles, S., 'Fixing the Legal Framework for Pharmaceutical Research' (2010) 
327(5969) Science 1083-1084 
347 The European Agency for Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA) is also an 
important alternative for obtaining marketing authorisation for medicinal products in the 
European Union. Marketing approval by the EMEA is valid in all European Union 
Member States as well as European Free Trade Association Member States which 
comprises: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 
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first market entrant (originator). Whilst the second market entrant might 
substitute the assay of a broad range of molecules with reverse 
engineering and then a smaller assays of molecules, that second entrant 
must undertake phase trials as rigorous as the first market entrant. This is 
because even if there are drugs in the same chemical class as those 
included in the originator's patent thicket, these chemicals require market 
approval. Which is desirable to promote safety as not all chemicals in a 
class may actually work, or be considered sufficiently safe to use. 
Where a would-be new entrant to a market may have reduced pre-
approval costs is where the new entrant can show bioequivalance 
between their pharmaceutical and one already approved for the 
designated condition, which is termed a generic application. 348 In this 
case, in place of the three phase trials this generic entrant to the market 
needs only the data to demonstrate bioequivalence.349 Since regulation 
only requires a minimum cohort of twelve people in the generation of 
bioequivalence data, 350 conducting bioequivalence tests is substantially 
cheaper than conducting clinical phase trials. 
348 Termed an 'Application for generic medicinal product' in the UK and an 'Abbreviated 
New Drug Application' in the USA 
349 Placebo controls are not required to demonstrate bioequivalence. European 
Medicines Agency (Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use) Guideline on the 
Investigation of Bioequivalence. (EMA, 20th January 2010, London) Available at: 
<http://www.emea.europa.eu/docs/en _ GB/documenUibrary/Scientific _guideline/20 1 % 1/ 
WC500070039.pdf> (Last Accessed: 21 st May 2010) 
350 European Medicines Agency (Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use) 
Guideline on the Investigation of Bioequivalence. (EMA, 20th January 2010, London) 
Available at: 
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However, originators will ensure that it is as difficult as possible for would 
be generic manufacturers to demonstrate bioequivalence. Data from the 
originator products, submitted to the regulatory authority, is never revealed 
to third parties, and so cannot be used by generic medicine 
researchers. 351 Thus, generic manufacturers do need to conduct research 
in order to produce enough bioequivalence data for the regulatory 
authority to be confidant that the generiC product is sufficiently accurately 
described by the phase trailing of the originator data. Data exclusivity for 
the originator drug means that for eight years the regulatory authorities will 
not assess the safety and efficacy profile of a generic application and for 
two or three years after expiry of the data exclusivity period the generic 
applicant drug cannot be marketed. The most opportune moment for the 
generic manufacturer to begin establishing their bioequivalence data is 
strongly dependent on national provisions concerning data exclusivity.352 
In the UK the bioequivalence study will assess indicators of the chemical's 
performance on volunteers, by monitoring the quantity of active substance 
in the body after application of the pharmaceutical. For a pharmaceutical 
to be considered a generic or reference medicine it must be bioequivalent. 
<http://www.emea.europa.eu/docs/en _ GB/documenUibrarylScientific _guideline/20 1 01011 
WC500070039.pdf> (Last Accessed: 21st May 2010) at 8. 
351 EGA FAQ. Available at: <http://www.egagenerics.com/FAQ-generics.htm> (Last 
Accessed: 1 sl July 2009) 
352 §60(5)(b) Patents Act 1977. However, some countries may provide much less 
freedom for research than others. See Okuyama, 5., Japanese courts find no 
"experimental use" haven for generic drug makers accused of infringing pharmaceutical 
patents (1997) 16(2) Biotechnol. Law Rep. 158-161 
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Which means that identical levels of the active substance must be 
observed in the body after application of the pharmaceutical as are found 
in the originator studies. In most cases almost identical levels of active 
substance between the originator chemical, already approved for the 
market, and the generic or reference medicine will deem the generic 
product as equally safe and effective as the originator chemical. However, 
there may be factors which require more information to be supplied to the 
regulatory authority. For example, if the method of delivery of the 
chemical is changed, if the method of manufacture or storage conditions 
differ, or if a specific property of the active chemical differs in some way 
from the originator.353 Any of these factors will provide grounds for the 
originator, or another interested party, to challenge the bioequivalence of 
the generic applicants' data. Moreover, the originator knows the data they 
submitted and has access to the data submitted by the generiC applicant, 
thus the originator has a strong tactical advantage in delaying the approval 
of generic products through bioequivalence challenges. 
Usually originators will patent around their product to strengthen their 
monopoly. However, not all of the patented chemicals are submitted for 
regulatory approval and so are not protected by a period of data 
exclusivity. Thus, one strategy that can be advantageous to generic 
manufacturers is to utilise, as their active ingredient, a different salt than 
the one for which the originator received market approval, but which is out 
of patent. Such applications can present difficulties to regulatory 
353 European Medicines Agency, Post-authorisation Evaluation of Medicines for Human 
Use, London: 19 September 2006, Doc. Ref. EMEAl393905/2006 
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authorities, as the substituted salt may express similar activity levels to the 
originator chemical, but have other effects that are not clearly indicated in 
the bioequivalence data. 354 In such cases the regulatory authority will 
usually require further information to persuade them of the safety and 
efficacy of the substitute chemical. 
Another technique that can be employed by generic manufacturers to 
enter the market earlier is to assert that an earlier patent necessarily 
anticipated the later one on which the originator company is now relying to 
maintain market monopoly or that the originators patents do not 
encompass the generic medicine. Other grounds of invalidity might also 
be raised, such as insufficiency. However, this can be both expensive and 
exceedingly risky. As this is usually contestation over access to a very 
proven and lucrative market the originator will invariably make a legal 
challenge against the generic manufacturer. 
One such legal challenge is the USA the doctrine of constructive patent 
infringement. Which, if demonstrated, provides the originator with a 
ground to sue for declaratory relief. Although the originator need not 
initiate an action straight away, they could wait until there is actual 
infringement. Which might be more damaging to the generic 
354 Verbeeck, R.K., Kanfer, I., and Walker, R.B., Generic substitution: The use of 
medicinal products containing different salts and implications for safety and efficacy. 
European (2006) 28(1-2) Journal of Pharmaceutical Sciences 1-6 
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manufacturer's investment, than the pre-emptive strike.355 In the UK where 
constructive patent infringement exists, but only to the extent that there is 
actual infringement and a party to the infringement has constructive notice 
of the fact and thus is culpable for the infringement, the originator must 
wait for the actual infringement. 
Once the data establishing bioequivalence to the authority's satisfaction is 
established then the safety and efficacy of the generic product can be 
cross-referenced by the regulatory authority with the confidential 
information held on the originator chemical. 356 
Generic medicines, that have satisfied the regulator that they have 
bioequivalence with an originator chemical that has received regulatory 
approval, do not require further sUbstantiation by clinical trial data.357 This 
has an effect on the cost of the pharmaceutical, but it is not the most 
significant factor in the price determination of a generic medicine. The 
most important price determinant factor is that the generic will not be 
introduced into a market with a monopoly. There will be competition, and 
thus the price of the generic must be competitive. 
355 Patently-O, Patent Law Blog. Pfizer Agrees Not To Sue Apotex on Zoloft. 2ih 
September. Available at: <Patentshttp://www.patentlyo.com/patentl2006/09Iindex.html> 
(Last Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
356 EGA FAQ. Available at: <http://www.egagenerics.com/FAQ-generics.htm> (Last 
Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
357 This is the reason why applications for regulatory approval in the USA are termed 
'Abbreviated New Drug Applications' because for the most part they are not required to 
include preclinical animal and clinical human test data to establish safety and 
effectiveness. See <http://www.fda.gov/cder/Regulatory/applications/ANDA.htm> (Last 
Accessed: 1 SI July 2009) 
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For a generic manufacturer to remain competitive they must dependably 
provide quality drugs and price them attractively. As such generics 
undergo frequent review and improvement.358 This is consistent with the 
accepted paradigm, which holds that competition in technology markets 
has positive consequences for the price, quality and introduction rate of 
new products to the market.359 This is especially the case when generic 
medicines are in strong competition with products from competing 
pharmaceutical companies. 
The behavioural difference between generic drug owners and patented 
drug owners can be explained quite simply. For the patented medicine, if 
it has been well secured, then even without patent line extensions for 25.5 
358 A line of investigation I pursued early in my research was whether the cost of tool 
setting for generic manufactures was lower than for patented medicine manufacturers? 
Both types of manufacturers have an interest in keeping their costs as low as possible, 
thus tool setting costs should be comparable. However, there are two indicators that 
these tool setting costs are not comparable. Firstly, there is the claimed minimum 
manufacturing costs for bulk chemicals. This was particularly evident between 1999-
2002 in the context of access to antiretroviral drugs for poorer nations. Secondly, there is 
the strategic benefit in maintaining broader manufacturing facilities. This is particularly 
the case when manufacturing drugs that may be used during pandemics. Being able to 
increase production in a very short time is an important factor in Government contracts. 
Also designating pharmaceuticals for other conditions or altering the formulation to extend 
market exclusivity may require modifications to tool setting. Thus, long run costs are 
reduced if the future requirement is foreseen in plant development and initial tool setting. 
Unfortunately, I could not acquire the necessary data to analyse. 
359 Referring to methods of doing business, see: Surowiecki, J., Patent Bending, 14 July 
2003 The New Yorker. Available at: 
<http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/07/14/030714ta_talk_surowiecki> (Last 
Accessed: 1 sl July 2009) 
166 
years360 from the filing date there is no need to innovate or to improve the 
medicine as there are no alternatives for those who need the medicine. 
Indeed, it is possibly more important for an originator to channel resources 
into prolonging the life of their monopoly than trying to develop a truly new 
application or product. 
For generic competitors to enter the market it might take much longer than 
25 years. 361 
European Commissioner for Competition Neelie Kroes summarised the 
properties of generic medicines when remarking, 
" ... longer protection acts as a disincentive to innovate ... Health 
care systems throughout Europe rely on generic drugs to keep 
costs down. Patients benefit from lower prices ... Moreover, 
360 The standard patent term is 20 years beginning with the date of filling (§2S(1) Patent 
Act 1977). A supplementary protection certificate may add up to five years (formerly: S.1. 
1992, No. 3091, Reg. 5; now covered in EC Regulation No. 469/2009). Clinical trial data 
submitted as a Paediatric Investigation Plan can entitle the applicant to a supplementary 
protection certificate of five and a half years (EC Regulation No. 1901/2006 Article 36; EC 
Regulation No. 46912009 Article 13(3)). These three measures in conjunction, can bring 
the period of market exclusivity available up to 15.5 years. Which will be 15.5 years 
starting from the date when the pharmaceutical received its product licence from MHRA 
or ten years from when the patent application was filed. 
361 Submitting data that indicates that the medicine might have a use on an indication 
considered a rare disease (no more than 5 in 10,000 people) can convey 10 more years 
of data exclusivity (EC Regulation No. 141/2000 Article 8(1)) 
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competition from generic products after a patent has expired itself 
encourages innovation in pharmaceuticals.,,362 
The commissioner does omit one critical point, one that we have already 
mentioned. Generics almost invariably follow a patented medicine. The 
first drug in a new field of pharmaceutical therapies is almost always 
patented.363 
362 Anonymous. 'Competition: Commission fines AstraZeneca €60 million for misusing 
patent system to delay market entry of competing generic drugs' (15th June 2005) 
IP/05/737 EUROPA (Rapid Press Releases) Available at: 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/737> (Last Accessed: 
15t July 2009) 
363 There are extremely rare exceptions. such as penicillin or the early polio vaccines. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT THEORY 
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"On a subject teeming with human significance rigorous logic is of the 
utmost imporlance.,,364 
2.1. Theoretical Framework 
Successful complete descriptions of the patent system's function have not 
previously been undertaken and antecedent literature treats the functions 
of the patent system as model incompatible objects. Innovation specialists 
have tended to focus on expanding the body of knowledge describing firm 
behaviour and research trends, but have neglected a rigorous, 
terminologically homogeneous, consolidation of existing function theory. 
Instead they have borrowed from patent theory desirable elements for their 
objective and ignored others. The unifying thread of economic modelling 
and analysis techniques does provide a prima facie thread of 
homogeneity. Unfortunately, due to the diversity of the patent genus365 
and the complexity of innovation functions, sufficient to predict with 
stability the comportment of the patent system, a straightforward 
aggregation of hypothesise yields unsatisfactory results. In this chapter 
we will demonstrate why. 
364 Cohen, M. R.. Positivism and the Limits of Idealism in the Law (1927) 27(3) Columbia 
Law Review 237-250. at 243 
365 TRIPS Article 27(1) sets the minimum parameters for patents of all Signatories of the 
WTO. It states. ' ... patents shall be available for any inventions. whether products or 
processes, in all fields of technology. provided that they are new, involve an inventive 
step and are capable of industrial application.' 
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2.1.1. Justification By Contradiction 
The coherence and homogeneity problems of patent theory result from the 
absence of a linear development of patent justificatory ideology.366 The 
most pervasive retrospective ideological assertion is that the patent 
system has throughout its existence been a utilitarian construct: 367 The 
action of granting a 'right to secure the enforcement power of the state in 
excluding unauthorized persons, for a specified number of years, from 
making commercial use of a clearly identified invention,368 is morally right 
since it produces at least as much good, or utility, for the ensemble of 
people affected by the invention as any alternative action a community 
could perform in its place to obtain the invention. This assumption 
concerning the effectiveness and nature of the patent system, frequently 
the starting point for patent system analysis,369 bears the hallmark 
difficulties of all utilitarian theory. Firstly, how can a utilitarian construct be 
366 To suggest that there is would be to assume that words had kept their meaning, 
subjective and inter-subjective relationals remained unchanged, and that social demarche 
was intransient. As described above at 1.1, the patent system is rather the organic growth 
resultant of extensive lobbying; decisions of the courts, tribunals and interparty 
agreements; and national protectionism, than a sustained systematic progression. 
367 Merges, R. P.; Menell, P. 5.; Lemley, M. A.; Jorde, T. M., (Edd.) Intellectual Property in 
the New Technological Age (1997) 135-137; Menell suggests that the ..... principal system 
adopted for the examination of intellectual property has been economic theory: a 
particular instantiation of utilitarianism." Menell, P. 5., '1600 Intellectual Property: 
General Theories,' (1999) 129-188, at 130. However, not all justifications are utilitarian. 
See Oddi, A. 5., 'Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents - the Not-Quite-Holy Grail,' 
(1996) 247-277 
368 Machlup, F., An Economic Review of the Patent System~ Subcommittee on Patents, 
Trademarks and Copyrights, US Senate, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, Study Number 15 
[United States Government Printing Office, 1958, Washington D.C.] 1 
369 Menell, P. 5.,1600 Intellectual Property: General Theories (1999) 129; Fisher, W., 
Theories of Intellectual Property 1 
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formulated and evaluated? Secondly, is it desirable to adopt a utilitarian 
construct to stimulate new invention? An answer to the first question can 
be constructed from a careful analysis of the patent system's functions. A 
response to the second question can be obtained from an understanding 
of the essential nature of a given patent.370 
This chapter is, therefore, a theoretical investigation of the statements 
about the patent system's function. These are statements that have been 
used to justify the imposition of a patent system on a community. The 
statements are problematic and hence it was considered clearer to label 
them as 'function statements' rather than 'functions', which would 
misleadingly presuppose the statements had been inferred from empirical 
support or possessed inherent coherence. It is the reason why we have 
maintained the cumbersome appellation of function statement. 
2.1 .2 By Dogma 
It will become clear that the existing statements of the patent system's 
function are affirmed dogmatically, that is they are stated authoritatively 
and are not to be disputed or doubted. Thus, they provide no further 
authority to justify the function of the patent system that is not contained in 
the original dogma. Moreover, the original premiss are in many cases 
contradictory with the premiss of other function statements, suggesting 
370 Whether the patent system is utilitarian by virtue that it produces at least as much 
good, or utility, for the ensemble of people affected by the invention as any alternative 
action a community could perform requires an examination of empirical data and a 
detailed premonition of alternatives. 
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that even if the problem of dogma were ignored many of the function 
statements could not be a coherent justification for the patent system's 
existence. 
2.1.3. By Thread 
We have identified from patent literature that the patent has six main 
threads that are used to justify its existence. We have labelled these 
'function statements,' and they are invention incentive, disclosure 
incentive, investment incentive, organised derivative innovation, property 
sovereignty, and knowledge feudalism. These function statements are not 
mutually exclusive and overlap does occur, particularly in conflicts 
between premiss. Other functions of patents for inventions that are prima 
facie different from function statements can be asserted, but these are 
either relevant only to specific aspects of patent legislation,371 or are 
derivatives or compositions of the function statements treated here. 
Property sovereignty and knowledge feudalism are not overtly used 
statements and might not generally be considered desirable objectives for 
the patent to serve. Moreover, since property sovereignty and knowledge 
feudalism are more drawn from empirical observations than patent 
literature372 they are more correctly treated in Chapter 3. 
371 For example, consider the availability of spes for medicines, but not for any other 
area of patentable innovation where safety requirements must be demonstrated, before a 
product can enter the market. Within it we find the strands of premiss pharmaceutical 
innovation is more desirable than other forms of inventive activity, or that pharmaceutical 
innovation is more expensive than any other form of inventive activity. 
372 A significant exception is Drahos, P. and Braithwaite, J. Information Feudalism: Who 
Owns the Knowledge Economy? [Earthscan publications Ltd, 2002, London] 
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2.1.4. Without Merit 
Amongst the other functions of patents for inventions that are not treated 
are those that are so entirely without merit that they deserve no treatment 
at all. The strongest amongst these is that a patent indicates that a 
pharmaceutical is safe. This is a misconception. For example, consider a 
patent awarded for a compound that improves the adherence of platelets 
to collagen fibres in the vascular endothelium by increasing effectiveness 
of the glycoprotein platelet collagen receptor. Even though that compound 
has been registered, it posses another hemostatic property, i.e. that it 
causes serious embolisation, that will prevent it from receiving a product 
licence and market approval.373 Patent acquisition and market approval 
are independent processes, and neither process is an indication of the 
eligibility of the pharmaceutical for the other. 
Some statements of the invention incentive function utilise the terms social 
benefit and social cost respectively to refer to resources derived from and 
required by the patent system. The terms are straightforward, but in most 
instances make an implicit assumption that the social benefit of a 
particular invention is strictly its final use value.374 Thus, the social benefit 
of the patent system derives from the innovation that occurs over that 
innovation which would occur in the absence of a patent system. Hence, 
in some innovation incentive models the social benefit of the patent 
373 The risks of the pharmaceutical are too great for the benefit that it conveys. 
374 McFetridge, D. G.; Rafiquzzaman, M., 'The Scope and Duration of the Patent Right 
and the Nature of Research Rivalry,' (1986) 104 on 'Postpatent Competition theory.' 
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system is the entirety of inventive activity, since in the respective 
innovation incentive function statement it is assumed that no innovation 
would take place without the patent for inventions. Since social benefit is 
not used consistently throughout the function statements its use will be 
avoided. The social cost of a patent is the use restriction imposed on the 
community by the patent holder by virtue of the patent. Though used with 
sufficient consistency by patent innovation literature to have enough 
homogeneity to form a workable definition it is too nebulous in its 
parameters to be used except in very general terms and its use will also 
be avoided. 
2.2. Invention Incentive Function Statement 
The first of the function statements, invention incentive, is the most well 
known function of the patent system and the subject of a very large body 
of empirical work. 375 The invention incentive function, or the theory of how 
the patent system provides an incentive, is best understood through the 
375 Nordhaus, W. D., Invention, Growth and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of 
Technological Change (1969); Kamien, M. I.; Schwartz, N. L., 'Market Structure, Elasticity 
of Demand and Incentive to Invent,' (1970); Kamien, M. I.; Schwartz, N. L., 'Market 
Structure and Innovation: A Survey,' (1975); Loury, G. C., 'Market Structure and 
Innovation,' (1979); Lee, T.; Wilde, L. L., 'Market Structure and Innovation: a 
Reformulation,' (1980); Kamien, M.1. and Schwartz, N., Market Structure and Innovation 
(1982). Rigorous explanative models of innovation utilising the innovation incentive 
statement in conjunction with empirical data significantly began with William Nordhaus in 
1969. Today there are generally between thirty to forty important empirical studies of the 
patent system utilising the incentive statement accessible in English, French, German or 
Italian, across the breadth of patent technologies or patenting firms, each year. 
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assumptions (premiss) that comprise the canonical form of the invention 
incentive function statement. 
2.2.1. Premise 1: No Patent, No Invention 
The first assumption (<pA )376, presupposes the advantage of the patent 
system as a source of innovation incentive, compared to the absence of 
such a system. It holds that without the patent system, the incentive for 
innovation will be insufficient to meet minimal community requirements. 377 
Announcing the winner of a race before a race begins might in some 
peoples' opinion defeat the purpose of the race. However, in this instance 
the premise (<pA) serves as a reversal of the burden of proof concerning 
the effectiveness of the patent that is demonstrative of the political origins 
of the patent system.378 It is a strong strategic position to take for those in 
favour of a patent system, as it places two difficult burdens on the critic if 
they are to falsify the innovation incentive advantages of having a patent 
system on the basis (of <pA) that without the patent system, the incentive 
for innovation will be sufficient to meet minimal community requirements. 
Thus, it must be determined what are the minimal community 
376 If you are not familiar with symbolic notation then these characters can be ignored as I 
have provided analysis and explanation in both forms. However, even if the symbolic 
syllogisms cannot be followed it does help to have a signifier for the exact premise close 
at hand. This will become clear as the discussion becomes more complex. If you are 
familiar with symbolic logic, you will see that only the main syllogisms are presented in 
symbolic form and these are relegated to the footnotes and then summarised in Appendix 
1. 
377 The return expected by a community for the resources it sets aside for that purpose. 
378 Chang, H-J., Kicking away the ladder: Development strategy in historical perspective. 
[Anthem Press, 2004, 1st Ed., 2nd Reprint, London] 19-57 
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requirements for innovation and then demonstrate that those requirements 
are met in the absence of a patent system. 
Prima facie, when the history of innovation prior to the Statute of 
Monopolies 1624,379 or even the Venitian Patent Ordinance of 1474, is 
considered the premise (cpA) might be falsified depending on the standard 
adopted for the minimum community requirements for innovation. If the 
standard adopted is too high then the patent system may fall foul of not 
satisfying the minimum innovation requirement of the community. 
For example, if the minimum community requirement for innovation were 
considered to be cures to all diseases. Then evidently before 1624 there 
were diseases without cures. Thus, in the absence of the patent system 
innovation could not satisfy community requirements for innovation. 
However, maintaining the same minimal requirement for innovation it is 
clear that under the present day patent system innovation is unable to 
satisfy minimal community requirements. The standard then for innovation 
to be sufficient to meet minimal community requirements must be set 
equal or bellow what is achieved under the patent system. 
However, it is also necessary to consider that the nature of innovation in 
the modern world38o may have changed substantially from that of the pre-
379 21 Jac.1, c.3 
380 The period at which we assert the modern world to begin is only important when 
constructing a model for falsification. As a convention this work ties the modern world to 
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patent world. This could be in terms of the properties of an invention, the 
nature of inventor381 and community expectation. 382 If this is the case, 
then inference from pre-patent innovation that invention will satisfy 
minimum community demands for innovation cannot be assessed. As 
even though the standard, which is to be applied for the required minimum 
of innovation, purports to be the same the social context has changed. 
Thus, the premise (cpA), that without the patent system, the incentive for 
innovation will be insufficient to meet minimal community requirements, on 
the basis of historical anecdote is unfalsifiable. 
We can explain this difficulty of 'proof more formally. Proof as such does 
not exist, we rely on conventions for our intersubjective standards of 
objectivity. Proof in this case requires the establishment of such a 
convention. Thus, it is necessary to falsify the hypothesis (cpA) that without 
the patent system, the incentive for innovation will be insufficient to meet 
minimal community requirements. Falsification of this hypothesis requires 
empirical study with a statistical significance indicative that more 
innovation takes place in the absence of a patent system than in the 
presence of one, or that the hypothetical standard set for minimum 
community requirements of innovation are met. Conducting a valid 
the rise of industrial innovation. For pharmaceutical innovation this is the early twentieth 
century, for biotechnology inventions this is the late twentieth century. 
381 Change in the paradigm of the individual inventor to the corporate and institutional 
inventor. See Noble. D. F. America by Design [Oxford University Press. 1979. 2nd Ed .. 
Oxford) 67-1 09 
382 That community expectation is a product of the acts of market dominant forces is a 
difficult hypothesis to falsify. 
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empirical study to falsify the hypothesis (<pA) is immensely difficulty. Which 
is why this reversal of the burden of proof is so powerful; for the patent 
critic to overcome it is extremely difficult, but it must be defeated before 
the premise (<pA) can be overcome. 
Technically this is a shoe that fits both feet. As indeed, it is a fallacy of 
relevance, present in a considerable volume of patent literature, to assert 
that for a given invention, innovation would or would not have occurred, 
but for a patent system. This is because, the interconnection of 
environmental, economic and psychological factors necessary for the 
realisation of an invention are so complex and tied to the specific loci -
cultural, temporal and spatial characteristics and composition of an 
invention - that it would be an argumentum ad ignorantiam to assert by 
virtue of the realisation of a similar invention within or without a patent 
system that the given invention would or would not arise. 
Furthermore, in the present world, which by virtue of TRIPS is to know at 
least as paper rules ubiquitous patent legislation, there are few if any legal 
enclaves of modern and patent free research and development. The 
award of software and business patents, as such, in the USA and the 
prima facie refusal of these enclosures of the public domain in Europe 
might appear to constitute a fertile field of examination. However, a 
comparative analysis of the effect of a patent system on either of these 
institutions would be inadequate for the purposes of ascertaining which 
inventions are most easily obtained in the absence of a patent system. 
179 
The reason being that the cross contamination of ideas and structures 
between each system and the component step nature of innovative activity 
(that is, each new inventive step is an inventive increment for future 
innovation) prevent the successful allocation of the necessary and 
sufficient intellectual breakthrough to the patent or non-patent granting 
system. 
2.2.2. Premise 2: No Rivalry 
The second assumption (<pB) of the innovation incentive function statement 
is utilised implicitly and holds that inventors perform research leading to 
non-rivalrous inventive steps.383 This premise (<pB) serves two purposes. 
Firstly, it simplifies mathematical modelling by excluding competitive 
research and duplicate resource expenditure from innovation models. 
Secondly, it serves as a base for two prima facie persuasive statements: 
Firstly, the longer the duration of a patent the greater the magnitude of 
incentive and thus, the greater the number of potential inventors 
persuaded to innovate (<p81).384 Secondly, the larger the breadth of entities 
capable of being patented the greater the domain of inventors to which the 
patent system provides incentive (<p62). 385 If the second premise (<p8) is 
383 Arrow, K. J., 'Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,' (1962); 
Nordhaus, W. D., Invention, Growth and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of 
Technological Change (1969); Scherer. F. M .. 'Nordhaus' Theory of Optimal Patent Life: 
A Geometric Reinterpretation,' (1972). 
384 Nordhaus. W. D., Invention, Growth and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of 
Technological Change (1969); Scherer. F. M., 'Nordhaus' Theory of Optimal Patent Life: 
A Geometric Reinterpretation,' (1972) 
385 Klemperer. P., 'How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?' (1990) 
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unfalsified then its two related premiss ((fIB1 and (fIB2) lead to a conclusion 
that the stronger the patent incentive, either by duration or breadth, then 
the greater the patent system's innovation incentive. However, the second 
premise ((fiB) is a denial of the classic description of human activity where 
economic actors pursue the most favourable product, spatial and physical 
attributes of a market. Innovators by their success either demonstrate the 
existence of a new market, or the weakness of market competitors. 3aG 
Whilst some inventions, technological breakthroughs, do create new 
markets the majority provide improvements and compete to supply 
existing demands. An empirical assessment of the invention market will 
also suggest that where a particular inventive step, improvement or 
breakthrough, offers very large rewards compared to similar technology 
areas, that is where inventors have the appropriate resources to compete 
for equivalent inventive steps, then copy inventing will take place.367 The 
rivalry to arrive first at the invention with the greatest reward is termed a 
patent race and is the subject of an economic theory that attempts to 
depict the dynamic incentives of the patent system. 388 It can be 
considered as a preferable, though limited, alternative to the second 
premise ((fiB) of the innovation incentive function statement. 
386 Loury, G. C., Market Structure and Innovation (1979) 93(3) The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 395-410 at 396-402 
387 Me-too pharmaceutical patents are an example, but inventing around is also a 
frequent occurrence with mechanical patents. On the 'overfishing' of limited technology 
'pools' see Barzel, Y., 'Optimal Timing of Innovations,' (1968). 
388 Dasgupta, P. S.; Stiglitz, J. E., 'Uncertainty, Industrial Structure and the Speed of 
R&D,' (1980) 
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Patent race theory389 is based on competition between actors to transform 
ideas into property. That is, the transformation of an inventive step into 
property that it is assumed will lead to a product that will reward the owner 
for their efforts. Thus, it has two significant components: a) the conditions 
an inventor has to satisfy to obtain a patent; and b) the value of the rents 
derived from the patent. Since acquisition of a patent is the end point for 
patent race theory, it is especially applicable to situations where the 
inventor lacks resources to undertake market supply of the invention, or 
where further development is necessary for the invention to be approved 
for the market (as is the case for pharmaceutical patents).390 The patent is 
seen as a product destined to meet a particular demand and the 
competition arises from the anticipated benefit of achieving rents from first 
389 Loury, G., 'Market Structure and Innovation' (1979) 93 Quarterty Journal of Economics 
395-410; Dasgupta, P., Stiglitz, J., 'Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of 
R&D' (1980) 11 Bell Journal of Economics 1-28; Lee,T., Wilde, L., 'Market Structure and 
Innovation: A Reformulation' (1980) 94 Quarterly Journal of Economics 429-436; 
Reinganum, J., 'The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development and Diffusion' in 
Schmalensee, R., and Willig, D., (eds.) Handbook of Industrial Organization [North 
Holland, 1989. 1st Ed., Amsterdam] 849-908; Harris, C., Vickers, J., 'Racing with 
Uncertainty' (1987) 54 Review of Economic Studies 1-21; Segerstrom, P., Anant, T., 
Dinopoulos, E., 'A Schumpeterian Model of the Product Life Cycle' (1990) 80(5) Amen'can 
Economic Review 1077-91; Grossman, G., Helpman, E., 'Quality Ladders in the Theory 
of Growth' (1991) 58 Review of Economic Studies 43-61 
390 Some economists suggest that the patent reduces transaction costs of licensing the 
invention. See Arrow, K. J., 'Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention,' (1962); Merges, R. P., 'Expanding Boundaries of the Law: Intellectual Property 
and the Costs of Commercial Exchange: A Review Essay,' (1995); Arora, A.; 
Gambardella, A" 'The changing technology of technological change: general and abstract 
knowledge and the division of innovative labour,' (1994). However, even if the patent 
lowers licensing transaction costs obtaining a patent and restricting the embodiment of 
the respective inventive step incurs transaction costs. Coase, R. H., 'The Problem of 
Social Cost' (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1-44 
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supply of that demand. For society it allows a balance to be found 
between eliminating inefficient inventors and wasting resources in 
duplicatory competition. The optimum balance set by the length of the 
race and the prize rents should create dynamic efficiency: That is, static 
efficiency such as the accessibility of medicines are balanced by long run 
concerns such as the research and development of new medicines. 
If a race is long with a large prize then it will stimulate inventors to work 
hard and will eliminate the most inefficient competitors. Elimination of the 
most inefficient competitors serves dynamic efficiency and thus contributes 
to welfare. However, the long duplicated expenditure of resources 
between competitors is wasteful. 
In the context of pharmaceuticals, prizes can be extremely large for a few 
patents, which are embodied in market approved products, but the 
majority of pharmaceutical patents receive no rents. The objective of 
these no-rent patents is to waste competitors' resources. This is positive 
in the light that they will deter many inefficient competitors from the patent 
race with the large reward and present savings to society. However, it is 
disadvantageous to society as the resources deployed in the no-rent 
patents must be compensated by rent from the prize patent of the patent 
race. It is also disadvantageous as competitors who continue to compete 
must expend resources to navigate the no-rent patents. This situation is 
represented in most therapy areas. The first mover advantages mean that 
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in some cases the race leader can still win even if they are less efficient 
than competitors. 
Since the prize is a large reward competitors may still continue to compete 
even after an inventor has obtained the prize.391 In general this is 
undesirably wasteful to society, though in some circumstances the 
increased uptake of competing products may make contributions to 
welfare. For the competitors it may reduce the value of the available 
prizes to static efficiency leaving little or nothing to be invested in other 
patent races. 
Although it is called patent race theory it can include the innovation 
activities of generic manufacturers. If improvement (insufficient to qualify 
as a new invention under § 2(6) Patent Act 1077) is a sufficient qualifying 
factor and market share is decisive of the winner, patent race theory 
readily accommodates generic medicines. Thereby, factors such as the 
price of the medicine, its quality and its availability become variables within 
patent race theory. Which already makes patent race theory more 
preferable to (<pB) assuming non-rivalrous inventive activity. 
Moreover, since innovation may be rivalrous the inventor may not be in a 
position to benefit from their inventive work.392 Furthermore, increase in 
391 Me-too medicines for example the PDE5 inhibitor market 
392 This might be for one or more of several reasons, i.e. because an earlier patent 
anticipates the inventive step or that despite the technological merits of the inventive step 
the inventor lacks the resources to access the market. 
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the total inventive effort does not guarantee an increase of innovation 
output. Thus, the related premiss (<pB1 and <pB2) of the second premise of 
the innovation incentive function statement, no longer state a reliable 
proportional relation between patent strengthening and innovation output. 
Rewards are considered to be greatest for first comers, thus inventors 
have an interest in investing their resources in order to be the first to 
patent the inventive step. In so doing it is likely that they will consume 
their resources faster and less efficiently than if their object were to 
achieve a particular inventive step in the absence of competition.393 The 
result of achieving a particular invention faster and less efficiently is that 
the resulting product is more expensive as the inventor must recoup higher 
opportunity cost. 
Moreover, even if a given inventor paces their research and development 
independently of competition and thus discovers the inventive step with 
economic efficiency there will be other potential inventors working on the 
same objective. These potential inventors must derive benefit from 
somewhere to repay their resource investment in unrewarded research. 
According to standard welfare economics this cost has eventually to be 
met by the community. 
2.2.2.1 Patent Race Alternative 
Patent race theory as a result can only describe an incentive for inventors 
who have sufficient resources not to be excluded from a market. As those 
393 Barzel, Y., 'Optimal Timing of Innovations,' (1968) 348-350 
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without resources to enter the market cannot compete. Remembering that 
licences are available for pharmaceutical products it is possible that they 
may join with another competitor or entrant to acquire sufficient resources 
to in effect enter the market. This is usually the case for university and 
government inventions. 
As market share is decisive of the winner, a patent by itself may become 
less important than other strategic behaviours.394 Subsequent patents, 
even though they are potentially weak because they lack an inventive 
step, may be required. Pharmaceuticals are a complex technology area in 
a mature industry where patenting standards can be surprisingly low.395 In 
these circumstances we would expect patent ownership to be shared 
amongst competitors resulting in low incentives to innovate. However, 
although ownership of pharmaceutical patents tends to be shared they are 
not shared amongst competitors. The patents are shared amongst 
research entities, such as universities or the NIH, and a research and 
manufacture pharmaceutical company. Therefore, incentives remain high, 
and later entrants into the market are sufficiently delayed that their losses 
from failing to win the patent race are not borne by the winner or originator. 
With a little complication evergreening can be modelled into patent race 
theory. Rather than considering that an innovation in a patent race 
corresponds to the acquisition of a single patent - the originator patent -
394 The degree to which the patent remains important depends on the technology sector. 
For a historic flavour of the variance see Mansfield, E., 'Patents and Innovation: An 
Empirical Study,' (1986) 
395 Harrison, C., 'Patent Watch' (2009) 8 Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 350-351 
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we can use wave theory and model subsequent market rent domination 
events (evergreening events) as crests. 
At this point it may be useful to our understanding to consider a very 
simple application of patent race theory as the uses we have suggested go 
beyond the standard conceptions of its use. Let us consider a simplified 
example based on the statin market. The market is divided amongst six 
products. However, some competitors own more than one of these 
products. For the moment we will aggregate the product variables for each 
competitor. Which means the market is divided amongst four competitors. 
Let them be a, b, C, and d. 
a's cumulative share of the market since it began is 45 per cent. b, C and 
d's cumulative market shares are 25, 20, and 1 ° per cent respectively. Let 
us consider that the cumulative value of the market over its lifetime has 
been 100. Thus, total revenues from the market are 45, 25, 20, and 10 for 
a, b, C and d respectively. a has two products on the market that have 
cost it u1 and u2. b also has two products that have cost it u3 and u4. 
Therefore the total profit from the market for a is 45-(u1+u2). For b the 
total profit is 25-(u3+u4). Therefore, if u1+u2 is greater than u3+u4+20, 
then a's participation in the market has been more effective than b's. By 
increasing the number of variables within this set of relations we are able 
to generate observations concerning different facets of the competitors' 
behaviour. Such indicators can be useful to investors wishing to place 
187 
their capital in a lucrative market, or for innovators to determine which 
strategies are most effective. 
First mover advantages including establishment of production and 
distribution networks have generally been identified as more important 
than patents.396 The chemical and pharmaceutical technology sectors 
however, are considered to be primarily patent dependent.397 This may be 
because within the chemical and pharmaceutical technology sectors 
market access tends to have a high resource requirement threshold. 
Moreover, within the context of pharmaceuticals there are options for 
extending lead-time that are only available to competitors who have a 
patene98 and pharmaceutical patents have a longer term than any other 
patent. Furthermore, the standard of sufficiency for pharmaceutical 
patents is low, which facilitates patent line extensions. Patent race theory 
within the context of pharmaceuticals, then is best considered as a 
particular distortion from market theory. Moreover, because of the 
resource threshold required for competition, the patent as an innovation 
396 See Levin, R. C., 'Technical Change, Barriers to Entry and Market Structure,' (1978); 
and Levin, R. C.; Klevorick, A. K.; Nelson, R. R.; Winter, S. G., 'Appropriating the Returns 
from Industrial R&D,' (1987), but also see Taylor, C.; Silberston, Z. A., The Economic 
Impact of the Patent System (1973); and Schwartzmann, D., Innovation in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry (1976). 
397 Edwin Mansfield's 1986 survey of one-thousand US manufacturing firms between 
1981 and 1983 is most often cited to show industry R&D dependence on patents. It was 
suggested that for automobiles, metal refining, electrical equipment, and office equipment 
inter alios that less than ten per cent of R&D was dependent on the patent. For 
pharmaceuticals and the chemical industry the patent was suggested to be necessary for 
about sixty and forty per cent respectively of new inventive steps. See Mansfield, E .. 
'Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study,' (1986) 
398 For example Supplementary Protection Certificates. 
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incentive and primary source of reward is only addressed to a very small 
number of economically powerful actors. 
We see a closer reflection of reality in substituting patent race theory and 
therefore rivalrous behaviour into the invention incentive function 
statement than if we simply retained (<(>B) the premise that inventors 
perform research leading to non-rivalrous inventive steps. However, there 
remains a difficulty. Both patent race theory and the premise (<(>B) that 
inventors perform research leading to non-rivalrous inventive steps, fail 
take account of innovation retarding effects of the patent system, for 
example the high costs involved in maintaining a patent.399 Indeed the 
cost of policing a patent and prolonging the life of a patent line is extremely 
difficult to foresee. Retrospectively such costs can be incorporated into 
patent race theory, but they are problematic because patent race theory in 
its simplest form considers a patent race to end when a single patent is 
obtained. These problems are understandable, because the invention 
incentive function statement ends once the innovation has been achieved 
399 Currently the patent filing at the UK Intellectual Property Office (UK IPO) costs £200 
GBP; it is comprised of a preliminary examination at £30 GBP, a search at £100 GBP and 
a substantive examination at £70 GBP. UK IPO renewal fees commence after the fourth 
anniversary from the filling date; they are currently £50 GBP for the fifth year augmenting 
by £20 GBP increments each year to £400 GBP for the twentieth year. Costs are taken 
from the UK IPO schedules as at December 30,2008. See: 
<http://www.ipo.gov.uk/types/patent.htm> (Last Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
The most important expense of a patent arises if it needs policing. During interview 
(March 2004), a European Patent Attorney specialising in chemical and pharmaceutical 
patents admitted that contention over a patent could typically cost each party several 
million GBP, not taking account of settlements, awards and the unbillable costs a party's 
agents may sustain. 
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and has no consideration for the aftermath. That is the principle reason for 
it to assume non-rivalrous invention (<pB): through this premise the 
invention incentive function statement can ignore costs arising from other 
patents and patent actions. 
Indeed, within our simplified substitution trying to account for the cost of 
competitive behaviour adds a complex qualification to the appealing 
simplicity of the incentive invention function statement. That is, even if a 
competitor innovates and is an originator, there is no guarantee that they 
will realise any reward from their invention. 
Furthermore, although patent race theory might provide a more 
sophisticated illustration of innovation incentive than simply assuming (<pB) 
that there is no rivalry, it needs to take account of a large number of 
negative innovation incentives that arise from rivalrous behaviour. 
Although we have mentioned some of these, such as the high cost of 
patent policing, others include the risk of infringing a patent through the 
embodiment of even minor technological changes to a product, and the 
disincentive of competing with others for the reward, where the winner 
takes all. Within a system where market share is permissible winner takes 
all is of less significance. However, for pharmaceuticals it should be 
remembered that patents and data exclusivity can pose absolute bars to 
market entry. Moreover, in a rivalrous environment the patent system 
constitutes an important strategic tool, even where a patent is not in fact 
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existent, and may permit dominance of both market and innovation sectors 
in the absence of actors of comparable resources. 
2.2.3. Premise 3: No Money, No Invention 
The third major assumption (<pc) of the innovation incentive function of 
patents is as equally important as the first two premiss (<pA and <pB). It 
assumes that an economic return is the most important incentive for 
inventive activity to occur. The patent for inventions' invention incentive is 
derived from its correlation of 'usefulness to society' and 'economic value' 
through scarcitlOO that allows the patent holder to assign or license use of 
the inventive step at a price. If there were no scarcity, then the most 
efficient producer of the product employing the inventive step would, all 
other parameters remaining the same, dominate the market to the extent 
the respective economy of scale permitted. 
As this premise is closely related to the fourth premise, it is expedient to 
treat them both at the same time. Let us introduce premise four. 
2.2.4. Premise 4: Inventor Owner 
By granting scarcity to the patent holder in order to encourage inventive 
activity the patent system adopts the natural allocation principle of 
copyright401 and makes the fourth important assumption (<pD) of the 
400 Penrose, E. T., The Economics of the Intemational Patent System (1951) 27 
401 For an early example see: Millarv. Taylor (1769) 98 E.R. 201: ..... it is just, that an 
author should reap the pecuniary profits of his own ingenuity and labour ... " per Lord 
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innovation incentive function statement - that the inventor and patent 
holder are the same natural person, or group of natural persons. The 
function of the patent system by permitting the inventor to control scarcity 
makes it easier for the inventor to derive an income from their inventive 
step.402 Thus, if the second premise (<(>6) is retained, and the costs of the 
patent are ignored, then the patent system according to the invention 
incentive function statement encourages perfect allocation. 
However, since the patent has a cost and is necessary (<j)A) necessary 
then, even theoretically, the patent system cannot encourage perfect 
allocation. 
2.2.5 Allocation, Incentive and Inventors 
Indeed perfect allocation is unlikely to be the objective of a system that 
relies on artificial scarcity unilaterally controlled by the person seeking 
reward for the invention. The mechanism by which this artificial scarcity 
provides the inventor with an incentive is Simple, but requires the objective 
of the patent holder or inventor to be pecuniary, in particular a period of 
maximisation. Thus, technological knowledge is sought only for the above 
normal profit that its respective patent may allow the inventor to reap. This 
Mansfield CJ at 252 and further Aston J. at 220-221, and Willes J at 212. Note three 
arguably different strands of reasoning. 
402 Plant, A, 'Economic theory concerning patents,' (1934) 32. On the patents part in 
reducing the licensing cost of technologies see Arrow, K. J., 'Economic Welfare and the 
Allocation of Resources for Invention,' (1962); Merges, R. P., 'Expanding Boundaries of 
the Law: Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial Exchange: A Review Essay,' 
(1995); Arora, A; Gambardella, A, 'The changing technology of technological change: 
general and abstract knowledge and the division of innovative labour,' (1994) 
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is a problem shared by patent race theory; there has to be a prize for 
either to work. 
Without the patent for inventions, and assuming the resources of the 
inventor and competitors to be alike, then the inventor is unable to assert 
an entry barrier to the market against their competitors. In the case of 
hypothetical perfect competition, supply will equal demand and above 
normal profit will not be available for the inventor. However, with a patent 
for inventions the inventor can prevent additional productive resources 
entering the market and in consequence will earn above normal profits for 
the duration of the patent. The invention incentive would conceptually 
function in the absence of patents, providing that another reward or 'prize' 
was available. 
The utilitarian justification of the patent system as the means of preference 
to supply community demand for innovation, at this point, becomes 
difficult. Essentially under perfect competition when supply equates to 
demand then equilibrium will occur. According to market theory the 
equilibrium pOint of perfect competition will yield lower prices and higher 
output than under monopoly. 
2.2.6. My Labour 
Though utilitarianism has difficulties in justifying the community's award of 
above normal profits to the inventor, because of the reduced accessibility 
of the invention and the lower research productivity, there are other 
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justifications for the invention incentive function to be organised in this 
way. Primarily, amongst these are labour specialism theory403 and labour 
theory. Labour specialism theory concerning patentable inventions holds 
that only a small portion of a community is capable of creating 
technological inventions. Since this small proportion of the community can 
earn sufficient reward from the community through means other than 
inventive activity there is no natural advantage for this minority to innovate 
rather than follow non-inventive behaviour. Furthermore, because not all 
innovations will be successful the risk involved in devoting resources to 
innovative activity makes innovative behaviour less favourable than non-
inventive behaviour. Thus, the potential inventor must be offered an 
incentive to carry out inventive activity in preference to other opportunities 
for reward. As a result the opportunity to receive above normal profits 
creates a preference amongst the inventive portion of the community to 
innovate. 
403 Not all elements of a workforce are capable of fulfilling all roles. The more complex 
the task the less the likelihood that a given element will be able to successfully complete 
every other role. See Plato, The Republic, trans. H. D. Lee [Penguin Books Ltd, 2003, 
1 st Ed., London] 103 ...... Iet us see how our city will be able to supply this great demand: 
We may suppose that one man is a husbandman, another a builder, some one else a 
weaver-shall we add to them a shoemaker, or perhaps some other purveyor to our bodily 
wants? Quite right. The barest notion of a State must include four or five men ... "; 
consider further brief mention by Xenophon on the Education of Cyrus in M. Finley, The 
Ancient Economy [Penguin books Ltd, 1992, 1st Ed., London] 135; developing 
contemporary treatment is found in Hume (A Treatise of Human Nature) and Smith (An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations); Other mention can be found 
amongst the discussion of the 'Division of Labour' by Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk, Emile 
Durkheim, Friedrich Hayek, Karl Marx, Carl Menger, Ludwig von Mises, and Henry David 
Thoreau. 
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The labour theory, sometimes labelled Lockean labour theory,404 assumes 
that a person's labour is their own. It then holds that because a person's 
labour is their own the product of that labour is also theirs as opposed to 
the community's.405 An insurmountable difficulty is resolving the 
transformation of resources belonging to a community as a whole into a 
product that belongs only to the transformer or the labourer. The difficulty 
in accepting the transformation is proportional to the use competitiveness 
of the initial resource and the accessibility of competing uses.406 In the 
Two Treaties of Government407 1690 Locke was only concerned with real 
property and not intellectual property. Physical property, the main subject 
of Locke's writing, lends itself more readily to individual attribution than 
intellectual property. Physical property can only be utilised by a limited 
number of people, thus a distributive mechanism is needed to determine 
who will be able to consume resources and for which purpose.4oa The 
atomalistic approach to ownership, as opposed to group ownership of 
physical property, is the historic product of European community 
structures.409 A progressive history of individualistic acquisition of property 
commons has a significant impact on Western legal mentality.410 As a 
404 Hughes, J., 'The Philosophy of Intellectual Property' (1988) 77 Georgetown Law 
Journal 287; 
405 Idea of the patent as an instrument of justice is still pertinent and can be seen in §40 
Patent Act 1977 concerning compensation for employees. 
406 Thus, the problem is essential one of resource allocation and not one of post-
transformation possession. 
407 Locke, J. P., Two Treatises on Government Laslett, P. (ed.) (1988) 
408 i.e. the appropriation function of property law or an argumentum ad baculum 
409 Macpherson, C. B., The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (1979) 221 
410 Cohen, M. R., 'Property and Sovereignty,' in Law and the Social Order. Essays in 
Legal Philosophy (1982) 41-44 
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result of the property experience the Lockean labour theory was readily 
adopted into intellectual property theory in order to provide natural right 
justification for the intellectual commons' closure movement. It will be 
remembered that the patent does not prevent use of the knowledge of the 
patented inventive step, rather it restricts physical embodiment of the 
patented inventive step. Whilst it was true that a natural right trope for 
intellectual commons' closure was not applicable by virtue of allocation 
necessity, it was also arguable that the enclosed knowledge was an 
addition to knowledge and because no one had previously thought of it. 
thus it was not yet part of the property in common to the community. 
Hence, property in the inventive step was the natural right of the inventor, 
because the inventor was the sine qua non of the community knowing the 
inventive step. 411 
2.2.7. All Together 
Thus, we arrive at a point where the patent system's innovation incentive 
function, according to its assumptions412 (<pA, <pB, <pc and <pD) will generate 
more rapid innovation by giving the inventor sufficient economic incentive 
to innovate rather than pursue non-inventive behaviour. In addition it will 
give the inventor their just entitlement. For without the inventor's initiative 
and work, the community's knowledge commons could never be 
411 Becker, L. C., 'Deserving to Own Intellectual Property,' (1993) 609-629, but is 
serendipitous innovation different? 
412 There are most important assumptions of the innovation incentive function statement. 
They are that the patent holder is the inventor, inventors pursue research that leads to 
non-rivalrous inventive steps and that without patents there would be insufficient incentive 
to innovate to meet community demand for innovation. 
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expanded. Unfortunately, we are also aware that according to market 
theory, which utilises the same techniques of economic analysis, but does 
not assume inventive incentive to be weaker in the absence of the patent, 
that innovation will be more expensive and slower for the community in the 
presence of monopoly.413 
An examination of patent practice suggests an inherent dependence of the 
patent as an economic stimulus of inventive activity to be more effective 
when coexistent with a thriving competitive market. A wealth of empirical 
anecdotes exist that are unfalsifying of the convention414 that where a 
market is occupied by relatively few uncompetitive firms there is a 
likelihood of languid technological progress.415 Professor Cornish 
suggests that the pharmaceutical and software industries with markets 
dominated by relatively few firms are, by virtue of their 'determination to 
innovate,' falsifying of a general convention suggesting proportionality 
between market dominance and inventive indolence encompassing all 
413 Market theory also makes assumptions which are in some cases impractical. 
414 This refers to falsifiability and as short hand states that the meaningful statement 
(,where a market is occupied by relatively few uncompetitive firms there is a likelihood of 
languid technological progress') is conclusively decideable and had not yet been falsifified 
by experience. See Popper, K., The Logic of Scientific Discovery [Routledge Classics, 
2004, ]'h Ed., London] 17 
415 Jewkes, J.; Sawers, D.; Stillerman, R, The Sources of Invention (1969)166-168; 
Merges, R P.; Nelson, R R, 'On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope.' (1990) 884; 
"There is abundant evidence from case studies to support the view that actual and 
potential new entrants playa crucial role in stimulating technical progress, both as direct 
sources of innovation and as spurs to existing industry members ... new entrants 
contribute a disproportionately high share of all really revolutionary and new industrial 
products and processes." Scherer. F. M., Industrial market structure and economic 
performance [Rand McNally College Publishing Company. 1980, Chicago] 437-438 
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technological sectors capable of being patented subjects.416 There is 
certainly reason for caution in proposing general descriptive relations 
encompassing all patent types.417 However, the products of both software 
and pharmaceutical markets are by nature extremely rivalrous, thus 
promoting competition with regard to certain products in spite of market 
dominance. For software, rivalry stems from a short market longevity of 
each product incorporating the inventive step. With pharmaceuticals the 
high profitability of a blockbuster invention inspires competitive me-toos. 
In both cases, although relatively few firms may dominate a given market, 
at the loci where the pharmaceutical or software industry example 
presents falsifying elements, a thriving competitive market is seen to 
exist.418 Since longevity thresholds and profit thresholds have a high 
correspondence with exception to an unqualified convention regarding the 
proportionality of market dominance and inventive indolence it is sensible 
to incorporate both into the epistemological construction of the convention. 
Thus, it may be clearer to suggest a convention that where a firm 
dominates a given market in the absence of rivalrous potential there is a 
tendency towards inventive indolence419 (pA), and where competitive 
416 Cornish, W., Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights 
(1999) 132 
417 Burk, D. L.; Lemley, M. A., 'Is Patent Law Technology-specific,' (2002) consider the 
courts reactions to different types of technologies and how different patent subjects do 
not receive homogeneous treatment across technology sectors. It should be questioned 
whether the entities of different technology sectors are capable of equivalent treatment? 
418 With software the Windows and Linux Operating Systems are demonstrative. 
Amongst pharmaceutical patents Viagra is a well known example, though Prozac is a 
better example. 
419 Soete, L., 'Firm size and inventive activity' (1979) 12 European Economic Review 319-
40 
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potential exists regardless of the small number of rivalrous firms there is 
still incentive to innovate more rapidly than if there were no potential 
competitive provider to that given market (pB).420 
To consolidate the premises of the innovation incentive function statement 
are that: without the patent system, the incentive for innovation will be 
insufficient to meet minimal community requirements (<pA); that inventors 
perform research leading to non-rivalrous inventive steps (<pB); that 
economic return is the most important incentive for inventive activity to 
occur (cpc); and that the inventor and patent holder are the same natural 
person, or group of natural persons (cpD). 
2.2.8. Beyond the Prize 
For research to generate non-rivalrous inventive steps (cpB), then there 
must be an absence of competition, which suggests there will be a 
reduced incentive to undertake further inventive activity (pA). Thus, the 
extent of the inventive activity, which will be undertaken under the 
invention incentive function statement, is not as extensive as would be 
undertaken if inventive activity was rivalrous (_cpB).421 
420 For example rail fastening systems. The market is dominated by Pandrol, but there 
are other firms with competitive potential, thus Pandrol has an incentive to invent to 
maintain its market leading position. 
421 Let inventive activity be 1\, and inventive activity as a result of the invention incentive 
function statement be 1\1. Therefore. 
cpAecpBecpCecpD::J 1\1 
•• B A 
• cp ::J P ::J-I\ 
,'. 1\1 ::J -1\ 
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The invention incentive function statement lacks coherence with regard to 
empirically supported inventive indolence. That is to say that if patents 
were a sufficiently strong monopoly to be non-rivalrous,422 then there 
would be no further innovation in the presence of a patent - i.e. once a 
patent was awarded there would be no incentive for further innovation until 
the patent expired or neared expiry. 
Remember that another premise of the invention incentive function 
statement is that the longer the duration of a patent the greater the 
magnitude of the incentive and thus, the greater the number of potential 
inventors persuaded to innovate (<(>B1). However, this premise now has a 
corollary. That is, each inventor creates inventions that do not compete for 
resources. The greater the incentive the more people stimulated to 
inventive activity. However, during the period of the patent indolence 
replaces the incentive to invent. Thus, the labour of those actors, by 
definition capable of inventive activity, is wasted during the period of the 
patent. Thus, increasing patent times, i.e. increasing the incentive to 
invent, proportionally increases waste. 
422 Remember our discussion of software and pharmaceutical patents above, the 
monopoly would have to be large enough to encompass the particular market and of 
sufficient duration that the patentee felt no urge to expend resources in further innovation. 
For there to be a retardative effect it would only be necessary that a moment of inventive 
indolence occurred. Longer instances would of course yield greater retardation in 
invention. 
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As a justification then, the invention incentive function statement is 
problematic. It suggests that in the absence of competition inventions will 
be realised efficiently, but then during the period that the incentive is 
received there will be a waste of resources. As a tool for justifying 
practice, it is also undesirable as long as there is sufficient incentive to 
direct activity into invention and no system of distributing that inventive 
activity, down to the individual actor, there will be duplicated and therefore 
wasteful research activity. This will particularly be the case if some 
inventions have more desirable incentives than others. 
2.2.9. Motivation 
There are other empirical behaviours that appear anomalous with respect 
to invention incentive models, but conceptually should be part of the 
invention incentive. Consider the polio vaccines devised by Jonas Salk 
and Albert Sabin. Neither inventor filed a patent or sought economic 
reward from their inventions. Their rewards appear to be derived from 
their satisfaction in preventing Poliomyelitis and perhaps the knowledge 
that the renown that followed their invention would lead to career 
progression. To attribute the incentive of all innovation to the patent is 
historically falsifiable and presumptuous of an understanding of the human 
being in toto and the diversity of environmental factors that might influence 
choice. However, considering the conditions in which innovation does 
occur there are several, not mutually exclusive, incentive reasons for 
inventive research: these are the ability to perform new tasks,423 more 
effective performance, lower production cost, renown, the natural creativity 
of humankind,424 a rent in the innovation, patent circumvention, and 
altruism. Some of these reasons for invention empirically conflict with (<pc) 
the premise that a financial return is the most important incentive for 
inventive activity to occur. Given the empirical example of the Polio 
vaccines a financial return is not a necessary condition of pharmaceutical 
innovation incentive. Furthermore, considering the utilisation of herbs, 
herbal extracts, and minerals by both ancient peoples and modern 
cultural-community-collective herborists - the wielders of the 
unsatisfactorily so-called 'traditional knowledge' - substantial discovery of 
the medicinal properties of compositions and extracts, i.e. invention, 
occurred in the absence of a financial reward. That other factors than 
financial reward have played an important role in the devising of medicinal 
agents is very difficult to falsify. In a similar measure, if the nature of 
pharmaceutical innovation has changed fundamentally from patentless 
regimes of medicinal innovation, it is difficult to falsify the premise (pc) that 
an economic return is the most important incentive for inventive activity to 
occur. In consequence, the ability to perform new tasks, more effective 
performance, lower production cost, renown, the natural creativity of 
humankind, a rent in the innovation, patent circumvention, and altruism 
423 The ability to solve problems or improve environmental conditions is historically an 
important source of innovation. For example, the stirrup was devised to increase the 
stability of a rider. 
424 Invention for the pleasure of devising a new manner of doing something or 
accomplishing something hitherto not possible. 
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(which we label q>C1) could be substituted in place of the premise to the 
invention incentive function statement in place of the for the premise (<pc) 
that an economic return is the most important incentive for inventive 
activity to occur. This is a qualified substitution: In the advent that it can 
be shown that the nature of pharmaceutical innovation has changed from 
that of non-patent granting pharmaceutical innovation regimes - not merely 
in terms the evolved channels of pharmaceutical production based on 
legal artifice, rather as a response to changed physical factors425 - and that 
a financial reward is the determinant condition for the success of the 
majority of innovation then our substitution (q>C1) reverts to (<pc) simply an 
economic return. On the other hand, if the nature of pharmaceutical 
innovation is not different by virtue of the physical characteristics of patent 
granting communities then (q>C1) our substitution remains unfalsified and 
can be retained. 
The ability to perform new tasks, or to solve problems has been an 
observable trait of humankind since the Neolithic period at the very 
least.426 There were certainly no patents to incentive innovative activity for 
a very long period where considerable innovation took place. The most 
plausible explanation for the incentive for the practices of domesticating 
animals and fashioning tools by splitting and grinding stone are the ability 
425 For example discontinuous change in human or virus serotype physiology with the 
medicine genesis techniques of the past 
426 Helbaek, H., 'First Impressions of the Catal HOyOk Plant Husbandry' (1964) 14 
Anatolian Studies 121-123 
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to perform new tasks and more effective performance.427 The practice of 
domesticating animals is likely the result, inter alia, of an incentive to 
perform a new task, i.e. the improvement of environmental conditions 
through the augmentation of resources readily available to a community. 
By creating tools of polished stone Neolithic humans would not only have 
gained the ability to perform new tasks, they also improved their ability to 
perform a given task. For example, Neolithic man used their stone tools to 
improve, inter alia, their ability to prepare shelters, to cure skins and to 
create their art. Gradual improvements to the domestication of animals 
and the manufacture of stone tools, through experimentation would either 
be for the reason of reducing the resources necessary for tool creation or 
to improve the efficiency of a tool. 
Other reasons for the domestication of animals or the manufacture of 
stone tools might include the natural creativity of humankind and altruism. 
Whilst the natural creativity of humankind can never be discounted it is 
also very difficult to assert, and might constitute a necessary condition of 
inventive activity.428 Altruism can only be asserted in those cases where a 
detailed account of motive is available.429 
2.2.10 Inescapable Waste 
As there are incentives to invent new and more efficient ways of 
performing tasks, there are also incentives to invent alternative or less 
427 Edwards, M., Stone Tools and Society [Routledge, 2002, 2nd Ed., London] 9-12 
428 This is a problem of cognitive theory and one that is an industry in the subject. 
429 For example in the cases of Florey, Salk and Sabin 
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efficient methods. Patent circumvention was unnecessary for Neolithic 
humans, but other beliefs or customs might have demanded that 
alternative methods of performing some tasks were devised.43o 
Another problem of the invention incentive function statement is that it 
assumes that an incentive is a necessary condition for invention to occur, 
and thus, neglects the importance of serendipity in the invention process. 
Serendipity (<pE) is not a necessary condition for invention incentive, but it 
is a sufficient condition.431 
It might be argued that though an invention is conceived it will not be 
developed further without an incentive. The invention incentive function 
statement is not concerned with consequent development of an invention 
so its premiss were not assumed with any justificatory intent towards post 
patenting, or rather post reward, activity.432 The invention incentive 
function statement is simply not concerned with what comes after 
acquisition of the patent. Therefore, problems such as inventive indolence 
(pA) do not feature within its justification. 
If the invention incentive function statement is to be considered part of a 
coherent model of patent justification alongside the other posited 
justifications then the consequences of its premiss after the award of a 
430 Edwards, M., Stone Tools and Society [Routledge, 2002, 2nd Ed., London] 12-14 
431 Where the disjunctive is exclusive invention will occur, according to the invention 
incentive function statement, when C{JE v (C{JA 0 C{JB 0 C{JC1 0 C{JD). Thus, _ «pA 0 C{JB 0 <pC1 0 <pD). 
:.C{JEand-C{JE,:. (C{JAoq>Boq>C1 oq>D). 
432 However, the organised derivative invention function statement is. See 2.5. below. 
205 
patent need to be considered. Having done this we are well are of the 
statement's limitations as well as the realism of its premiss. Thus, we are 
well placed to consider how its premiss cohere with the premiss of other 
function statements. Moreover, when it arises in patent literature we will 
be immediately aware of its limitations and therefore the validity of 
syllogisms that utilise it or its elements. 
2.3. Disclosure Incentive Function Statement 
Whilst the invention incentive function statement assumes (q>A) that without 
the patent system the incentive for innovation will be insufficient to meet 
minimal community requirements, the disclosure incentive function 
statement has a very different premise. 
2.3.1. Premise 1: No Patent, No Disclosure 
It assumes that inventions will occur without patents and that the existence 
of patents, through their requirement of specification, widens the use of an 
otherwise undisclosed inventive step by making the respective knowledge 
available to the community. Indeed the disclosure incentive function 
statement considers (q>B1) the assumption that longer patent terms provide 
a larger incentive inconsequential. Since it assumes that the same degree 
of innovation will occur in the absence of the patent as in its presence. 
The only difference is that without the patent the essential knowledge of 
the inventive step will not be distributed to the community. 
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The premise (cpB2) that the larger the breadth of entities capable of being 
patented then greater the domain of inventors to which the patent system 
provides incentive, is also irrelevant as such. However, this premise is 
relevant to the disclosure incentive function statement in that if a 
technology area is not eligible for patents then knowledge about invention 
in that area will not be disclosed. Therefore premise (cpB2) would be 
understood in the context of the disclosure incentive function statement to 
be: The larger the breadth of entities capable of being patented then 
greater the domain of disclosure to which the patent system provides 
incentive. 
The first premise (cpA) of the invention incentive function statement and the 
first premise of the disclosure incentive function statement do not cohere. 
Therefore, the invention incentive function statement and the disclosure 
incentive function statement conflict. 
As there remain many interesting points to raise concerning the interplay 
of these two function statements, and to avoid complication, we shall 
distort the two premiss. We will replace both conflicting premiss with a 
new premise (<pA1). Which is as much as possible a compound of 
important elements from the two premiss. This is then, that without the 
patent there would be too little invention and disclosure of that innovation, 
to meet minimal community requirements (cpA\ 
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The disclosure incentive function statement needs to be considered as two 
components: a principle and an auxiliary. The principal statement for the 
disclosure performed by the patent system is that without the patent there 
would be no disclosure: i.e. the modus tollendo tollens relation, only if 
there is a patent system will disclosure take place. If there is no patent 
system, then no disclosure takes place.433 Substituting for the distorted 
premise (q>A1) this would be: if there is no patent system, then too little 
disclosure will take place to satisfy minimal community requirements. The 
auxiliary statement is that disclosure through the patent system is 
desirable. The statement concerning the desirability of disclosure through 
the patent system is auxiliary because it is only necessary when the 
principal, that the patent system is the only manner of disclosure that has 
incentive, is falsified. Usually within a scientific discipline scientific papers 
are a more fertile source of knowledge than patent specifications. 
However, there is a growing trend for scientific information that may have 
practical applications to be withheld from publications in the hope that a 
patent might be obtained: Thus, the patent acquires more validity as an 
433 This is an interesting position to consider in the context of the appropriation of cultural-
community-collective herbalist knowledge through the patent system, where such 
knowledge was obtained outside of the patent system, and the defensive effect that this 
appropriation through the patent has on creating defensive practices regarding the 
disclosure of cultural-community-collective herbalist knowledge. See Magaisa, A. T. 
Knowledge and Power: Legal, Political and Socio-Historical Perspectives on the 
Protection of Traditional Medical and Knowledge Systems in Zimbabwe, Warwick 
University thesis collection. 
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important form of disclosure, but at the same time loses its strength as a 
desirable incentive for scientific research.434 
Falsification of the principal, that the patent system is the only manner of 
disclosure, through empirical example is straightforward.435 Furthermore, 
given the rapid advances in reverse engineering facilities and the 
increasing availability of technical information through media and technical 
publications, including the document subjects of mosaicing, then the 
community's ability to discover the knowledge of a given inventive step is 
highly probable: A chemical's structure can be analysed and its 
constituents identified. From there the source from which the chemical 
was extracted can be prospected or the chemical itself can be 
synthesised. 436 A mechanical embodiment of an inventive step can be 
taken to pieces the function of each piece and the incidence of each 
piece's properties on the comportment of the system can be identified. 
Thus, although disclosure by the patent system may facilitate the 
acquisition of knowledge by a community it is not a necessary condition for 
knowledge concerning an inventive step to become available to a 
community. 
434 Lei, Z., Juneja, K., Wright, B., 'Patents versus patenting: implications of intellectual 
property protection for biological research' (2009) 27 Nature Biotechnology 36-40 
435 Invention occurred before a patent system existed and continues outside of the patent 
system. Moreover, invention should always occur before patent registration and therefore 
invention should always precede patenting. We state should as the invention sometimes 
occurs after the application. For a contemporary example, consider the unamended 
specification of US patent 6,410,516. 
436 A good example is the anti-malarial artemisinin, produced from sweet wormwood, that 
in spite of the limited availability of information concerning its source or manufacture was 
successfully reengineered adding enormously to community knowledge. 
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2.3.2. Inadequate Disclosure 
There is another reservation on the effectiveness of the patent 
specification as an adequate disclosure of knowledge concerning an 
inventive step.437 The organisation of patent grants in the UK is such that 
the responsibility for policing insufficient specifications falls on private 
parties either by opposition proceedings or more likely as a counterclaim in 
infringement litigation following the patent grant.438 As a result the quality 
of information concerning the inventive step in the specification of some 
granted patents is exceedingly poor. Considering that patent technical 
information is addressed to the notional person skilled in the art and the 
diversity of patentable technology fields it is unrealistic to assume that the 
patent office has access to sufficient expertise in all technology fields to 
judge that a specification is sufficient.439 This is the main justification for 
the inclination of the patent system towards granting rather than refusing 
patents and the post implementation theoretical justification of the current 
437 For an understanding of the framework of a well drafted claim see Mickelthwaite, E. W. 
E., "Brushing up our drafting," [2003] CIPA, 320-324, 379-386; and Mickelthwaite, E. W. 
E., "Effective specification drafting," [2003] CIPA, 482 
436 For example insufficiency as a ground of revocation §72(1 )(c) UK Patent Act 1977 
grants the comptroller the ability to revoke a patent. but this is almost always as a 
consequence of successful defence litigation by a rival manufacturer of the embodiment 
of the inventive step, by showing that the patent specification was insufficient to instruct 
someone skilled in the art to perform the inventive step. 
439 Grubb, P. W. Patents for chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology: 
Fundamentals of global law, practice and strategy (2004) 365; see Barton, J. H., 
'Patenting Life,' (1991) 254(3) Scientific American 40-46; Eisenberg, R. S., 'Proprietary 
Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research,' (1987) 97 Yale Law 
Review 177-231; Merges, R P.; Nelson, R R, 'On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope,'(1990) 90(4) Columbia Law Review 839-916. 
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system whereby private parties can bring actions that mayor may not 
result in the revocation of grants. In economic efficiency the present 
system of private party policing is, prima facie, cost effective to the state. 
In reality the situation is more complex and the uncertainty of the value of 
some patents as determinant actors in litigation proceedings is likely to 
increase the overall cost of inventions especially during the lengthy 
reconstruction of the notional addressee. 
A clearer instance of the difficulty of relying on patent specifications for 
disclosing technical information to the community is the case of technology 
transfer. There has been much revile of the patent system especially over 
the last two decades as a source of information transfer.44o The Indian 
generic pharmaceutical experience was that breakthrough medicines were 
more readily understood through analysis of the chemical composition of 
the drug rather than reference to patent specification data.441 Another 
difficulty of patent specification data is that often what the non-patent 
specialist would consider to be part of the same inventive step is broken 
down into many more patent claims for inventive steps,442 a process 
440 This discontent concerning academic research has arisen because of the changes in 
government attitudes to research. See, Eisenberg, R., 'Public Research and Private 
Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research' 
(1996) 82(8) Virginia Law Review 1663-1727; On the discontent see, Bozemanr, B., 
'Technology transfer and public policy: a review of research and theory' Research Policy 
29 (2000) 627-655 at 644,646 
441 Lanjouw, J., 'The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in India: "Heartless 
Exploitation of the Poor and Suffering"?' (1998) NBER Working Paper No. W6366. 6-7 
442 In the UK this practice is a product of the 'partial validity' allowance first instituted by 
the Patent Act 1919 
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occasionally known as insurance enclosure.443 This insurance enclosure 
can frequently yield as many as forty or fifty patents.444 In this case not 
only is it difficult to join information together concerning the overall 
functioning of an invention, but the clever draftsman can draft the multiple 
patents in such a way that the entirety of the inventive step is anticipated 
whilst an essential part of the information necessary for a community to 
understand the inventive step is absent from the specifications taken as an 
ensemble. 
2.3.3. Premise 2: More Than It Seemed 
This is the pOint at which the auxiliary disclosure incentive function 
statements become important. It is clear that a community will undertake 
discovery of information regarding an inventive step if the application of 
the inventive step is considered useful and there is no disclosure or 
insufficient disclosure, formally or informally declared. Thus, why is the 
patent system as a source of disclosure important? The answer lies within 
443 This informal term is likely the product of the reasoning that if a claim is divided into 
many claims then these many claims can push the boundaries of the patent claim 
providing some of the claims are stable enough to exclude rivals from the overall 
invention with some certainty. If the expansive patent claims are revoked then the stable 
claims and the multiplicity of them provide a comfortable fall back to exclude rivals from 
the flagged domain. There is also for the larger repeat players a form of insurance 
available in the complexity of proceedings for rivals when there are numerous patents 
rather than a single patent. 
444 In several jurisdictions, though not the UK, excessive multiple claims are discouraged 
by an increase in fees when an application has claims in excess of a set number. For 
example, the EPO has a substantial fee increment for applications with claims in excess 
of ten. The Amend Rule 29(2) has, since January 2002, permitted the EPO to adopt a 
strong position against multiple independent claims within a patent application. See EPO 
Guidelines C 1114. 
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the enmeshment of three other reasons for the importance of the 
disclosure accomplished by the patent system. As with the principal, 
these reasons are posited as advantages for the community rather than 
generation of individual incentive. The individual incentive for the 
information holder to disclosure arises from the benefits that the patent 
system bestows on the inventor, i.e. a rent, and not the formalities of 
patent acquisition. 
The first auxiliary disclosure incentive function statement is that a patented 
inventive step might have more applications than the first patentee 
anticipated (ql) and that through increasing the fraction of the community 
exposed to knowledge of the inventive step other useful embodiments of 
the inventive step will be discovered (pc). An inventive step might have 
more applications than the inventor realises and disclosure permits others 
the opportunity to discover those other applications.445 
2.3.4. Incompatible Again 
The first auxiliary disclosure incentive function statement is, prima facie, 
incompatible with the invention incentive function statement in another 
way. The invention incentive function statement makes available a reward 
to the inventor by granting the inventor the ability to enforce scarcity in the 
embodiment of the inventive step. In effect, once the inventive step has 
been discovered the patent, in the invention incentive function statement, 
445 «lox)=> pC, (q,Fox), :. pC, where x is, in this equation, representative of a disclosure 
method; e.g. reverse engineering, mandatory publication, or patent speCification: 
«pFo<pA1)=> pC, (<pFo<pA1), :. pC. Clearly, (<pFoX)=> pC, -x, :. _pc 
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reduces the use of the inventive step that would, in the absence of a 
patent system, be made. 
The first auxiliary disclosure incentive function statement takes a very 
different stance when it holds that: 
A patented inventive step might have more applications than the first 
patentee anticipated (ql) and that with the patent system (where the 
incentive for innovation will be sufficient to meet minimal community 
requirements of innovation and disclosure (<pA1)) then increasing the 
fraction of the community exposed to knowledge of the inventive step 
other useful embodiments of the inventive step will be discovered (pC).446 
2.3.5 Already Owned 
Given (<pF) that a patented inventive step might have more applications 
than the first patentee anticipated, what incentive does the patent provide 
for Y to disclose their knowledge when inventor Z is awarded a patent that 
anticipates the unforeseen new application invented by Y? Neither, the 
invention incentive function statement, nor the disclosure incentive 
function statement provides Y with an interest to make the knowledge of 
the new 'invention' available to the community. The clearest example of 
patent claim anticipation of unforeseen uses of an inventive step is the 
product per se patent for chemical inventions. If a patent is granted for the 
chemical compound itself, a compound per se patent, then all process 
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involving the respective compound have been anticipated.447 If the case of 
the compound per se patent is considered anomalous and temporarily 
excluded from consideration then concordance of the assumption by the 
invention incentive function statement, concerning the patent as a means 
to obtain scarcity, and the first auxiliary disclosure incentive function, 
regarding the patent as a means of stimulation new applications, is 
possible. The conditions for concordance are that the new application is 
not anticipated, hence capable of being patented, and that the 
specification of the first patent is sufficient to stimulate the second inventor 
to make the cognitive connections for the new application. However, the 
first condition will no longer be a necessary condition where the 
possession of a patent and the expertise of another may convey sufficient 
incentive to a patent holder to create contractual agreements, usually 
cross licensing, with non-rivalrous inventors to pluralise embodiment of the 
inventive step. 
2.3.6. Sanctioned Cartel 
If there are two patents in a common pool for example, i.e. one from each 
party, and the two firms are engaged in non-rivalrous markets then for 
both parties there are advantages of finding new applications.448 This 
patent pooling relation is concordant with the invention incentive function 
statement in the case where inventors would otherwise have insufficient 
means to develop and or exploit an invention themselves. Moreover, were 
447 See Grubb, P. W. Patents for chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology: 
Fundamentals of global law, practice and strategy (2004) 345-348 
448 An empirical example of this benefit chain is Bell Labs transistor. 
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they to begin rivalrous behaviour each would receive lower returns than 
the share they would receive from splitting revenues arising from the 
patent pool. In the context of patent pooling then the compound per se 
patent is no longer anomalous and the invention incentive function 
statement and first auxiliary disclosure incentive are compatible with 
regard to first auxiliary disclosure incentive function statement,449 and the 
incentive for the discoverer of the new application to share their discovery 
amongst the patent pool contributors. 
2.3.7. Patent Advertising 
The second auxiliary disclosure incentive function statement is that the 
patent advertises the availability of an inventive step thereby facilitating 
licensing of that inventive step. By facilitating licensing the patent reduces 
transaction costs and makes embodiment of the inventive step more 
accessible to a community than if higher transaction costs were involved. 
However, considering that the marginal cost of increasing the utilisation of 
information is zero450 and that the patent system is expensive for parties 
wishing to exclude competitors451 to hold that the patent system as a form 
of advertising reduces transaction costs is an unsatisfactory statement. It 
449 (q,Fo<pA1) ::J pC 
450 See Arrow, K. J., "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," R. 
R. Nelson (eds.) The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social 
Factors [Princeton University Press, 1st Ed., 1962, New York] 616-617 
451 Blanco White, T. A., Patents for Inventions (1974) 9-10 
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fails to consider all the extra transaction costs a patent system creates. 452 
Considering particular industries, For example agriculture, it is seen that 
specialist markets advertise their products through a number of forums, 
particularly specialist magazines and shows. The pharmaceutical industry 
advertises in journals, both by actual advertisements and articles. Other 
than the journals the key marketing tool of the pharmaceutical industry is 
the pharmaceutical representative, on whom the task to educate the health 
practitioner falls. These methods of distributing specialist products to a 
professional audience have been highly successful and continue to work 
well. Applying the same market economiCS, used to show that the patent 
specification facilitates licensing of the inventive step's embodiment 
thereby making the invention more accessible to a community, does not 
yield empirically the expected outcome. If the patent system through the 
advertising capability of disclosure were able to reduce transaction costs 
and increase marginal revenue then a comparable institution to the patent 
system for the purpose of advertising would have evolved within the trade 
industries. That has not been the case, nor is the evolution of the patent 
system a suitable example. As we have noted the patent system did not 
evolve from the nature and characteristics of the inventive steps 
themselves, but rather as a result of the technocratic power wielded by 
patent practitioners453 in the aftermath of a technology migratory policy. 
452 For example in the presence of a patent system it is necessary for inventors to 
conduct infringement searches to determine whether their activity infringes anyone else's 
patent rights. 
453 Drahos, P; Braithwaite, J., Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge 
Economy? [Earthscan Publications Ltd, 1st Ed., 2002, London] 43-48 
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The second auxiliary disclosure incentive function statement is a very 
weak patent function statement. 
2.3.8. Technology Transfer 
The third auxiliary disclosure incentive function statement is that the patent 
system serves as a method of technology transfer by requiring that 
complex technical information be expressed with sufficient clarity that a 
person skilled in the art be able to replicate the embodiment of the 
inventive step.454 The patent system's specification requirement is 
however, as already indicated, a frequently insufficient tool for insuring 
disclosure of information capable of permitting a community to replicate 
the inventive step. The tension between technical complexity and non-
obviousness in a patent application is inevitably biased in favour of 
technical complexity that would make an invention seem as non-intuitive 
as possible. Thus, even an obvious and anticipated invention can seem 
inventive. Consider for example the meaning of 'a physiologically 
acceptable substance stabilized in an acidic medium.'455 Whilst it does 
refer to a pharmaceutical compound that is non-toxic and can be stabilised 
in tablet form by an organic acid it also refers to many foodstuffs that are 
pickled, i.e. a jar of pickled onions. The institution in Western Europe of 
454 This is exemplified by §14(3) UK Patent Act 1977 which states that "[t)he specification 
of an application shall disclose the invention in a manner which is clear enough and 
complete enough for the invention to be performed by a person skilled in the art." Failure 
to comply with this requirement provides a ground of revocation for insufficiency under 
§72(1)(c) UK Patent Act 1977. 
455 This is actually taken from a claim rather than a specification, but although on a more 
complex level for a specification the same spirit of mystification can pervade the patent 
drafter's style. See UK 45,6671 CELL TRIX H/AO 441 
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competing patent offices has not had a desirable effect on the grant of 
patents with clear scope. In fact the competition between patent offices 
and the applicant friendly approach has resulted in many patents being 
granted for unclear and poorly drafted patent applications.456 
2.3.9. Together Again 
So far according to the assumptions of the invention incentive and 
disclosure incentive function statements, that if there is a patent system 
then there will be sufficient invention and disclosure of that innovation to 
meet minimal community requirements «l\ Moreover, when there is 
disclosure through a patent then the increased fraction of the community 
exposed to knowledge of the inventive step will permit other embodiments 
of the inventive step will be discovered (pC).457 
To be a viable justification, the disclosure incentive function statement 
requires458 that the invention arising from the patent system and its 
method of disclosure is greater than the invention and disclosure which 
would occur in the absence of the patent system. This returns us to our 
methodological problem, that available data is insufficiently comparable to 
generate statistical inferences: There is either a patent system or there is 
not; In the circumstances that there is not then cross migration of ideas 
456 See Cornish, W., Intel/ectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied 
Rights (1999) 133 
457 cpA1. <pF ::::> pC::::> A([<pA1] 
458 ,\([<pA1»[_<pA1]) 
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between that system and systems where there is a patent system will 
contaminate data. 
However, we are aware that the patent system is not an adequate form of 
conveying technological information to the community and we can use this 
as an indicator of the truth of the first premise (<pA1) of the disclosure 
incentive function statement. Thus, if disclosure of knowledge about the 
invention is greater in the absence of the patent system then the 
disclosure incentive function statement is falsified. 
The disclosure incentive function statement of the patent system, even 
when the principal is leant assistance by the auxiliaries, is unpersuasive 
except in one circumstance: Where patent pooling, or the contracting of 
external resources is necessary or preferable to the patent holder. In this 
scenario possession of a patent, by virtue of the bargaining power the 
patent bestows, is likely to make the patent holder contract with others 
who possess the required resources, including expertise, to increase the 
patent holder's marginal revenue. This incentive model can also be 
extended further by substituting the desire for an increased marginal 
revenue for the ability to perform new tasks, more effective performance, 
renown, the natural creativity of humankind, or altruism. This cooperative 
development of a patent and new embodiments of an inventive step is 
closely related to the prospect theory and commercialisation theory of the 
organised derivative innovation function statement. It is also an important 
description for the trend described in Chapter II for current pharmaceutical 
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research and patenting. The small biotechnology company, in 
Schumpeterian terms a competence-destroying industry,459 through a 
closer linkage with the breakthrough knowledge of the old science bases, 
immunology and molecular biology,460 and the availability of resources 
through the university and government institutions of which its key 
researchers are part, has created an environment more favourable to 
pharmaceutical innovation then the pharmaceutical manufacturing and 
research firms. The small biotechnology company, however, lacks access 
to finances, regulatory approval expertise and marketing savvy that the 
pharmaceutical manufacturing and research firms possess. For the 
sustained economic viability of either organism both knowledge sets are 
necessary conditions. Taken together the knowledge sets are also a 
sufficient condition for the economic success of the small biotechnology 
company and the pharmaceutical company. The biotechnology company 
supplies new applications or new inventions and the pharmaceutical 
company passes these through the hurdles of regulatory approval and 
then delivers them to the market. When the biotech company fails to find 
a viable drug candidate then it will go into liquidation and the 
pharmaceutical manufacturing company, which would formerly have been 
conducting such research, will be insulated from the loss. 
459 Creative destruction according to Schumpeter is responsible for long term economic 
growth. This is a process by which innovative entrepreneurs enter established markets or 
created new ones thereby destroying the value and market dominance of companies that 
exerted some monopoly power. See Schumpeter, J. A. Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy [Harper & Row Publishers, 1942, Reprint 1975, New York] 82-85 
460 Abernathy, W.; Clark, K., 'Innovation: Mapping the Winds of Creative Destruction,' 
(1985) 14 Research Policy 3-22; Powell, W., 'Collaboration in the Biotechnology Industry,' 
(1996) Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 152(1) 197-215,202-203 
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2.4. Investment Incentive Function Statement 
The co-operative relation between the inventor and external resources 
necessary to the commercialisation of an invention can be described in 
terms of the investment relations of the investment incentive function 
statement. Although in this expression there is no longer a sense of parity 
in status between the inventor and the investor.461 
2.4.1. Premise 1: Investor Not Inventor 
The origin of the inventor's subordinate relation begins during the first 
phase of the Age of Reform. When increasing the flow of capital to 
industry and encouraging the participation of investors in research were 
economically desirable.462 The patent system was designed to serve as 
the bridge between industrial research and investment. with the value of 
the inventive step being the risk and the prize. The inventor themselves, 
became irrelevant except as a mechanical component in the invention 
process. Inventors become interchangeable and the contract of service 
461 The motivation to innovate is directed at the inventor in the invention incentive function 
statement. (<pc, <pC1, <pD) 
462 Holdsworth, W., A History of English Law Volume XV Goodhart, A. L.; Hanbury, H. G. 
(eds.) (1965) 4. However, 'development' of the patent system during this period is 
attributable to substantially more than encouraging investors. See Select Committee 
reports BPP 1829 (332) III and BPP 1851 (486) XVIII; Royal Commission BPP 1864 
(3419) XXIX; Select Committee BPP 1871 (368) X, 1872 (193) XI. For a very brief 
account of reasons for reform see Cornish, W., Intellectual Properly: Patents, Copyright, 
Trade Marks and Allied Rights [Sweet and Maxwell, 4th Ed., 1999, London]113-115 
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became the standard engagement for 'workers' in invention.463 In this 
fashion the investment incentive function of patents for inventions conflicts 
with the patent indigenisation of the copyright natural allocation principle 
necessary to the invention incentive function. In the invention incentive 
function the investor or institution is irrelevant to the process of innovation 
except as mechanical part that can be changed with impunity with regard 
to the success of the innovation itself. In the investment incentive function 
the investor or institution is determinant of research resulting in an 
invention. 
2.4.2. Conflicting Statements 
The apparent conflict of the innovation and investment function statements 
arises not from an incompatibility of the innovation and investment 
incentives themselves. but rather from an epistemological error in the 
construction of the two function statements. To both the innovation and 
investment incentive for the acquisition of a patent both the invention of 
the 'worker' and the resources of the investor are necessary conditions. 
The epistemological difficulty arises from the lack of consequence the 
invention and incentive function statements place on the participation of a 
certain actor. It is easy to visualise the origin of this inconsistency of 
perspectives in the two function statements when it is seen that the 
perspectives are a result of maximising the appeal of the patent system to 
the addressed actor. Thus. the inconsistency is a deliberate politic and not 
an academic error. For the investor the greater the degree of certainty, 
463 An ethos that is embodied in all current patent regimes. See §39(1) UK Patent Act 
1977. 
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that where there is a patent the return on the patent will be a return that 
they receive the better and the more they will invest in innovation activity. 
If a particular inventor is recognised as being a necessary actor in 
discovering the inventive step, the corpus of the patent claim, the inventor 
may acquire some equity in the patent: the so-called Lockean labour 
theory of reward.464 
2.4.3. Capital But No Genius 
On the other hand the investor cannot be important to the incentive 
function statement because it is assumed that the incentive is addressed 
to the inventor (<pC). If the investor was as important, as they are 
empirically and legalll65 then (<pC) that the incentive is addressed to the 
inventor cannot be assumed as the patent does not grant the inventor a 
greater incentive to undertake inventive activity than other activities. The 
labour specialism theory, an important descriptive element in the 
construction of the invention incentive function statement, holds that only a 
small portion of a community is capable of creating technological 
inventions. Since this small proportion of the community can earn 
sufficient reward from the community through means other than inventive 
activity there is no natural advantage for this minority to innovate rather 
than follow non-inventive behaviour. Indeed as these gifted inventive 
464 Idea of the patent as an instrument of justice is still pertinent and can be seen in §40 
Patent Act 1977 concerning compensation for employees. In fact compensation for 
employees under this section is relatively unknown and very unsuccessful as a ground of 
litigation. 
465 §39(1) Patent Act 1977 is the manacle on the patent at the end of the chain owned by 
the totality of investors. 
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individuals may reap less reward acquiring incentives for investors, than 
they might acquire elsewhere for themselves, they may be lost from the 
investor controlled technology area. As they are irreplaceable according 
to the invention incentive function statement, any inventions they might 
have realised will be lost from the system. 
2.4.4. Combining Incentives 
This is where substitution of 'inventive activity occurs for the ability to 
perform new tasks, more effective performance, lower production cost, 
renown, the natural creativity of humankind, a rent in the innovation, patent 
circumvention, and altruism' (q>C1) for 'economic return is the most 
important incentive for inventive activity to occur' (<pC), is important, 
because although inventing is no longer as financially enticing, because 
the ownership of the patent vests in another, other incentives still make 
invention a more favourable activity for the potentially inventive portion of 
the community. At least this is the only method of reconciling the invention 
incentive function statement and the investment incentive function 
statement. 
Then, let us consider the invention that the inventor produces as a result of 
other incentives than the patent system.466 This invention would be 
compatible with the investor incentive function statement, provided that the 
investor's use of artificial scarcity does not conflict with the inventor's 
desired reward (<pC1). However this relation is incomplete as the investor's 
466 <pel ::J A 
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choice, exercised by their agents in the case of shareholders, is 
dependent on the shareholders perceiving a profit. 
Therefore, invention will only occur under the combined auspices of the 
invention and investment incentive function statements, iff the inventor 
perceives they can receive their desired incentive, and the investor 
perceives they can receive an attractive economic return. 467 
In this form only can the investment incentive function statement be 
considered compatible with the invention incentive function statement. 
Interestingly at the point when the patent has been acquired there may 
have already been investment, indeed the capital provided by prior 
investment might have been a necessary condition. However, where 
development of the invention is necessary then the patent may capture 
further investment, providing that there is a likelihood of (<pc) an economic 
return for the investor. 
2.4.5. Patent Attracts Investment 
Acquisition of a patent may constitute an approbation that the invention is 
a viable commodity, indeed the patent as a property right and monopoly 
enables the patent holder to seek funding from capital markets. In the 
case of pharmaceuticals the acquisition of a patent may stimulate some 
interest but of greatest concern is the likelihood that clinical trials and 
market approval will proceed favourably. However, the pharmaceutical 
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patent presents the confidence of enclosure, that may attract the funds 
necessary for the development phase necessary for market approval. 
With the growing presence of biotech firms as innovators in the 
pharmaceutical technology sector, large pharmaceutical research and 
manufacturing companies are repositioned as investors or buyers.468 For 
the purposes of the investment incentive function statement it is sufficient 
to consider investment up to the moment that the invention is patented. 
When we consider the practicalities of pharmaceutical innovation and 
safety approval then post-patenting costs will be considered. 
In the stark form that we have presented the investment incentive function 
statement, it is clear that innovators will only be encouraged to innovate 
when the investors perceive that they will receive a return on their invested 
capital. This is especially significant in pharmaceuticals where the 
invested capital is great. If it is necessary for an invention to be developed 
before it can be used and the only established channels for that 
development are perceived to be secondary investors then the initial 
investors must be equipped with some vehicle to ensure that they will 
recoup their investment when the secondary investors develop the 
468 This is not a new phenomena, it had been DuPont's policy in the interwar period. See 
Mueller, W. F., 'The Origins of the Basic Inventions Underlying DuPont's Major Product 
and Process Innovations, 1920 to 1950' in The rate and direction of inventive activity: 
Economic and social factors [National Bureau of Economic Research, Princeton 
University Press, 1962, Princeton] 323-346 
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product. For better or worse, at the moment the patent serves this 
purpose.469 
2.4.6. Pharmaceutical Incentive 
Within the context of pharmaceuticals this poses an interesting situation. 
With the fierce competition by pharmaceutical companies to develop 
generic, copycat or me-too drugs and the separate regulatory 
requirements each entails, there seems little likelihood that pharmaceutical 
innovation resulting from public funding would not serve an economic 
purpose and result in a commercial product. Thus, what is interesting is to 
track down where (<pc) the economic return must occur in the investment 
chain for the investment incentive function statement to function. 
Regulatory approval will be very important to the return of investment. 
We will show later that the research institution benefits, but the secondary 
investors receive the greatest economic return. The primary investors, 
however receive nothing,470 and are responsible for meeting (<pc) the 
469 The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act 1980 (USA), better known 
as the Bayh-Dole Act, provided universities, small businesses and non-profit 
organisations in the USA with the ability to obtain intellectual property rights on 
innovations and creations achieved with public funding. The principal argument for this 
act was the investment incentive function. statement. See 35 U.S.C. § 200: "It is the 
policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to promote the utilization of 
inventions arising from federally supported research or development; to encourage 
maximum participation of small business firms in federally supported research and 
development efforts; to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and 
nonprofit organizations, including universities ... " 
470 See 35 U.S.C. § 212. Of course the invention will become available, if not necessarily 
accessible to the primary investor. 
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economic return expected by the secondary investors. To make this 
clearer, it is useful to consider the primary investor as being the general 
public and who underwrite the research. The secondary investor only 
becomes involved once there is a product to be developed and a return 
seems viable. 
The dispositive issue is whether there would be greater development of 
the invention where the inventing institution was able to offer an exclusive 
licence for the invention, or where non-exclusive licences were available to 
all potential developers of the invention. 
2.4.7. If It Pays Best 
If the magnitude of (<pc) the economic return is the determinate factor, then 
in the absence of an exclusive license developing the invention is prima 
facie less favourable, as it will not permit monopolistic rewards.471 
However, other factors may affect the magnitude of (<pc) the economic 
return, such as subsequent development sharing clauses472 or the cost of 
initially acquiring the information. 
471 There may be instances where it will be advantageous to develop an invention in the 
absence of monopolistic rewards. This might be the case with computers, where 
compatibility issues may be determinative of development prospects. 
472 These are conditions to the patent license contract that require the contractee to share 
all their developments with other contractees. They sometimes include compensation 
clauses or lead time stipulations to ensure the fairness of the arrangement for the more 
innovative contractee. 
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Where the investment incentive function statement is especially successful 
in the context of publicly funded research, is that it prompts the funded 
research institution, that is the inventor, to promote their invention, thus 
ensuring that the invention is developed and commercialised. 
Unfortunately, since the license may be exclusive the assignee may have 
purchased the patent title in order to suppress the invention. In which 
case the intentions of the Bayh-Dole Act are undermined.473 A further 
problem is that research with the greater economic returns will be favoured 
over research leading to economically less or unprofitable applications. 
The economic return from the invention and the invention's usefulness to 
society may not coincide, other than in economic terms. 
2.5. Organised Derivative Innovation Function Statement 
This is potentially a clever post patent operational function statement. 
However, couched beneath a very superficial veneer is its self-vitiation. 
2.5.1. Premise 1: I Know Best 
The organised derivative innovation function statement provides, as per 
the prospect theory of Edmund Kitch,474 that the utility of a patent occurs 
after an initial invention is made: In that the patent holder, through 
473 Working requirements in the case of pharmaceutical patents can be offset for a greater 
delay through use of market approval application. Since bioequivalence is an important 
factor in medicines this either very rarely necessary or is performed extremely cleverly. 
474 Kitch, E. W., 'The Nature and Function of the Patent System' (1977) 20(2) J. Law & 
Econ. 265-290 
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selective and conditional patent licensing is able to control future 
improvements and developments in the technology area and thereby 
ensure that resources are not squandered on developing rivalrous 
derivative technologies. As did Kitch, it implicitly assumes that a single 
patent can control an entire technology area allowing the holder of the 
patent to determine which products are developed. We can with little 
difficulty extend the theory to a patent pool or cross licensing agreement 
providing that one actor can control subsequent product development 
within the technology area. 
As such the organised derivative innovation function statement is 
pessimistic about the ability of competitive forces to develop useful 
rivalrous derivative inventions which may in themselves produce divergent 
strands of useful derivative invention. Thus, for this theory it is extremely 
important that the standard of the patent is perfectly balanced. That is, 
that the patent standard does not permit a patent holder to bar too large an 
area from subsequent development, but at the same time the barrier is a 
enough that the patent holder can retain control over their prospect. 
2.5.2. Contrariness Again 
This function statement is then, extremely optimistic of the foresight of the 
prospect patent holder. As a result it is an important consideration in 
determining how long patent monopolies should endure. For different 
technology areas technology uptake varies, and in some cases the 
availability of different development paths is preferable for the users, e.g. 
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consumers. This is the case with pharmaceuticals where variations can 
have enormous therapeutic benefits for particular patients, but drug 
tailoring is extremely expensive and then further limited by organised 
development through patent restrictions. 
Thus, organised derivative invention presumes that the invention which will 
occur as a result of non-rivalrous development of a technology area will be 
greater than if there were competition.475 To be more clear, the function 
statement states that there would be less wasteful invention and that 
subsequent development in the directed non-rivalrous environment would 
be greater than the wasteful developments during competition. 
Which is incompatible with the disclosure incentive function statement. 
Remember the disclosure incentive function statement holds that more 
invention will result from disclosure through the patent system than if there 
was no disclosure, since there may be more applications of the invention 
that the inventor realises (qt) and that revealing the invention to a larger 
section of the community will permit those other applications to be 
identified (pC).476 
2.5.3. Better, Not More 
In particular the organised derivative invention function statement 
disagrees with the presumption that more innovation is necessarily a 
475 A([q>B]>[_<pB]) 
476 A([q>F .pC]>[_ q>F • pC]) 
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preferable channelling of resources. Providing that technological 
advancement is the objective and that resources saved through the 
limitation of research to systematic non-rivalrous research are reinvested 
in further systematic development of the prospect, then (<pB) non-rivalrous 
research produces more effective invention. 
Let us consider the reinvestment of resources gained from an earlier 
invention (cpG).477 Providing that exterior investment is momentarily 
eschewed then it is expected that invention as a result of reinvestment will 
be greater than where there is no reinvestment.478 This would be a valid 
conclusion if investment is proportional to invention for a given technology 
sector. Serendipity (cpE) must also be ignored, or considered to be 
sufficiently infrequent that it has no statistical significance.479 
2.5.4. Externalities and Market Behaviour 
However, the organised derivative innovation function statement relies on 
the prospect patent to regulate the behaviour of externalities, thus exterior 
investment cannot be ignored. There is therefore a potential conflict with 
the investment incentive function statement which holds that there will be 
more innovation if other than the economic incentive that the investor 
requires, there is also an incentive for the inventor, than in the same 
conditions except there is no incentive for the inventor.48o 
477 Let these be <fJG 
478,l.([<fJG]>[_<fJG]) 
479,l.([<fJGo_<fJE]>[_<fJGo_<fJE)) 
480,l.([cp C1 o <fJ C]>[_<fJC1o<fJ c]) 
233 
Whilst for the prospect patent holder the economic return (<pc) may be 
greater if subsequent technology is controlled, gross economic return 
within the technology market may be reduced. Moreover, we are aware 
from the invention incentive function statement that where competitive 
potential exists, regardless of the limited number of rivalrous firms, there is 
still incentive to innovate more rapidly than if there were no potential 
competitive providers to that given market (pB). 
If the market is non-rivalrous, as required by the invention incentive 
function statement and the organised derivative innovation function 
statement, then the total innovation will be the result of the initial 
investment and the result of innovation funded by reinvestment.481 
Because, invention is non-rivalrous and the prospect is controlled there will 
be no development of applications that the prospect patent holder does 
not perceive. Moreover, there will be inventive indolence because there 
are no potential competitive entrants to the market.482 Therefore let us 
consider if innovation of the technology area would be preferable in the 
control conditions of organised derivative innovation or where there was 
rivalry and no total control over a prospect.483 
Thus, the dispositive issue is whether the innovation which arises out of 
reinvestment is greater than the innovation which would result from 
481 <pB => ~I + ~(<pG) 
482 '.' <pB => pA + -c{ +_ pB+_ pC => _~ 
483 :. (~I + A[<pG)) V (AI + A[<pF +pB+pC)) . _(AI + A[<pG+<pF +pB+pC]) 
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inventors other than the prospect patent holder being able to participate in 
subsequent development paths of the prospect, the new uses that they 
might discover and the increase in development due to competition. 484 
Particular market behaviours may also undermine or reinforce the 
importance of the organised derivative innovation function statement. For 
example, evergreening vitiates the necessary perception of the organised 
derivative innovation function statement that the prospect patent holder is 
a technologically foresighted and benevolent guide for subsequent 
technology development. The cost of monopolies and (cpG) the low 
reinvestment of resources gained from an earlier inventions provide further 
important considerations. 
Licensing or exploitation of a patent must be profitable to the patent 
holder. Thus, if another party improves on the patent holder's invention, 
but utilises the patent holder's inventive step, the patent holder may have 
an interest in refusing a license permitting the other party to exploit the 
refined invention. This will occur in many instances, though primarily, 
where the patent holder has incurred expenditures that outweigh 
assignment or foreseeable licensing returns. 
2.5.5. Further Failings 
Organised derivative innovation is contrary to (cpF), the notion that there 
may be other useful embodiments of the invention that the inventor does 
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not perceive, in its assumptions. This is because it holds that the first 
patentee's control over the 'prospect' is desirable because it establishes a 
standard and reduces the wastefulness of rivalry. Thus, the organised 
derivative innovation function statement is an antithesis of the 
conventional view that scientific progress is a series of increments building 
on the knowledge of others. In this function statement the progressive 
development of the inventor's own ideas are preferable. Where it is 
preferable to have a larger population consider information as they may 
possess different expertise and skills. Thus the larger population will be 
beUer equipped to propose more increments in the progress of science. In 
the realisation of a technology this might result in a greater number of 
applications. Thus, an increase in use value that might be curtailed if 
subsequent development is limited to a strict agenda perceived by an 
individual or very restricted group who may not perceive possible 
applications. This contradiction is rendered clearer if the Popperian notion 
of falsification is considered.485 Moreover an orderly and systematised 
progression of development is unnatural, especially considering cpE as a 
sufficient term for innovation to occur, and may cause some useful 
applications to be neglected. Thus organised derivative innovation is likely 
to be more costly than an organic uncontrolled development outside of an 
institutionalised prospect. 
485 See Popper, K., The Logic of Scientific Discovery [Routledge, 12'h Ed., 2002, London] 
p.9 
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Empirically there is not one example where the utilisation of control over a 
'prospect' has lead to the most desirable standardisation for a future 
technology tree.486 The notion of control over a prospect and improvement 
of a patent outside of the patent holder's technological paradigm is 
incompatible lest the improver have the cooperation of their rival. In the 
case of partnerships and low prior investment in establishing a prospect 
there may be a degree of freedom in developing other standards, but 
equally there may be a greater cost that is not realised until much later. A 
particularly poignant and well documented example of this is the 
development Steam engine.487 
2.5.6. Bad Choice 
Knowledge that is gained earlier provides a basis for future advance. 
Where an actor can dictate the initial channels of development from an 
invention then that actor is empowered to create greater opportunity for 
themselves. Depending on perspective this mayor may not be positive. 
Consider for example the computer industry. At present almost all 
computers, especially those available to the public, are binary machines 
based on electrical signals. Far superior, light has three states and is 
therefore a ternary system. Thus instead of bits, information is conveyed in 
486 Also see Merges, R.. and Nelson, R. R.. 'On the complex economics of patent scope' 
(1990) 90 Columbia Law Review 839-916 
487 For a well presented account of the steam engine development in the context of the 
organised derivative innovation function statement see: Boldrin, M. and Levine, D. K., 
Economic and Game Theory: Against Intellectual Monopoly [e-publication 2008] Chapter 
1: 1-5. Available at: <http://ievine.sscnet.ucla.edufgeneraifintellectualfagainstnew.htm> 
(Last Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
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trits. Where one trit is the equivalent of 1.58596 (log23 ) bits. Moreover, 
light travels faster than electricity, has less attenuation than electrical 
current, and therefore produces less heat and has lower power 
consumption. Yet with the mass-produced binary components for 
computers, binary machines quickly established their place in society. 
With the result that now the start up costs in implementing a superior light 
based machine are unviable. Inevitably if our demand for processing 
power, bandwidth and ecological interest continues those costs will have 
to be met488 , and moreover when the switch finally occurs we will have 
less of a knowledge base than if the superior platform had been initially 
adopted. This is the danger of Kitch's proposed prospect theory of 
development for the societal benefits of patents. Empirically the paradigm 
adopted and maintained through economic and market advantage in the 
context of organised derivative invention will not be the most effective 
technology for purpose. 
Another consideration is the attractiveness of some patents compared to 
others. Patents that have potentially much greater (cpc) economic return 
than others, are likely to be more contested in patent races, and as such 
be over sought leading to the very wasteful and duplicate activity the 
organised derivative invention function statement purports to alleviate. 
Moreover, if the prospect patent is sufficiently broad to be determinative of 
488 Knuth, D.E., The Art of Computer Programming - Volume 2: Seminumerical Algorithms 
[Addison-Wesley, 2nd Ed., 1980] 190-192 
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subsequent development and monopolistic enough to permit that control 
then it becomes even more of a prize for patent races. 
2.5.7 More Disfavour 
Furthermore, as broad patents unless they are licensed easily and widely, 
i.e. have low transaction costs, then the broad patent is counterproductive 
as it limits the size of the population whom can access the technology and 
contribute to its development. Moreover, as we will see in conjunction with 
stable cartels, a broad patent shared only amongst a very limited 
population may create a situation where derivative inventions within the 
cartel are less competitive than rival inventions. Thus, this invention 
function statement undermines itself once again. In consequence it is 
difficult to perceive how the organised derivative innovation function 
statement might not render technological advance more difficult and 
costly. 
Transaction costs are inarguably increased by the presence of a patent. 
As patent transactions require both the contractual agreement and 
completion of patent formalities. It may also be necessary to demonstrate 
the robustness of the patent enclosure. Thus, in addition to restricting the 
population which can work on derivative invention, a broad patent also 
adds extra dead weight costs to transactions. 
Even in the absence of a broad prospect patent the patent may still 
constitute an effective prospect patent. If the technology is realised 
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through additions to the prospect invention it is possible that the more 
advanced product requires access to several prior inventions, and thus the 
prospect patent may be determinative of whether the advanced 
improvement is a viable product for commercialisation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MISALLOCATION AND ASSEMBLY OF PHARMACEUTICAL 
KNOWLEDGE 
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"The suitability of the expenditure is relative therefore to the spender 
himself, and to the occasion or object." 489 
As a vehicle of ownership and control the aptitude of patent rights goes 
beyond control simply over the invention. Indeed patents serve two 
significant policy control objectives. These are the property sovereignty 
function and the knowledge feudalism function. As they are not overtly 
used in statements to justify intellectual property and are directly related to 
misallocation and the assembly of pharmaceutical knowledge they were 
considered more correctly to be part of this chapter despite their 
theoretical nature. 
3.1. Property Sovereignty Function 
This function statement concerns controlling the property of others, 
particularly countries which are poorer technologically, but rich in 
resources. Base goods trade for far less on markets than manufactured 
goods. This seems self evident as the manufactured good, even if we 
eschew other factors, requires the base material and labour. Therefore, if 
a country can impose barriers that prevent countries rich in resources 
converting its base goods into manufactured goods, then a wealth gap can 
be maintained. The way in which this is done is through controlling 
489 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IV. ii. 3. 
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knowledge. Preferably, through preventing use or acquisition of 
knowledge of technological applications that are currently in demand. 
3.1.1 Knowledge As Control 
Knowledge has an irrepressible power, it cannot be contained and 
eventually it will escape. The only real reason for a knowledge economy is 
that those in a position to dictate the national law of property and to force 
multilateral agreements have no desire for competitive markets in real 
goods where they may have a disadvantage in access to base materials 
and cheap labour. With intellectual property you can manufacture your 
goods where the labour is cheap with resources from the cheapest 
suppliers and prevent access to markets by anyone who lacks expertise in 
obtaining intellectual property rights. 
Knowledge is synonymously a public good, a social product, or a merit 
good. To qualify as such knowledge satisfies two essential criteria. 
Firstly, knowledge is non-rivalrous. Which means that one individual can 
use knowledge without concern that their use will consume the knowledge 
and thereby prevent the use of the same knowledge by other people. 
Secondly, knowledge is non-excludable. Which means that it is extremely 
difficult or impossible to prevent people who have not paid for the good 
from accessing it. Thus, when we consider knowledge it is necessary to 
distinguish knowledge from skills whose acquisition is dependent on 
training or experience. Since knowledge is difficult to exclude others from, 
trying to do so is both unnatural and expensive. 
243 
Thus, for the holders of the reins of power there has to be an advantage in 
trying to control knowledge. Preventing access to knowledge, has 
historically failed. Thus, more clever tools are needed and this is the role 
of intellectual property, specifically patents.490 
" ... a note of realism about what intellectual property represents: 
'intellectual property is really an issue of survival within the world 
system' ... It is the price that countries have to pay, largely to US 
companies, to enter the world trading system.,,491 
The standard of living492 that a nation can afford its citizens is dependent 
on a number of factors, that are particularly reflected in the gross domestic 
product per capita. Gross domestic product (GDP) is the 'total money 
value of all final goods and services produced within an economy over a 
one-year period.'493 The backbone of GDP calculations is constituted by 
addition (and subtraction) of private consumption, investment, government 
490 Copyright plays a significant role in reducing access to educational materials and 
participation in research publications in almost all diSCiplines. 
491 Drahos, P. and Braithwaite, J. Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge 
Economy? [Earthscan publications Ltd, 2002, London] 104 
492 'Standard of living' although a nebulous concept and difficult to quantify in real terms, 
is a good general guide to relative quality of life in different localities. In this instance the 
UN Human Development Index was the primary measure employed. Its factors are: the 
Life Expectancy Index, Education Index, Adult Literacy Index, Gross Enrolment Index, 
GDP Index. However, it was later noted that a comparison of 'gross domestic product per 
capita' provided a less complicated and almost as informative tool. 
493 Pass, C., Lowes, B., and Davies, L. Dictionary of Economics [HarperCollins, 3rd Ed., 
2000, Glasgow] 228 
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expenditure, and the value of gross exports and gross imports. Many 
factors of GDP calculations, such as private consumption and government 
expenditure directly overlap with consideration of standards of living. For 
some countries, especially those with large populations, such as India and 
China, where population wealth is disparate GDP is a poor indicator. 
Instead it was found that there is a better correlation between gross 
domestic product per capita and standards of living, rather than GDP and 
standards of living. It is therefore in the interest of a nation's populace for 
their country to have a high gross domestic product per capita relative to 
other nations.494 
3.1.2. Over Natural Resources 
However, the natural resources available within a nation's territories do not 
necessarily reflect the wealth of that nation. If the distributions of minerals, 
plants, and animals were determinative of population wealth then a relative 
index of national standards of living would remarkably differ from those 
presently existent. Instead as most minerals, plants and animals are not 
consumable in their natural form they must be transformed in order that 
society can consume them. Thus, if control were exerted over the 
transformed form or the method of obtaining the transformed form, then 
some control would also be exerted over the natural form. Where there 
are competing possible transformations from the natural form many factors 
494 This work although intermeshed with a naturalistic positivism is biased towards 
utilitarianism and efficiency, where they are coincident, rather than elitism. Otherwise 
GDP might serve as an acceptable measure of comparison, as is the case in many 
development reports. 
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will affect the choice of transformation, including economics and technical 
facilities. The ability of the acquirer of the natural form resource to 
continue to supply a market is dependent on the demand of the 
transformed form, and therefore on the transformer of the natural form. 
Since the supplier of a natural resource can be interchanged with another 
supplier of that natural resource each supplier must remain competitive 
and therefore has a reduced choice as to the final transformed form that 
their natural resource will realise. The transformer of the resource, most 
notably at the level of final transformations, is economically subject to the 
whims and tastes of society, but to a degree can also dictate whim and 
taste. Where the whims and tastes of society closely correlate with 
objects of intellectual property such as a patents, then employment of 
natural resources can be determined through ownership of transformed 
forms and the methods of transformation. Thus, intellectual property, 
particularly patents can exert indirect control over natural resources by 
influencing both the economics and the technical choices available to 
transformers and therefore to the economy of natural resource supply. 
For a nation with a scarcity of natural resources in comparison to other 
nations, the ability to control the value that the natural resources of the 
other nations can realise is extremely important and determinative of 
relative standards of living. Moreover, between competitive nations the 
economic value of knowledge that cannot be kept secret or be controlled is 
low. Were there not bars to other nations undertaking the transformations 
that would make their natural resources favourable to consumers then an 
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index of standards of living and GOP would correlate with the originators of 
natural resources. For example consider the economic growth of the USA 
from 1915 to 1940 and China in the 1980-2000 when recognition of other 
nations' intellectual property was limited or inexistent. 
Where knowledge, which is determinative of product superiority or 
improved production and can only be exploited by disclosure of the 
knowledge, then that knowledge has a very high value. This high value is 
realised by the positive effect that the knowledge has on a nation's GOP 
through the indirect control over natural resources both national and 
foreign. Simplistically this can be visualised as the difference in imports 
and exports where the knowledge is restricted, compared to the sum of 
imports and exports if that knowledge were freely disseminated and 
employable. 
3.1.3. Over Labour Resources 
Thus, for a nation where the cost of labour is higher and the access to 
base resources is lower than its competitors, the employment of 
knowledge to gain product superiority or improved production is the only 
method of achieving sustained productivity growth. Patents, through 
providing a means of limiting knowledge exploitation, serve to 
accommodate control over the natural resources of other nations. 
Thereby exerting a property sovereignty function. Historically patents 
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have long served this purpose. Even with greater acuity before the Statute 
of Monopolies.495 
Nations with high labour costs and low natural resources, providing they 
can secure enough patents and have these respected by other nations, 
can economically dominate countries rich in resources and labour. 
However, where the other nations, rich in resources and labour are able to 
channel their energies into securing patents or attracting patent holders to 
economic activity within their nations then the rich originator of 
transformations, both poorer in labour and resources will dwindle in 
importance. Thus, 
"In 1980, less than one-tenth of manufacturing exports came from 
the developing world. Today it is almost one-third and in 20 years' 
time it is likely to be one_half."496 
As transformation choices permutate and ownership of the transformation 
or transformed form is only temporary then the ability of property vehicles, 
such as patents, to control natural resources is also transient. Their effect 
495 Consider, the use of saltpeter licenses, whereby deputies of the patentee used their 
authority to dig in the lands of others, including their houses, cellars, and barns. See 
Clode, C. M., The early history of the Guild of Merchant Taylors of the Fraternity of St. 
John the Baptist, London, with notices of the lives of some of its eminent members. 
[Harrison Printers, 1889, London] 87 
496 Sainsbury Review. The Race to the Top: A Review of Government's Science and 
Innovation Policies. [HMSO October 2007] 4 
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is visible as retardative of the economic development of nations with 
greater natural resources but less patent acquiring expertise. 
"In fact, patentability always came after the industry had already 
emerged and matured on its own terms.,,497 
However, the exploitive ability of patents is not limited to control over 
resources in other countries, an effective scheme can be run nationally or 
globally regardless of the wealth of a particular nation. Outside of 
intellectual property this organised control of a market would be penalised 
as cartelisation.496 
3.1.4. Maintaining Cartels 
Technology cartels were and are formed in two essentially distinct 
patterns, both of which are based on the late Nineteenth Century German 
company strategy of using patents to enclose a technology area. For lack 
of a better term in the literature I classify these as unstable and stable 
technology cartels. In the unstable cartel the company holding the 
dominant patent portfolio conditionally licences their portfolio to others to 
manufacture dependent products. In return the licensor demands a return 
from the licensees, thereby effectively fixing prices, limiting total industry 
497 Boldrin, M. & Levine, D. K., Economic and Game Theory: Against Intellectual 
Monopoly [e-publication 2008] Ch.3 p. 4. Available at: 
<http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/general/intellectuallagainstnew.htm> (Last Accessed: 1 st 
July 2009) 
498 Drahos, P. and Braithwaite, J. Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge 
Economy? [Earthscan publications Ltd, 2002, London] 151 
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output, partitioning the market, and allocating categories of consumer and 
territories. I refer to this as an unstable technology cartel because it is 
dependent on the licensor retaining control over technologies essential to 
the industry. 
This first form of cartel is fairly weak and contemporaneously is usually 
only attempted by University spin-out companies attempting to enter the 
pharmaceutical market and retain niche control.499 Cartels of this kind are 
usually largely ineffective at controlling prices and distribution. There are 
however notable exceptions such as the protease inhibitor market, where 
Abbott has utilised Norvir pricing to effect prices and market share from 
December 2003 onwards.soo 
The second form of technology cartel is stable because it functions on the 
basis of on cross-licensing agreements for technologies. In the formation 
499 For liability reasons, I am unwilling to name companies, but as search of news about 
pharmaceuticals including the terms 'university spin-out companies' and 'consortium' in 
conjunction with an appraisal of the territorial distribution of the spin-out product and its 
pricing structure will provide several examples. 
500 Norvir's remaining patent expiration dates are: January 30, 2014; March 13,2014, 
December 3,2014; January 15, 2015; and December 26,2016. (Data checked with 
USPTO online database.) It is expected that Norvir will continue to be used to control the 
market prices of protease inhibitor therapies that require Norvir to improve their efficacy 
until patent and exclusivity expiry. However, following a settlement payment on August 
18, 2008 to an antitrust class action regarding its pricing of Norvir, Abbott's long term 
pricing policy is not yet clear. Abbott purportedly will pay $10 million to $27.5 million USD 
in settlement (http://www.healthcare-digital.com/Judge-approves-Abbott-SeUlement-in-
Norvir-LawsuitJ222.aspx), in 2008 Norvir sales were $311,245,000 USD 
(DrugPatentWatch.com. Available at: 
<http://www.drugpatentwatch.com/premium/preview/detail/index.php?searchtype=alpha& 
category=Tradename&searchstring=NORVIR> (Last Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
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of the stable cartel, rival companies nucleate around a common 
technology, this may be initiated by a patent holder of the common 
technology who instead of an attempt at overarching control through the 
licensing of their patent, will instead license their patent for a small or 
token buy-in and a strong agreement that technological derivations and 
improvements will be shared amongst the cartel members. This has the 
consequence that multiple companies can benefit from each other's 
innovation, thus rejuvenating the existence of the cartel, whilst excluding 
outsiders. Formation of price setting agreements and division of markets 
and territories can be effected through the terms of cross-licensing thereby 
eschewing the vigilance of competition laws and providing an effective 
basis for legal enforcement of the cartel, which ironically can take place 
within the qualified court or intellectual property office. Compensation 
clauses within the cross-licensing agreements provide for an indemnitas 
for the more innovative cartel members. 
Ernest Solvay instituted the alkali cartel as a stable cartel. In return for a 
licence to use his ammonia-soda process, Solvay required that the 
licensees share all improvements with him, which he in turn reserved the 
right to share with other licensees. In consequence not only did Solvay 
retain control of the industry, but his process was kept competitive with 
respect to rival processes.501 The dispositive for the categorisation on the 
501 Krause, W., and Puffert, D. J. 'Chemicals, strategy, and tariffs: Tariff policy and the 
soda industry in Imperial Germany' (2000) 4 European Review of Economic History 285- E'""K"j~ 
309; Haber, L.F., The Chemical Industry During the Nineteenth Century [Clarendon ~ "\ 
TEMPI.(~MAI\' \ 
Press, 1958, Oxford] 89 LlBPfl!2l'v 
c.: A...-
"V/l/ E '"' ':? "-
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alkali cartel as a stable cartel is the presence of cross-licensing, of which 
Solvay acted as a broker. 
lei and DuPont, supposed rivals, present an interesting history of possible 
cartelisation.502 Their enduring cross-licensing of technologies 
encompassed both the sharing of information and expertise. This was to 
the extent that even when one company had control over the core patents 
for a technology area the other firm had the incentive to innovate in order 
to retain a viable membership of the partnership and access to the core 
inventions.503 To further ensure a balance in their sharing compensation 
clauses existed to value the weight of each firm's contributions to the 
patent pool. 
Early purchase of technologies is essential in the maintenance of a cartel. 
Non-manufacturing innovators have a trend of licensing their inventions to 
anyone able to afford the royalties, thus promoting the largest market entry 
of competitive firms. 
Arora puts explicitly reported cross-licensing agreements amongst 
pharmaceutical licenses for the period 1980 to 1990 at around fifteen per 
cent, whilst for the chemical industry explicitly reported cross-licensing 
502 Drahos, P. and Braithwaite, J. Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Know/edge 
Economy? [Earthscan publications Ltd, 2002, London] 53 
503 Spitz, P.H., Petrochemicals: The Rise of an Industry [John Wiley, 1988, New York] 
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forms about sixty per cent of alilicensing.so4 This difference is explained 
through the lack of competing technologies within the pharmaceutical 
sector. Where there is the possibility of rival technologies then the payoff 
strategy has to be changed; it is more advantageous to license early and 
for a lower margin to ensure uptake of the technology and some return. 
Whereas in the pharmaceutical sector, with the difficulty for rivals to create 
bioequivalents, there is generally no necessity to pre-empt the uptake of 
rival technologies. 
In 1923, Hermann Isay,505 remarked of the manufacturing industries that 
" ... no other industries have at their disposal for cartellizing purposes as 
effective a device as the ... patent."S06 
Because of its focus on control, the property sovereignty function 
statement is closely linked to the knowledge feudalism function statement. 
However whilst the property sovereignty function statement is concerned 
with control over resources, price setting and market sharing, the 
knowledge feudalism function statement is concerned with the control of 
knowledge itself and the retardation of expertise. 
504 Arora, A., 'Patents, licensing and market structure in the chemical industry' (1997) 
26(4-5) Research Policy 391-403, at 397 
505 Author of the Patentgesetz Und Betreffend Den Schutz Von Gebrauchsmustern, 
published in a 6th edition in 1932. 
506 Drahos, P; Braithwaite, J., Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge 
Economy? [Earthscan Publications Ltd, 1st Ed., 2002, London] 44 
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3.2. Knowledge Feudalism Function 
Pursuit of knowledge might be considered to have two underlying 
motivations: The valuing of knowledge for its own sake and the acquisition 
of power through the benefits that knowledge conveys.SO? In the research 
of pharmaceuticals there exists a notion that the purpose of research is for 
the benefit to health and lives that knowledge acquisition will grant, and 
though in some instances this may be the case, the economics of 
knowledge acquisition predominate. 
3.2.1. Knowledge As Power 
In the present patent driven pharmaceutical innovation regime 
pharmaceutical research is about empowerment. It is about the economic 
value of the product and the pecuniary benefit that can be obtained. 
Intellectual property can be used or exploited, depending on one's 
conception of intellectual property's purpose, to act as a buffer between 
the 'haves' and the 'have-nots'. 
"Developing countries are poorer not only because they ... [control] 
fewer resources, but because there is a gap in knowledge ... But by 
strengthening the developed world's stranglehold over intellectual 
property, ... TRIPS reduced access to knowledge for developing 
cou ntries. ,,508 
507 Kingston, W., The political economy of innovation [Nijhoff Publishers, 1984, The 
Hague] 21 
508 Stiglitz, J. 'Give prizes not patents' (2006) 2569 New Scientist 21 
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Growing an empire where there is not always a new product is difficult if 
the playing field remains unchanging. However, if the legal rules can be 
altered, then boundaries of the map can be changed. One way to ensure 
this is to retard the uptake of information and the development of 
expertise. If the expertise of rivals is prevented from attaining the same 
level, then superiority of products can be ensured and markets can be 
dominated. The purpose of the knowledge feudalism function statement is 
to ensure lead-time in knowledge creation by retarding knowledge uptake 
and development of expertise by rivals. 
3.2.2. Paying the Piper 
Government granted monopolies create a special relation between the 
monopolist and the Government. Providing that the monopolist can 
emphasise the necessity of their activity to influence popular opinion then 
the monopolist can distort the political system by sharing the benefits of 
their monopoly with the government, thereby acquiring preference at the 
expense of those paying the rent on the monopoly. Between 1998 and 
2004 the USA pharmaceutical industry has spent has spent $758 million 
USD in lobbying,509 which is more than any other industry in the USA or 
elsewhere. 
The expenditure on lobbying may have paid dividends, as pharmaceuticals 
have the longest potential patent term of all technology areas. Of course 
509 USA Today Looks at Prescription Drug Industry's Lobbying Efforts (28 Apr 2005) 
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the reasoning for this is that they have the longest market approval delay. 
In 1984 the USA Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, provided for an extension of patent 
protection for pharmaceutical patent holders to compensate for delays 
caused by FDA approval requirements. This extension was limited to five 
years. 510 The UK followed with the Patent (Supplementary Protection 
Certificates for Medicinal Products) Regulations 1992511 . Where extension 
of the patent term to 25 years is possible subject to the period of delay 
between the grant of the patent and authorisation of the drug to enter the 
market. Every year of delay beyond five years entitles the patent holder to 
an additional year of patent protection up to a maximum of five years 
following a ten-year delay. 
In a study of the knowledge transfer effects of patents for invention in a 
developed nation, 8ascavusoglu and Zuniga512 applied a reduced-form 
econometric equation relating French cross-border receipts in technology 
services to an index of patent strength, real GOP per capita, openness, 
and the technological characteristics of knowledge-recipient countries. 
510 The patent term in the USA for pharmaceuticals was 17 years prior to TRIPs 
compliance in 1995, which extended the patent term in the USA to 20 years. US Code 
Title 35 Section 154(2). As a result of the 1999 amanedment the five year extension 
period for delays as a result of the market approval for pharmaceuticals was annulled 
thus there is no limitation to this extension period in the USA, see Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 
106-113, § 1 000(a)(9) [title IV, § 4402(a)]. 
511 S.1. 1992 No. 3091 
512 Bascavusoglu, E; Zuniga, M. P., 'Foreign Patent Rights, Technology & Disembodied 
Knowledge Transfer Cross Borders: An Empirical Application' (2002) Working paper 
Universite de Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne. 
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They concluded that once countries reached a certain market size and 
level of income then the implementation of stronger intellectual property 
rights could improve technology markets. They state that this is true only 
when conditions are favourable for knowledge transfer. 513 There are two 
factors which are essential to the transfer of knowledge these are that the 
country possesses the capacity to innovate, and thereby benefit from the 
knowledge of others and secondly that commercialisation of technologies 
has a guaranteed profitability.514 
3.2.3. Exclusive Melody 
As patents increase the cost of technology transactions they require higher 
prices for technologies. As a result knowledge transfer may be affected as 
patent rights are strengthened.515 For example implementing product 
patents where there had only previously been process patents, may 
prevent firms that had previously competed to supply a market from being 
able to continue. As a result the local prices for the affected technologies 
513 Bascavusoglu, E; Zuniga, M. P., 'Foreign Patent Rights, Technology & Disembodied 
Knowledge Transfer Cross Borders: An Empirical Application' (2002) Working paper 
Universite de Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne. 
514 See Benchekroun, H., and Vishwasrao, S., 'On welfare reducing technological change 
in a North-South framework' (2009) 61(3) Oxford Economic Papers 603-622; Vishwasrao, 
S., and Bosshardt, W., 'Foreign ownership and technology adoption: evidence from 
Indian firms' (2001) 65(2) Journal of Development Economics 367-387; Smith, P., 'Are 
weak patent rights a barrier to U. S. Exports?' (1999) 48 Journal of International 
Economics 151-177; Vishwasrao, S., 'Intellectual Property Rights and the mode of 
technological Transfer' (1994) 44(2) Journal of Development Economics 381-402 
515 For a discussion couched as an econometric investigation on the effects different 
degrees of intellectual property rights have on decisions to license technologies see 
Yang, G, and Maskus, K. E., 'Intellectual property rights and licensing: An econometric 
investigation' (2001) 137(1) Review of World Economics 58-79 
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may rise. With a reduction in the competition between firms and in the 
number of experts working in the speciality there will be an overall decline 
in expertise. Moreover, if the stages of research and manufacture are 
undertaken elsewhere, for example in another country, then there is no 
forum for specialists to be trained, gain experience or contribute to local 
competition. 
On the other hand in the absence of local expertise to produce products 
from local knowledge, the entry of outside expertise may be able to 
commercialise knowledge previously existent and provide new 
commodities. Within the context of pharmaceutical development this can 
require greater capital than is available locally and thus the patent permits 
the firm with capital to acquire and suppress the commercialisation 
potential of a local product. This is a very favourable position for firms 
from wealthy nations and any strengthening of patent rights should be 
accompanied by an increase in the complexity and costs of patent law. 
Which in turn will increase the dead weight of transaction costs and further 
insulate patent right holders from the germination of competitive expertise. 
3.2.4 Missing Picture 
Viswasrhao,516 Yang and Maskus,517 suggest that stronger IPRs have a 
tendency to increase licensing activity. For Korea, Mexico, Brazil, and 
516 Vishwasrao, S. Intellectual Property Rights and the mode of technological Transfer. 
(1994) 44(2) Journal of Development Economics 381402 
517 Yang, G, and Maskus, K. E., 'Intellectual property rights and licensing: An econometric 
investigation' (2001) 137(1) Review of World Economics 58-79 
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Indonesia large responses have been identified.518 However, although 
patents may acts as catalysts for technology market growth, the potential 
increase in licensing fees that emerge with increased patent protection519 
have not been taken into account: it is not reported if increases in 
licensing flow is a product of a greater frequency of licensing or a result of 
the higher royalty rates paid. Most importantly, is the distribution of 
technical knowledge masked by the centralization of licensing and 
production catalysed by patent monopoly? In 1997 Lanjouw520 reported 
that imitation by Indian firms of pharmaceuticals newly marketed in Europe 
or the USA takes less than 2 years and that production and distribution 
was undertaken competitively by over 
"250 large pharmaceutical firms, ... about 9,000 registered small-
scale units, [and] another 7,000 unregistered small-scale units.,,521 
This is a completely different infrastructure compared to the 
pharmaceutical industry in the USA, UK or the European Union, where 
518 Maskus, K. 'Parallel Imports' (2000) 23(9), World Economy 1269-1284 
519 Shapiro, C., 'Navigating the patent thicket: cross licenses, patent pools, and standard-
setting' (2000) Working Paper No. CPCOO-11. at 12. Available from: 
<http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/4hs5s9wk#page-1> (Last Accessed: 15t July 2009) 
520 Lanjouw, J. 0., 'The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in India: 
"Heartless Exploitation of the Poor and Suffering"?' (1998) NBER Working Paper No. 
W6366 
521 Lanjouw, J. 0., 'The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in India: 
"Heartless Exploitation of the Poor and Suffering?"' (1998) NBER Working Paper No. 
W6366: at 9. Lanjouw attributes this data to clippings: "Pharmaceuticals" from major 
Indian Newspapers from various years on file at the Institute for Studies in Industrial 
Development, New Delhi. 
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relatively few very large pharmaceutical companies comprise the 
pharmaceutical market, including bulk supply and generics. 
3.3. Cost and Resource Allocation 
By virtue of the private profit driven system of innovation that the patent 
system, business and lawyers engender, the high increment on the cost of 
patented medicines is to permit companies researching new 
pharmaceutical patents to recoup the cost of research and development 
and clinical testing. 522 
The factors determinative of whether a chemical compound is developed 
or therapeutic investigation takes place were described by Maclay ton , 
Smith et a/.523 Whom inferred these factors from an empirical study of 150 
USA companies, specialised in the provision of health products, and their 
decision to enter foreign markets. The factors proposed were: the market 
and marketing opportunity, legal barriers, the company's economic 
objectives, cultural unity and physiographic barriers, political stability, 
522 PhRMA, Tough Questions, Straight Answers: A Discussion of Today's Pharmaceutical 
Issues [PhRMA, Summer 2004, Washington]; PhRMA, Why Do Prescription Drugs Cost 
So Much and Other Questions About Your Medicines [PhRMA, June 2000 Washington] 
523 Maclay ton, D., Smith, M. and Hair, J., Determinants of Foreign Market Entry: A 
Multivariate Analysis of Corporate Behavior (1980) 20(3) Management International 
Review 40-52 
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economic development and performance. 524 The WHO Global Atlas of 
Infectious Diseases, or the size of which populations in which diseases 
occurred were not important enough to mention where the economic 
development in which the afflicted populations occurred did not meet the 
company's threshold for its economic objectives. Considering that the 
purpose of pharmaceutical companies, usually profit for its 
shareholders,525 then it should not be anticipated that they undertake 
altruistic work or combat disease without profit. 
Risk is present in most forms of economic life, and if one party is insulated 
from it then another will bear the extent of that insulation. There are two 
fashions of displacing risk, to reduce the elements which may cause it, i.e. 
not developing drugs that will have poor markets, and to be compensated 
for bearing the risk. 
3.3.1. Avoidance and Compensation 
As this subchapter highlights the mechanisms in place certainly present 
both characteristics; risk reduction and compensation for risk taking. An 
alternative view of Plant's notion that patent rights can direct activities to 
more useful purpose might correlatively be viewed in the context of 
pharmaceuticals that patent rights partially shift the innovation risks to the 
public. This is not a total shift of risk in an economic sense as the turning 
of profits significant to a company the size of most large research and 
524 Albaum, G., and Peterson, R. A., 'Empirical Research in International Marketing: 1976-
1982' (1984) 15(1) Journal of/nternational Business Studies 161-173 
525 Companies House, DVD Rom Directory, March 2009 
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manufacturing companies requires marketing savvy and consummate 
commercial skills, as well as a product pipeline. There are no complete 
indemnities for failing pharmaceutical giants, but then they have not 
seemed to need any more than they already possess, even with the 
market entry of generics. 
From 1982 to 2001, the pharmaceutical industry was the most profitable 
industry in the USA every year. 526 In 2002, however the pharmaceutical 
industry suffered a significant profit crisis. In that year, although seventy-
eight medicines were approved by the USA Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA),527 only seventeen contained new active ingredients. Moreover, of 
the seventeen containing new active ingredients, only seven were FDA 
classified as improvements over older medicines. Which means that 
seventy-one of the approved drugs (91 per cent) were variations of old 
drugs or deemed no better than drugs already on the market. None of the 
improved medicines came from major USA based pharmaceutical 
companies. This lead to a general restructuring amongst large 
pharmaceutical companies, which has the effect that research has been 
increasingly out-sourced. Thus, the risk of conducting research has been 
increasingly borne by other companies. 
526 'Rx R&D Myths: The Case Against The Drug Industry's R&D "Scare Card'" Public 
Citizen, July 2001. <http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACFDC.PDF> (Last Accessed: 1 st 
July 2009); Fortune Magazine data 
527 FDA, CDER NDAs Approved in Calendar Years 1990-2004 by Therapeutic Potential 
and Chemical Type. Available at: <http://www.fda.gov/cder/rdmUpstable.htm> (Last 
Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
262 
It has thereafter remained one of the most profitable industry in the 
USA.528 
"Some two billion people around the globe cannot get the 
medications they need because they are too poor, or drugs for their 
diseases are not in production. Big pharmaceutical companies ... 
cannot fix the problem unless it is profitable.,,529 
There are insufficient finances available to make it profitable for 'Big 
Pharmaceutical companies' to undertake research on all the diseases that 
afflict human beings. Moreover, because of their inefficiency and their 
need for profitability 'Big Pharmaceutical companies,' are not best qualified 
to try. 530 Monopolies use inefficient and extremely costly methods of 
production. The objective of a monopoly is to obtain remuneration far 
greater than opportunity cost. Even if opportunity cost were met, in the 
absence of the pharmaceutical patent and substantial reliance on 
monopoly industry to innovate, there is little likelihood that cures to all 
diseases and remedies for all conditions could be found. Resources 
528 In 2006 the mining and crude-oil production sector surpassed the pharmaceutical 
sector in terms of profits as a per cent of revenues. Fortune 500 data. 
529 MacKenzie, D., 'GSK tops new ethical ranking for investors' (16 June 2008) 
NewScientist.com. Available at: <http://www.newscientist.com/channellhealth/dn14141-
gsk-tops-new-ethical-ranking-for-investors.html> (Last Accessed: 15t July 2009) 
530 Resources are always going to be channelled into the most profitable product. even if 
that product is a 'me-to' with no therapeutic improvement. Considering products on the 
market, research by large pharmaceutical companies into symptom suppressants and 
prophylactics has been far more successful than at finding cures. Of course finding 
useful active ingredients is a complex and difficult activity and it may only be coincidence 
that the more economically valuable treatment is obtained more often than a cure. 
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available for research are finite, just as they are for the manufacture and 
distribution of medicines. However, channelling these finite resources into 
a system that is inefficient and requires large forecast profit before it will 
consider investigating a condition or chemical, is not a desirable method of 
improving the availability of medicines or the accessibility of medicines to 
everyone; that is not just to the poor, but to the wealthy as wel1. 531 
3.3.2. Cost Of Innovation 
In 1991, Oi Masi et al., building on the work of Hansen's 1979 report,532 
estimated that for a sample group of 93 NCEs developed by twelve 
pharmaceutical companies through the late 1970s and 1980s the average 
expenditure per approved product was $114 million USO (1987 USO 
value).533 Which lead Oi Masi et al. to conclude fully capitalised costs of 
$231 million USO (1987 USO value). Hannah Kettler, updating Oi Masi's 
figure to 1997 values on the basis of the GOP implicit price deflator 
suggests that the fully capitalised costs are $321 million USO (1997 USO 
531 Conditions such as diabetes, hypertension, heart disease, high cholesterol, and 
arthritis are presently chronic illnesses and therefore require ongoing therapies. 
Treatment of these conditions outside of insurance schemes can be expensive even for 
people within economies with a high per capita income. For the super wealthy the prices 
of pharmaceuticals is not a problem, however expensive they are. However, availability 
is. See, i.4. at 32, 3.3. at 246. 
532 Hansen, R. W .. 'The pharmaceutical development process: Estimates of development 
costs and times and the effects of proposed regulatory changes,' in Chien, R. (eds.) 
Issues in Pharmaceutical Economics [Lexington Books, 1979, 1st Ed., Boston] 151-187 
533 Oi Masi, J. A., Hansen, R. W., Grabowski, H. G., Lasagna, L., 'Cost of Innovation in 
the Pharmaceutical Industry' (1991) 10 Journal of Health Economics 107-142 
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value) per approved pharmaceutical product. 534 In 2003, Oi Masi et al. 
produced another estimate of $802 million USO (2000 USO value) fully 
capitalised costs for the research and development of a new 
pharmaceutical product. 535 
A further report by Oi Masi, et al., suggests $1.318 billion USD (2006 USO 
value).536 Utilising the published methodologies of Kettler in conjunction 
with the discount rate and increased capitalised costs of Oi Masi et al. this 
suggests that in 2009 figures, that the fully capitalised cost of a new 
industry innovated and developed pharmaceutical product is about $1.525 
billion USD (2009 USD value). Of course this figure comprises full re-
imbursement for all projects that failed to generate approved 
pharmaceutical products537 and does not take account of only 
pharmaceuticals that were candidates for therapeutic improvement. As a 
result the figure is an extremely poor indicator of the cost of new drugs. 
3.3.3. Mansfield Questionnaire 
Edwin Mansfield conducted a survey by questionnaire amongst the 
research and development directors of one hundred corporations in the 
USA. In response to the question of what fraction of inventions would not 
534 Kettler, H. 'Updating the cost of a new chemical entity' [Office of Health Economics, 
1999, London] 14-15 
535 Di Masi, J., Hansen, R, Grabowski, H., 'The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of 
Drug Development Costs' (2003) 22 Journal of Health Economics 151-185 
536 DiMasi, J. A., and Grabowski, H. G., 'The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech 
Different?' (2007) 28 Managerial and Decision Economics 469-479 
537 Kettler, H. 'Updating the cost of a new chemical entity' [Office of Health Economics, 
1999,London]26 
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have been developed between 1981and 1983 in the absence of a patent 
protection, found that for pharmaceuticals this was 60 per cent, whilst the 
average across all industries was only 14 per cent. 538 
Mansfield's survey is supportive of the hypothesis that the development 
decisions of pharmaceutical research and manufacture companies are 
directed towards perceived profit-making opportunities and that the patent 
is an important factor in the realisation of profits. As the goal of industrial 
research policy is to evaluate research and development project costs with 
respect to expected returns so as to secure the achieve the most profitable 
allocation of resources practically possible, this is not an unexpected 
result. 539 Moreover, Mansfield's survey does not suggest that the 
inventions that the twelve pharmaceutical companies would not have 
developed in the absence of patent protection would not have been 
developed by another company. Nor does it reveal how many 
pharmaceuticals were not developed as a result of patent protection. 
3.3.4. From Whence 
There should be little doubt in the mind of most economists that 
monopolies use inefficient and costly methods of production. 
Pharmaceutical research requires substantial funding and this money has 
to come from somewhere. Almost all pharmaceutical innovations can be 
538 Mansfield, E., 'Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study' (1986) 32(2) Management 
Science 173-181 
539 Mansfield, E., Rapoport, J., Schnee, J., Wagner, S., et al. Research and Innovation in 
the Modern Corporation [Newton, 1971, 1s1 Ed., New York] 48-49 
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designated as originating from one of two sources: these being publicly 
funded research institutions and pharmaceutical research companies. In 
the USA, pharmaceutical industry research and development accounts for 
only 43 per cent of pharmaceutical research and development. 29 per 
cent of pharmaceutical research and development is generated by the 
NIH.54o Jeffrey Robinson has suggested that forty-five out of fifty best 
selling drugs were in fact substantially developed with taxpayer's 
money.541 
If the research produced through public funding is for the moment ignored, 
then out of the money society spends on pharmaceuticals only about 
thirteen per cent is allocated to research, development and clinical trials. It 
is desirable that pharmaceutical innovation takes place, however that only 
thirteen per cent of spending on pharmaceuticals is directed into research, 
development and clinical trials, where innovation is the justification for the 
monopoly, is clearly suggestive of an inefficient and costly method of 
540 Chang, H-J., Kicking away the ladder: Development strategy in historical perspective. 
[Anthem Press, 2004,1 8\ Ed .. 2nd Reprint, London] 31; see 
<http://www.pharma.org/publications> (Last Accessed: 1S\ July 2009). Whilst this figure 
corresponds with data provided in news articles, a definitive and attributed break down of 
source data is desirable. 
541 Robinson, J., Prescription Games [Simon and Schuster, 1st Ed., 2001, London] 121; 
Also see, Dembner, A., 'Public handouts enrich drug makers, scientists' (April 5. 1998) 
The Boston Globe A 1 - "The Globe looked at 50 top-selling drugs approved by the Food 
and Drug Administration over the past five years: 35 new drugs. which are bestsellers 
among those the FDA deemed most important or most unique, and 15 "orphan" drugs 
targeting rare diseases. Thirty-three of the 35 new drugs and 12 of the 15 orphans 
received money from the National Institutes of Health or the FDA to help in discovery, 
development, or testing ... 45 of 50 top-selling drugs got government subsidies total[l]ing 
nearly $175 million [USD]." 
267 
innovating. Moreover, the magnitude of the deadweight grows in 
proportion to patent rents. 
Consider Ritonavir (Norvir), which was developed by Abbott, through 
substantial NIH assistance including grants. As a result Abbott's 
investment in developing Ritonavir was approximately fifteen million USD 
of its own funds,542 which was mostly spent on pre-approval clinical trials 
and studies to obtain market approval for Ritonavir. By 2002, Abbott had in 
cumulative sales of Ritonavir received over one billion USD, which is more 
than sixty times the estimated cost of Ritonavir pre-approval expenditure. 
Thus, Abbott's expected income from Ritonavir over the next decade 
would have been around two billion USD for Abbott over the next 10 
years.543 However, Abbott increased Ritonavir's price by 500 per cent in 
December 2003,544 thereby increasing the expected income on Ritonavir 
to around twelve billion USD by 2010. 
542 UN IH didn't ask for any financial return and Abbott didn't offer ... " Dembner, A., 'Public 
handouts enrich drug makers, scientists' (April 5, 1998) The Boston Globe A 1 
543 Cafferty, P., Families USA, Big PhRMA Behaving Badly: A Survey of Selected Class 
Action Lawsuits Against Drug Companies [Families USA, January 2005, Washington] 2 
544 Alcorn, K., 'Ritonavir price increase: what are the consequences in 2004? 
Consequences forcompetitors,'18 December 2003. Available at: 
<http://www.aidsmap.com/en/news/1 E63C821-275E-45C2-95BC-6F6B99F38D54 .asp> 
(Last Accessed: 1st July 2009); Cafferty, P., Families USA, Big PhRMA Behaving Badly: A 
Survey of Selected Class Action Lawsuits Against Drug Companies [Families USA, 
January 2005, Washington] 2; 
'Price of AIDS Drug Soars Fivefold Seattle Times, 5 January 2004. 
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3.3.5. Your Money Or Your Life 
What is clear is that individual pursuit of self-interest to a pharmaceutical 
research manufacturer (whose articles of association and memorandum 
are not conceived on the basis of a trust and altruism, but rather 
shareholders' wants) is not compatible with the close correlation of cost 
and price of a pharmaceutical, or with society's interest in accessing 
medicines.545 In fact the rent seeking behaviour of pharmaceutical 
companies suggests that in the majority of cases, if not all, the price of 
patented pharmaceuticals has little if no correlation to the actual cost of 
supply, but is entirely determined on the strength of a strong monopoly.546 
On the basis of the strong monopoly the patent holder can charge almost 
any price they desire for products incorporating the technology of their 
patent. This situation presents a large distortion to the expected balancing 
of classical supply and demand. Moreover, the high prices that the 
monopoly permits are not in society's economic interest, even though they 
may be in the interest of the company's shareholders and the lobbied 
political entities. The financial health of SOciety is improved by the less 
spending on wasteful or deadweight activities. 
545 In the present context there are three components to 'society's interest.' These are (i) 
the availability of a drug, (ii) the accessibility of a drug, and (iii) transparency about the 
performance of a drug (Le. the side effects and effectiveness). 
546 Robinson, J., Prescription Games: Ufe, Death and Money Inside the Global 
Pharmaceutical Industry [Simon & Schuster Ltd, 1st Ed., 2001, London] 85 
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Baker and Chatani, 2002,547 identified six areas of rent seeking behaviour 
in the pharmaceutical industry that result in wasteful, and or harmful 
activity. These are: 
1) Research and development of copycat medicines 
2) Large financial expenditure on marketing 
3) Restrictions on the dissemination of research and falsification of 
data 
4) Legal costs and bribes to generic manufacturers 
5) Lobbying and grass root campaigns 
6) Incentive for grey markets 
Whilst all of these points are responsible for the introduction of deadweight 
into the innovation, development and distribution of pharmaceuticals points 
3 and 6 are treated in the subsequent subchapters. Point 3 (Restrictions 
on the dissemination of research and falsification of data) is considered as 
two separate issues; as a burden on innovators and as a safety concern. 
Thus, the different issues of Point 3 are treated in subchapters 3.4 and 
3.6. Point 6 (Incentive for grey markets) is considered within subchapter 
3.6.5 with regard to safety concerns. 
547 Baker, D., and Chatani, N., Promoting Good Ideas on Drugs: Are Patents the Best 
Way? The Relative Efficiency of Patent and Public Support for Bio-Medical Research 
(2002) CEPR Briefing Paper [Centre for Economic and Policy Research, Washington] 2-3 
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3.3.6 Circumvention And Copying 
Remember, copycat medicines do little more than copy existing medicines, 
unlike generic drugs they do not present therapeutic improvement over the 
copied drug. Moreover in the instance that they follow a pharmaceutical 
still in patent, then they need to employ different active agents, have a 
different composition and process of manufacture. When these 
differences constitute sufficient novelty in their own right then the copycat 
medicine is patented and termed a me-too, but does not necessarily 
present any therapeutic improvement over the copied medicine. 
Nevertheless, since a me-too needs to accomplish similar effects to the 
originator, but with a different active ingredient, amongst other things, it will 
have different side effects and therefore may be suitable for some people 
the originator drug is not. As such a me-too may pose a positive 
contribution to the medicine chest, even if it is a small one. 
The presence of copycat drugs on a market may reduce the price of the 
copied medicine. However it is deemed a substantial dead weight 
expenditure because of the lack of therapeutic improvement and the 
expense required to innovate the chemical, to develop it, and put it through 
regulatory approval. Moreover, other costs will also arise. These will 
invariably include a marketing initiative, but may also require legal costs. 
Such costs would be entirely unnecessary but for the patent system which 
requires inventing around to occur and the attractive rewards of the 
engendered monopoly. PhRMA profiling of industry members suggests 
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that over seventy per cent of members research spending is directed 
towards copycat medicines.548 
3.3.7. Good Sell 
Pharmaceutical company sales teams adopt several strategies. These 
include: advertising to health care professionals, direct consumer 
advertising, provision of samples, promotional gifts for prescribers, and the 
employment of pharmaceutical sales representatives. Pharmaceutical 
marketing activities comprise about twenty-eight per cent of a 
pharmaceutical company's total spending.549 
In the UK, pharmaceutical advertising is specifically controlled by the 
Medicines Act 1968,550 the Medicines (Advertising and Monitoring of 
Advertising) Amendment Regulations 1999 and the Control of Misleading 
548 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America,. Pharmaceutical Industry 
Profile 2001. [Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America. 2001. 
Washington. D.C]. The 2001 profile is no longer available online. but the 2008 and 2009 
profiles may be accessed from: <http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/> (Last 
Accessed: 1s1 July 2009); see Baker, D., and Chatani, N., Promoting Good Ideas on 
Drugs: Are Patents the Best Way? The Relative Efficiency of Patent and Public Support 
for Bio-Medical Research (2002) CEPR Briefing Paper [Centre for Economic and Policy 
Research, Washington] 2 
549 Data derived from the USA Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings for the 
companies: Pfizer Inc, Johnson & Johnson, Merck & Co. Inc .. Abbott Laboratories, 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, Wyeth, and Eli Lilly and Company. Sectors represent the 
mean expenditures by these companies over a four year period. 
550 In particular Part IV. which implements EU Directive 2001/83/EC which seeks to 
harmonise the advertising of medical products for human use within the European Union. 
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Advertisements (Amendment) Regulations 2000. 551 In addition there are 
several voluntary practice guides to which companies can adhere. These 
include: The British Code of Advertising Practice, Association of the British 
Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) Code of Practice for the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, the Proprietary Association of Great Britain Code of Standards of 
Advertising for Over-the-Counter Medicines (Known as the 'PAGB 
standard'), the Radio Authority Codes, and the Practice Guide of the 
Independent Television Commission. 
As a result of amendments to the Medicines Act 1968 only a limited class 
of medicines can be marketed directly to consumers. However, the 
creation of patient groups to supply pharmaceutical manufacturer's 
information to consumers has been recognised as a valid method of 
circumventing direct-to-consumer restrictions in the UK. The ABPI Code 
of Practice has been updated to reflect this trend. 
In addition to the domestic practice guides there are two further guides 
which are potentially applicable to pharmaceutical advertisers in the UK 
market. These are the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries' 
Associations and the International Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturer's Associations. Both of these bodies have their own codes. 
The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries' Associations' code 
closely follows the regulations of Articles 86-100 of EU Directive 
2001/83/EC including a failure to identify 'essential information.' Each 
551 The Trade Descriptions Act 1968, will be relevant where companies make false claims 
about the products or services. 
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association, including the ABPI, which is a member of the European 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries' Associations, must adhere to the 
associations. Since EU Directive 2001/83/EC has either been 
implemented into the law of member states or is now directly applicable 
the benefits of the European Association is debatable. The European 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries' Associations does however in 
very restricted circumstances permit complaints against members. 
Otherwise complaints against breeches of advertising good practices 
presented in the guides of national associations must be made to those 
associations. The bottom line is that association standards are not well 
policed and appear more as an argument that the UK pharmaceutical 
industry has an ethical code of conduct and that further government 
regulation is not required. 
A survey by the Institute for Evidence-Based Medicine, in Germany, 
evaluated the information presented on 520 pharmaceutical products 
contained in 175 brochures that were distributed amongst forty-three 
General Practitioners. It found that ninety-four per cent of the information 
had no basis in scientific evidence, whilst fifteen per cent of the brochures 
contained no citations. A further twenty-two per cent had citations which 
could not be found. Amongst the remaining sixty-three per cent the 
citation information was for a relevant research article, but the results in 
the research article and the brochure did not correspond. A mere six per 
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cent of entries comprised statements citing relevant supportive scientific 
evidence. 552 
The Medicines Act makes it an offence to issue false or misleading 
advertisements, or to make representations about an unauthorised 
indication. This includes promoting products prior to obtaining a license 
authorising sales of the pharmaceutical. It also requires retailers to make 
the special product characteristics of their medicines to be supplied every 
time they promote a product to any person qualified to prescribe or supply 
the medicine. The ASPI publishes the ASPI Data Sheet Compendium 
every fifteen months, which it distributes to all practicing doctors and 
pharmacies thereby creating constructive notice of the special product 
characteristics or their member's medicines. 
The Medicines (Advertising and Monitoring of Advertising) Amendment 
Regulations 1999 restricts the supply of free samples, the provision of 
training by medical representatives and the distribution of gifts and other 
such incentives. 
Enforcement of these restrictions is through the Control of Misleading 
Advertisements (Amendment) Regulations 2000, which empower the 
MHRA to undertake civil actions against breaches of the regulations, 
including injunctions and damages. Offences under the Medicines Act 
1968 are subject to criminal proceedings, but where the Act and 
552 Tuffs, A., 'Only 6% of drug advertising material is supported by evidence' (2004) 328 
BMJ 485 
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Regulations overlap health care practitioners may appeal to the MHRA to 
undertake civil action. The presence of the criminal proceedings in 
addition to the qualification of the MHRA to bring civil actions may 
constitute a potent deterrent against misleading advertising, but the extent 
to which policing is undertaken is a point of some controversy. Technically 
the promotion of Seroxat and Vioxx in the UK constituted misleading 
information, however no action was taken. 
Moreover, the pharmaceutical industry comprises some of the brightest 
and most creative people of any industry. Even with the threat of onerous 
enforcement there are many potential avenues available to stimulate 
sales. For example, creating the perception of a cure for an illness that 
does not exist553 or exaggerating and transforming normal sexual difficulty 
into the symptoms of treatable affliction.554 Whilst patient groups with their 
websites, news letters and meetings present excellent forums to 
'inadvertently' circumvent promotional restrictions. 
Charities also present a suitable target for the engines of mass marketing. 
By establishing a charity a pharmaceutical company benefits from tax 
deductions from its marketing costs, a target audience who are placed into 
a relationship of trust, and impunity from advertising and promotion 
553 Vedantam, S., 'Drug Ads Hyping Anxiety Make Some Uneasy' (July 16, 2001) 
Washington Post A 1 
554 Loe. M .. The Rise of Viagra: How the little Blue Pill Changed Sex in America [New 
York University Press. 2004. New York] 
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regulations. Moreover, the charity might even receive donations to 
subsidise its surreptitious marketing campaign. 
"Object of the Charity is to promote the study and advancement of 
knowledge about [condition] ... and to improve the health and 
welfare of [condition sufferers] ... ,,555 
Another method of employing the positive image of charities is to utilise 
their name in conjunction with medicines, thus inspiring greater confidence 
in the product.556 
Other groups not readily perceived as creatures of the pharmaceutical 
industry, are think tanks and patient advocacy groups. Pharmaceutical 
companies regularly fund these and, although such groups bear no 
affiliation other than their source of funding with pharmaceurical 
companies, they regularly adopt the pharmaceutical companies' cause. 557 
One such example is the National Patient Advocate Foundation, whose 
sources of funding include Pfizer, Merck and GlaxoSmithKline. 558 
555 This is the form of several Charitable Organisations' charitable purpose statements. 
Of the four registered charities considered most dubious and contacted for information, 
three provided information on different products all of which were produced by the same 
company or its subsidiaries. Moreover, one provided detailed information about the 
performance of a USA drug not yet approved in the UK. 
556 Abelson, R., 'Sales Pitches Tied To Charities Draw States' Scrutiny' (May 3,1999) 
New York Times, A 1 
557 Anonymous, 'USA Today Looks at Prescription Drug Industry's Lobbying Efforts' (28 
April 2005). Medical News Today. Available at: 
<http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/23518.php> (Last Accessed: 16t July 2009) 
558 Drinkard, J. 'Drugmakers go furthest to sway Congress' (April 26,2005) USA Today 
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According to PhRMA a 2008 KRC Research survel59 they commissioned, 
found that sixty-nine per cent of doctors described free drug samples as 
either "always useful" (fifty-two per cent) or "often useful" (seventeen per 
cent).560 The report goes on to state that ninety-five per cent of doctors 
agreed that the provision of samples permitted patients to begin immediate 
treatment. 
Samples constitute an extremely effective method of attaching a patient to 
a therapy that they might not otherwise select. Changing drug therapies 
can have harmful repercussions; in addition to negating improvements in 
the patient's condition, it can aggravate adverse effects. For patients who 
cannot afford the medicine starting them on a sample is a cruel and 
possibly health detrimental course of action. Of course the availability of 
samples may permit a doctor to effectively subsidise a patient's therapy. 
However, in terms of contributing to therapeutic improvements and their 
deadweight incidence on funds available for reinvestment in research and 
development samples present negative indications. 
Another deadweight is promotional gifts: a pad of paper bearing the 
company's trade mark, a pen, umbrella, or weekend in Paris. Gifts can 
559 Source is cited as: "KRC Research, 'Physicians' Opinions About Pharmaceutical and 
Biotech Research Company Activities and Information' n=501, 2008, sponsored by 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America." 
560 PhRMA 'Pharmaceutical marketing in PersPective' (2008) at 6 Available at: 
<http://www.phrma.org/files/Marketing and Promotion Facts_071108_FINAL.pdf> (Last 
Accessed: 15t July 2009) 
278 
take a number of forms from promotional merchandise to outright 
payments.561 None of which contribute positively to the vitality of drug 
development, or reduce the barriers to access that high prices create. 
3.3.8 Well Represented 
Pharmaceutical sales representatives provide doctors with company 
information about new treatment options that is designed to influence 
prescribing habits. In 2000 PhRMA's own data indicated that the USA 
pharmaceutical industry employed nearly twice as many people in sales as 
it did in research; with 87,810 people in sales compared to 48,527 people 
in research. 562 In contrast, and also according to PhRMA, only about 
fourteen per cent of doctors said pharmaceutical representatives have a 
"major impact" on prescribing habits.563 Which suggests that even the 
limited effectiveness of pharmaceutical sales representatives generate 
substantial income. During the period 2003 to 2005 where job 
561 Dyer. G., and Williamson, H., "German Doctors Accused of Taking Bribes," (March 12, 
2002) London Financial Times B3 
562 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America,. Pharmaceutical Industry 
Profile 2001. [Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, 2001, 
Washington, D.C]. The 2001 profile is no longer available online. but the 2008 and 2009 
profiles may be accessed from: <http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/> (Last 
Accessed: 1st July 2009); see Baker, D., and Chatani, N., Promoting Good Ideas on 
Drugs: Are Patents the Best Way? The Relative Efficiency of Patent and Public Support 
for Bio-Medical Research (2002) CEPR Briefing Paper [Centre for Economic and Policy 
Research. Washington] 9 
563 The following report is cited as the source data, but it was unavailable: Boston 
Consulting Group, 2002 BCG Proprietary Physician Survey, n=399, 2002; See PhRMA 
'Pharmaceutical marketing in PersPective' (2008) at 4 Available at 
<http://www.phrma.org/files/Marketing and Promotion Facts_0711 08_FINAL.pdf> (Last 
Accessed: 18t July 2009) 
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advertisements for pharmaceutical sales representatives were placed in 
the UK, listed salaries ranged from £24,000 GBP to £68,000 GBP with a 
median of £41,000 GBP. In terms of salaries alone, the employment of so 
many pharmaceutical representatives constitutes a large expenditure. 
Moreover, the methodology of pharmaceutical representatives requires 
further capital. 
Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives build relationships with doctors 
through a number of strategies, which include calling on doctors at their 
workplaces and the organisation of Speaker Meetings. Speaker meetings 
might include one or several doctors and will usually involve a presentation 
by an invited doctor or by the pharmaceutical sales representative. In 
some cases these may involve seminars at resorts, with additional 
incentives for those who attend.564 
During an informal discussion (2003) a pharmaceutical representative 
explained 
"We're instructed to keep profiles on our doctors so that we can 
report what data interests them the most. It makes meetings more 
productive for both of us ... I don't go on about stuff that doesn't 
interest them and they get to hear about cool new introductions that 
they need to prescribe." 
564 luger. A.. 'Fever Pitch: Getting Doctors To Prescribe Is Big Business' (January 11. 
1999) New York Times A1 
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She also revealed that it was useful to find out as early as possible what 
the doctor's hobbies and interests were, so that relevant promotional items 
could be left at the meeting. Or so she could take them to a restaurant 
that they liked, which "could be a great ice-breaker."s6s 
3.3.9. Keeping Abnormal Profits 
..... it has become too obvious to most writers that the size of the 
monopoly profits earned under the protection of patents is not at all 
correlated with the efforts, capital funds, or sacrifices invested in the 
innovative work."566 
Any profit greater than that which is just sufficient to ensure that a supplier 
will continue to supply its existing product is conventionally labelled excess 
profit or abnormal profit. The pricing of a patented pharmaceutical that 
satisfies a strong demand for a therapy will always generate higher than 
normal profit. However, the high pricing will not always result in a 
sufficient imbalance between market supply and demand that other 
suppliers enter the market, because of the technical burdens the presence 
of a patent places on would be market entrants.S67 In wealthy 
565 Pharmaceutical Sales Representative interview, London (December 2003) 
566 Machlup, F., An Economic Review of the Patent System: Study of the Subcommittee 
on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Committee of the judiciary (1958) US 
Senate, 85th Congress, 2nd SeSSion, Study Number 15, Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, at 29-30 
567 However for patented pharmaceuticals in very poor therapeutic markets, having a 
pharmaceutical patent may not result in more than normal profit. This is a particular 
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economies, such as the USA, the majority of in-patent pharmaceuticals 
earn abnormal profits, but not all do.568 
Since in the USA the parameters set by insurers distort the prescribing 
habits of doctors, it is unsurprising that companies go further and collect 
data on the individual prescribing habits of doctors.s6g Not only would this 
data reveal the conditions which receive the most prescriptions, but it 
would also reveal the income bracket of a doctor's patients and the degree 
of influence company promotional behaviour had on the doctor. Thereby 
permitting more targeted pricing and adoption of more effective marketing 
policies. Moreover, where a doctor is intractable efforts can be devoted to 
prescribers on whom efforts and expenditure will present the most return. 
Moreover, as monopolists expect far greater returns, i.e. substantially 
above marginal costs they engage in rent seeking behaviour. In the 
context of pharmaceuticals where the alternatives to taking a therapy are 
either serious reduction in quality of life or death, the monopolists and their 
shareholders have for the last four decades expected abnormal profits. 
Which results in their monopoly increasing the deadweight in the product 
problem of the pharmaceutical patent in directing research efforts into less lucrative but 
important therapeutic areas such as neglected diseases. 
568 From a sampling of 4914 patented pharmaceutical products in the USA, Roberts 
identified that more than 95 percent of those products returned abnormal profits from 
sales in any year that they were marketed and in patent. Roberts, P., 'Product 
Innovation, Product-Market Competition, and persistent profitability in the US 
Pharmaceutical Industry' (1999) 20 Strategic Management Journa/655-670, 660 
569 Stolberg, S., Gerth, J., 'High-Tech Stealth Being Used To Sway Doctor' (November 16, 
2000) New York Times A1 
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or method of production, that they monopolise, to a greater extent than 
other awards of privilege that permit competition. Although patents are the 
most important tool for controlling a pharmaceutical market, there are 
other instruments to be exploited in synergy. 
Evidently, once a monopoly is established and if it is a successful 
monopoly, i.e. the profits are above normal, then there is reason to 
maintain the monopoly at all costs. Thus, resources are channelled into 
strengthening the existent monopoly, and preventing potential competitors 
from entering the market. This includes preventing the introduction of new 
technologies before the monopoly of the old technology is extinguished. In 
Pharmaceutical Patent Life Cycles,570 some of the methods of extending 
the patent monopoly, For example Orphan Status, and erecting other 
barriers to market entry, such as data exclusivity, were described. So far 
though the most politically significant factor in the expenditure that ought to 
be destined for improving availability and access of medicines and 
vaccines has been ignored. 
Through lobbying and support of political entities the political system is 
distorted, as the donor may withhold the future promise of assistance if 
their desires are not approached. When a powerful industry collective is 
making the donations, during the elections is just one pOint of opportunity. 
the donated funds can have significant impact for the receiving party. In 
the 2004 USA presidential election the Bush campaign received a 
570 Section 1.5. Pharmaceutical Patent Life Cycles 
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$516,000 USD571 boost to their campaign funds from Big Pharma.572 With 
the USA congress firmly in Democratic hands in the present election 
funding has favoured the Democratic candidates. Whilst the Republican 
candidate McCain received $44,000 USD from Big Pharma, the 
Democratic candidates Obama and Clinton received $181,000 USD and 
$174,000 USD respectively from Big Pharma.573 Although only a small 
fraction of squandered resources it is enough money to equip, train and 
pay many well educated researches. Moreover, considering that in 2003 
there were 1,274574 registered lobbyists hired by pharmaceutical 
571 Although there seems to be great discrepancy in what was contributed. Mathiason, 
N., Big Pharma puts block on cheap drug imports (3 August 2003) Guardian. co. uk / The 
Observer. Available at: 
<http://www.guardian.co. uklbusiness/2003/aug/03/aids. theobserver> (Last Accessed: 1 sl 
July 2009) 
Suggests Big Pharma contributed $14 million USD to Bush's Presidential election 
campaign; Anonymous, 'USA Today Looks at Prescription Drug Industry's Lobbying 
Efforts' (28 April 2005). Medical News Today. Available at: 
<http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/23518.php> (Last Accessed: 151 July 2009) 
USA Today, courtesy of Medical News Today suggest that during the 2004 USA 
presidential elections the pharmaceutical industry donated "at least $17 million [USD] to 
federal candidates, including $1 million [USD] to President Bush. 
572 Smith, A., Big Pharma opens wallet to Dems (7 March 2008) CNNMoney.com. 
Available at: 
<http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/04/news/companies/pharma_votes/index.htm> (Last 
Accessed: 181 July 2009) 
573 Smith, A., 'Big Pharma opens wallet to Dems' (7 March 2008) CNNMoney.com. 
Available at: 
<http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/04/news/companies/pharma_votes/index.htm> (Last 
Accessed: 18\ July 2009) 
574 Anonymous, 'USA Today Looks at Prescription Drug Industry's Lobbying Efforts' (28 
April 2005). Medical News Today. Available at: 
<http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/23518.php> (Last Accessed: 1-' July 2009) 
But see Mathiason, N., 'Big Pharma puts block on cheap drug imports' (3 August 2003) 
Guardian. co. uk / The Observer. Available at: 
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companies on Capitol Hill, redirection of funds from distortion of the 
political system could pay for substantially more researchers. 
Pharmaceutical lobbyist salaries vary, but the most prominent usually have 
annual salaries in millions of USD. In 2010 Billy Tauzin earned 11.6 
million USD as the head of PhRMA.575 
Lobbying has yielded favourable outcomes for the pharmaceutical industry 
in the USA. These have recently included expansion of Medicare 
coverage to prescription pharmaceuticals, the blocking of government 
price discount negotiations, quickened FDA drug approval, and 
maintenance of the barriers against exhaustion through the ban on the 
import of low price prescription medicines from Canada.576 
3.3.10 Great Hole 
As of the January 1, 2006, Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003 expanded the very restrictive funding options 
for prescription medicines available in the original Medicare. A Part 0, the 
prescription drug benefit, was introduced, which for a monthly premium 
<http://www.guardian.co.uklbusiness/2003/aug/03/aids.theobserver> (Last Accessed: 151 
July 2009) Claims 625 pharmaceutical lobbyists using the present tense, id est 2002 or 
2003. 
575 Wayne, A., and Armstrong, D., 'Tauzin's $11.6 Million Made Him Highest-Paid Health-
Law Lobbyist,' 29th September 2011. Bloomberg. Available from: 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-29/tauzin-s-11-6-million-made-him-highest-
paid-health-Iaw-Iobbyist.html> (Last Accessed: 5th December 2011) 
576 Drinkard, J. 'Drugmakers go furthest to sway Congress' (April 26, 2005) USA Today; 
Medical News Today - unattributed text 'USA Today Looks at Prescription Drug 
Industry's Lobbying Efforts' (28 April 2005) Medical News Today. Available at: 
<http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/23518.php> (Last Accessed: 151 July 2009) 
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provides fairly comprehensive pharmaceutical coverage. The positive 
benefits to subscribers of receiving assistance to some prescription drugs 
is also of financial benefit to pharmaceutical companies who have thereby 
gained customers. However, when Part 0 was passed through congress 
there was apparently a failure to estimate how much the plan would really 
cost, although price inflation by pharmaceutical companies supplying 
medicare drugs,577 and the presence of pharmacy benefit managers might 
also a significant factor in the estimation flaws. As a result there is a large 
deficit in the available finances, which has resulted in a phenomenon 
known as the 'doughnut hole'. Medicare subscribers are able to gain 
assistance with seventy-five per cent of prescription medicine costs up to 
$2,700 USD in yearly prescription costs. However, once they pass this 
amount they are responsible for all their costs until they exceed $6,100 
USD. Over $6,100 USD they receive assistance once again with ninety-
five per cent of the cost of prescription medicines.578 Part D premiums 
vary with the plan579 and are based on regional medical costs and range 
from $1.87 USD to $17.91 USD per month.58o 
577 Families USA, 'Medicare Legislation Will Be A Deep Disappointment for America's 
Seniors' (Nov. 25, 2003). Available at: 
<http://www.familiesusa.org/resources/newsroom/statements12003-statements/press-
statement-medicare-Iegislation-will-be-a-deep-disappointment.html>; see 'overcharging' 
at 1095, Austin, G. E., and Burnett, R. 'An Innovative Proposal for the Health Care 
Financing System of the United States' (2003) 11 (5) Pediatrics 1093-1097 
578 Medicare - Official U.S. Government Site for People with Medicare. Available at: 
<http://www.medicare.gov/pdp-things-to-consider.asp> (Last Accessed: 1&t July 2009) 
579 Medicare - Official U.S. Government Site for People with Medicare. Available at: 
<http://www.medicare.gov/pdp-things-to-consider.asp> (Last Accessed: 1&t July 2009) 
560 http://www.seniorark.com/medicare/MedicarePartD2009Guidelines.htm. However, 
case comments on the internet suggest that some people's premiums are much higher. 
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In 2007, Federal Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services estimated that 
over eight million, thirty-two per cent of the twenty-six million, Part D 
subscribers reached the coverage gap.581 
However, the positive effect of the Medicare Part 0 fro pharmaceutical 
companies is the new pool of buyers that has been created. Many of 
those utilising medicare would have purchased some medicines without 
the scheme, but there are also users who would have not. Moreover, 
users crossing the coverage gap are more likely to purchase all of the 
drugs under the coverage plan that their doctor has suggested to treat 
their conditions, which too has increased sales.582 
"The ten largest pharmaceutical companies enjoyed substantial 
profit increases in the first six months of the new Medicare drug 
As a result these figures need verification from an authorative source. Unfortunately 
Medicare do not provide data directly 
581 Medicare Coverage Database. Available at: 
<http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MCD/overview.asp> (Last Accessed: 1't July 2009) 
582 "Three factors account for the Medicare drug program's impact on profits: increased 
demand for popular drugs; the inability of the drug plans to obtain discounts from drug 
manufacturers; and the ability of the drug manufacturers to increase prices significantly 
for drugs used by over six million dual-eligible beneficiaries." Committee on Government 
Reform, House of Representatives, 'Analysis Pharmaceutical Industry Profits Increase by 
Over $8 Billion After Medicare Drug Plan Goes Into Effect' (September 2006) at 4. 
Available at: <http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20060919115623-70677 .pdf> (Last 
Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
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program. In the first half of 2006, profits for these companies 
increased by over $8 billion, a 27% increase.,,583 
3.3.11. Hired Help Or Insiders 
One of the reasons for the success of pharmaceutical lobbying and the 
reluctance in the USA to implement price control schemes might result 
from the frequency with which the highest echelons of USA government 
have personal interests in the pharmaceutical industry.584 
Consider Gilead Sciences, in November 2005 government notables with 
an interest in Gilead included USA Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
(board member and former chairman of Gilead Sciences), former USA 
Secretary of State and Bush campaign advisor George Schultz (board 
member), Vice-Chairman of Suez-Tractebel and Honorary Chairman of 
Bilderberg Etienne Davignon, and Defense Business Board and corporate 
advisory council to the USA Department of Defence John W Madigan.585 
Gilead Sciences is notable in 2005, and indeed still is, because of the 
583 Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, 'Analysis 
Pharmaceutical Industry Profits Increase by Over $8 Billion After Medicare Drug Plan 
Goes Into Effect' (September 2006) at 2. Available at: 
<hUp:/Ioversight.house.gov/documents/20060919115623-70677 .pdf> (Last Accessed: 1 st 
July 2009) 
584 Although the distinction between lobbyist and congressman is not particularly clear. 
Bykowicz, J., 'Gingrich Firm Top Clients Got to Attend Signing of Favored Bill,' (26th 
January 2012) Bloomberg. Available at: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-
26/gingrich-company-helped-clients-attend-bill-signing-of-favored-Iegislation.html> (Last 
Accessed: 29th February 2012) 
585 GRAIN, 'Fowl play: The poultry industry's central role in the bird flu crisis' Briefing 
Document (2006) at 15. Available at: <http://www.grain.org/briefings_files/birdflu2006-
en.pdf> (Last Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
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potential for an influenza pandemic and Gilead's ownership of the patent 
for Tamiflu.586 As an antiviral useful in the prophylaxis of both 
influenzavirus type A and B infections, Tamiflu is one of several drugs that 
may be useful in reducing the loss of life in an influenza pandemic. Prior 
to 2005 the market for Tamiflu was small however following the wake of 
concerns over a flu pandemic by the WHO, USA President Bush 
announced measures to counter incursions of the pandemic into the USA. 
These included a fund of $1.4 billion USD to purchase Tamiflu.587 
In 2005 sales of Tamiflu rose by four hundred per cent and Gilead's royalty 
earnings from the patent grew by 166 per cent. Rumsfeld in that period 
owned $5 million USD to $25 million USD of Gilead equity.s88 
In the UK the situation is startlingly similar with many instances of 
donations that are shortly followed by government contracts or 
government investment initiatives. The pharmaceutical company 
PowderJect founded by Paul Drayson - later to became Lord Drayson (six 
weeks before donating £500,000 to Labour) - received a £32 million 
586 Oseltamivir phosphate 
587 GRAIN, 'Fowl play: The poultry industry's central role in the bird flu crisis' Briefing 
Document (2006) at 15. Available at: <http://www.grain.org/briefings_files/birdflu2006-
en.pdf> (Last Accessed: 1s1 July 2009) 
588 GRAIN, 'Fowl play: The poultry industry's central role in the bird flu crisis' Briefing 
Document (2006) at 15. Available at: <http://www.grain.org/briefings_files/birdflu2006-
en.pdf> (Last Accessed: 1s1 July 2009) 
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government contract to supply smallpox vaccine, shortly after Mr. Drayson 
donated £50,000 to Labour. s89 
3.4. Burden on Innovators 
Pharmaceutical research and the bundled industry costs of developing and 
retailing medicines are substantial. Funding can come from a diversity of 
sources, but for private pharmaceutical companies there is a shareholder 
expectation that the company will strive to enhance shareholder value 
(3.4.1 - 3.4.2). With the pharmaceutical giants adopting the 1990's 
investigation paradigm of big mining companies - by letting entrepreneurial 
small companies handle early stage exploration and the risk of not making 
a valuable find - investment losses in identifying important molecules to 
develop should have been reduced (3.4.3). Nevertheless, the cost of 
medicines has continued to rise. 59o With the large pharmaceutical 
companies, demonstrating growth to shareholders is a problem. The only 
pharmaceuticals that are capable of generating noticeable revenue 
increases are blockbusters. Investing in anything less, regardless of the 
therapeutic advance it conveys, is economically unviable, or requires 
589 Sparrow, A., Tycoon gave £O.Sm to Labour after receiving peerage (24 August 2004) 
Telegraph.co.uk. Available at: 
<http://www.telegraph.co. uklnews/uknews/14 70152ITycoon-gave-andpoundO. 5m-to-
Labour-after-receiving-peerage.html> (Last Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
590 "[usual and customary] price index for our first basket of 100 commonly used 
prescription drugs increased at an average annual rate of 6.6 percent from 2006 through 
the first quarter of 2010" GAO-11-306R Prescription Drug Price Trends Available at: 
<http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/97284.pdf> (Last Accessed: 1 st November 2011) 
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investment in a subsidiary. With the development and market regulation 
expertise firmly in the hands of large pharmaceutical companies, smaller 
biotech firms without affiliation are unlikely to successfully bring a product 
to market and maintain an exclusive market presence through their patent. 
3.4.1. Must Profit 
Consider Pfizer. Pfizer is an enormous company, with revenue of $52 
billion USD. To make a positive difference to its revenue a drug needs to 
annually generate revenues in the range of $1 billion to $2 billion USD. 
For most companies the addition to the company's base line of a $400 
million USD per annum product, at an 80 percent profit margin, is very 
welcome indeed. For Pfizer, it does not even touch the performance 
indicators. 
In 2005 Pfizer had very good revenues, but overall its earnings fell by 
28.8%. In 2006, through layoffs and the sale of its consumer-products 
division to Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer managed to post a 139% increase 
in earnings. Whilst layoffs and sale of its consumer-products division 
provided a one off regeneration of Pfizer, this was simply a stopgap and 
streamlining measure. In the long run Pfizer needs new blockbusters to 
restore its vitality. 
A paucity of major drugs in a company's property portfolio, or viable NCEs 
in its development pipeline, is a serious problem to a big pharmaceutical 
company's health. By the end of 2008, Pfizer will have weathered four 
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years of patent protection losses on medicines591 that have major revenue 
significance: that is an annual sales loss of $14 billion USD. The 
independent market analysts Datamonitor estimate that by 2016 the 
annual sales loss for pharmaceutical companies as a result of expiring 
patents will be $140 billion USD.592 
Considering the significance of blockbuster drugs to the pharmaceutical 
giants' earnings, and the difficulty of realising a blockbuster medicine, it is 
unsurprising that so many companies have so much riding on a handful of 
potential pharmaceuticals.593 The attitude that blockbusters are to be 
sought or created in priority has several detrimental effects, as will be 
highlighted. For the research scientist, generation of a future product line 
that has blockbuster potential is an important requisite of good career and 
financial prospects. Thus, as innovation is seen to dwindle and 
shareholders become furious at pharmaceutical giants for not making the 
dramatic gains in earnings that the shareholders have come to expect,594 a 
new trend has emerged in shareholder soothing. Pharmaceutical 
companies have started to reveal their future hand, by detailing the 
revenue potential of pharmaceuticals in their development pipeline. 
591 Expired patents include the anti-depressant Zoloft; the blood pressure pill, Norvasc; 
and the antibiotic Zithromax. 
592 Patents Shine, but Don't Be Blinded by Them. May 18, 2007. Available from: 
< http://www.fool.com/investing/h igh-g rowth/2007/05/18/patents-sh ine-but -d~nt -be-
blinded-by-them.aspx> (Last Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
593 Simons, J., CNN Money.com Dec 2006. Available from: 
<4http://money.cnn.com/2006/12/04/news/companies/pluggedin _simons_pfizer. fortune/in 
dex.htm?source=yahoo_quote> (Last Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
594 Fortune 500 Snapshots. Available from: 
< http://money . cn n . com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/snapshots/> 
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For example in December 2006, simply the disclosure by the Swiss 
pharmaceutical company Actelion Ltd of its potential new tissue-targeting 
dual endothelin receptor antagonist, Actelion-1 , 595 raised Actelion's shares 
by 1.4% in a much lower Swiss market.596 At the time Actelion-1 was only 
in Phase II trials597 and thus hardly a strong indicator that it would reach 
the market, let alone realise the performance of Actelion's flagship drug 
Tracleer. Nevertheless, investors will often count preclinical compounds 
as "in the pipeline." Unfortunately, when the blockbusters do not appear 
share futures can suffer, that is unless they receive further soothing. 
The impact of this situation on the scientist is significant. The scientist 
must ensure, that future blockbuster drugs reach the market by passing 
smoothly through regulatory approval. To an industry outsider this might 
be considered unethical, however the pharmaceutical industry is self-
regulating and the pressure to maintain sales and product lines is 
immense. The 'ought' does not cost the company billions, whereas the 
shareholders and market might. The pressure that the pharmaceutical 
595 The Actelion Annual Report 2006. Available from: 
<http://annualreport06.actelion.com/home/cornerstones/clinical-developement.html> 
596 Drug Pipeline and Pharmaceutical Market Data, Sunday, December 10, 2006. 
Available from: <http://chartsbank.blogspot.com/2006/12/actelion-about-to-disclose-
new.html> (Last Accessed: 1&t July 2009) 
597 Pre-clinical compounds are considered to be in the pipeline by some pharmaceutical 
investors. Patents Shine, but Don't Be Blinded by Them. May 18, 2007. Available from: 
<http://www.fool.com/investing/h igh-g rowth/2007/05/18/patents-sh ine-but -dont -be-
blinded-by-them.aspx> (Last Accessed: 1 &t July 2009) 
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company experiences is translated to the patent specialists. technology 
consultancy firms and the research scientists. 
3.4.2. Must Delay 
With the decline of the pharmaceutical industry from its position as the 
most profitable industry and the move of investment portfolios to mining 
and crude-oil production. the research scientist is under greater pressure 
than ever before to produce a portfolio of drugs that are potentially strong 
earners and are clearly seen to be so. Already research spending had 
been focused on products which carried blockbuster potential regardless 
of their added therapeutic value598 • ceteris paribus this trend will be 
strengthened in the coming years. 
"Patent laws ... , in effect,,, do not. .. appreciably stimulate inventive 
activity .... but they do direct it into channels of general 
usefulness. ,,599 
As far as therapeutic value is neglected where it does not coincide with 
blockbuster creation, or the market for a pharmaceutical is discounted 
because it does not meet profitability criteria, then the pharmaceutical 
patent cannot be considered as channelling inventive activity into general 
usefulness. where usefulness is therapeutic advance. 
598 Hollis A. An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation. 2005. 1. 
Available at: <http://econ.ucalgary.ca/fac-files/ah/drugprizes.pdf> (Last Accessed: 1 sl July 
2009) 
599 Pigou. A. The Economics of Welfare [Macmillan. 1924, 2nd Ed .• London]; Menell (1999) 
p.132 
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Other than the difficulty in identifying a chemical with blockbuster potential, 
is the difficulty in finding one that it is safe to market. One way to achieve 
profit from an invention monopoly is to ensure that there is little or no 
product competition, thus by obstructing or stifling the innovation of 
medicines targeting the same or similar conditions, or by delaying 
disclosure of the monopolist's own improvements. Pharmaceutical 
companies spend considerable amounts of money and employ large 
teams of patent specialists and technology consultancy firms in order to 
close all access to their monopoly, plan for its life cycle maximisation, and 
if possible to prevent any market entry. For example more than twenty per 
cent of human genes are already patented and some of these genes are 
patented more than twenty times.6oo As a result other pharmaceutical 
firms, particularly if they are producing 'me-too' medicines, also employ 
large teams of patent specialists and technology consultancy firms. 
The patenting of chemicals of the same family, similar transport vehicles, 
the methods or administration and preparation creates a strong barrier to 
market entry and a formidable obstacle to potential competitors seeking to 
invent around the patent. Such a barrier is sometimes referred to as a 
'patent thicket.' 
"These 'patent thickets' ... basically inflate the transactions costs of 
developing a new innovation, and are, therefore, likely to inhibit the 
600 Jensen, K., and Murray, F., 'Intellectual property. Enhanced: intellectual property 
landscape of the human genome' (2005) 310 Science 239-40 
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rate of development of new ideas or the good601 and services that 
come from them.,,602 
They can be a bar to research because of the unavailability of a licences 
or because acquisition of a licence is prohibitively expensive.603 In some 
cases patent thickets have also discouraged researches and slowed 
research and development because of the complexities of dealing with 
large numbers of patents.604 Constant review of immense and rapidly 
growing patent databases also requires resources.605 This type of work is 
often out sourced to patent agents and technology consultancy firms. The 
technology consultancy firms produce a report, usually containing copies 
of prior art documents or claims that they consider the most relevent. 
These are then studied and reported on by the patent agent. 
Thoroughness in this type of work is extremely important and displacing 
601 Typically the phrase is 'goods and services,' although in this instance 'good' would 
also make sense in a welfare, quantative inovation sense; id est more inovation is better, 
that extra innovation conveys added benefit. However, we question whether a 
typographical error was made here. 
602 Geroski, P. A., Intellectual Property Rights, Competition Policy and Innovation: Is 
There a Problem? (2005) 2:4 SCRIPT-ed 422-428 at 424-425. Available at: 
<http://www.law.ed.ac.uklahrc/script-ed/voI2-4/geroskLpdf> (Last Accessed: 1st July 
2009) 
603 Wadman, M., 'Licensing fees slow advance of stem cells' (18 May 2005) Nature. E-
pub. Available: <http://www.nature.com/news/200S/0S0516/pf/435272a_pf.html> (Last 
Accessed: 181 July 2009) 
604 Eisenberg, R., 'Expanding the boundaries of intellectual property: Innovation policy for 
the knowledge society.' In Dreyfuss, R. C. (eds.) Bargaining over the transfer of 
proprietary research tools: Is this market failing or emerging? [Oxford University Press: 
2001, 15t Ed., Oxford] 223-250 
605 Simmons, E., S. 'Prior art searching in the preparation of pharmaceutical patent 
applications' (1998) 3 (2) DRUG DISCOV TODAY 52-60 
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the liability for searchers is an important factor in the outsourcing. A 
patent thicket can create considerable difficulties for would be competitors 
searching for unenclosed avenues and it can require considerable time 
and effort by specialist searchers and scientists to identify if all approaches 
have been sealed off. 
3.4.3. Outsourcing Invention 
It has been claimed that the pharmaceutical patent favours small firms 
against the economic strength of larger companies. Such a statement if it 
holds any validity is based on a theoretical model whereby the small 
company is perfectly placed, i.e. financially,606 technically, and legally. In 
practice, small firms (which are not subsidiaries of larger pharmaceutical 
companies) innovating in the area of pharmaceuticals are usually spin-off 
companies from university and public research institutions and are very 
dependent on the university for the provision of expertise and resources in 
obtaining a patent.6D7 Therefore, the university's Technology Transfer 
Office is significant in assisting the spin-off company obtaining a patent, 
and is also key in determining strategy, such as licensing a product at as 
606 u ••• what the inventor receives from our patent system is not so much a monopoly in the 
working of his invention as a licence to compel his competitors to join him in spending 
large sums in litigation." Blanco White (1974,9-10). 'Low cost' patent infringement cases 
can cost millions in litigation, whilst 'high cost' patent infringement cases can cost 
substantially more. See, CJA Consultants Ltd, Patent Litigation Insurance - A Study for 
the European Commission on the feasibility of possible insurance schemes against 
patent litigation risks [CJA Consultants Ltd, 2006, London] 13, 36. 
607 Macho-Stadlera, I.,perez-Castrilloa, D., Veugelers. R., 'Licensing of university 
inventions: The role of a technology transfer office,' (2007) 25(3) International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 483-510 
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early a stage as possible.6oB The principal reasons for early licensing of 
patents on potential pharmaceuticals are connected with resources either 
for in vitro testing models, development, or simply because if the invention 
has good remunerative prospects the patent will be circumvented, 
revoked, or infringed by a company with deeper pockets and greater legal 
expertise. Where pharmaceutical patents are obtained by spin-off 
companies the patents with potential tend either to be assigned or become 
the subject of a cooperative agreement with a large pharmaceutical 
company or a large pharmaceutical companies subsidiary. It is estimated 
that there are 3,000 biotechnology companies worldwide. but that only 100 
of them have products with market approval. 
Up until 2008 patent aSSignments from spin-off companies and small 
biotechs were usually with larger pharmaceutical companies, who would 
then conduct clinical trials, secure further patents, and if viable bring a 
product to market. Despite the increasing visibility of small biotechs, there 
are no new pharmaceutical companies on the scale of the old research 
and manufacturing giants such as Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, 
Abbott Laboratories, Eli Lilly, Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Amgen. Small 
companies such as the university spin-off biotech companies, lack the 
resources, legal knowledge and regulatory savvy of the large 
608 Concerning univerSity intellectual property commercialisation see Siegel. D .. 
Veugelers. R.. Wright. M .. 'Technology transfer offices and commercialization of 
university intellectual property: performance and policy implications,' (2007) 23(4) Oxt 
Rev Econ Policy 640-660; For an outline of the important factors in University Technology 
Transfer Office licensing ot patents see Haour. G., Mieville. L .. From Science to Business 
[Palgrave Macmillan. 2010. 1 st Ed .. New York] 62-65. 68-69. 95-97. 
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pharmaceutical companies. In order for them to grow they either have 
form partnerships with experienced pharmaceutical developers or to 
aggregate609 and aggregation requires partners who can strengthen and 
complement a company's expertise. Such partners because of those very 
properties are likely to have been acquired or even set up as subsidiaries 
of larger companies. For example the Belgium biotech company 
Galapagos was registered in 1999 from a joining of the Dutch 
biotechnology company Crucell N.V., which is a subsidiary of Johnson & 
Johnson, and Tibotec, which is a spin-off company from the Rega Institute 
for Medical Research, Leuven University. 
Since 2008 there has been a growth of pharmaceutical companies who 
specialise in developing products for markets or, in the USA since 1998, in 
providing manufacturing facilities for biotechs.61o Other companies have 
speculated in buying patents from biotech research companies and trying 
to license them to larger research and manufacturing companies, but this 
has not been successful and only the subsidiaries of Hoffmann-La Roche, 
Johnson and Johnson or Eli Lilly endured into 2010. In terms of future 
trends there is a balance between profit and risk that will in some areas of 
609 Champsi, F.H., 'Biotechnology mergers and acquisitions,' (2003) Bioentrepreneur. 
Available at: < http://www.nature.com/bioenU2003/030101/full/nbt0598supp_61.html> 
(Last Accessed August 2011) 
610 The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act, enacted in November 1997, 
amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act relating to the regulation of food, 
drugs, devices, and biological products. The legislation replaced establishment licenses 
and product licenses with a biological license. Which made manufacturing outsourcing 
possible, as manufacturing premises no longer had to be a participant in the ownership of 
the product. 
299 
pharmaceutical development inhibit the patent acquisition by middleman 
patent trading companies. Indeed, private equity investors are 
increasingly concentrating on divesting the research functions of large 
pharmaceutical companies, so the companies can be run "more 
efficiently.,,611 The early signs of which are already visible.612 Where 
research institutions and affiliated companies produce multiple patents 
with market potential, the larger market dominant pharmaceutical 
companies reposition themselves to have closer ties to that new 
generation pharmaceutical innovator.613 This relationship may be in the 
form of sponsorship, research expertise, or equipment. Eli Lilly who are 
the current market leaders in establishing close connections with university 
biotech research facilities offer two principle advantages in return for 
patent rights: These are use of their in vitro model systems and their 
sophisticated phenotypic screening systems. Since Eli Lilly conducts 
assays of molecules submitted by members of its research network614 for 
free it provides researches to more readily identify the in vitro traits of their 
molecules an Eli Lilly to assay a much larger variety of molecules than its 
611 Available at: 
http://www.pmlive.com/pharm_markeUearlier _news .cfm?showArticle= 1 &Artidel D=5924 
(Last Accessed September 2007) 
612 Eli Lily from June 2011 has operated a research and development program, known as 
the Open Innovation Drug Discovery Platform, with leading pharmaceutical research 
universities across Europe. 
613 e.g. in September 2011 an Open Innovation Drug Discovery agreement was made 
between Lilly and the University of Valencia. In January 2012 the University of 
Cambridge agreed to an Open Innovation Drug Discovery Platform. As of February 2012 
there are currently over sixty-members in Eli Lilly's Open Innovation Drug Discovery 
Platform. 
614 Open Innovation Drug Discovery Platform, which was formerly called PD2. 
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former research departments could have, as well as permitting Eli Lilly to 
keep constant track of the prolificity and quality of research network 
members. In terms of the extent of assayed molecules under this 
research model one is reminded of the Eighteenth Century German dye 
industry. Outsourced pharmaceutical innovation appears to be the 
paradigm for the next period of pharmaceutical innovation. With the 
potential for greater numbers of molecules to be assayed this had good 
ramifications for availability. However, as the cost of patented 
pharmaceuticals continues to rise there is no indication whatsoever that 
reducing the investment risks in finding NCEs has improved the 
accessibility of medicines. 
3.5. Duplicated Resource Expenditure 
In theory patent databases can be exploited to create and develop further 
inventions, thereby greatly reducing the duplication of effort. However, 
because of the necessity of continuous review, the patent system in effect 
channels funds into the policing of patent databases. 
"Critics imply that it would be better if only one company raced for 
each target. But if that were so, wouldn't they be likely to slow 
down? Even if that weren't the case, you have a big problem, which 
is that not all drugs clear the regulatory burden. If ten companies 
set out to target, say, serotonin reuptake inhibition, some of their 
drugs will prove toxic or ineffective. If only one company is going 
for it, many categories will end up with no drug, as the candidate in 
that category falls out of the pipeline for one reason or another.,,615 
3.5.1. Sometimes Revealed 
One justification of the patent system is the disclosure incentive function 
statement, which assumes that distribution of knowledge to the community 
concerning the inventive step is preferable to that information remaining 
concealed or requiring others to invest resources in the same discovery. 
In contrast and existing alongside the duties imposed on everyone, but the 
patent holder and licensees, by the patent right are the duties bundled 
within data exclusivity. Data exclusivity follows the same reasoning as 
trade secrets. The functional characteristic of data exclusivity, that is the 
inability of competitors to make use of that information, is akin to the 
modus-operandi of trade-secrets. Theoretically the market power of data 
exclusivity is less restrictive when compared with patents. This is because 
data exclusivity does not legally prohibit other companies from generating 
registration data of their own. In practice however, the large financial 
resources and extended time required for gathering and generating 
pharmaceutical registration data for a new drug create a market barrier 
that is too high for many generic-based companies.616 Moreover, it is a 
615 More on me-toos Economist.com. Available at: 
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2007/04/more _ on _ metoos.cfm> (Last 
Accessed April 2007) 
616 Pugatch, M.-P., Intellectual property and pharmaceutical data exclusivity in the 
context of innovation and market access, ICTSD-UNCTAD - Dialogue on Ensuring Policy 
Options for Affordable Access to Essential Medicines Bellagio (2004). Available at: 
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grotesque waste of resources and prevents the thorough screening and 
examination of clinical testing results that would occur if the data was 
retrievable or publicly disclosed. 
Since the Jacquard loom, digital media and data retrieval systems have 
become increasingly capacious, more sophisticated, reliable, easier to 
transfer, and cheaper. Consequently, the marginal cost of digitally 
duplicating anything capable of being transmitted via digital media 
converges towards zero. If all research which was conducted was open, 
sharable and attributed, then reduced expenditure on duplicate research, 
greater rapidity in therapeutic improvements, as well as different variants 
of drugs in a category could be identified to suit individual optimisation 
more effectively are expected. 
The research methodology and redaction of findings by industry and 
university pharmaceutical researchers demonstrates a statistically 
significant greater dependence on academic research publications than on 
patent databases. It is not suggested that patent databases are useless to 
the researcher. Indeed for the academic researcher they can provide a 
short cut. For example in the case of a description of a preparation the 
steps of the methodology will usually be placed in the patent claim in a 
nicely enumerated form, rather like a cooking recipe, that can be printed 
off and used in the laboratory. Whereas, in the academic literature the 
methodology will be presented in a form that may require a little work to 
<http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/Pugatch_Bellagio3.pdf> (Last 
Accessed: 1&1 July 2009) 
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produce a printed guide which can be used in the laboratory. Most often 
within the industrial pharmaceutical research environment the patent 
serves as a definition outside of which the objective product must lie, but 
academic publications form the backbone of starting theory and 
inspiration.617 
However, as the system is presently set up, pharmaceutical research 
conducted for the purpose of producing a marketable innovation requires 
the purview of patent databases in addition to academic publications. 
'Only if the invention is one that need never be revealed to the rest 
of the industry in the course of exploiting it does the patent provide 
a clear long-term gain in terms of publicity.'618 
Patent law can permit greater assurance of monopoly than trade secrecy 
and saves the inventor the cost of keeping their invention secret. 
However, it can be expensive to obtain a patent619 and to police it.62o 
Depending on the properties of the invention and its technological context 
protecting a monopoly in an invention may be far more expensive through 
a patent, than through secrecy. 
617 Discussions with industry and university pharmaceutical researchers: 2004, 2005, and 
2006. 
618 Cornish, W., Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, and Allied Rights [Sweet and 
Maxwell, 4th Ed., 3rd Impession, 1999, London] 135 
619 Lemley, M. A. Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office. (2001) 95(4) Northwestern 
University Law Review 21-56 
620 Blanco White, T. A., Patents for Inventions (1974) 9-10 
304 
Patent data bases do not work effectively as knowledge transfer tools. 
"Historically, the information contained in patent databases has not 
been fully exploited, with estimates that up to 30 per cent of 
worldwide research and development projects are merely a 
duplication of existing technology.n621 
3.5.2. Buying Access 
This is an indicia of the patent system's failure or inefficiency as a 
utilitarian construct. Since, theoretically, the cost of reproducing a non-
rivalrous good, once that good has been discovered is zero, then the 
marginal cost of such a good is zero. In practical terms the cost of 
communicating knowledge of the discovery raises the cost. However in 
the case of the patent, not only is there a cost involved in the 
communication of the discovery, the formalities of its publication and in 
assertion of the owner's proprietorship, but there is also a 30 per cent 
further deadweight through duplication.622 
Transfer of information might be considered a secondary function of the 
patent system with respect to the patent system's primary function of 
asserting property claims. However, in a society that considers itself 
Sainsbury Review. The Race to the Top: A Review of Government's Science and 
Innovation Policies. [HMSO October 2007] 6 





technologically progressive communication of existing technology is to 
research and development is both essential for a nations technological 
welfare as well as a nation's economic well being. Thus, even if the patent 
system was to be mistakenly considered to poses only a secondary 
function as setting the state of the art another forum, or training, to 
effectively communicate to research and development projects the state of 
existing technologies is required. If a replacement of the pharmaceutical 
patent can effectively provide a more effective forum for technology 
transfer, then the cost of creating an additional forum or providing the 
necessary training must be considered.623 
As innovation involves the drawing out the concrete implications of new 
things it involves learning. The cost in both time and resources can be 
greatly reduced by the sharing of expertise. Global public goods can 
facilitate access knowledge and the transfer of technology and expertise. 
The Human Genome Project and other open and accessible public 
research projects are increasingly presenting more rapid accumulations of 
information than any private initiatives. 
"It is accepted that health research has been accelerated through 
immediate free access to the sequence of the human genome and 
other related genomic datasets. This success can be seen as part 
623 Let this additional cost or training be W 1P. 
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of a larger shift in public policy towards requiring research data to 
be openly accessible.624 
Moreover, the full implications of an invention are not always immediately 
apparent. 625 Equipping a larger portion of society with the information 
statistically increases the likelihood that society may benefit from the 
discovery of other uses for the information. 
3.6. Safety Concerns 
"No product is 100 per cent safe, because all products have side 
effects. These may be very minor, but they may also be serious ... 
Different people respond to medicines differently. Several factors can 
influence the chances of side effects. These include the prescribed 
dose, the condition being treated, the age and sex of the patient, and 
other treatments which the patient may be taking, including herbal I 
complementary medicines ... 626 
624 Arzberger, P., Schroeder, P., Beaulieu, A., Bowker, G., et al. 'Science and 
government. An international framework to promote access to data' (2004) 303 Science 
1777-1778 
625 Kingston, W., The political economy of innovation [Nijhoff Publishers, 1984, The 
Hague] 22 
626 MHRA, Medicines and Medical Devices Regulation: What You Need to Know (2008) 2. 
Available at: 
<http://www.mhra.gov.uklhome/groups/comms-
ic/documents/websiteresources/con2031677.pdf> (Last Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
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3.6.1. Profit Not Safety 
If the pharmaceutical patent system is really about protecting the 
investment in regulatory approval, then grant of approval is considered as 
the end point. It seems obvious once stated, that the purpose of 
regulatory approval is to ensure as far as is possible, balancing policy 
issues such as resource allocation, that the State is satisfied of the benefit 
the medicine conveys against the risks it poses. Thus, safety is, as it 
ought to be, the end point of the processes leading to regulatory approval. 
Thus, whether or not regulatory approval is obtained is immaterial to the 
end point, i.e. that the product is safe, even if not to the means of attaining 
it. However, this is not the case, as the patent is valid immaterially of its 
safety. Thus, it cannot be claimed that pharmaceutical patent system is 
really about protecting the investment in regulatory approval.527 Lack of 
confidence in regulatory approval, as an indicator of safety, is statistically 
significantly exhibited amongst UK healthcare professionals. 528 
This is illustrated by the low UK confidence in new pharmaceutical 
products compared to Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the USA 
taken together.529 UK spending on new medicines begins lower than in 
the other countries and remains lower throughout the five year period over 
627 Nor does it seem to have ever been. See Blake, J. B. (ed.) Safeguarding the Public: 
Historical Aspects of Medicinal Drug Control [Johns Hopkins University Press. 1970, 
Baltimore] 112-122. 144-157 
628 PICTF, Competitiveness and Performance Indicators 2004.10 
629 PICTF, Competitiveness and Performance Indicators 2004. 10 
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which data was assessed. Typically the newer a pharmaceutical product 
is then the lower its rate of uptake in the UK compared to the comparator 
countries. For example, in 2004, apart from Japan, at 16 per cent, UK 
medicines expenditure on products launched during the previous five 
years was the lowest at 17 per cent. In contrast medicines expenditure on 
products launched during the previous five years in the USA was 27 per 
cent. Moreover, 2004 median per capita use of new medicines, that is 
medicines in their first year after launch, in the UK was 17% of the group 
mean per capita use of medicines in their first year after launch in 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the US taken together.630 
For new medicines in the UK, the rate of uptake relative to the US and 
other EU countries increases as a function of time form the medicines 
launch. However, after three years the UK median rate of uptake of new 
pharmaceuticals is only 39% of the mean international levels. Five years 
from market entry of the new medicine the UK mean uptake rises to only 
54%.631 The cautious uptake of new medicines in the UK is not 
indiscriminate. A minority of medicines are used above the group mean for 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the US.632 
630 PICTF, Competitiveness and Performance Indicators 2004,10 
631 PICTF, Competitiveness and Performance Indicators 2004,10 
632 PICTF, Competitiveness and Performance Indicators 2004, 10 
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Lack of confidence in the safety of new medicines granted regulatory 
approval is reflected outside of trends in the uptake of new 
pharmaceuticals. Increasingly pharmaceutical companies are accused by 
patient groups and healthcare practitioners' representative bodies of hiding 
important contra-indications and data sensitive to the validity of safety 
information. Disclosure of negative information regarding a medicine's 
complete contra indications, and effectiveness is essential to achieving the 
most beneficial employment of those medicines and ought to publicly 
available.633 
In most countries including the UK and USA, pharmaceutical companies 
are able to withhold unfavourable studies and trial results from the public. 
Surprisingly, this is the case even if a medicine is ineffective against the 
targeted condition. Where pharmaceuticals are inspected by regulatory 
authorities, providing an indication to national drug purchase schemes of a 
drug's cost benefit, this situation is less likely to occur unless the submitted 
data was inaccurate or incomplete. However, where a drug gains 
approval for a particular condition, but is then distributed "off-label" to treat 
another condition then there is a possibility that the drug may be 
ineffective and possibly have detrimental health ramifications. 
633 The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act 1997 (USA), that made 
promotion of oft-label uses to physicians legal, provides translation of the ethical ought 
into a should in §401. 
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3.6.2. Whole Truth 
Pharmaceutical companies have often promoted pharmaceuticals to 
physicians for off-label conditions, where the pharmaceutical patent 
owner's tests revealed that the drug did not function statistically 
significantly better than the placebo in treating the proposed off-label 
condition. Recognition of this problem by physicians, whom are often at 
the forefront of legal reprisals for ineffective off-label treatments, and the 
lethargic response of the legislator has lead to some leading medical 
journals, including the New England Journal of Medicine634 and the 
Journal of the American Medical Association,635 refusing to publish the 
results of clinical trials, unless those clinical trials were registered and 
disclosed prior to the study taking place. 
In response the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
(PhRMA) publicised a new clinical database where pharmaceutical trials 
could be registered and their data recorded. It argued that the journal's 
634 See Laine, C., Horton, R, DeAngelis, C., Drazen, J. M .. Frizelle. F. A., Godlee F .. at 
al. 'Clinical Trial Registration - Looking Back and Moving Ahead' (2007) 356 (26) N Engl 
J Med 2734-2736; De Angelis, C., Orazen, J. M., Frizelle, F. A., Haug, C., Hoey, J., 
Horton, R, et al. 'Is This Clinical Trial Fully Registered?' (2005) 352 (23) N Engl J Med 
2436-2438; De Angelis, C., Orazen, J. M., Frizelle, F. A., Haug, C., Hoey, J., Horton, R, 
et al. 'Clinical Trial Registration: A Statement from the International Committee of Medical 
Journal Editors' (2004) 351 (12) N Engl J Med 1250-1251 
635 Current Journal of the American Medical Association Trial Registration policy is 
available at: <http://jama.ama-assn.org/misc/ifora.dtl#TriaIRegistration> (Last Accessed: 
1st July 2009) 
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stance was unnecessary as pharmaceutical companies were already 
voluntarily disclosing their study results. 636 
PhRMA's statement of confidence was almost simultaneously undermined 
as New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer brought an action against 
GlaxoSmithKline pic for "repeated and persistent fraud by concealing and 
failing to disclose to physicians certain information about Paxil [Seroxat in 
the UK] a drug used to treat depression." The action was brought 
following the leak of a confidential GlaxoSmithKline pic memo to the 
press.637 The memo documented a 1998 clinical trial that concluded 
SeroxatlPaxil "failed to demonstrate any separation of SeroxatlPaxil from 
the placebo,,,638 that is Seroxat/Paxil was only as effective as the placebo. 
Independent trials revealed that a statistically significant population of 
adolescents taking serotonin reuptake inhibitors approved by the FDA 
suffered induced adverse effects,639 including a two-to three-fold increased 
636 New bill targets drug data disclosure: Drugmakers criticized for only publicizing 
favorable study results. September 2004. Available from: 
<http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story .aspx?guid=% 7B80E3167D-8965-4AC9-
9FE4-1 EA8D7B05EF2% 7D> (Last Accessed: 1 at July 2009) 
637 McGoey. L.. and Jackson, E, 'Seroxat and the suppression of clinical trial data: 
regulatory failure and the uses of legal ambiguity' (2009) 35 (2) J. Med. Ethics 107-112: 
Kondro. W .• 'Drug company experts advised staff to withhold data about SSRI use in 
children (2004) 170 (5) CMAJ 783 
638 The GlaxoSmithKline pic memo is viewable online at: 
<http://www.ahrp.org/risks/SSRI0204/GSKpaxillpg1.html> (Last Accessed: 11t July 2009) 
639 Preda, A., Maclein, R.. Mazure. C .• Bowers. M. 'Anti-depressant associated mania and 
psychosis resulting in psychiatric admissions' (2001) 62 Journal of Clinical Psychiatry 30-
33; Jain, J. 'Fluoxetine in child and adolescents with mood disorders: a chart review of 
efficacy and adverse reactions' (1992) 2 Journal of Child & Adolescent 
Psychopharmacology 259-265; Riddle. M. A., King. R. A., Hardin. M. T., Scahill, L.. Ort, 
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risk of suicidal behaviour.64o Worldwide SeroxaUPaxil sales reached just 
under $4.97 billion USD in revenue for GlaxoSmithKline pic and its 
subsidiaries in 2003.641 
Despite the positive initiative by the New England Journal of Medicine and 
the Journal of the American Medical Association, which was followed in 
2005 by a ruling of the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors 
requiring trials to be registered prior to participant enrolement as a 
precondition for publication in member journals, adequate pre-registration 
has not been particularly effective. 
In 2009 a particularly damning report on the effectiveness of pre-trial 
registration was published.642 It found that out of a sample of 323 trials, 
only 147 (45.5 per cent) were adequately registered. That is they were 
registered before the end of the trial, with a clear speCification of the 
objective. However of the 147 adequately registered trials 46 (31 per cent) 
S.I., Chappell, P., et a/. 'Behavioral side effects of fluoxetine in children and adolescents' 
(1991) 1 Journal of Child & Adolescent Psychopharmacology 193-198 
640 Sreggin PR. 'Suicidality. violence and mania caused by selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors (SSRls): A review and analysis.' (2003/2004) 16 International Journal of Risk & 
Safety in Medicine 31-49; King. R. A.. Riddle. M. A .. Chappell. P. B .. Hardin. M. T., 
Anderson. G. M .. Lombroso. P .. Scahill, L., 'Emergence of self-destructive phenomena in 
children and adolescents during fluoxetine treatment' 1991 30 Journal of American 
Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 179-186 
641 Kondra, W., 'Drug company experts advised staff to withhold data about SSRI use in 
children (2004) 170 (5) CMAJ 783; Pharmaceutical patents - Paxil sales soar despite 
dispute CHEM IND-LONDON (5): 6-6 MAR 3 2003 
642 Mathieu, S., Soutron, I., Moher, D., Altman, D. G., et al. 'Comparison of Registered 
and Published Primary Outcomes in Randomized Controlled Trials.' (2009) 302(9) JAMA 
977-984 
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showed discrepancies between the outcomes registered and the 
outcomes that were published. Moreover, the significance of the 
discrepancies could only be assessed in 23 of the 46, but within those 23 
discrepancy vitiated adequately registered trials 19 (82.6 per cent) 
favoured statistically significant results. That is they presented an 
exaggerated report of success from the trials. 643 As a point of major 
concern this suggests that less than a third (105 out of 323) of peer 
reviewed clinical trial findings published in medical journals that require 
pre-trial registration actually presented adequate pre-trial reporting. As 
Mathieu et al. only reported with respect to the registration and 
subsequent reporting and did not conduct a detailed analysis of 
experimental modelling for each trial. Therefore, as deliberate falsification 
may have been undertaking elsewhere, fewer of the trial reports may be 
dependable. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of trial pre-registration is greatly 
undermined by the fact that 89 published reports (27.6 per cent) had no 
trial registration whatsoever and 45 trials (13.9 per cent) were registered 
following completion of a study. All of which according to journal 
publication requirements of pre-trial registration should have been refused 
publication. A further 39 (12 per cent) were registered but lacked a 
description of the objective or provided an ambiguous or indecipherable 
description of the objective. 3 (0.9 per cent) of the sample population were 
643 Mathieu, S., Boutron, I., Moher, D., Altman, D. G., et al. 'Comparison of Registered 
and Published Primary Outcomes in Randomized Controlled Trials.' (2009) 302(9) JAMA 
977 -984. At 977 
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both registered after completion of the trial and had an unclear description 
of the objective. 644 
The safety issues concerning a medicine are not as straight forward as 
one might initially imagine. For example demonstrating drug safety in 
high-risk populations is not necessarily sufficient to presume safety in 
apparently less-risky populations.645 Thus, the presentation of clinical 
results can be difficult to interpret for regulatory authorities whom are 
presented with a summary of the information prepared by a self-interested 
party and required to process it within tight time constraints. 
Moreover the accuracy of the data submitted to regulatory authorities and 
to the public is sometimes deliberately misleading. For example, a study 
published in March 2000 indicated that patients taking Vioxx were five 
times more likely to suffer heart attacks than those using the generiC 
medicine Naproxen. Merck's response was to claim that the difference 
resulted from cardioprotective properties of naproxen, rather than a defect 
in Vioxx. However, a Merck memo dated November 21,1996, depicts a 
strategic dilemma faced by Merck.646 The company wanted to 
demonstrate through clinical trials that Vioxx was less likely to cause 
644 See Mathieu,S., Boutron, I., Moher, D., Altman, D. G., et al. 'Comparison of 
Registered and Published Primary Outcomes in Randomized Controlled Trials.' (2009) 
302(9) JAMA 977-984 
645 See Chan, F. K.L., J. Y.L. Ching, L. C.T. Hung, V. W.S. Wong, V. K.S. Leung, N. N.S. 
Kung, et al. Clopidogrel versus Aspirin and Esomeprazole to Prevent Recurrent Ulcer 
Bleeding. (2005) N Engl J Med 352: 238-244. 
646 Mathews, A. W., and Martinez, B. 'E-mails suggest Merck knew Vioxx's dangers at 
early stage' (November 1, 2004) Wall Street Journal (Eastern edition) A 1 
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gastrointestinal problems than older painkillers. However illustrating the 
difference would require Vioxx patients not to take aspirin. Aspirin reduces 
the risk of cardiac events, but can lead to gastrointestinal problems, such 
as ulceration. Thus, the memo dutifully warned that the trial would show 
that "there is a sUbstantial chance that significantly higher rates" of 
cardiovascular problems would be exhibited by the Vioxx group.647 That 
the warning in the memo was not an oracular mistake is reinforced by a 
Merck internal e-mail of February 25,1997, by Briggs Morrison informing 
senior research staff that if patients in the Vioxx group did not also receive 
aspirin then "you will get more thrombotic events and kill [the] drug."s48 In 
an e-mail Alise Reicin, soon to become Merck vice president for clinical 
research, proposed that people with high cardiovascular risk be excluded 
from the Vioxx population for the study so that the difference in the rate of 
cardiovascular problems between the Vioxx sample group and the other 
test groups would not be evident. 649 
There is a statistically significant increase in the positive outcomes of 
clinical trials, when the trials are conducted by the corporation owning the 
rights to the pharmaceutical being trialed.65o Independent research 
647 Mathews, A. W., and Martinez, B. 'E-mails suggest Merck knew Vioxx's dangers at 
early stage' (November 1, 2004) Wall Street Journal (Eastern edition) A 1 
648 Mathews, A. W., and Martinez, B. 'E-mails suggest Merck knew Vioxx's dangers at 
early stage' (November 1, 2004) Wall Street Journal (Eastern edition) A 1 
649 Mathews, A. W., and Martinez, B. 'E-mails suggest Merck knew Vioxx's dangers at 
early stage' (November 1, 2004) Wall Street Journal (Eastern edition) A 1 
650 For example see Mack, A., Examination of the evidence for off-label use of gabapentin 
(2003) 9(6) Journal of Managed Care Pharmacy 559-568; and Pande, A. C.; Crockatt, J. 
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findings frequently reveal a very different set of safety findings than those 
achieved in-house. Muraglitazar is a dual Peroxisome proliferator-
activated receptor agonist that was approved, based on the drug 
manufacturer's trial data,651 by the FDA advisory committee on 9 
September 2005 for use in controlling blood glucose levels in patients with 
type 2 diabetes. A later independent evaluation of Muraglitazar lead to the 
conclusion, 
"Compared with placebo ... , muraglitazar was associated with an 
excess incidence of the composite end pOint of death, major 
adverse cardiovascular events (MI, stroke, TIA), and CHF. This 
agent should not be approved to treat diabetes ... until safety is 
documented in a dedicated cardiovascular events trial. .. 652 
The patent, or rather the notion of a monopoly ownership for 
pharmaceuticals, is so at odds with the reason for regulatory authority that 
whilst the patent exists as a determinant of long term above normal profit 
G., Janney, C. A., Werth, J. L., Tsaroucha, G., Gabapentin in bipolar disorder: a placebo-
controlled trial of adjunctive therapy (2000) 2 (3 Pt 2) Bipolar Disord. 249-255 
651 On 23 December 2004, Bristol-Myers Squibb announced that it had submitted a New 
Drug Application to the FDA for muraglitazar, as an agent under development for the 
treatment of patients with type 2 diabetes. Within a New Drug Application the 
investigation of the compound as administered to humans and evaluated for safety and 
effectiveness in treating, preventing, or diagnosing a speCific disease or condition 
comprises the single most important factor in the approval or disapproval of a new drug. 
See <http://www.fda.gov/cder/Regulatory/applications/> (Last Accessed: 1 sl July 2009) 
652 Nissen, S. E., K. Wolski, E. J. Topol. Effect of Muraglitazar on Death and Major 
Adverse Cardiovascular Events in Patients With Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus (2005) JAMA 
294: 2581-2586. 
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and regulatory authorities are dependent on proprietary data undisclosed 
to the public the opportunity for economic benefit will trump safety 
considerations. Thus, rather than human beings being the end-in-itself of 
the pharmaceutical patent and regulatory systems the human being is 
merely a component on route to the end-in-itself which is above normal 
profit. This development is hardly surprising considering that the 
pharmaceutical industry is comprised of companies and the end-in-itself 
for companies is profit. 
3.6.3. No Lying 
Discoveries that pharmaceutical companies have tried to conceal their 
research findings are becoming more frequent653 and studies produced by 
pharmaceutical companies present data that is biased towards the safety 
and effectiveness of their medicines.654 Moreover, because of the 
653 Okie, S. 'Missing Data On Celebrex' (August 5, 2001) Washington Post A 11; King, R. 
T., 'How a Drug Firm Paid For University Study, Then Undermined It' (April 25, 1996) 
Wall Street Journal A 1 
654 Amir, E., Seruga, B., Freedman, 0., Tannock, I.. 'Lapatinib plus Paclitaxel as first-line 
Therapy for patients with human epidermal growth factor receptor 2-positive metastatic 
breast cancer: Inappropriate conclusions from a company-sponsored study?' (2009) 27 
JCO 1919; Smith, R., 'Conflicts of interest: how money clouds objectivity' (2006) 99 
JRSM 292-297; Bodenhiemer, T., 'Conflict of Interest In Clinical Drug Trials: A Risk 
Factor For Scientific Research' (August 15, 2000) Paper presented at the NIH 
Conference on Conflicts of Interest in Scientific Research. Available at: 
<http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/coi/bodenheimer.htm> (Last Accessed: 1'1 July 2009); 
Friedberg, M., Saffran, B., Stinson, T. J., Nelson, W., et a/. 'Evaluation of Conflict of 
interest in Economic Analyses of New Drugs Used in Oncology' (1999) 282 Journal of the 
American Medical Association 1453-1457; Stelfox, H., Chua, G., O'Rourke, K., Detsky, 
A., 'Conflict of interest in the debate over calcium-channel antagonists' (1998) 338 N Engl 
J Med 101-106; see Baker, D., and Chatani, N., Promoting Good Ideas on Drugs: Are 
Patents the Best Way? The Relative Efficiency of Patent and Public Support for Bio-
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availability of financial rewards or research sponsorship for those whom 
produce favourable results some researchers may take falsification into 
their own hands.655 
There are worse case scenarios whose propensity to reoccur remains 
perversely unaddressed and will remain so until the patent and regulatory 
system is rebalanced so that the human being, or a particular property 
thereof, i.e. human health, becomes the end-in-itself. 
The Vioxx example illustrates how unsatisfactory it is for the agency 
certifying a pharmaceutical to be safe for the treatment of human beings to 
rely on data provided by a pharmaceutical applicant and then providing 
overview supervision of that company's monitoring of the approved drug. 
Pressure from physicians and independent researchers was put on the 
FDA for its perceived failure in monitoring the blockbuster painkiller Vioxx 
after serious side effects had been noted. In 2001 after independent 
studies had revealed that Vioxx had a statistically significant increase in 
myocardial infarctions compared to older painkillers the FDA was urged to 
mandate further clinical safety testing.s5s However, it did not do SO.657 
Medical Research (2002) CEPR Briefing Paper [Centre for Economic and Policy 
Research, Washingtonl1 0 
655 Katz, D., Mansfield, P., Goodman, R., Tiefer, L., et al., 'Psychological Aspects of Gifts 
From Drug Companies' (2003) 290(18) JAMA 2404-2405; Eichenwald, K., and Kolata, G., 
'A Doctor's Drug Studies Turn Into Fraud' (May 17,1999) New York Times A1 
656 Topol, E. J., 'Failing the public health - rofecoxib, Merck, and the FDA' (2004) 351 N 
Engl J Med 1707-09 
657 Horton, R., 'Vioxx, the implOSion of Merck, and aftershocks at the FDA' (2004) The 
Lancet 1-2, at 1 
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Unfortunately the failure of post approval FDA monitoring is not an 
anomaly. Unless there are changes to the present system then 
institutionally a similar crisis is likely to occur again. Dr Graham, the FDA 
Safety Officer as a result of the crisis advised that, 
" ... The FDA, as currently configured, is incapable of protecting 
America against another ViOXX."658 
3.6.4. We Have Change 
In black letter terms, the principal problems in the USA and the UK are the 
same for regulatory authorities working alongside the pharmaceutical 
patent regime. However, there are fewer regulatory instruments to muddy 
the picture in the USA, than there are in the UK, so to begin with we shall 
consider the USA. The principal problems are two fold: Firstly, that the 
Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA)659 instituting the arrangement 
where pharmaceutical companies pay the FDA to review their 
pharmaceutical products made no provision for funding for the FDA to 
continue to review the pharmaceutical product once approval for it to enter 
the market is granted. During the second reenactment of the PDUFA 
through the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act in 2002, amendments were made to permit some funding of 
658 Online NewsHour: Drug Safety. Available at: 
<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/fedagencies/july-dec04/fda_11-23.html> (Last 
Accessed: 15t July 2009) 
659 The FDA maintains an informative website on the PDUFA, currently in its fourth re-
enactment. Available at: <http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdufa/> (Last Accessed: 1&1 July 2009) 
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post market-approval appraisal, but the ability of the FDA to monitor all 
drugs adequately post market-approval cannot be realised on its present 
budget. Secondly, there is considerable pressure when an apparently 
important breakthrough product reaches the approval stage and appears 
to behave positively for it to become available. As most drugs are 
promoted as significant or breakthrough then the rapidity of review has 
been formally constrained to speed. For the FDA to retain the ability to 
continue collecting application fees from pharmaceutical applicants on 
submission of New Drug Applications (NDA), the FDA is required to meet 
performance benchmarks. The primary benchmark is the speed by which 
the components of the NDA review process are carried out. Especially 
where a therapeutic breakthrough has purportedly occurred then there is 
pressure on the agency to approve the medicine as quickly as possible so 
that patients can benefit from it. Since implementation of the PDUFA the 
median approval time for non-priority new drugs fell from 27 months to 14 
months.SSO 
In the UK, a good example of the pressure that drug safety regulatory 
bodies undergo is provided post Herceptin. The results are clear: The 
MHRA regulatory approval system was adapted, resulting in a fast track 
scheme. Whilst MHRA does not carry out its own trials and relies on the 
data from others studies, including those by the proprietor pharmaceutical 
company, MHRA does posses funding for ongoing review of 
660 GAO-02-958 Effect of User Fees on Drug Approval Times, Withdrawals, and Other 
Agency Activities. Available at: <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02958.pdf> (Last 
Accessed: 1s1 July 2009) 
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pharmaceutical safety. However, as with the FDA the MHRA budget is 
inadequate to monitor all pharmaceuticals on the market and its 
dependence on others' studies and feedback mean that its interventions 
are not as expedient as desirable. 
Another problem that affects the FDA, and might be shared by other 
regulatory authorities is the concealment of information deemed 
commercially sensitive, yet which may present important indications of the 
safety of a medicine. It has been suggested that the FDA routinely 
conceals information it considers commercially sensitive.661 For example 
the FDA suppressed essential information concerning Cox-2 inhibitors.662 
From one of its NDA files the FDA removed twenty-eight pages of data 
about Cox-2 inhibitors. 
Moreover, Peter Juni, a clinical epidemiologist at the University of Berne 
and one of investigators responsible for revealing to the public the 
elevated cardiac infarction risk of Cox-2 inhibitors, claimed that his work 
had been obstructed by the FDA. His team had found "that many pages 
and paragraphs had been deleted because they contained trade secret 
661 Dobson, R., and Lenzer, J., 'US regulator suppresses vital data on prescription drugs 
on sale in Britain' (June 12, 2005) The Independent. Available at: 
<http://www.independent.co.ukllife-style/health-and-families/health-
news/article493903.ece> (Last Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
662 Editorial. 'Vioxx: an unequal partnership between safety and efficacy' (2004) 364 
Lancet 1287-1288 
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and/or confidential information that is not disclosable. ,,663 David Graham, 
associate director of the Office of Drug Safety within the FDA, is reported 
to have had his results, indicating that patients taking Vioxx suffered five 
times as many heart attacks as patients taking the generic painkiller 
naproxen did, suppressed by his superiors in the FDA. Furthermore 
Graham's supervisors are reported to have refused him permission to 
present his findings and tried to prevent him from publishing them in the 
Lancet.664 
Richard Horton, editor of the Lancet, summarised this problem "Too often 
the FDA saw and continues to see the pharmaceutical industry as its 
customers, a vital source of funding for its activities, and not as a sector of 
society in need of strong regulation ... with Vioxx, Merck and the FDA 
acted out of ruthless, short-sighted, and irresponsible self-interest. ,,665 
3.6.5. Grey Markets 
Unsurprisingly the existence of large patent mark-ups endow 
pharmaceutical manufacturers with the potential to achieve high profits, 
663 Dobson, R., and Lenzer, J., 'US regulator suppresses vital data on prescription drugs 
on sale in Britain' (June 12, 2005) The Independent. Available at: 
<http://www.independent.co.ukllife-style/health-and-families/health-
news/article493903.ece> (Last Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
664 Dobson, R., and Lenzer, J., 'US regulator suppresses vital data on prescription drugs 
on sale in Britain' (June 12, 2005) The Independent. Available at: 
<http://www.independent.co.ukllife-style/health-and-families/health-
news/article493903.ece> (Last Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
665 Horton, R., 'Vioxx, the implosion of Merck, and aftershocks at the FDA' (2004) The 
Lancet 1-2 
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and thereby create a strong incentive for the emergence of grey markets 
and counterfeit pharmaceuticals.666 The Center for Medicines in the Public 
Interest, New York, predicts that global sales of fake medications will by 
2010 be worth an estimated $75 billion.667 As counterfeit drugs and 
pharmaceuticals sold on a grey market may not meet safety standards, 
nor present an honest account of their contents or dosages, they are 
another safety issue that needs to be addressed. The World Health 
Organization (WHO) estimates that 5-8% of drugs worldwide are 
counterfeit. 668 
The WHO's observation of the types of pharmaceutical counterfeits 
available in wealthier and poorer countries is supportive of the profit 
motivating factor for pharmaceutical counterfeiting. According to the WHO 
the most frequently counterfeited drugs in poorer developing countries are 
pharmaceuticals used to treat life-threatening conditions such as malaria, 
tuberculosis, and AIDS, whilst in wealthier countries counterfeits tend to be 
666666 Counterfeit drugs are usually pharmaceuticals 'sold under a product name without 
authorization, where the identity of the source of the drug is knowingly and intentionally 
mislabelled in a way that suggests that it is the authentic approved product. This definition 
can apply to brand name, generic products, or the bulk ingredients used to make the 
product.' Lutter, R. W., FDA (USA) Congressional Testimony on Counterfeit Medicines, 
November 1, 2005. Available at: 
<http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm112670.htm> 
667 Schenker J. L., "MPedigree's Rx for Counterfeit Drugs," Business Week, December 3, 
2008. Available at: 
<http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/contentldec2008/gb2008123_027994.htm> 
668 Capell, K. & Timmons, S. 'What's in that Pill?' Business Week, June 18, 2001. 
Available at: <http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/contentl01_25/b3737076.htm> 
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new and expensive lifestyle medicines; such as hormones, steroids, and 
antihistamines.669 
Many mechanisms by which counterfeit pharmaceuticals can be excluded 
from consumers have been put forward and these range to 
recommendations that consumers buy only from authorised pharmacies 
and stockists, to the implementation of a unique coding that can be 
checked by the consumer. One such code system is mPedigree, 670 where 
the pharmaceutical manufacturer packages medicines embossed with a 
unique code recorded in mPedigree's database. Consumers purchasing 
the drug are able to scratch off a panel on the product's packaging to 
reveal the code. The consumer can then text this code from their 
telephone to the mPedigree's servers and after a short delay receive a text 
response indicating whether the product is authentic. Whilst such 
methods may be highly useful in countries with developed economies, 
stable infrastructures for drug distribution, and a viable text messaging 
service, for the majority of the world's population they are technologically 
and uneconomically viable. 
669 Voice of America News, 'WHO Battles Counterfeit Drugs in Asia.' November 12, 2003. 
Available at: <http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2003-11/a-2003-11-12-43-
WHO.cfm?moddate=2003-11-12> 
670 Schenker J. L., "MPedigree's Rx for Counterfeit Drugs," Business Week. December 3, 
2008. Available at: 
<http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/contenUdec2008/gb2008123_027994.htm > 
(Last Accessed: 151 July 2009) 
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3.7. Availability of Pharmaceuticals 
One of the main miscomprehensions about the accessibility of 
pharmaceuticals is that access to pharmaceuticals is a poor person's 
problem. This is only partially true. As we have indicated the rate of 
pharmaceutical innovation is likely retarded. Therefore medicines, which 
in the absence of the present system would be available, are not. Thus, 
such drugs are unavailable regardless of an individual's wealth. 
Moreover, there are many drugs approved as safe and effective, on the 
basis of proprietary data, that are subsequently, through the misfortune of 
users, found to have no therapeutic utility to the target group or to 
exacerbate symptoms sometimes leading to mortality. As a result uptake, 
in new medicines does always not occur the moment that a 
pharmaceutical becomes available on the market. In some countries, For 
example the UK, lack of confidence in the safety of new products causes a 
statistically significant lag in uptake, with respect to other European 
countries and the USA.671 
Use of medicines by hospitals and physicians can frequently result in the 
most clinically effective medicine not being chosen, but rather one that will 
allow the institution to stretch its budget further. This is a point of 
controversy in many areas of medical practice. In particular the post-
operative treatment of orthopaedic replacement patients with warfarin, 
671 PICTF, Competitiveness and Performance Indicators 2004,10 
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rather than heparin, or warfarin/heparin.672 It is estimated that this 
cheaper alternative might be the cause of 20,000 deaths annually in the 
UK. However, it is good to note that fifteen years on and approximately 
300,000 deaths later that the patent has expired on Heparin I and Heparin 
I is less expensive and more readily used. There are currently no figures 
available as to the number of deaths that would be preventable through 
the use of the newer forms of Heparin that are still under patent. Other 
jurisdictions experience the same problems. 
"In the United States, in many healthcare systems salary bonuses 
are offered to those who prescribe cheaply I and salary 'withholds' 
await those who prescribe too expensively. This contributes to the 
patients' uneasiness that their interests and ours may at times be 
incompatible.,,673 
Information is a key factor in the choice of which medicines to utilise as 
complement therapy, as treatment, or as a prophylactic. For even a 
medical practitioner to keep up to date on the latest drugs and new 
discoveries about those in circulation is a daunting task. For a non-
specialist, finding and assimilating information relevant to their condition 
and then insisting that their doctors follow that course is unrealistic. 
Wealth may provide more treatment possibilities, but only if the relevant 
672 O'Brien, B. J., Anderson, D. R., Goeree, R., 'Cost-effectiveness of enoxaparin versus 
warfarin prophylaxis against deep-vein thrombosis after total hip replacement' (1994) 
150(7) CMAJ 1083-1090 
673 Avorn, J. Balancing the cost and value of medications: the clinician's dilemma. (2002) 
20 Suppl. 3 Pharmacoeconomics 68 
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doctors and institutions have the required expertise and choose to make 
other treatment options available. 
Admittedly there has traditionally been a great difference between funding 
for research on diseases which affect the wealthier nations, than those 
affecting poorer populaces. But there are diseases that significantly effect 
all populations that would benefit from increased coordination in research 
and resource sharing. For example cancer and Alzheimer's. 
3.8. Accessibility of Pharmaceuticals 
The two principle access barriers to pharmaceuticals already granted 
market approval are: the price of the medicine and the supply. 
Supply is simply the amount of product made available for sale. Artificial 
scarcity plays a role in ensuring high drug prices. The artificial scarcity 
that permits prices to remain high usually occurs through the manufacturer 
producing only enough of the pharmaceutical to meet the expected 
demand curve for the price that they have decided on. However, the 
artificial scarcity is sometimes maintained after competitor products should 
have entered the market. There is a trend for some generic introductions 
to delay entry to a market, thereby leaving supply to the patented 
originator for a longer period. This occurs through a "pay-for-delay 
settlement" agreement between the generic manufacturer and the 
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manufacturer of the patented originator medicine. A payment from the 
manufacturer of the patented originator medicine creates artificial scarcity 
in the competitive generic product thereby permitting the out-of-patent 
originator medicine to continue to sell for high prices. 
In the USA the Federal Trade Commission has been less tolerant of 
anticompetitive practices than competition authorities in the European 
Union. In 2003, a decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
payments by the patent owner of an originator medicine a to a generic firm 
that had filed a patent challenge were unlawful as an anticompetitive 
practice. 
" ... it is one thing to take advantage of a monopoly that naturally 
arises from a patent, but another thing altogether to bolster the 
patent's effectiveness in inhibiting competitors by paying the only 
potential competitor $40 million [USD] per year to stay out of the 
market. ,,674 
In 2005 the Federal Trade Commission brought an action against 
Schering-Plough Corporation 675 alleging that agreements to eliminate 
potential competition and to share the resulting profits constitutes a 
violation of antitrust law and should be prohibited under the antitrust laws. 
Both the Second and Eleventh Circuit appellate courts upheld the legality 
674 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003). 
675 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 
919 (2006) 
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of a pay-for-delay agreements.676 Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit both 
rejected the Sixth Circuit's approach to pay-for-delay agreements677 and 
refused to consider if there was an per se antitrust violation, or illegality by 
the rule of reason.67B 
In 2008, another pay-for-delay agreement case the Federal Circuit Court 
of Appeals further alienated the decision of the Sixth Circuit by holding that 
" ... absent fraud ... or sham litigation the mere presence of a patent 
entitles the patent holder to purchase protection from competition until 
patent expiration.,,679 
The decisions effectively grant impunity to patent holders for what would 
otherwise be anti competitive practices for the duration of their patent term. 
Whilst this notion is limitative to the time a patent holder may contract to 
exclude competition from a market, it does permit enormous market 
distortion and a delay to reductions in pharmaceutical prices that would 
result from competition. Moreover, through clever patenting and enclosure 
it is possible to maintain patents on a pharmaceutical product for long 
periods. Thus, it may be possible for companies to split the proceeds of a 
monopoly for several decades. Even then when there were no remaining 
tweaks to be made to the invention in order to engender evergreening, the 
676 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005),10 cert. denied, 548 
U.S. 919 (2006); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation. 429 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2005) 
677 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d at 1056,1065 (11th Cir. 2005) 
676 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d at 1065 (11th Cir. 2005) 
679 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig .. 544 F .3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
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manufacturer might be able to simply cease to manufacture the out-of-
patent pharmaceutical and then monopolise the market with another. 
Generic manufacturers providing that they benefit more from the 
monopolists pay-out and that <pc is a sufficient motivation for their 
behaviour will be content to be paid to be a spectator. 
Not all scarcity in supply is artificial. There may be particular reasons why 
the quantity of a medicine that can be produced is much lower than 
demand, or even the manufacturer's projected optimum profit. This would 
be the case where the active ingredient cannot yet be synthesised and 
thus, needs to be extracted from organic sources occurring in very limited 
supply.6BO Of course the publicised limitation might also be a fiction 
designed to maintain high prices even in the face of pandemic, we shall 
have to await the memo. 
Other than a shortage in supply, the problem of artificial scarcity is price 
inflation. As a result of inflated prices populations that might have 
660 According to Roche this is the case with Tamiflu (oseltamivir phosphate) that is 
manufactured from shikimic acid, which cannot be syntheSised economically and was 
only effectively isolated from Chinese star anise. See GRAIN, 'Fowl play: The poultry 
industry's central role in the bird flu crisis' Briefing Document (2006) at 15. Available at: 
<http://www.grain.org/briefings_files/birdflu2006-en.pdf> (Last Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
Shikimic acid is now commercially extractable from modified E. Coli. See Johansson, L., 
Lindskog, A., Silfversparre, G., Cimander, C., Nielsen, K., et a/., 'Shikimic acid production 
by a modified strain of E. coli (W3110.shik1) under phosphate-limited and carbon-limited 
conditions' (2005) 92(5) Biotechnology and Bioengineering 541-552: Bradley, D., 'Star 
role for bacteria in contrOlling flu pandemic?' (2005) 4 Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 
945-946; Kr~mer, M., Bongaertsa, J., Bovenberga, R., Kremera, 5., et a/., 'Metabolic 
engineering for microbial production of shikimic acid' (2003) 5(4) Metabolic Engineering 
277-283 
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otherwise been able to afford medicines are denied access to them. 
There are some medicines that are so necessary for human welfare that, 
as a minimum, all societies ought to have access to them. 
3.8.1. Essential Medicines 
"Essential medicines681 are those that satisfy the priority health care 
needs of the population. They are intended to be available within 
the context of functioning health systems at all times in adequate 
amounts, in the appropriate dosage forms, with assured quality, and 
at a price the individual and the community can afford.,,682 
The Essential Medicines List, in addition to providing the minimum 
medicine needs for a basic health care system, only lists the most 
efficacious, safe and cost-effective pharmaceuticals for priority conditions. 
Moreover the basis of identification of priority conditions also takes 
account of the potential for cost-effective treatment. Thus, extremely few 
patented drugs feature on the WHO Essential Medicines List. Out of the 
three-hundred and twelve listed medicines of the 14th edition list (2005) 
681 A list of essential medicines is produced by the WHO annually, though each Nation is 
in principle responsible for compiling its own list. WHO Essential Medicines list available 
at: <http://www .who. intlmedicines/services/essmedicines _ def/en/> (Last Accessed: 1 sl 
July 2009) 
682 United Nations - Millennium Development Goal 8 Task Force Report 2008, 'Delivering 
on the Global Partnership for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals.' At: 36. 
Available at: <http://www.who.intlmedicines/mdg/MDG8EnglishWeb.pdf> (Last Accessed: 
1 sl July 2009) 
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there are only fourteen currently under patent.683 Eleven of the fourteen 
are antiretroviral medicines designated for the treatment of AIDS.684 
Whilst the remaining three patented medicines are for other diseases.685 
That so few patented drugs appear on the Essential Medicines List is not 
an indication that satisfactory therapies are mainly available from amongst 
medicines that are out of patent, but the price of patent medicines 
excludes almost all patented drugs from the list for two reasons. Firstly, 
the potential for cost-effective treatment means that unless a cheaper 
therapy is available then the condition is not designated as a priority 
condition, thus no medicines to treat that condition will be listed at all. 
Secondly, for designated priority conditions only the most efficacious, safe 
and cost-effective pharmaceuticals are listed. The consequence of this is 
that although the list provides extremely useful advice to governments and 
health agencies based on pricing and efficiency it does not provide an 
ideal list based on drug effectiveness or all conditions. Thus, the core 
selection of the 14th edition Essential Medicines List contains no anti-
cancer drugs at all. Which makes the list very incomplete from an 
683 Abacavir Antiretroviral, Didanosine Antiretroviral. Lamivudine Antiretroviral. Stavudine 
Antiretroviral. Efavirenz Antiretroviral. Nevirapine Antiretroviral. Indinavir Antiretroviral. 
Ritonavir Antiretroviral, Lopinavir and ritonavir Antiretroviral. Nelfinavir Antiretroviral. 
Saquinavir Antiretroviral, Proguanil Malaria prophylaxis, Levofloxin. Eflornithine 
Antiprotoloal. See United States FDA Orange Book (online). Available at: 
<http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/> (Last Accessed: 16t July 2009) 
684 Abacavir Antiretroviral, Didanosine Antiretroviral. Lamivudine Antiretroviral. Stavudine 
Antiretroviral, Efavirenz Antiretroviral, Nevirapine Antiretroviral. Indinavir Antiretroviral. 
Ritonavir Antiretroviral, Lopinavir and ritonavir Antiretroviral, Nelfinavir Antiretroviral, 
Saquinavir Antiretroviral. 
685 Proguanil Malaria prophylaxis, Levofloxin, Eflornithine Antiprotoloal. 
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American perspective as cancer is the second highest cause of mortality in 
the USA after heart disease.686 Moreover between 1980 and 2000, life 
expectancy for cancer patients across select cancer types has increased 
by 2.9-3.0 years (5.9-6.0 years for breast cancer), with 83 per cent of the 
increases due to new therapies, including new pharmaceuticals.687 
Another study indicates that since 1975, the improvements in the longevity 
of cancer patients are 50 to 60 per cent attributable to pharmaceutical 
developments.6BB 
The United Nations Millennium Development Goal 8 (MDG8) Task Force 
Report 2008 indicated that amongst twenty-seven 'developing countries' 
the mean public availability of essential medicines was only 34.9 per 
cent. 689 Where medicines are not available publicly their private retail 
prices are many fold greater and lack of accessibility to them statistically 
significantly more pronounced. The report also highlighted the variations 
in public expenditure, finding per capita spending ranges among countries 
686 Heron, M., Hoyert, D. L., Murphy, S. L., et al., 'Deaths: Final Data for 2006' (2009) 
57(14) National Vital Statistics Reports (DHHS Publication No. (PHS) 2009-1120), at 2,3, 
22-23. Available at: <http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57 _14.pdf> (Last 
Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
687 Sun, E., Lakdawalla, D., Reyes, C., Goldman, D., Philipson, T., at a/., 'The 
determinants of recent gains in cancer survival: An analysis of the Surveillance, 
Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) database' (2008) 26 (15S) Journal of Clinical 
Oncology 6616. Abstract of ASCO meeting with table of data. 
688 Lichtenberg, F., 'The Expanding Pharmaceutical Arsenal in the War on Cancer' (2004) 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 10328 
689 United Nations - Millennium Development Goal 8 Task Force Report 2008, 'Delivering 
on the Global Partnership for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals.' At: 37. 
Available at: <http://www.who.intlmedicines/mdg/MDG8EnglishWeb.pdf> (Last Accessed: 
1st July 2009) 
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of similar economic status to be $26.67 to $505.46 USD for 'developed 
countries' and $0.04 to $16.30 USD for 'least developed countries.'69o 
There are many diseases and conditions that are not addressed by the 
WHO Essential Medicines List.691 With some patented medicines for 
conditions not on the WHO list, though extensively subsidised by the 
government compared to other patented products, that are priced at more 
than $300,000 USD per patient692 even when medicines are available, 
they may be unaffordable for the majority of the population. 
Under the present regime, there are two methods by which both factors 
can be directly addressed. One is agreement of a lower price through a 
pricing regulation scheme. The other is through compulsory licensing. 
Collective payments for pharmaceuticals might sometimes be suggested 
as a third, but whilst they spread the burden of who pays for a medicine, 
they do not directly affect the price or supply of a medicine. Parallel 
importing,693 arising from price discriminations, does occur and can 
provide price relief for some populations. However it also creates 
690 United Nations - Millennium Development Goal 8 Task Force Report 2008, 'Delivering 
on the Global Partnership for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals.' At: 37. 
Available at: <http://www.who.intlmedicines/mdg/MDG8EnglishWeb.pdf> (Last Accessed: 
1st July 2009) 
691 15th edition list. Available at 
<http://www.who.intlmedicines/publications/08_ENGlISHjndexFINAL_EML 1S.pdf> (Last 
Accessed: 15t July 2009) 
692 For example, Cerezyme which is used to treat sufferers of Gaucher disease, an 
hereditary enzyme deficiency which if untreated can result in liver and spleen rupture, 
lung and more rarely kidney impairment. 
693 
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regulatory problems and can assist in the establishment of a grey markets, 
thereby posing health and security risks. 
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CHAPTER 4 
STEPPING AROUND MISALLOCATION 
337 
It is telling that there are so many proposals for improving access to 
medicines and refocusing research initiative. This chapter provides an 
examination of key well thought out proposals reflective of the different 
mechanisms raised by a much larger group of proposals than could be 
examined here.694 
All the proposals share recognition that the price of pharmaceutical 
products is high and they seek to address the large gap between the price 
and marginal cost of the medicines. However, whilst some proposals are 
only focussed on improving access to medicines, others are concerned 
with research and thus impact on the availability of medicines. As a result, 
a natural division for this chapter is proposals that target accessibility of 
existent pharmaceutical technologies (4.1) and proposals that target 
availability of pharmaceutical inventions (4.2). 
The factors by which we assess each proposal are derived from the 
problems identified in Chapter 3. These are issues of accessibility, 
694 For example we have not discussed proposals that drastically flawed, i.e. those that 
seek to improve research focus by injecting additional government money into research 
for industry acquisition of patent rights, as these will only exacerbate analysed problems. 
Nor have we considered proposals suggesting changes that are already talking place and 
thus, whose components are discussed in detail elsewhere in this thesis. Consider the 
Open Innovation Drug Discovery initiative of Eli Lilly and similar programs by its 
competitors. This re-emerging paradigm, with the exception of the proposal's magical 
additional funding from government, closely resembles a proposal for the organisation of 
fee-for-service facilities within drug companies where academics and industry can 
collaborate and which is funded by both the users and government. See, Nathan, C., 
Aligning Pharmaceutical Innovation with Medical Need (2007) 13(3) Nature Medicine 304-
308 
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availability and the safety of pharmaceuticals. For each proposal the 
discussion follows this form. 
The proposals in this chapter do not envisage the disjoining of research 
and the pharmaceutical product, thus measures which impact on the price 
of an existent medicine, i.e. accessibility, may also impact availability. 
Bearing this in mind it is more practical to consider proposals targeting 
accessibility first. 
4.1. Propositions for accessibility695 
"The large and growing gap between the price and the marginal 
cost of drugs is the most apparent problem of the current patent 
system."696 
Control of the gap between the price and the marginal cost of medicines 
can be limited in several ways, none of which are mutually exclusive. 
Price setting limits the price at which a pharmaceutical can be sold (4.1.1 ), 
but there needs to be a method to assess what that price will be (4.1.1 .1 . 
Price Regulation Schemes). In some circumstances price limitation might 
be insufficient or inexistent, and yet medicines are needed (4.1.1.2 
695 By accessibility we refer to the opportunity for as many people as possible to benefit 
from existent medicines. 
696 Baker, D., 'Financing Drug Research: What are the Issues?' (2004) Issue Brief, Centre 
for Economic and Policy Research. Available at: 
<http://www.who. intlintellectualproperty/news/en/Submission-Baker. pdf> (Last Accessed: 
151 July 2009) 
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Compulsory Licenses). The existence of different markets for the same 
drug, even if they are all sourced from the same supplier, may have an 
incidence on price (4.1.1.3 Price Discrimination). Alternatively or 
concurrently price might be limited through strengthening the bargaining 
position of the buyer (4.1.2. Monopsony). 
4.1.1. Price Controls 
" ... governments have relied heavily on government fiat rather than 
competition to set prices, lowering drug spending through price 
controls applied to new and old drugs alike. Such controls, when 
applied to new drugs, reduce company compensation to levels 
closer to direct production costs, leaving less revenue for R&D.,,697 
The above-normal profit, the result of a pharmaceutical patent 
monopoly,69B is also a government fiat. As there is no competition during 
the "fiat" patent monopoly, mention of competition in the report must refer 
to competition during the innovation process, i.e. pre-patent, or after patent 
expiry. As innovation cost has little determination on the pharmaceutical's 
price,699 and that patented pharmaceutical prices are driven by company 
697 U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration. Pharmaceutical 
Price Controls in OECD Countries: Implications for U.S. Consumers, Pricing, Research 
and Development, and Innovation [Washington, December 2004] ix 
698 There is a caveat here in that not all patented pharmaceutical products will necessarily 
achieve abnormal profits. See, 3.3.9. Keeping Abnormal Profits. 
699 For historical example consider Figure 1. Pharmaceutical company distribution of 
revenue from 2000 to 2004; or Gagnon, M-A., Lexchin, J., 'The Cost of Pushing Pills: A 
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profit and shareholder expectation competition is not a determinative of 
price during the patent term of the pharmaceutical. Comparison of 
average ex-manufacturer patented pharmaceutical prices (2003 data), 
were between 18 and 67 per cent lower than patented drug prices in the 
USA.700 
The prices of patented pharmaceuticals rise far above the level of 
inflation,701 and the companies that own these medicines declare profits 
within the top fifth of Fortune 500 Companies.702 Whereas only a fifth or 
less of revenue is spent on research and drug development. 703 
New Estimate of Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States,' (2008) 
5(1) PLoS Med. Available at: 
<http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/1 0.1371/journal.pmed.0050001 > (Last 
Accessed th April 2010); Lauzon, L-P., Hasbani, M., 'Analyse economique: industrie 
pharmaceutique mondiale pour la periode de dix ans 1996-2005. Montreal: Chaire 
d'etudes socio-economiques de I'UQAM, 2006. 
http://www.cese.uqam.ca/pdf/rec_06Jndustrie_pharma.pdf 
700 U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration. Pharmaceutical 
Price Controls in OECD Countries: Implications for U.S. Consumers, Pricing, Research 
and Development, and Innovation [Washington, December 2004] 11 
701 From 2006 through to the first quarter of 2010 the overall rise in medical costs was 3.8 
per cent per annum. For in-patent pharmaceuticals the annual increase was 8.3 per cent. 
Government Accountability Office (USA) Prescription Drugs: Trends in Usual and 
Customary Prices for Commonly Used Drugs GAO-11-306R [Government Accountability 
Office, February 2011, Washington] Available at: 
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11306r.pdf> 4 
702 Fortune 500, May 2006 to May 2011 
703 See Section i10. Also see, Lauzon, L-P., Hasbani. M., 'Analyse economique: industrie 
pharmaceutique mondiale pour la periode de dix ans 1996-2005. Montreal: Chaire 
d'etudes socio-economiques de I'UQAM, 2006. Available at: 
<http://www.cese.uqam.ca/pdf/rec_06jndustrie_pharma.pdf> (Last Accessed: 13th 
February 2011) 
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" ... during the 1980s, prescription drug prices increased by almost 
three times the rate of general inflation and certain drugs increased 
in price by over 100 percent in five years.,,704 
Without price controls, it is claimed that pharmaceutical revenues would be 
higher and that resources available for research and development "could 
be significantly higher.,,705 The Department of Commerce International 
Trade Administration (USA) 2004 report suggests that price controls result 
in lower revenues for medicines than would result from a competitive 
market. 706 It suggests that the range of diminished returns is between $18 
billion USD and $27 billion USD per annum. Moreover, it holds that if the 
price reductions did not occur then revenues (2003 figures) would be 
increased by 25 to 38 per cent.707 This is an incorrect view, in a 
704 United States General Accounting Office. Prescription Drugs Changes in Prices for 
Selected Drugs (1992) GAO/HRD-92-128, at 1 
705 U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration. Pharmaceutical 
Price Controls in OECD Countries: Implications for U.S. Consumers, Pricing, Research 
and Development, and Innovation [Washington, December 2004] x 
706 Considering the magnitude of revenues after price controls, even though firms 
currently only invest between 8 to 20 per cent of revenues in research and development, 
this is historically and theoretically unlikely. See Rumelt, R, 'How much does industry 
matter?' (1991) 12(3) Strategic Management Journal 167-185; Jacobson, R, 'The 
perSistence of abnormal returns' (1988) 9(5) Strategic Management Journal 415-430; 
Rumelt, R. 'Theory, strategy and entrepreneurship'. In D. Teece (ed.), The Competitive 
Challenge: Strategies for Industrial Innovation and Renewal [Ballinger, 1987, 1st Ed., 
Cambridge, MA1137-157; Mueller, D. Profits in the Long-Run [Cambridge University 
Press, 1986, 1st Ed., Cambridge, UK] 15-34 
707 U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration. Pharmaceutical 
Price Controls in OECD Countries: Implications for U.S. Consumers, Pricing, Research 
and Development, and Innovation [Washington, December 2004] x 
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competitive market pharmaceutical prices would be much lower than 
under the price regulated monopoly. 
What the report perhaps intended to state was that price controls result in 
lower revenues for medicine monopolies, than would result from a 
monopoly not limited by price controls. This may be correct, but only to a 
point. As national pharmaceutical budgets are fixed, effectively raising the 
price of medicines by removing price regulation will lead to a redistribution 
of the pharmaceutical budget. There will be perhaps very little change in 
revenues across the pharmaceutical industrl08 whilst the availability of 
drugs will diminish as pharmaceutical companies find they can realise the 
same income on fewer introductions. Moreover, many pharmaceuticals in 
the UK would be reassessed by NICE and may fail cost-benefit 
assessment.70g As a result of removing price regulation schemes, national 
expenditure on monopoly pharmaceutical products may decline as 
substitutes and generic medicines with better cost-benefit weightings 
replace them. This would not have a positive effect on health care with 
fewer drug introductions and newer more effective drugs being 
substantially delayed from entering use. 
708 The report assumes that increasing drugs prices will have no effect on sales volumes; 
that funds would be available to pay the higher costs; and that replacements such as 
generics, could not be substituted. See U.S. Department of Commerce International 
Trade Administration. Pharmaceutical Price Controls in OECD Countries: Implications for 
U.S. Consumers, Pricing, Research and Development, and Innovation [Washington, 
December 2004] xii 
709 Similar repositioning of coverage on pharmaceutical products may occur with health 
insurers in the USA. 
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4.1.1.1. Price Regulation Schemes 
Price regulation schemes reduce the price of medicines and despite the 
enormous volume of literature stating that they reduce research and 
development there is no empirical data demonstrating that this is the 
case. 710 Price regulation schemes appear by themselves to be an 
inadequate solution to the problems engendered by a patent based 
system of innovation for pharmaceutical technologies. As other than 
altering the price paid for a pharmaceutical and the income of 
pharmaceutical companies that then feeds down into (research and 
development, marketing, profits ... etc.), price control has no effect on 
medicine safety, on which drugs are innovated, or the efficiency of 
pharmaceutical innovation. 
Within the European Union, Member States have autonomy over the 
mechanisms by which they choose to regulate pharmaceutical prices, 
provided that such provisions are in accordance with the Transparency 
Directive.711 The UK's system of price controls is particularly influential in 
price setting both within the European Union and the Commonwealth. 
710 Empirically there are no falls in the number of approved NCE introductions from the 
normalised curve following changes in drug pricing policy. 
711 Directive 89/105/EEC sets out a legal framework to eliminate disparities between 
Member States which hinder or distort intra-Community trade in medicinal products 
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"The [UK] Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) ensures the 
NHS has access to good quality branded medicines at reasonable prices, 
and promotes a healthy, competitive pharmaceutical industry.,,712 
On the 18th of June 2008 the UK Department of Health issued a press 
release announcing progress in the negotiations with the Association of 
the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI). On the same day the UK 
Government issued a consultation paper concerning the use of statutory 
powers to control prices of patented713 medicines sold to the NHS from 1st 
September 2008. 
It was clearly intended that the statutory powers would apply to 
pharmaceutical companies that did not join the new voluntary scheme or in 
the event that agreement over a new voluntary scheme is not reached714 
and thus serve as an incentive to opt for the new PPRS. The Statutory 
measures are proposed a 3.9 per cent price cut on patented 
pharmaceuticals and limited the price of patented pharmaceuticals, where 
712 Department of Health PPRS information website. Available at: 
<http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Healthcare/Medicinespharmacyandindustry/Pharmaceuticalpric 
eregulationscheme/index.htm> (Last Accessed: 15t July 2009) 
713 Although the powers are clearly destined for use on medicines still under patent, there 
is scope for statutory price control of medicines not under patent. See Department of 
Health, Consultation on a statutory scheme to control the prices of branded NHS 
medicines. Launch date: 18 June 2008. Available at 
<http://www.dh.gov.uklen/Consultations/Liveconsultations/DH_085523> (Last Accessed: 
181 July 2009) 
714 Department of Health, Consultation on a statutory scheme to control the prices of 
branded NHS medicines. Launch date: 18 June 2008, at 13 
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there is an unpatented equivalent, to 1.5 times the price of the unpatented 
equivalent. 715 
In accordance with section 261 of the National Health Service Act 2006, 
on the 13th of August 2008 a new interim non-contractual PPRS716 was 
agreed between the Health Departments of the United Kingdom and the 
ABPI. This agreement was effective from the 1 st of September 2008 until 
the 31 st of December 2008. The new PPRS although restating the 
cooperation of the Department of Health and the British pharmaceutical 
industry towards the 'provision of safe and effective medicines for the NHS 
at reasonable prices'; the promotion of 'a strong and profitable 
pharmaceutical industry ... capable of ... sustained research and 
development expenditure ... [Ieading] to the future availability of new and 
improved medicines'; and to 'encourage the efficient and competitive 
development and supply of medicines to pharmaceutical markets ... '. 717 
715 Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry and the UK Department of Health, 
The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme. (2008) E-Publication, London. Available 
at: 
<.http://www.dh.gov.uklen/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGu 
idancel?ldcService=GET_FILE&dID=145977&Rendition=Web> (Last Accessed: 151 July 
2009) 
716 Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry and the UK Department of Health, 
The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme. (2008) E-Publication, London. Available 
at: 
<.http://www.dh.gov.uklen/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGu 
idancel?ldcService=GET _FILE&dID=145977&Rendition=Web> (Last Accessed: 151 July 
2009) 
717 Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry and the UK Department of Health, 
The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme. (2008) London: 1 
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Members opting into the new PPRS retained their rights under the 2005 
scheme, particularly with respect to arbitration, but rather than the fixed 7 
per cent price decrease under the 2005 scheme they are only subject to a 
5 per cent price decrease, with a further 2% if an unpatented equivalent 
became available. 
The price regulation scheme, as did previous schemes, whilst reducing the 
price the NHS spends on patented pharmaceuticals does not go far 
enough in delivering cost effective medicines to NHS patients. Indeed the 
savings achieved by the NHS through price modification of patented 
medicines is estimated at £310 million of the £9bn currently spent on 
patented medicines each year. Whilst this saving will go a little towards 
offsetting the reduced growth rate in NHS spending it will not remedy the 
failure of the PPRS to deliver cost effective drugs for the National Health 
Service (NHS).718 
Moreover, it also applies direct pressure to sensitive funding sectors such 
as research and development. Pharmaceutical companies cannot afford 
to risk the loss of shareholder confidence. More pressure on revenues in 
this manner means more focus on blockbusters, line extensions and high 
profit lifestyle drugs and therefore less industry funded investigation of less 
profitable therapeutically advantageous medicines. Immediate responses 
718 Office of Fair Trading. The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme. An OFT Market 
Study. OFT. London: 2007. Available from: 
< http://www.oft.gov.uklshared_oft/reports/comp _policy/oft885.pdf> (Last Accessed: 15t 
July 2009) 
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to reduced revenue will most likely be met by corporate restructuring to 
maintain investor interest and not increases in dynamic efficiency.719 This 
problem will be further exacerbated by the tendency of other countries, 
particularly Japan, France, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands and Belgium, 
which directly follow UK drug pricing trends.no It is suggested, that "[i]n 
total, countries totalling some 25 per cent of global demand link the prices 
of some of their pharmaceutical products to those in the UK.,,721 
4.1.1.2 Compulsory Licensing 
The Patents Act 1977, as amended,722 makes compulsory licenses 
available under UK law. A distinction is drawn between patents with WTO 
patent holders and patents without WTO patent holders/23 the compulsory 
licensing of patents without WTO patent holders being far less onerous.724 
However, considering the scarcity of WTO non-members, this distinction is 
rather redundant. 
719 For example consider Pfizer, which from 2009 to 2011 has reduced its research and 
development budget by reducing the diversification of its research and number of 
research staff and facilities. 
720 Timothy Fitzgerald, Bridgehead International Chief executive officer, quoted in 'The 
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme Survives Again, UK' Medical News Today 13 
June 2008 Available at: <http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/111049.php> (Last 
Accessed: 1s1 July 2009) 
721 Office of Fair Trading, Annexe 0, Global overview of the pharmaceutical industry 
(February 2007) OFT665d, at 4. Available at: 
<http://www.oft.gov.uklshared_ofUreports/comp_policy/oft885d.pdf> (Last Accessed: 1 sl 
July 2009) 
722 In particular see Patents and Trade Marks (WTO) Regulations 1999, S.I. 1999 No. 
1899 
723 §48 Patents Act 1977 (as amended) 
724 Compare the conditions of §48A Patents Act 1977 (patents with WTO patent holders) 
with the conditions required by §488 (patents without WTO patent holders) 
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According to §48A Patents Act 1977, compulsory licences are available 
where domestic demand for the patented invention is not being reasonably 
met,725 where the patent owner's refusal to grant a license on reasonable 
terms either; effectively blocks later improvement,726 or prejudices 
commercial or industrial activity in the UK.727 Or where the conditions 
imposed with the grant of a license limit the use of the patented invention 
or patented process to an extent that commercial or industrial activity in 
the UK is unfairly prejudiced.728 
Prima facie, the grounds to make an application for a compulsory licence 
seem quite broad. However, there are qualifications of reasonable and 
unreasonableness to be taken into account.729 Moreover, the 
discretionary power exercised by the comptroller is subject to an extensive 
list of 'purposes' and 'factors' that the comptroller oughe30 to take into 
account when exercising their discretion. It is feared by the industry that 
use of compulsory licenses by countries too poor to purchase a medicine 
at the set price will allow those countries to obtain medicines that can then 
be re-sold on grew markets in countries where the medicines are 
725 §48A( 1 )( a) Patents Act 1977 
726 §48A(1)(b)(i) Patents Act 1977. See Article 82 EC; and Intel Technologies v Via 
Technologies [2003] FSR 574, where the Court of Appeal rejected Laddie J's (Philips 
Electronics v Ingman [1998] 2 CMLR 1185), until then persuasive, suggestion that Magill 
(RTE & ITP v EC Commission C241-91, C242-91 [1995] ECR 808) might not be 
applicable to a patent. 
727 §48A( 1 )(b )(ii) Patents Act 1977 
728 §48A( 1 )( c) Patents Act 1977 
729 §50 Patents Act 1977 
730 Monsanto's CCP Patent [1990] FSR 93, at 97 
349 
purchased at their set price. This fear has been frequently couched in 
other terms. 
"Poor countries will not eradicate diseases by compulsory licensing 
certain pharmaceuticals. In fact the opposite is more likely because 
of the negative signal that such a decision would send to 
companies contemplating investment in knowledge-based 
industries. It would be a tragedy if long-term economic 
development and consequent improvements in the health of the 
poor were to be undermined by short-sighted policies aimed at 
placating narrow vested interests.,,731 
Compulsory licences are available under Article 31 TRIPS. which limits 
medicines produced under compulsory license to those destined for the 
domestic market. 732 Criteria that must be met are set out by Article 31 
TRIPS. In the case of countries without domestic facility to manufacture 
pharmaceuticals Article 31(f) TRIPS is in effect amended. so that such 
countries can import drugs manufactured under compulsory license in 
other countries.733 
731 Morris. J. TRIPS and Healthcare: Rethinking the Debate (2001) International Policy 
Network. Available at: <http://www.policynetwork.netlmain/press_release.php?pr _id=39> 
(Last Accessed: 15t July 2009) 
732 Article 31 (f) TRIPS 
733 WTO. Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health (1 st September 2003) WT/U540 (General Council decl'Sj .""""~ 
30th August 2003) ~ 
There is further scope under trips to implement control of pharmaceutical 
access under Article 27 TRIPS. Where an argument could be made by a 
country for actions to achieve the health goal for its people of providing 
affordable and essential drugs to its population. Nevertheless for Article 
27 permission, the medicine must feature on the WHO's list of Essential 
Medicines, and the use of Article 27 TRIPS must be validated by a WTO 
panel.734 The use of Article 27 TRIPS as a means of appropriating 
pharmaceuticals for their populace requires the WTO signatory seeking 
the compulsory licence to persuade the WTO panel that there was no 
other measure less inconsistent with the treaty in order to supply 
affordable drugs. In this case it might be argued that price controls would 
be a more reasonable measure. However, the economic bargaining 
power of a country is likely a significant factor in determining the extent of 
price regulation beyond the extent of indexing undertaken in other 
countries. Which may be an insufficient reduction in price for the country 
that has to seek a compulsory licence. 
Scherer suggests that a flexible compulsory licensing policy that could be 
fine tuned to circumstances is preferable. Moreover, he holds that 
'technical progress would not grind to a halt if a uniform policy of 
compulsory licensing at 'reasonable royalties' ... were implemented. tl735 
734 WTO, Report of the Panel on Thailand: Restrictions on Importation of an International 
Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov 7, 1999, GATT B.I.S.0 (3th Supplement) at 216 
735 Scherer, F. M .. The Economic Effects of Compulsory Patent Licensing [New York 
University Press, 1977, New York] at 85. But also see 67-75. 
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4.1.1.3. Price Discrimination 
Price discrimination arises where a supplier is able to sell the same 
product in separate markets at different prices. Whilst Price 
discrimination736 may be an effective tool of positive publicity for a 
pharmaceutical company, it is problematic for the pharmaceutical 
company for two principal reasons. Firstly, it highlights to people the 
difference in price at which the company can still afford to market its 
product and the highest prices at which the company markets its product. 
It does not matter to the wealthier buyers whether their higher premiums 
are necessary in order to fund the poorer person's access to the medicine. 
737 Secondly, as the deSignated wealthier population seek to purchase the 
medicine at the cheaper rate, they introduce competition. This was one of 
the major objections, antiretroviral pharmaceutical patent holders had, to 
the selling of cheaper AIDS drugs in Africa at the beginning of the new 
millennium. 738 It was feared that the cheaper antiretroviral drugs sold in 
Africa would be bought up and then imported to the lucrative USA and 
European markets. 
736 In economic terminology this would be 3rd degree price discrimination, or direct 
segmentation. Bearing in mind that the principle of exhaustion has severe limitations on 
co-ordination, see: Nalla, V. R., Venugopal, V. and Van Der Veen, J. A. A .. "Coordination 
with Supply Chain Contracts in the Presence of Two Different Consumer Segments" NRG 
Working Paper Series No. 07-07 (2007) 
737 A justification of the price difference on the basis that market paying the highest price 
is subsidising the lower price market is not favourable to buyers in the high price market, 
though it might be morally accepted. 
738 Copson. R. W .. Issue Brieffor Congress - AIDS in Africa (7 January 2003) 
Congressional Research Service. The Library of Congress. Code IB 10050. At CRS-1 0 
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Even within Europe there are differences the pricing of medicines either 
due to price regulation schemes or the different purchasing power of 
national sickness insurance.739 Thus, parallel importing does occur/40 
though pharmaceutical producers have attempted to control parallel 
importing through various means/41 such as: agreements with 
undertakings that effectively limit geographic distribution, but are 
exempted from competition provisions under Article 81 (3) EC; forbidding 
product repackaging;742 supplementary protection certificates;743 
739 See Case T -168/01 G/axoSmithKline Services Unlimited v. Commission 
740 Article 6 TRIPS leaves the rules for exhaustion of intellectual property rights for 
national determination. See Schmiemann, M., Exhaustion of patent rights and the 
European union (1998) 20 World Patent Information 193-195; Centrafarm BV v Sterling 
Drug Inc. Case 15/74 [1974] ECR 1147; Laserdisken ApS v Kulturministeriet Case C-
479/0412 September 2006; Griffiths, J., Principle of Community exhaustion upheld by 
Court of Justice (2007) 2( 1) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 15-16. The 
EU and many countries, including the USA and Canada, have adopted a principle of 
international exhaustion. Thus, the owner of the intellectual property rights cannot 
prevent the resale of a non-counterfeit product anywhere in the world on the basis of their 
intellectual property rights, almost regardless of where the product was first placed on the 
market. Where a license is involved in the use of a product preventing resale of that use 
then the principle of international exhaustion may not apply. 
741 Jack, A., 'EU drug industry to clamp down on repackaging for sale abroad' (1 June 
2007) FT.com. Available at: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/30f3c532-0fdd-11dc-a66f-
000b5df1 0621.html> (Last Accessed: 1 sl July 2009) 
742 To comply with national requirements for packaging and labelling information, 
particularly with regard to language, or to adapt the product to different consumer 
preferences, parallel importers frequently repackage pharmaceuticals before distributing 
them in other member states. However, this must involve reapplication of the 
manufacturer's Trade Mark. For the EU position of reapplication of Trade Marks in 
parallel importing see: Boehringer v Swingward Case C-143/00 [2002] ECR 1-3759 172; 
Merck. Sharp & Dohme v Paranova Case C-443/99 [2002] ECR 1-3703 152 
743 Where the parallel import pharmaceutical originates from an EU Member State that 
does not yet award supplementary protection certificates, then the pharmaceutical 
manufacturer can exert their patent rights or supplementary protection certificate to 
prevent the import and of that product in an EU Member State where supplementary 
353 
adaptation of quota allocation systems; 744 and the imposition of shorter 
best before dates.745 
Various measures have been implemented over the years to prevent 
parallel importing, but most have failed and grey markets, and so-called 
grey markets, in medicines flourish. 746 For health and safety reasons 
protection certificates are available. For example, from 1993 to 2000 AstraZeneca 
successfully extended their monopoly through the use of misleading information to 
national patent offices in concerning the supplementary protection certificate status of 
Losec and thereby prevented Losec parallel importing. See Anonymous, 'Competition: 
Commission fines AstraZeneca €60 million for misusing patent system to delay market 
entry of competing generic drugs' (15 june 2005) IP/05/737 EUROPA (Rapid Press 
Releases) Available at: 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/737> (Last Accessed: 
1st July 2009) 
744 This involves distribution through subsidiary wholesalers where allocation is assessed 
on consumption trends and produce is then allocated by quota to ensure that there is no 
surplus for parallel importing, thereby theoretically securing the most profitable outcomes. 
In practice secure allocation of quotas is difficult and expensive, thus imposing dead 
weight and still permitting some parallel importing. 
745 A shorter best before date means that parallel importers have less time flexibility to 
purchase, repackage and market the pharmaceutical in another EU Member State. 
Customers, particularly pharmacists and stockists will factor into their sales management 
the expiry of the medicines. Thus, if the medicines in the Member States, where the 
pharmaceutical medicines are more expensive, have a Significantly longer best before 
date then they may become preferable in spite of the price variation. This technique 
could be considered analogous to degradation of the product in the expensive market for 
resale in the cheaper market (For example, business and home software). Some people 
critique this marketing strategy as risking the manufacturing company's goodwill. This 
however, in my opinion is an incorrect view. Nevertheless see Goodbody, A., and 
Goodbody, L., 'How to Protect Your Business Against Parallel Imports - Legally!' (17 
February 2005) HG.org. Available at: <http://www.hg.org/articles/article_1174.html> (Last 
Accessed: 1 st July 2009) 
746 See Criminal Intelligence Service Canada. Available at: 
<http://www.cisc.gc.ca/pharmaceuticals/pharmaceuticals_e.html> (Last Accessed: 15t July 
2009) 
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allowing pharmaceutical grey markets to thrive presents a danger to public 
health and security,747 therefore regulation to prevent parallel importing 
has to be carefully thought out. There are however instances where some 
governmental sympathy to the buyers has led to a relaxation in customs 
seizures.748 Nevertheless, as buying pharmaceuticals abroad becomes 
easier and vendors' websites become increasingly persuasive749 it will be 
extremely interesting to see the effect on the European and USA national 
markets. 
4.1.2. Monopsony 
The idea of the monopsony in the pharmaceutical market is to combine 
buyers into a monopolistic body to counter the effect of the monopolistic 
seller. Whilst the monopolistic seller retains their price-setting power and 
can continue to try and obtain above-normal profit, the seller is constrained 
by the highest price that the monopolist buyer is willing to pay. 
747 World Health Organization, Fact Sheet Nil 275 (14 November 2006) Available at 
<http://www.who.inUmediacentre/factsheets/fs275/en/> (Last Accessed: 1s1 July 2009) 
748 USA consumers have for many years bought small quantities of prescription drugs 
either whilst in Canada or by order through the internet. It is illegal to import 
pharmaceuticals into the USA and tight customs regulations meant that in the past most 
of these 'supplies' were seized at the Canadian border by USA customs. Seizures of 
small quantities of medicines for personal use, have been relaxed. See: Kermode-Scott, 
B., 'US eases its restrictions on prescription drugs from Canada' (21 October 2006) 333 
(7573) BMJ 824. 
749 Consider for example: www.CanadianPharmacyTrust.com - " ... no hidden fees, 
shipping to all 50 states, ... savings up to 80% off on all your prescriptions, ... " Available 
at: <http://www.canadianpharmacytrust.com/> (Last Accessed: 111 July 2009) 
355 
Thus, the decision of price becomes a negotiation between the two 
determinant players. On the one hand the monopolist seller has a good 
that the monopolist buyer needs, but on the other hand the monopolist 
seller needs to recoup their investment and continue to find other products 
for the monopolist buyer. 
" ... [W]hat creation of the second monopolist [(the monopolist buyer)] 
does is, not to bring prices to the natural, or competitive, point, but 
to render them indeterminate over a considerable range ... ,,750 
The monopolist seller has a time constraint and no other way to vend their 
goods or recover costs than through the monopolist buyer. 
Negotiating experience also differs between the seller and buyer; the 
monopolist seller although they may bargain and make many substantial 
exchanges with the monopolist buyer, the monopolist buyer will make 
many fold the number of exchanges with sellers in other products. 
Moreover, the monopolist buyer has limited resources to allocate and a 
time scale in which it may spend those resources. As the monopolist 
buyer cannot purchase therapies for all conditions they are forced to 
prioritise: Thus, increasing the pressure on the seller to achieve an 
agreed sale price rather than have their products bypassed for those of 
another product that the monopolist buyer also finds desirable. 
750 Pigou, A. C., The Economics of Welfare [Macmillan, 4th Ed., 1932, London] 358 
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The monopolist seller is further limited by the application of competition 
rules to the distribution of their product. The monopolist buyer suffers no 
handicap through its concentration, on the contrary its concentration gives 
it an almost perfect monopsony. There is however the principle of 
exhaustion to contemplate. If different national markets within an 
economic union practicing free movement of goods negotiated different 
prices and the distribution of those medicines was not limited, then parallel 
importing would occur and a monopsony would not occur. However, the 
definition of a monopsony is sufficiently flexible for a buyer to agree to pay 
different prices in different places, but the essential factor is the existence 
of a singular buyer for the whole market. 
In theory monopsony may reduce the deadweight within the pricing of 
pharmaceuticals. Monopsony though requires enlightenment by the buyer 
and frank disclosure of costs by the seller if it is going to move towards 
dynamiC efficiency, otherwise it may only balance short run costs or at the 
other end of the spectrum allow excess profit. 
In practice government might on some occasions be considered to employ 
monopsonistic leveraging when negotiating price regulation with industry 
representatives and manufacturers. Considering the statutory powers 
poised for application to pharmaceutical companies that do not join the 
new voluntary UK PPRS, the government wields more than monopsonistic 
bargaining power. Indeed because of the government's relationship and 
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responsibilities to its citizens, and government's financial interest in 
pharmaceutical industry funding, it would be an incorrect view to consider 
government, as is, a monopoly buyer. Certain agencies may be 
considered to have monopsonistic tendencies, but again these through the 
lack of a strict administrative separation of powers bargain through a set of 
parameters arising through a complexity of political, as well as economic 
factors. Even without consideration of the political distortions government 
wields on behalf of their national health schemes and government's 
interest in funds from pharmaceutical companies, within the present 
system there is not monopsony: large buyers such as the National Health 
Service are in a stronger position than other buyers, but there are 
concurrent buyers overseas, over the counter, and private professional 
health organisations. 
Furthermore, setting one price for all sectors of demand for a product may 
not be practicable, or may be disadvantageous to particular sectors. 
When considering the different sectors of demand that might exist for a 
product there are two which illustrate the difficulties in determining the 
price. Firstly, the economic prosperity of the population will determine 
what people can pay for a medicine or the funds available in a government 
purchase scheme. Consider that in April 2008 the median weekly pay for 
an employee in the UK was £479 GBP,751 whilst in the following poorest 
countries: Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Georgia, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, and Uganda, there are populations that 
751 Office of National Statistics, Annual Survey of Hours & Earnings 2008. Available at: 
<http://www.statistics.gov .uklStatBase/Product.asp?vlnk=131 01 > 
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live on less than one dollar USD a day.752 The magnitude of the disparity 
between the available resources is staggering. Moreover, in these poorest 
countries the prevalence of disease is much greater than the UK, as a 
result of climatic, education, and developmental factors. Consider the 
differences in available capital for both the population of the UK and the 
population of these poorest countries to receive the same medicines would 
require considerable price discrimination, with some form of subsidy 
scheme. Practically the monopsony would be extremely difficult to 
implement if it attempted to promote health care on a basis of equality. 
Moreover, ensuring pharmaceutical access in the poorer countries may 
engender further problems from the monopsony. More than one buyer, 
but only one per sector might alleviate some of the difficulties in decision 
policy. But in effect this would be third degree price discrimination and as 
we noted above in some circumstances it would result in parallel 
importing. 
Monopsony may increase the bargaining position of the buyer so that a 
clear accounting of innovation costs could be obtained, thereby removing 
some of the threat value from the 'research and development scare 
card.'753 However, many of the advantages conveyed by monopsony 
might be better obtained through government intervention in the form of 
direct legislation on the points of interest. Improved safety of medicines 
752 US Department of State - Human Rights Reports. Available at: 
<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrptlindex.htm> (Last accessed 15\ March 2011) 
753 See Public Citizen, Rx R&D Myths: The Case Against The Drug Industry's R&D 
"Scare Card" 2001. Available from Public Citizen at: 
<http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACFDC.PDF> (Last Accessed: 15\ July 2009) 
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and a more honest evaluation of a medicine's effectiveness and suitability 
would already be a considerable improvement. Indirectly this might be 
obtained through product liability under monopsony, but this would be 
unsatisfactory. As although the monopolistic buyer could seek redress 
from the monopolistic seller this would not remove deadweight from the 
monopolistic buyer's initial purchase of medicines for target groups in 
which they have little more, or less effectiveness than a placebo, or 
prevent the suffering resulting from the administration of medicines to 
groups that are unsuitable recipients of the medicines. 
4.2. Propositions for availability. 754 
Most proposals principally target accessibility. However, both the 
Pharmaceutical Innovation Fund (4.3.1.) and Medical Innovation Prize 
Fund (4.4.1) recognise the dearth of industry focus on therapeutic 
improvements and utilise assessment of therapeutic improvement to 
determine the size of payouts for patented inventions. This is likely to 
have desirable results in stimulating more drugs that are therapeutic 
improvements and thus will have a positive impact on availability. 
4.2.1 Pharmaceutical Innovation Fund 
"The key to unblocking the impasse of high drug prices is to reward 
drug innovators based on the therapeutic value their products 
754 By availability we refer to whether drugs are existent, thereby encompassing the 
development of new medicines, and by accessibility we refer to the opportunity for as 
many people as possible to benefit from existent medicines. 
360 
create through a national government-funded Pharmaceutical 
Innovation Fund.,,755 
The objective of this proposal is to alleviate inefficiencies caused by high 
drug prices and to direct pharmaceutical research towards innovations that 
are more desirable to society. The pharmaceutical innovation fund is a 
scheme that runs alongside the patent system. It involves the 
establishment of a fund, supplied by government capital that is responsible 
for making payments based on the therapeutic advances that a qualified 
invention makes. 
It is not clear if all pharmaceuticals qualifying for the fund are automatically 
subject to zero cost compulsory licensing of their patent, or whether this 
only occurs when the fund makes a payment. 
Payments from the fund are specified as being large enough to be 
preferable to returns that a pharmaceutical company might receive through 
the patent system. A figure of $1.2 billion USD for yearly payments is 
provided as an indication. A yearly pool of $60 billion USD has been 
755 Hollis A. An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation. 2005; 2. 
Available at: <http://econ.ucalgary.ca/fac-files/ah/drugprizes.pdf> (Last Accessed: 1 SI July 
2009) 
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suggested to provide adequate incentives for invention in the USA,756 or 
global funds of about $120 billion USD.757 
Qualifying medicines will be restricted to those "whose primary 
purpose is to improve health outcomes."758 
One suggested method of measuring health outcomes is through the use 
of Quality Adjusted Life Years (QAL Ys). A government agency would 
assign a drug a QAL Y rating allowing the extent to which it improved the 
quality of life and/or extended life compared with the next best treatments 
available. 
QAL Ys are based on the number of years of life that would be gained as a 
result of a therapeutic intervention. A number between 1.0 and 0 is 
awarded for the quality of health in a given year. 1.0 is awarded for a year 
of perfect health and 0 for death. Health that falls below 'perfect' receives 
a score between 1.0 and O. They are often employed in Cost-utility 
analysis. For example, it is believed that from January 2005 that the 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) has operated a 
756 Hollis A. An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation. 2005; 15 
Available at: <http://econ.ucalgary.ca/fac-files/ah/drugprizes.pdf> (Last Accessed: 1 sl July 
2009) 
757 Hollis A. An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation. 2005; 15 
Available at: <http://econ.ucalgary.ca/fac-files/ah/drugprizes.pdf> (Last Accessed: 1 sl July 
2009) 
758 Hollis A. An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation. 2005; 2 
Available at: <http://econ.ucalgary.ca/fac-files/ah/drugprizes.pdf> (Last Accessed: 151 July 
2009) 
362 
cost-effective threshold at about £30,000 per QAL y.759 Thus, where a 
therapeutic intervention is considered to have an incremental cost of more 
than £30,000 per additional QAL Y gained the intervention will not be 
deemed cost-effective. Whereas, interventions with an incremental cost 
of less than or equal to £30,000 per additional QAL Y gained may qualify 
as cost-effective. 
Although QAL Ys are sometimes suggested to enable standardised 
comparisons to be made between the therapeutic benefits of different 
drugs, they are often as a tool of standardised assessment vitiated by 
subjectivity.76o 
QALYs provide the best attempt so far to solve the problem of measuring 
health care outcomes but they still suffer from a number of serious 
problems. A key question is who is to make the subjective choices which 
determine the QAL Y? Is it health professionals, the general public or 
patients who have experience of the particular medical condition and 
treatment? Experiments have shown that the value of a QAL Y can change 
759 Devlin. N.; Parkin. D. Does NICE have a cost-effectiveness threshold and what other 
factors influence its decisions? A binary choice analysis. (2004) 13 (5) Health Economics 
437-52 
760 Drummond. M. F .. Output measurement for resource allocations in health care. (1989) 
5 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 59-74; Gerard. K .. Mooney. G .. QALY league tables: 
three paints for concern-goal difference matters. [Aberdeen: Departments of Public 
Health and Economics. 
1992. University of Aberdeen] (Health Economics Research Unit discussion paper 04/92) 
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radically according to who is making the choices. 761 Other problems 
include the fact that the responses given are to hypothetical situations and 
so may not accurately reflect people's real decisions, and that valuations 
are influenced by the length of the illness and the way in which the 
questions are asked.762 
Moreover, QAL Ys may in many cases undervalue the value of a particular 
therapeutic intervention because they do not take account of externalities, 
such as the gain for the patient's family and friends, as well as the value of 
a patient's labour which will be gained as a result of the therapeutic 
intervention. 
Although the proposal has as an objective improvement in the efficiency of 
research and development its impact on deadweight factors is limited. It is 
more effective than the patent system at diverting resources into 
inventions that present therapeutic advances, because it increases the 
rewards for these inventions over beyond rewards otherwise available 
under the patent system. Assuming that the number of users of the 
761 Loomes, G., and McKenzie, L. 'The Use of QAL Ys in Health Care Decision Making' 
(1989) 28 Social Science and Medicine 299-308 
762 Bell, C. M., Urbach, D. R., Ray, J. G., Bayoumi, A., Rosen, A. B., Greenberg, D., 
Neumann, P. J., 'Is Everything in Health Care Cost-Effective? Bias in Published Cost-
Effectiveness Studies' (2006) 332 BMJ 699-703; Brauer C, Greenberg D, Rosen AB, 
Neumann PJ. 'Trends in the Use of Health Utilities in Published Cost-Utility Analyses' 
20069(4) Value in Health 213-218; Hahn RW, Kosec K, Neumann PJ Wallsten S. 'What 
Affects the Quality of Economic Analysis for Life-Saving Investments?' (2006) 26(3) Risk 
Analysis 641-55; Talmor, D., Shapiro, N., Greenberg, D., Stone, PW., Neumann, P. J., 
'When is Critical Care Medicine Cost-Effective? A Systematic Review of the Cost-
Effectiveness Literature' (2006) 34(11) Critical Care Medicine 2738-2747 
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pharmaceutical product remained unchanged then the Pharmaceutical 
Innovation Fund would necessarily be more expensive in developing 
pharmaceuticals than the present patent system. However, because the 
price of the manufactured pharmaceutical under the fund is much lower 
than it would be under the present patent system, then the number of 
users may increase. As the number of users increases then the unit cost 
of the product under the Pharmaceutical Innovation Fund falls. Thus, 
despite the cost of the fund it may present a more efficient system for 
research and development inducement for some conditions, than the 
present patent system. 
Unfortunately, this proposal retains the costs of the patent institutions and 
perhaps the correlative cultural legacy of litigation as a method of 
determining what is a valid invention, the state of the art or the distribution 
of rewards from the fund. All of which are costs that are unnecessary to 
the invention of pharmaceutical technologies. The Pharmaceutical 
Innovation Fund does not modernise knowledge generation or take into 
account organisational paradigms that improve the efficiency of 
pharmaceutical innovation. Nor, does the fund make improvements to the 
safety of new pharmaceutical innovation products. It may well create 
additional incentive for ghost written reports and bogus clinical trial data. 
"Governments also intervene in pharmaceutical markets in most countries 
through extensive regulation, price controls and purchases. In the 
proposed system, government would not be involved in the market at all, 
365 
but would retrospectively determine the therapeutic benefit of an 
innovation in order to make a payment to the patentee . .,763 
One of the suggested factors in the government's evaluation of the payout 
that a pharmaceutical will receive are, in addition to the QAL Y, the annual 
sales figures for the pharmaceutical: The more units sold the greater the 
size of the payout for the pharmaceutical.764 If this is the case, then this 
proposal is likely to exacerbate marketing expenditure and safety. 765 
4.2.2. Medical Innovation Prize Fund 
The medical innovation prize fund766 is another incentive system that is 
very similar to the Pharmaceutical Innovation Fund. It also retains the 
patent system and has no direct incidence on the process of research and 
development. Patents over pharmaceutical technologies are obtained as 
they are now. However, the pharmaceutical patent no longer grants a 
763 Hollis A. An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation. 2005; 2 
Available at: <http://econ.ucalgary.ca/fac-files/ah/drugprizes.pdf> 
764 "".the innovator ... would have an incentive to market the drug so as to increase the 
volume of sales on which it could earn points." Hollis A. An Efficient Reward System for 
Pharmaceutical Innovation. 2005: 11-12 Available at: <http://econ.ucalgary.ca/fac-
fi lesl ah/d rug prizes. pdf> 
765 Baker, D., 'Financing Drug Research: What are the Issues?' (2004) Issue Brief, Center 
for Economic and Policy Research. Available at: 
<http://www.who.intlinteliectualproperty/news/en/Submission-Baker.pdf>(Last Accessed: 
1 st July 2009) 
766 Love, J., and Hubbard, T., 'The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines' 
(2007) 82 (3) Chicago-Kent Law Review 1519-1546. However, the proposal is still 
actively under development. See, Love, J., and Hubbard, T., 'The Big Idea: Prizes to 
Stimulate R&D for New Medicines' (Revised 26th March 2007) Available at: 
<http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/bigidea-prizes.pdf> (Last accessed 1 ih December 
2011) 
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monopoly right by excluding competitors from utilising the invention. 
Instead the patent ensures that the patent holder will receive a reward 
from a large public fund. The suggested period for this reward is ten 
years, and the size of the reward is to be determined on the basis of the 
therapeutic benefit that the new medicine conveys. It has been suggested 
that such a fund would be 0.6 per cent of GDP.767 
The particular objective of the fund is to encourage the development of 
more medicines that constitute therapeutic advances. As a result it 
presents a considerable refinement to the patent system's utilitarianist 
ambition of directing resources into the channels of greatest usefulness. It 
is also likely to be more effective than the pharmaceutical innovation prize 
fund, from which it was perhaps conceived, as it applies to all 
pharmaceutical patents not merely to those whose purpose is 'to improve 
health outcomes.' 
This has the result that pharmaceuticals which pose no therapeutic 
advance will receive no money from the fund and yet be available for all 
manufacturers to produce without the payment of royalties. 
767 Love, J., 'Would cash prizes promote cheap drugs?' (2007) 2629 The New Scientist 
(online). Available at: <http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg 19626296.1 OO-would-cash-
prizes-promote-cheap-drugs.html> (Last Accessed: 18t July 2009). The HR417 proposal 
sets the Fund total at 0.5 per cent of the U.S. GOP Love, J., and Hubbard. T., 'The Big 
Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines' (Revised 26th March 2007) Available at: 
<http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/bigidea-prizes.pdf> (Last accessed 12'h December 
2011) at 13 
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An interesting question is why the patent system features in the 
mechanism of the fund at all? As monopolist rights are eschewed in 
favour of promoting competition to drive down the price of the 
manufactured product, the presence of the patent system in the chain is 
dead weight. Moreover, the fund fails to address another important 
problem of the present pharmaceutical system, i.e. the small percentage of 
the price of pharmaceutical products that is reinvested in research. Whilst 
the fund shifts the burden from the consumer and perhaps lowers the 
overall cost to society in providing the medicines, a large portion of the 
fund's payouts will still not be directed towards further research. 
Moreover, some nations are better equipped both in resources and 
expertise to conduct pharmaceutical research, as always some markets 
will be of greater reward than others. Will assessment of the 
pharmaceutical's therapeutic advance be performed with respect to 
conditions within the national jurisdiction, or will it be a global assessment? 
For example sleeping sickness is not normally experienced in the USA, 
thus a medicine that is extremely effective against sleeping sickness 
compared to the current state of the art treatments, would receive little or 
no payout from the fund if the assessment is for USA conditions only. On 
the other hand if the fund takes account of conditions globally, will the 
prinCipal source of the fund's capital, the American citizen be content to 
36~ 
payout? If the fund is global then political and national issues may be 
factors. 768 
Currently the patent fails as an 'index of social usefulness' although 
rewards and prizes do constitute encouragement for activity to take place. 
If the inventive genius of the inventors is to be considered as an iff of the 
innovation occurring, the patent system suggests that the inventive genius 
is less valuable than the capital of the investor. We see this in the 
ownership rights an employer exerts by default over employee's 
inventions.76g As well as in the differing remuneration the inventor and 
investor receive. Since the innovators receive less return than the 
manufacturer, who is in the pharmaceutical patent system both the 
employer and the cumulative body of the investor.77o The use of patents 
as an index for prizes is unlikely to be straightforward. The person or team 
that made the breakthrough, on which the prize winning patent was based, 
might not be the owners of the patent or even mentioned on the patent 
application except as prior art. Furthermore, which should be the 
qualifying patent, as the active ingredients of the winning pharmaceutical 
will most likely be the subject of multiple patents? There will certainly be 
patents on the aspects of the product, as well as on its manufacture and 
768 Baker, D., 'Financing Drug Research: What are the Issues?' (2004) Issue Brief, Center 
for Economic and Policy Research. Available at: 
<http://www.who.intlinteliectualproperty/news/en/Submission-Baker.pdf> (Last Accessed: 
1 sl July 2009) 
769 See §39( 1) Patents Act 1977 
770 Outsourcing of manufacture which has recently become possible is increasingly being 
adopted by larger former research manufacturers, as well as very small biotechnology 
companies. 
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its manner of administration. If these patents lie in different hands which 
owner will qualify for the prize? The Medical Innovation Prize Fund has a 
clever answer to the problem of evaluating prize payments to particular 
patents. Patents on FDA approved products would be usable by generic 
manufacturers and the inventor (is this used synonymously with patent 
holder or refer only to the names listed as inventors within the patent 
application?) would use the frequency with which their patents were used 
to make a prize claim from the Fund.771 However, when deciding prizes 
will any additional weighting be given to the patent holders who funded the 
clinical trials that enabled FDA approval? Or will patent holders on the 
approved therapy only benefit from the frequency by which generic 
producers utilise their patents? 
The patent system places the onerous of determining the utility of a 
pharmaceutical invention, and the value of particular patents, on the patent 
owners through the medium of legal contention and market reception. 
That legal contention is expensive and this in turn increases the costs of 
patent filing as applicants attempt to make their positions as strong as 
possible. Thus, even with the complications of deciding the allocation of 
funds amongst different patent holders of the chosen therapy, the Medical 
Innovation Prize fund may constitute a cheaper method of determining 
utility. 
771 Love, J., and Hubbard, T., 'The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines' 
(Revised 26th March 2007) Available at: <http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/bigidea-
prizes. pdf> (Last accessed 1ih December 2011) at 16 
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Marketing has a strong incidence on demand and is another drain on 
possible investment in research and development and a contributor to the 
reduced accessibility of medicines. The criteria used to determine utility 
will be extremely important regarding the incentives of competitors for the 
prize fund to create an impression of utility through marketing and false 
reporting of safety and therapeutic value. The assessment criteria are 
also significant for interest in diseases, such as Orphan diseases, which 
effect a small proportion of populations. 
HR 417 is a practical suggestion of the Medical Prize Fund and the 
general rules under which the fund would administer prizes.772 The general 
rules state that companies who register new medicines with the FDA will 
compete for rewards by providing evidence of the inventions benefit 
patients based on measured improvements to health outcomes. 
Assessment criteria include, 
"(1) The number of patients who benefit from a drug, biological 
product, or manufacturing process including (in cases of global 
neglected diseases, global infectious diseases, and other global 
public health priorities) the number of non-United States patients. 
(2) The incremental therapeutic benefit of a drug, biological product, 
or manufacturing process, compared to existing drugs, biological 
772 Love, J., and Hubbard, T., 'The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines' 
(Revised 26
th 
March 2007) Available at: <http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/bigidea-
prizes.pdf> (Last accessed 12th December 2011) at 13 
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products, and manufacturing processes available to treat the same 
disease or condition. 
(3) The degree to which the drug, biological product, or 
manufacturing process addresses priority health care needs, 
including: 
a. Current and emerging global infectious diseases; 
b. Severe illnesses with small client populations (such as 
indications for which orphan designation has been granted 
under section 526 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (21 U.S.C. 360bb»; and 
c. Neglected diseases that primarily afflict the poor in 
developing countries. 
(4) Improved efficiency of manufacturing processes for drugs or 
biological processes." 
Since the fund pays out over 10 years, there is scope for assessment of a 
pharmaceuticals true effectiveness, rather than overly optimistic 
proprietary trial data. Thus, although early payments may be made, later 
payments could be withheld as changes in the number of patients taking 
the medicine or the incremental therapeutic benefit is revealed to be less. 
This might be the case anyway if new assessments and rankings of 
medicines are made each year. 
Moreover if the HR417 Medical Prize Fund has legal capacity, prize 
payments based on false indicators and data about the drugs from the 
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company registering the new product can be recouped with damages. 
Legal capacity will also mean that the Medical Prize Fund has liability in 
formulating its decision. Which may not be a problem if the sources of 
information and manner of deliberation are clearly set out and followed. 
Love and Hubbard argue for a 'non-voluntary' scheme.773 Whether the 
scheme is voluntary or compulsory also has an impact on the liabilities of 
competitors. Whether the compulsory or voluntary nature would effect the 
liabilities of the Medical Prize Fund are beyond my knowledge of USA 
constitutional and administrative law. In the UK if such a scheme were 
compulsory then the Medical Prize Fund would be subject to judicial 
review of its operation and decisions. This would be in addition to the 
contractual undertakings that it made in operating the prize fund. 774 A 
compulsory scheme would make more sense: Consider, the circumstance 
where the scheme is not compulsory and the patents on an FDA approved 
product are held in different hands. If one of those patent holders does not 
wish to be part of the scheme, this would affect payments to the 
volunteering patent owner and undermine the scheme's effectiveness. 
Although the Medical Innovation Prize Fund makes no direct changes to 
market approval regulation, it may have consequences for the party 
funding the drug trials and the time taken to reach market approval might 
773 Love, J., and Hubbard, T., 'The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines' 
(Revised 26th March 2007) Available at: <http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/bigidea-
prizes. pdf> (Last accessed 12'h December 2011) at 15 
774 Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1893] 1 a.B. 256 
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be an important factor. Moreover, would data exclusivity conditions still 
apply? Considering the objective of the fund to promote early competition 
it is likely that data exclusivity restrictions would be abridged or 
discontinued. As the fund pays out after therapeutic advances have been 
determined, does the fund shift the burden of clinical trials into the hands 
of companies with sufficient capital to afford the clinical trial outlay? If it 
does then it continues the present status quo rather than stimulating small 
sized patent holders to undertake clinical trials and product approval. The 
effect of the Fund in terms of borrowing and investment must be 
considered. Investors in pharmaceutical companies are familiar with the 
share impact a patent might have; how will the Fund alter their investment 
behaviour? 
Contractual relations between the Fund and competitors may drain Fund 
resources particularly where incorrect data allows a new product applicant 
to earn a prize when they should not have done. Thus, the scheme would 
benefit from a clause requiring the Fund's legal costs in recovering 
wrongly claimed prizes to be automatically met by the product applicant 
who submitted misleading information. However this is complicated by 
payments that have been made to third party patent holders on the 
qualifying product. Whilst these parties were not party to the data 
submitted in support of FDA approval they will have received prize 
payouts. Since a significant component of FDA application information is 
subject to confidentiality, the Fund's access to this information needs to be 
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considered. Unless the fund can recover wrongly made payments then 
the fund poses no positive indicia for the safety of products. 
Some products may not initially qualify for prizes, and although they later 
would the assessment may occur too late to permit sustainable 
development of medicines within that company's environment. This may 
or may not be a desirable outcome as the failure of that competitor would 
suggest inefficiency. However the failure may be based in a lack of 
success securing interim capital, rather than research and development 
inefficiency. This might be the case if the invention was targeted at poor 
populations. 
Furthermore, there is no indication that the fund will have consequences 
on the submission of data and the accuracy of reporting. However, it 
would present the advantage that the FDA would be less likely to consider 
information concerning significant negative indications commercially 
sensitive, and thus not reveal it to consumers.775 
4.2.3. Tax Incentives 
Differences in the taxation of company profits have been noted to 
influence company decisions on where to locate their activities. As a 
775 Dobson, R., and Lenzer, J., 'US regulator suppresses vital data on prescription drugs 
on sale in Britain' (June 12, 2005) The Independent. Available at: 
<http://www.independent.co.ukllife-style/health-and-familiesIhealth-
news/article493903.ece> (Last Accessed: 18\ July 2009) 
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result, tax rates and tax incentives have a rich history of being used to 
attract company activity. 
The UK's basic rate of corporate taxation is thirty per cent, which is lower 
than corporate taxation in most of its developed competitor countries. In 
addition to lower corporation tax the UK also offers significant inducement 
for research and development through research and development tax 
credits. These are particularly pertinent to pharmaceutical companies 
whose activities may include some research. The available incentive 
varies with the size of the company. For small or medium sized 
companies 150 per cent tax relief for research and development 
expenditure is available on staff and material costs. Large companies can 
claim 125 per cent tax relief for research and development expenditure on 
staff and material costS.776 
As a means of encouraging research activity within the corporate sector, 
tax incentives are utilised in the USA, Canada and by all the member 
states of the European Union. They are not however, ubiquitously without 
critics. 777 
The obvious method of utilising tax credits to improve the availability of 
medicines has been through alterations in the magnitude of the incentive. 
776 HM Revenue and Customs (UK). Available at: <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/randd/> (Last 
Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
777 Griffith, R. (2000) 'How important is business R&D for economic growth and should the 
government subsidise it?' Briefing Note No. 12, The Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
Available at: <http://www.ifs.org.uklbns/bn12.pdf> (Last Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
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This however, must be considered in the broader context of national 
attempts to resituate research and development industries within their own 
dominion and the perception of the benefits that increases in national 
research and development have on national welfare, rather than a 
legitimate interest in promoting research and development globally. The 
use of tax credits to improve the accessibility of pharmaceuticals is not as 
straightforward. 
A proposal has been made to utilise a tax credits to encourage 
pharmaceutical companies to lower drug prices. Which would make the 
proposal an attempt to improve the accessibility of medicines. It does not 
replace the patent system, rather companies would receive a rebate on 
the tax due on their profits for that product based on the changes that they 
make to the price relative to the marginal cost of drugs.778 How clearly 
these changes can be assessed is unclear, as is the body that will 
administer the credits and the qualification criteria. 
Moreover, the gains in the reduction of pharmaceutical product prices are 
translated into a deficit in the receipt of money that the government would 
receive. Whilst the net income of the pharmaceutical company on the 
product will be increased, or stay the same. Thus, generation of the 
pharmaceutical products would not necessarily become more effective or 
cheaper. What happens under this system is that there is a slight change 
in the sources of revenue for the qualifying pharmaceutical company. The 
778 Lybecker, K. M, and Freeman, R. A., 'Funding pharmaceutical innovation through 
direct tax credits' (2007) 2 Health Economics, Policy and Law 267-284 
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essence of the proposal is that customers pay less and the government 
receives less money in tax. Where this scheme becomes attractive is 
where companies that intend to market products abroad qualify. This 
makes the State offering the tax credits more favourable as a discount is 
only required on the national product and the tax credits can be earned 
without restriction of product pricing in other countries. 
Another proposal utilising tax credits involves redirecting research towards 
medicines that present therapeutic advances, rather than regulation of 
prices. Instead of receiving tax credits for all research, the tax credits 
would only be available for research on designated conditions. 779 
However, there are a number of difficulties. With no limitation 
mechanisms for pricing, the loss of tax incentives from research and 
development on non-designated conditions would be transferred to 
product prices for medicines on designated conditions. Non-designated 
conditions would still present attractive markets and continue to be 
researched, most likely within the same facilities and by the same staff as 
designated conditions. Moreover, it is likely that many medicines for non-
designated conditions would be found, at least until independent research 
demonstrated otherwise, useful for prophylaxis of designated conditions. 
779 The report speCifically talks about WHO Essential Medicines, indicating that the author 
has no knowledge of how WHO Essential Medicines are identified. I have taken the 
liberty of substituting 'designated conditions.' What constitutes a 'designated condition' is 
best left to a National Health authority based on their disease demographics. 
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"All too often, the production of financial capital seems to occur at the 
expense of social and natural capital. ,,7S0 
As seen in the previous chapter, the creation of a less problematic and 
effective system for generating and distributing medicines is difficult to 
envisage where innovation incentives are focused on the economic value 
derivable from the medicine itself rather than the wider impact of that 
medicine on human life. Managing incentives in a system as complex as 
pharmaceutical innovation is not a straightforward task. The main failing 
of the proposals in Chapter 4 is that they are primarily focused on post-
patent supply and do not alleviate safety concerns or modernise our 
research methodology for pharmaceuticals. 
The material in this Chapter takes a different approach, to improving 
accessibility, availability and safety, to the proposals in Chapter 4. In 
many ways it is radical, because it seeks to move away from proprietary 
methods of controlling inventive pharmaceutical knowledge. It is focussed 
on reducing the difference between the price and marginal cost of 
available medicines (5.1), modernising pharmaceutical research on the 
basis of contemporary technologies and historic lesson (5.2), and on 
improving safety (5.3). Thus, it is organised along the same line as 
780 Senge, P. M., The Fifth Discipline: The art and practice of learning organization 
[Random House Business Books, 2006, London] xiii. Within the context of pharmaceutical 
innovation this quotation is a provocative stimUlation for a speculative thesis: Consider, 
without being constrained to the institutions which exist today, how pharmaceutical 
innovation might be achieved with the wealth of technologies available and humankind's 
immense ingenuity. 
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Chapter 4's proposals were organised and assessed; that is accessibility, 
availability and safety. 
5.1. Improving accessibility 
Early freedom in the uptake of pharmaceutical technology ought to be 
facilitated if the objective of pharmaceutical innovation is to provide new or 
improved therapies for people suffering conditions. As we saw in Chapter 
4 the significant proposals to improve the accessibility of medicines were 
mechanisms of forcing lower prices. Our solution for lowering the prices of 
available pharmaceuticals is completely different. Our methodology is to 
unlink the pressures of availability and accessibility (5.1.1. Research 
Disjoined) and our methodology for doing this is to extinguish property 
rights over pharmaceutical knowledge (5.1.2. Abandoning Pharmaceutical 
Patents) and thereby promote competition between manufacturers. 
5.1.1. Manufacture Disjoined 
Uncoupling the cost of research from the price of medicines is initially very 
difficult to conceptualize. Throughout our lifetimes our indoctrination has 
been that the cost of innovating and testing pharmaceuticals must be 
recouped in the sale price of pharmaceuticals or no one would do it. As 
we have seen there are examples that show this is not the case, but the 
discussion of how decoupling manufacture from research impacts on 
research, the systems of incentive for generating new pharmaceutical 
knowledge, and the systems for testing that knowledge will be discussed 
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in 5.2. For the moment we are concerned with the legislative reforms 
necessary for the decoupling and their effect on accessibility. 
5.1.2. Abandoning Pharmaceutical Patents 
There is a lot of legislation concerning pharmaceutical ownership and 
intellectual property rights. There is more than for any other patentable 
area. The most significant legislation however, are the national Patent 
Acts. For example, in the UK this would be the addition of 
pharmaceuticals to the 'are not inventions' list of §1 (2) Patent Act 1977781 
and removal of entries specifically concerned with pharmaceuticals, such 
as §2(6), from the rest of the Act. 782 Depending on whether the transition 
is instant (with rights on currently patented pharmaceuticals extinguished) 
or a gradual phasing out (with no new patents for pharmaceuticals being 
awarded)783 then it may not be necessary to retain National use 
requirements.784 However, even if an instant change is adopted if other 
nations retain patents for pharmaceuticals provisions relating to the 
National services will be useful.785 
Textual alteration of the leading international treaties on patents is 
straightforward even if organising the political consensus is not. 
781 Also see Schedule A2 UK Patent Act 1977 as amended. 
782 The relevant sections for the UK Patent Act 1977 as amended are: §§1(2); 56(2)(b); 
56(4); 128A(1); 
783 Historically the addition of technology areas to non-patentable subject matter has been 
done by ceasing to grant new patents on the technologies and by revoking granted 
patents with compensation. See, 42 USC § 2181 - Inventions relating to atomic weapons 
784 For example, §56(4) UK Patent Act 1977 as amended. 
785 For example. §56(2)(b) UK Patent Act 1977 as amended. 
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TRIPs786 as the leading international agreement on intellectual property 
certainly requires amending,787 as does the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property 1883.788 More complicated are multilateral 
and bilateral trade agreements, and unified markets. For example removal 
of patents for pharmaceuticals within the European Union would require 
the amendment or annulment of 14 Directives789 and 26 Regulations. 79o 
However without pharmaceutical patents and exclusory practices, such as 
data exclusivity, we would expect competitive pharmaceutical manufacture 
to exaggerate the positive trends of old therapeutic areas in current day 
generic pharmaceutical markets, such as first generation analgesics. 
Thus, we would expect lower medicine prices, increased quality, and 
removal of inefficient producers from the market. Moreover, because 
process patents would not be available over pharmaceutical manufacture, 
dissemination of ideas should be more rapid which would lead to swifter 
improvements in pharmaceutical manufacturing, storage and distribution. 
786 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994 
787 Part I Article 39(3); Part II Articles 27(3) - on matters excluded from patentability; 39(3) 
- on data exclusivity encompassing pharmaceuticals; Part V may require renegotiation if 
some nations retain patents for pharmaceuticals. 
768 Article 1 (3) Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883 
789 2011/62/EU; 2010/84/EU; 2009/53/EC; 2009/120/EC; 2008/29/EC; 2005/28/EC; 
2004/27/EC; 2004/24/EC; 2003/94/EC; 2003/63/EC; 2002/98/EC; 2001/83/EC; 
2001/20/EC; 89/105/EEC 
790 EU/1235/201 0; EC/668/2009; EC/249/2009; 2009/219/EC; 2008/29/EC; 
2008/C243/01; EC/1234/2008; EC/312/2008; EC/1394/2007; EC/658/2007; 
EC/1902/2006; EC/1901/2006; EC/507/2006; EC/2049/2005; EC/1905/2005; 
EC/726/2004; EC/494/2003; EC/1085/200; 3EC/1084/2003; EC/847/2000; EC/141 /2000; 
EC/2743/98; EC/2141/96; EC/1662/95; EC/540/95; EC/297/95 
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Moreover, the production methods employed to manufacture and package 
medicines generally follows a constant returns to scale relation. That is 
that the cost of producing five-hundredth batch is almost the same as 
producing the second or third. The absence of artificial limitations on 
supply will have important connotations for the least economically wealthy 
nations, where even if local pharmaceutical manufacturing is unviable 
philanthropic assistance will have greater purchasing power. 
Employment in the pharmaceutical manufacturing sector will also be 
affected by reinstating pharmaceutical inventions as public goods. Without 
the pharmaceutical patent, and with the cost of research disjoined from the 
price of purchasing a medicine, the individuals earning many millions USD 
each year may no longer do SO,791 and pharmaceutical manufacturers 
might not perpetually remain amongst the top five most profitable 
industries each year. However, there would likely be no loss in the 
number of jobs within the pharmaceutical manufacturing industry. If the 
Indian experience is indicative of the effect of abolishing the patent, then 
there would be an increase in the number of jobs in the pharmaceutical 
791 For example. Miles White - Abbott - $33.4M; Fred Hassan - Schering-Plough - $30.1 M; 
Bill Weldon - Johnson & Johnson - $25.1 M; Bob Essner - Wyeth - $24.1 M. Data from: 
Staton. T. and Martino. M., 'Top 17 Paychecks in Big Pharma' (19 May 2008) 
FiercePharma. Available at: <http://www.fiercepharma.com/special-reports/top-17-
paychecks-big-pharma> (Last Accessed: 18\ July 2009) 
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manufacturing industry and an expansion of the industry's industrial 
capacity.792 
Furthermore, the incentive to innovate under a monopoly is not necessarily 
greater than the incentive to innovate in a competitive market. 793 Amongst 
the least economically wealthy nations, the countries not adopting strict 
patent policies have developed stronger domestic research facilities and 
been more innovative than the least economically wealthy nations that 
did. 794 
Whether pharmaceutical knowledge is a public or artificially private good is 
a choice of society. As we have stated knowledge is by nature a public 
792 Lanjouw, J. 0., 'The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in India: 
"Heartless ExplOitation of the Poor and Suffering"?' (1998) National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper, W6366. 
793 Ng, Y.-Q., 'Competition, Monopoly and the Incentive to Invent' (1971) 10 Australian 
Economic Papers 45-49. Paper re-establishes Arrow's conclusion showing that the 
incentive to invent is greater under competition than monopoly. The analysis has some 
conditions that need to be considered in context of pharmaceutical innovation, such as 
the ability of the second inventor to reverse engineer a product, or the value of pre-
invention incentives for non-drastic inventions. Unlike Davis, I find that the model is 
acceptable, with relation to pharmaceuticals, for both drastic and non-drastic inventions, 
admittedly pharmaceuticals can present a more complex situation as prices are also a 
function of marketing. See: Davies, K. 'Competition, Monopoly and the Incentive to 
Invent: A Comment' (1971) 14 Australian Economic Papers 128-131; Ng, Y.-Q., 
'Competition, Monopoly and the Incentive to Invent: A Reply' (1977) 16 Australian 
Economic Papers 154-156 
794 Brazil and India are examples of countries that were poor but did not implement strong 
pharmaceutical patent rights initially. Whilst Thailand and South Africa were poor, but 
implemented strong pharmaceutical patent rights. Also see, Davidson Frame, J., 
National Commitment to Intellectual Property Protection: An Empirical Investigation 
(1987) 2 Journal of Law and Technology 209-227 
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good. Neither pharmaceutical companies, nor patents, are natural 
persons; they are not endowed at birth with unalienable rights from God. 795 
They are created by governments and as such can be ended by 
governments, modified or adapted to best fit the needs of society. Such is 
the purpose of government to organise the rapports of society in society's 
best interests. What those interests are is not always clear or even easy 
to decide. However, it is clear that the pharmaceutical patent system 
currently makes pharmaceutical prices exclusive of many people who 
need them. 
5.1.3 Reduced Delay 
Any delay to availability or accessibility of medicines may have mortal or 
long-term detrimental consequences for people suffering the target 
condition. In this light it is preferable that available pharmaceutical 
therapies are accessible as soon as they are considered safe. 796 
There are substantial economic rewards for society in decoupling research 
from manufacturing and removing the patent from pharmaceuticals. We 
can currently see an indication of this from Germany and the UK. Both 
Germany and the UK pharmaceutical industries make significant gains 
795 Jefferson, T., (1776) ME 1 :29, Papers 1 :315. Transcription copy available at: 
<http://www.princeton .edu/-tjpapers/declaration/declaration .pdf> at 2 
796 Nelson and Merges argue that early freedom to use inventions should be an essential 
component of intellectual property, in the context of pharmaceutical therapies their 
arguments are especially poignant. See Merges, R, and Nelson, R R On the Complex 
Economics of Patent Scope. (1990) 90 Columbia Law Review: 839-916. Particularly at 
908. 
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from the manufacture of medicines without patents.797 This creates jobs, 
increases supply security and helps to converge supply and demand. 
In a market where competition on patentless medicines occurs, the 
centralised buyer, i.e. the NHS, is able to invest savings, from only paying 
research, development, clinical testing and manufacturing related costs for 
medicine innovation, improvement and supply. Moreover, a significant 
component of the public funds input will not be reallocated into private 
hands.79B Which will have a consequence on grey markets and the degree 
of risk manufacturers are willing to undertake to increase profits through 
illegal or dangerous practices. Moreover, even in these conditions 
pharmaceutical manufacturing may remain lucrative as the full extent of 
demand for pharmaceuticals is met. 
5.2. Improving Availability 
If research and manufacture are uncoupled, the costs superfluous to 
research removed, (for example marketing, lobbying and shareholder 
dividends). Moreover, if the same level of funding is directed to research 
797 Competitiveness and Performance Indicators 2004, PICTF. Available at: 
<http://www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uklpictf/2005indicators.pdf> (Last Accessed 
February 2006) 
798 "Tracking government-funded research to develop new treatments, a Spotlight team 
investigation revealed a billion-dollar taxpayers' subsidy for pharmaceutical companies 
already awash in profits. The investigation also documented a pattern of scientists and 
universities cashing in on government-funded inventions." See Dembner, A., 'Public 
handouts enrich drug makers, scientists' (April 5, 1998) The Boston Globe A 1 
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and development then research productivity should increase as a result of 
efficiency gains. This may entail other methods of collecting some of the 
funding that the population would save on medicine prices and channelling 
it into research and development to make up the previous industry 
investment on research. This could be done through a small increase in 
taxation. It would be an unpopular move, but the advantages in the instant 
change to the accessibility of medicines might offset its general 
unfavourable reception. Within the UK reductions in pharmaceutical prices 
would be less than in the USA which would mean that the UK would need 
a higher level of taxation than the USA to recuperate enough of consumer 
spending on pharmaceuticals to sustain research levels. 
There may be a slight shift from private health care in the UK to the NHS if 
savings allowed expansion of NHS services into areas where previously 
only private treatments were available. Changes in the USA would be 
viable without significant legislative intervention in domestic health 
insurance or Medicare. Both in the UK and USA there may be savings in 
health insurance premiums. 
Restoring pharmaceutical knowledge to a public good has more 
advantages than the increased purchasing power of capital spent on 
pharmaceuticals for both production and research. It permits 
implementation of the most productive pharmaceutical invention paradigm. 
We explained that the degree of testing necessary to achieve a successful 
dye disfavoured the single chemist.799 This is true of pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology research today. Nearly all researchers work in a laboratory 
they share with other researchers. Whilst they may conduct all the 
experiments of their research they will at some point interact intellectually 
with the ideas of the other researchers. Most likely they will even work in 
small teams. However, because knowledge that might lead to a 
pharmaceutical patent is potentially extremely valuable there is an innate 
bias towards secrecy and avoiding any collaborations that are not 
absolutely necessary. 
This same patent focused mentality also causes another loss to society. 
"The current innovation system encourages researchers to patent 
and commercialize discoveries that in an earlier era were 
considered basic science insights."soo 
Without the potential for pharmaceutical patents, basic science insights 
can exist again. Furthermore, with the loss of reticence to share 
knowledge collaborations and inter linking of expertise becomes 
preferable. 
799 Section 1.2.1. New Research Paradigm 
800 Taylor, P. L., 'Research sharing, ethics and public benefit' (2007) 25 Nature 
Biotechnology 398 - 401 
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5.2.1. Research Networking In the Digital Era 
According to DiMasi's uncertain estimates, 23 per cent of NCEs are 
granted FDA approval. 801 Kettler providing an update of DiMasi's cost 
estimates to 1997 values notes that the "cost of new drug development is 
critically dependent on the proportion of drugs that fail in clinical testing."a02 
Comanor utilises these propositions to infer that, 
"If recent scientific advances could reduce the proportion of failures, 
then the overall research costs would decline substantially. ,,803 
Knowledge sharing has been noted to reduce the cost of knowledge 
creation, with knowledge spill over an important component of 
industrial progress. 
Research networking and restoration of focus on the generation of high 
quality basic science will not be fully achieved in the field of 
pharmaceuticals in the presence of a pharmaceutical patent. There is too 
801 DiMasi, J. A., Hansen, W., Grabowski, H. G., Lasagna, L., Cost of Innovation in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, (1991) 10 Journal of Health Economics 107-142, at 121-126 
802 Kettler, H. E., Updating the Cost of a New Chemical Entity, [Office of Health 
Economics, 1999, London] at 26 
803 Comanor, W. S., The Pharmaceutical Research and Development Process, and its 
Costs. (1991) UCLA Research Program in Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy, paper 
99. At 4. 
Available from the eScholarship Repository at: <http://repositories.cdlib.org/pep/99-1 > 
(Last Accessed: 1st July 2009) 
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large a self-interest. However, we have strong indications that increased 
research networking improves pharmaceutical innovation productivity.Bo4 
Some economic models of knowledge transfer assume the cost of 
transferring knowledge to be zero. Practically this is not the case. 
Knowledge transfer in the pharmaceutical and chemical industries is not 
costless. Primarily there are costs involved in data storage, data transfer 
and then the expertise required to understand the data.8os Moreover 
where data is incomplete or requires experimentation to be fully 
understood there are other costs inherent to the transfer of knowledge 
which must be accounted for. Indeed amongst a survey of British firms 
knowledge transfer has been highlighted as the main reason for patent 
licensing agreements.8oe This is not the information and technical 
specifications provided in the patent application, but rather the know-how 
604 If the trends in the number of NCEs compared to R&D investment are plotted, then 
European research productivity as a proportion of investment has increased, whilst USA 
pharmaceutical innovative productivity as a proportion of investment has fallen, becoming 
almost flat. Donald Light suggests this difference is the result of the European initiative of 
bringing applied research scientists together. Such a view is supported by changes in the 
behaviour of the large better performing pharmaceutical companies over 2011, with their 
forging of strong collaborative links between academic research departments under a 
forum controlled and monitored by the pharmaceutical company (For example, the Open 
Innovation Drug Discovery Platform). See, Light. D., 'Global Drug Discovery: Europe Is 
Ahead' (2009) 28(5) Health Affairs 969-977 
605 Gambardella, A., 'Competitive advantages from in-house scientific research: The US 
pharmaceutical industry in the 1980s (1992) 21(5) Research Policy 391-407 
806 Taylor, CA, and Silberston, ZA, The economic impact of the patent system: A study 
of the British experience [Cambridge University Press,1 st Ed., 1973, Cambridge] 23. 
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and expertise of the inventors.807 Utilisation of the patent for this purpose 
adds another dimension of complexity and expense to the acquisition of 
information, where a contract would have been sufficient, 808 a contract 
and patent licensing agreement are required. 
With utilisation of digital media and the global infrastructure of internet 
communications the initial expense of establishing a system and 
maintaining it can be offset by the extremely low marginal costs of 
connecting more users, the increased ability of a larger group of 
specialists to contribute to research progress, the greater availability of 
information.8os There are many examples of where successful 
collaborations, with varying degrees of technology, are being routinely 
performed over the internet.81o 
607 Allen, T., and Cohen, S., 'Information Flow in Research and Development 
Laboratories' (1969) 14(1) Administrative SCience Quarterly 12-19 
608 Arora, A., 'Licensing tacit knowledge: Intellectual property rights and the market for 
know-how" (1995) 4 The Economics of Innovation and New Technology 41-59 
609 Bitzerab, P., and Schrder, J., 'Open Source Software, Competition and Innovation' 
(2007) 14(5) Industry & Innovation 461-476 
610 For example: Alliance for Cellular Signalling; BioBricks; BioForge; Biojava; BioPerl; 
BioPython; BioRuby; Bio-SPICE; GMOD; Human Genome Project; Simple Molecular 
Mechanics for Proteins; and the SNP Consortium. If these examples are not persuasive 
then consider the improvements that expanding research and development more broadly 
across an industry has compared to merely in-house research and development. For an 
analysiS of Germany see, Becker, W., and Dietz, J., 'R&D cooperation and innovation 
activities of firms-evidence for the German manufacturing industry' (2004) 33(2) 
Research Policy 209-223 
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5.2.2. Transaction Costs 
By allowing sustainable data sharing the internet has dramatically lowered 
transaction and technology transfer costs. 811 It has also provided more 
powerful retrieval tools and permitted the generation of much larger 
databases. It would be surprising if employment of its technologies in 
modernising, interlinking and opening research did not yield further 
advantages than have already been experienced over closed proprietary 
models of research.812 
There are three points of concern when trying to establish a specialist 
research network across the internet and these have been the subject of 
much study.813 
Firstly, there are the intermeshed issues of quality control and moderation 
of the database, which are also integrated into the parameters of who can 
contribute and the structure in which those contributions are added to the 
system. The degree of access to be granted might be based on being a 
member of a nationally recognised profession, or part of an institution, with 
all additions and amendments id stamped and dated. Security against 
malicious users and saboteurs has been utilised in many different open 
811 Wellcome Trust. 'Costs and Business Models in Scientific Research Publishing' (2003) 
Available at: <http://www.wellcome.ac.ukldoc_WTD003185.html> (Last Accessed: 1s1 July 
2009) 
812 Taylor, P. L., 'Research sharing, ethics and public benefit' (2007) 25 Nature 
Biotechnology 398 - 401 
813 An excellent resource on research collaboration via the internet is: Olson, G., 
Zimmerman, A, and Bas, N., (Eds.), Scientific Collaboration on the Internet [MIT Press, 
2008, 1st Ed., Cambridge, Massachusetts] 
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contribution projects. It has been found that such systems can be made 
robust by requiring authors to log in, so that their id stamp appears on the 
edit; flagging new content and amendments for a probationary period and I 
or until they are approved by another author; and by keeping a back-up 
archive that allows fine tuned reversion. The most useful current form of 
reversion is considered to be by author, by date or both. 
5.2.3. Content Quality 
Moderators pose another difficulty entirely. However, within the research 
communities and the medical profession there are already established 
hierarchies, where more senior members are responsible for the conduct 
of their lab members or clinical staff. Extending the responsibility to them 
of moderating their teams contributions would not in most cases be a great 
burden. Particularly as in the current climate of 'publish or perish' they are 
likely to be party to publications by their team members. Once posted, 
material should be flagged so that database users know that it is 
uncorroborated. The work would be unflagged once it was confirmed by 
the findings of a group independent of the initial entry, whose data would 
expand the statistical Significance of the data. Moreover, a second author 
to unflag database contributions is not a burdensome requirement as there 
are most likely other researchers in the same or very similar field that will 
read the contributions and utilise or repeat experimental components. A 
further advantage of this system is that it advertises the work of a research 
group intimately allowing for more frequent collaborations that are far less 
onerous to organise. The ability of other groups to expand or comment on 
394 
research findings also increases the quality of the data. Only the authors 
submitting the paper and the journal editor see most reviewer comments 
for peer review journal publications. Such comments may be of interest to 
a wider audience, particularly when they impact on the validity of the 
experimental results. Importantly reviewer comments and entries by other 
research groups are likely to expand the interest of the work and increase 
the linkages with other spheres of knowledge. 
Omotani comments that, 
..... two processes, dialogue and implementation - ... reflection and 
action - moving in parallel, and feeding each other. .. "614 
were responsible for the improved student performance within a learning 
community. There are parallels with that community and scientific 
research communities.615 
"It wasn't anyone thing that happened that enabled this or that 
innovation to occur. It was definitely the result of those 
conversations. It was all about developing a capacity to talk together 
814 Senge, P., The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organisation 
[Random House Business Books, 2006, 2nd Ed., London1308 
815 There are fewer similarities with non-hard science areas of research which lack 
pretence of objectivity, such as philosophy. Non-hard science questions are distinct 
through the inapplicability of the Popperian falsifiability criterion. Non-hard science 
disciplines lack the need to accept contentious theoretical ideas, instead they are rather 
'intuitive.' Thus, in non-hard science disciplines it is less important to find a convention 
that can be regarded as objective. 
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in very diverse groups, developing a collaborative network of people 
who were supportive of one another. .. ,,816 
Improving research methodology is more readily effected by subjecting 
work to the attention of other groups in the same field and perhaps related 
fields. By creating a database where such communities may undertake a 
conversation would improve the quality of research, create a natural 
system of rating significance and improve transparency. This would be 
exceptionally useful for clinical trial data, where subsequent independent 
findings too often present a different picture to the data generated by the 
pharmaceutical company applying for market approval. 
5.2.4. Simple Or Complex 
Secondly, there is the issue of sophistication. The more advanced the 
search and archival systems, the more sophisticated the imaging and 
graphical interfaces, then the higher the specification of computers 
required. Not all countries have access to advanced computing facilities. 
Thus, either alternative less demanding retrieval and archival platforms 
would concurrently be needed, or some gradual initiative to facilitate 
access and contribution to the datasets. There is balance to be achieved 
in limiting the sophistication of databases to improve accessibility of the 
data. Limiting the sophistication of a database too greatly may create 
problems for the presentation of information, the establishment of a 
community 'conversation' and thereby prevent the technological platform 
816 Senge, P., The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organisation 
[Random House Business Books, 2006, 2nd Ed., London] 308 
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being used to full advantage. The database needs to be viable, 
manageable, and yet at the same time prospective enough not to be 
limitative or retardative of the research effort. Indeed, the database should 
be a precursory 'conversation' to the database's creation. 
5.2.5. Upkeep 
The third problem is the expense, upkeep, and ownership of the 
superstructure. There are many solutions available from the studies of 
collaborative research projects. Many merely consider the interface of the 
parts of knowledge being interchanged and are more concerned with the 
allocation of the fruits of success rather than sustained ongoing 
collaboration. In such cases each collaborator has management, 
responsibility for their own resources. This would be an unsatisfactory 
position for a global research effort and might shift the burden of research 
to particular nations, thereby reintroducing the 'free-rider' objection to 
voluntary contribution and support systems. This however need not be the 
case. Obligatory proportional contribution could be required and complete 
dataset copies housed in more than one location, with all of them 
belonging to the global community or occupying server space leased from 
a national governments at cost. There are many possibilities for 
proportional contributions. For example, the cost of upkeep CQuid be 
apportioned on the basis of GOP. 
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5.2.6 Open Access 
A patent requires the inventor to disclose details about the invention, 
which are then placed on publicly accessible databases. The patent 
databases can provide a rich source of information that can facilitate in the 
development of new products. However, the patent entry may also require 
knowledge and understanding of the state of the art to understand and 
build on the invention. Or whilst the entry describes an invention it may be 
part of an incomplete mosaic that needs to be understood as an ensemble 
in order to embody the invention usefully. We should also remember the 
strategies of the German dyestuff manufacturers; who employed both 
secrecy and misleading patent data to extend their lead times. Indeed, a 
patent is no guarantee that the information filed is correct. Today, clever 
patenting of complex substances may indeed involve a dozen misleading 
patents, containing erroneous or untested knowledge.817 
Patent databases can require specialist knowledge to navigate and use 
effectively, although basic searches are fairly easy to conduct. Moreover, 
the manner in which information is filed is not necessarily researcher 
friendly or sufficient. Neither is there any guarantee that the information is 
useful or accurate. It is common practice following discovery of what may 
be a successful medicine candidate to file patents on every drug of the 
same family. Many, if not all of these drugs will be less effective than the 
candidate chemical, not effective, or even detrimental for target group if its 
specification even mentions a target group. 
817 Informal discussions with patent attorneys (2004-2005) 
398 
Moreover, the restrictive effect of patents on the access to information on 
research methods and results may impose substantial efficiency losses in 
addition to the deadweight loss of monopoly.818 To understand the 
mechanism claimed in a patent, investigators might need to conduct their 
own experiments in order to verify that the information is correct and to 
understand the mechanics of what is taking place. Whilst poorly drafted 
academic literature reporting experimental results can sometimes be 
lacking in the information that others need to replicate or fully appreciate 
the experiment, patents if it is possible to give the appearance of 
sufficiency invariably are.819 As little information as possible is supplied 
and as long as the patentee is able to argue sufficiency and secure their 
claim, then their patent attorney has done their job. 
I n the absence of a defacto monopoly on the employment of information 
the data itself loses its economic value except in the very limited context of 
first mover advantage. Thus, data pooling becomes a greater possibility 
and with the excellent and growing information networking possibilities it 
would have a substantial impact on primary research. Moreover, since the 
818 David, P. A., 1992, "Intellectual property institutions and the panda's thumb: Patents. 
copyrights, and trade secrets in economic theory and history", Working paper #287, 
CEPR. Stanford, CA. 
819 Remember that a patent application must disclose the invention sufficiently clearly and 
completely that a person skilled in the art could replicate it. However, the notional 
addressee to substantiate or contest a patent is a complex construct that may be an 
interdisciplinary team (EPO T 460/87 - CLBA 1996 - VISCOSUD) of specialists (EPO T 
164/92 - OJ 1995/305 - ROBERT BOSCH) and it may be possible to narrow down 
particular specialists to a very small number of people. 
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research is to be carried out by groups disconnected from the 
manufacturing and sales of the pharmaceutical, lead time is irrelevant, 
except as an advantage for the researchers to gather enough data for their 
publication. Optimistically, with the establishment of an open access 
global research database, then journal publications might become 
obsolete as the nature of publishing research findings changes to 
database contributions. The move from proprietary journals to free-access 
databases820 would present substantial savings for research communities 
and educational institutions.821 
5.2.7. Tried And Excelled 
Successful collaborative projects utilising web based architecture for 
information exchange and joint publishing822 present optimistiC indications 
for the aptness of this medium for global collaborative research. Although 
none has yet existed on the proposed scale the historical antidotes 
suggestive that the methodology of open information sharing would be 
highly successful. 
Moreover, the success of the German dyestuff pioneers was the institution 
of highly organised industrial research. 
820 Free in the sense that a subscription is not required. The architecture of access. i.e. 
the cost of a computer, may be inhibitive of access. However, the deadweight or artificial 
scarcity in the price of access would be eliminated. 
821 Educational institutions are particularly important for specialist labour - reducing 
education costs might improve the labour pool. 
822 For example the Human Genome Project. See Arzberger, P., Schroeder, P., 
Beaulieu, A., Bowker, G., et al. 'Science and government. An international framework to 
promote access to data' (2004) 303 Science 1777-1778 
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"The Germans had realised something the others had not - nature 
would only give up its chemical secrets under a collective assault by 
a large group of sCientists."s23 
Unlike the 19th Century dyestuff chemists we now have access to 
technologies that allow us to communicate across the planet. To store, 
share and search an enormous quantity of data within seconds. 
Moreover, the cost of connecting others to that system has negligible 
marginal costs for those connected. The survey has not been done, but it 
seems highly likely that if medical researchers were asked if their work 
would benefit from their ability to access the research work of all other 
medical researchers in the world, to share ideas and perspectives freely 
without the institutional fetters of proprietorship, and to examine data of 
clinical trials (successful and unsuccessful) that they would respond 
affirmatively. 
"Data sharing is essential for expedited translation of research 
results into knowledge, products and procedures to improve human 
health."s24 
Even if an individual is capable of forming abstract relations between 
multiple sources of information and thereby realising practical benefits, 
823 Drahos, P; Braithwaite, J., Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge 
Economy? [Earthscan Publications Ltd, 1st Ed., 2002, Londonj40 
824 <http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/data_sharing/> (Last Accessed April 2007) 
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such linkage is not possible without the simultaneous awareness of the 
multiple sources of information.825 Moreover, the greater the number of 
people exposed to information and/or the greater the available information 
the greater the likelihood of useful correlations being made. 
As most inventive steps are arrived at on the basis of existing bodies of 
knowledge or by the serendipitous use or combination of existing 
technologies, it has been common throughout human experience for 
inventions to be achieved by different individuals unbeknownst to one 
another within a short time period. Three well documented and interesting 
examples are the hot air balloon826, radio and penicillin, but there are 
many others. A global pharmaceutical research dataset would eliminated 
serendipitous duplication and channel such energies into collaborative 
research or later improvements. Moreover, the search through the 
database is no longer to discover what research directions have already 
been claimed around your research trajectory, but rather what useful 
results, expertise and possible assistance there is available. 
With data from experimentation and clinical trials, both successful and 
unsuccessful, made available the greater the likelihood that the utility of 
the idea and the trial information can be put to further use. An argument 
625 Kingston, W., The political economy of innovation [Nijhoff Publishers. 1984, The 
Hague] 26 
626 Louren90 de Gusmao, B. {1709} Fac-simile d'un dessin a la plume de sa description et 
de la petition adressee au Jean V. (de Portugal) en langue latine et en ecriture 
contemporaine. [Reunies S. A., 1917, 1st Ed., Lausanne] 7-17 
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along this line for collaborative input into innovation is well supported 
empirically by initiatives such as the GNU Project and Wiki. 
Furthermore, if data pooling occurs then the practical elements of the 
innovation to production chain are free to focus on improvement, and if 
there is competitive behaviour without defacto monopoly each competitor 
must strive to be as effective and savant in their choices as they are able. 
The information gathering research institutions, on the other hand, are free 
to continue data pooling. 
There is another advantage of data pooling across institutions. Burns and 
Stalker found that firms with mechanistic forms of organisation and 
hierarchic structures of control and communication were poorer innovators 
than firms that were organised in an organic form in an environment of 
consultation rather than command.827 Presently where firms, research 
organisations and clinics enter into collaboration, the organisation is 
usually clearly hierarchically defined by non-disclosure agreements, 
intellectual property licenses and other collaborative contracts. If data is 
pooled but authorship is fully detailed, then the establishment of 
collaboration with useful partners is facilitated and whilst institutions can 
827 Burns, T., and Stalker, G. M. The management of innovation [Tavistock, 15t Ed., 1961, 
London] 6. See: Nordhaus, W. R, Invention, Growth and Welfare [MIT Press, 1969, 1st 
Ed., Cambridge, Massachusetts] 56; Aiken, M., Bacharach, S., and French, J., 
Organizational structure, work process, and proposal making in administrative 
bureaucracies (1980) 23 Academy of Management Journal: 631-652; Covin, J., and 
Slevin, D., Strategic management of small firms in hostile and benign environments 
(1989) 10 Strategic Management Journal: 75-88 
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maintain their agendas and hierarchical structures, the specialist can form 
organic consultative collaborations with relevant specialists across the 
world. 
5.2.8. Benefits Unbound 
Undeniably the 19th Century dyestuff leaders skilfully employed patents in 
conjunction with secrecy to deter entry and preserve market leadership. 
However, their growth, dyestuff expertise, and initial leadership of the 
market, were a direct result of their industrial research organisation. In a 
world where there are no pharmaceutical patents, where medical and 
medicinal knowledge is unowned there are no requirements for 
gatekeepers other than quality. In fact utilisation, development and 
production of others' research would be for the betterment of populations. 
Time stamped, author attribution on database entries would provide a 
stronger universal recognition system for insight and work than any 
existent today. 
There are further benefits available from a non-proprietary system of 
global medical and pharmaceutical research. One of the problems 
amongst contemporary drug development teams is identifying key stages 
in their objectives. For example, where the team identifies a chemical with 
a minor therapeutic advance, should they continue their research in the 
hope of finding a major therapeutic advance, or should they direct their 
efforts into the commercial development of the minor advance. 
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Within my proposed system the development concern is not significant. 
Once the minor advance is identified then the research group can look for 
the major therapeutic advance, confident that their addition to the 
database will have already enriched global knowledge and been author 
attributed. Moreover, should a group find that the minor therapeutic 
advance beneficial in the treatment of a condition then it can set up and 
begin clinical testing. Moreover because of the openness of the 
information system, there is no inhibitory factor preventing the initial 
research group participating in the clinical trials. This would allow a closer 
interface between breakthrough research and clinical testing. 
The sharing of information and the ease of collaboration should have 
important effects on reducing the cost of realising safe NCEs. It will also 
lead to a greater acquisition of expertise as researchers are subject to 
much more data and know how than they would have experienced working 
in small groups behind walls of secrecy and under the burden of creating 
blockbuster medicines. It is likely that reorganising pharmaceutical 
research in the way we have suggested will have a cut off point where 
investment in research starts to become less productive. However, 
amongst a larger pool of expertise and where all investigations are logged 
this point of diminishing breakthroughs with increasing funds should take 
much longer to reach. 
The Findlay extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin model that attempts to 
describe the production of two final goods (and an untradable product) in a 
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small open economy suggests that in the real world there is an optimal 
extent to which research can be utilised in the production of a good 
thereby realising a profit. Further research results in a loss of profit. 
Whilst this model seems to prima facie provide an argument for the 
strengthening of a patent monopoly with respect to research, it does not 
however suggest that with a longer monopoly more research would be 
conducted, or that there would be a greater focus on research before a 
product was released to the market. Indeed with the preference for as 
lower costs to profit margin as possible as the favourable modus operandi 
of manufacturing, it is in fact a very strong argument for the disjoining of 
research from manufacturing. Thereby permitting both research and 
manufacturing to be ends in themselves. 
The Findlay extension considers capital and labour to be constants. The 
untradeable product consists of research that has been conducted, but 
that has at present no opportunity for profit. Within the model this will 
comprise all information that the manufacturer obtained through research 
investment, but is not positioned to exploit. Considering the possibility of 
employing licensing and non-disclosure agreements to supplant relations 
between firms, this research outcome must be considered to be without 
realised value. Within the context of pharmaceuticals, there may also be a 
more sinister interpretation: Indeed the information may contain safety 
contraindications and therefore affect the value of a product. However, 
forming a linkage between the untradeable research findings and the 
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products is an unnecessary complication to the clear simplicity of Findlay 
extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. 
FIGURE 2. The Finlay extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin model comparing 
the profitability of two products, where one product (8) varies with 
increasing technological knowledge as a result of further research by the 
manufacturer, whilst the other product (A) develops as a result of 





This figure suggests that there is an optimal point for research investment 
and incorporation of research into a product. The dotted line indicates 
where increased research investment no longer adds to the profit margin 
of product 8. 
828 Based on a figure in Findlay, R., Factor proportions and growth [MIT Press, 181 Ed., 
1995, Cambridge, MAl 89 
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Consider two goods: For the purpose of Figure 2 let these be A and B. 
Where good A is the product of technological diffusion into a market with 
little or no innovation on the part of the manufacturer. Good B is the 
product of technological implementations resulting from research 
conducted by the manufacturer. 
We label the abscissa simply as research and it should be borne in mind 
that B comprises a substantially larger research investment than A. 829 
Thus as the degree of research incorporated into a good increases with 
the state of technology on the market, so does the research investment 
and cost of producing a more sophisticated product B. 
In the absence of pharmaceutical patents and other exclusory rights this 
will only be true for manufacturing, although full disclosure of the 
manufacturing and quality control process as part of a licence as a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer will reduce the profit margin available from 
research into manufacturing. This will occur as disclosure reduces lead-
time on the introduction of improvements in manufacture. However, the 
returns gained to the industry as a whole from access to almost all 
improvements in manufacturing and access to the research network 
should more than compensate for loses that a higher level of investment at 
an individual level might have inspired. 
829 For a full treatment of Findlay's extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem see 
Findlay, R, Factor proportions and growth [MIT Press, 1st Ed., 1995, Cambridge, MAJ. 
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Profit margin does not apply to a public good in itself, only into products 
incorporating it. However, as applications are produced there will be 
savings to society with fewer and shorter hospitalisations and lower 
mortality. Whilst knowledge in itself is a public good, the labour of 
researchers and the database are private goods and thus, a Findlay 
extension may also present a valid general description that a cut of point in 
increasing returns on research investment will occur. 
One of the main points with forcing research into academic research 
environs such as universities is that even when the research department 
does not discover potential blockbuster pharmaceutical. the university 
researchers publish their results in the data base. Thus, knowledge is 
continuously driven forward at lower marginal and transactional costs. 
The standards of research in a scientific community subject to peer review 
can be high, and though fraudulent claims of success are known in such 
environs they are invariably short lived. In clandestine research 
departments where scientists require management and legal authorisation 
to publish results or make statements to the press, the standards of 
primary research remain unknown elements. Whilst the research may be 
of a quality on par with peer reviewed institutions, it may well be otherwise. 
Openness and thoroughness are of crucial importance not only to science, 
but also with respect to clinical safety testing. There are many 
pharmaceuticals that have caused death and endangered people because 
they were purported to provide therapeutic benefit, when in fact they were 
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more harmful and no more effective for the target condition than a 
placebo. 830 
5.2.9. More Expertise 
Maintaining and training medical researchers can be expensive and with 
the change in the nature of funding for university research facilities and the 
increasing dependence of universities on industrial partnerships, funding 
and training opportunities for postgraduate researchers are limited to very 
small spheres of specialisation. One of the most expensive components 
of the postgraduate researcher's development will be their access to 
knowledge and skill training. Secrecy plays an important part here, with 
the financial gains the university or researcher will obtain from devising a 
blockbuster drug, few risks of information leak are tolerated. 
State conducted clinical trials in the absence of a patent would produce 
more reliable and fully available trial data. Moreover, there would by no 
need for the substantial expenditure on marketing and product promotion 
830 Wagner, K. D., Kowatch, R. A., Emslie, G. J., Findling, R. l., WHens, T. E, McCague, 
K., D'Souza, J., Wamil, A.,. Lehman, R. B., Berv, D., Linden, D., A double-blind, 
randomized, placebo-controlled trial of oxcarbazepine in the treatment of bipolar disorder 
in children and adolescents. (2006) 163 Am J Psychiatry 1179-1186: Hewitt. R G., 
Yiannoutsos, C. T., Higgs, E. S., Carey, J. T., Geiseler, P. J., Soave, R, Rosenberg, R, 
Vazquez, G. J., Wheat, L. J., Fass, R. J., Antoninievic, Z .. Walawander, A. L., Flanigan, 
T. P., Bender, J.F., Paromomycin: no more effective than placebo for treatment of 
cryptosporidiosis in patients with advanced human immunodeficiency virus infection. 
AIDS Clinical Trial Group. (2000) 31(4) Clin Infect Dis. 20001084-1092; Pande, A. C.; 
Crockatt, J. G., Janney, C. A., Werth, J. L., Tsaroucha, G., Gabapentin in bipolar 
disorder: a placebo-controlled trial of adjunctive therapy (2000) 2 (3 Pt 2) Bipolar Disord. 
249-255 
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that presently occurs. Information regarding the use, risks, and 
effectiveness of medicines, including trial data, could be provided on an 
open and searchable database. Thus, not only would health practitioners 
have more information, more readily available there would be greater 
transparency towards the public as well. Furthermore, because the data 
presentation could be systematised the health professional or member of 
the public would be able to perform a direct comparison. There are costs 
involved in wrongly medicating, open access to accurate data on 
medicines should be expected to reduce, even though not eliminate, these 
costs. 
Perhaps this is something that we need to remember when public or 
private research laboratories and organisations make even small seeming 
contributions to knowledge: However small, each advancement should be 
lauded. Nevertheless, all gains would be multiplied if the work and 
expertise of every other practicing researcher and clinician were available. 
Within this global scale of knowledge production even the largest research 
laboratories and networks of today would be considered tiny. 
5.2.10. Local Medicines 
Moreover, in the absence of patent restrictions knowledge migration and 
the establishment of fledgling pharmaceutical industries in countries where 
there is a large demand for medicines to treat indigenous diseases, but 
little foreign investment may occur. Historically, the absence or weakness 
of patents for pharmaceuticals has permitted the development of local 
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pharmaceutical industries. Whilst that will contribute to improvements in 
accessibility of some medicines, it will not address local endemic diseases 
by itself. As labour costs within the manufacturing industry within that 
country will be lower, these fledgling industries might perform well 
competing with manufacturers in economically wealthier countries. Indeed 
because of the cheaper labour pool foreign corporations may be 
stimulated to make direct investment in developing a local industry. 
Moreover, the savings, revenue, and development of technical skill derived 
by the society from its new industry may feed into application of science 
from other parts of the World into local problems. Furthermore as the 
industry increases the wealth of the nation there may eventually be 
sufficient resources to establish research facilities focused on endemic 
diseases. 
Whilst knowledge may poses an irrepressible power and be difficult to 
contain expertise is more readily restricted, especially where the state of 
the art is particularly complex. Without education an open database of 
technical information is not as useful as it should be, which is a failing of 
our proposal. In an economy with rich research facilities the training of new 
generations of research scientists, clinicians and medical personnel would 
be facilitated by our proposal. Thus, education would not be an inhibitory 
factor in interaction with the database. However, in a country where there 
are no research facilities and only rudimentary education, the database 
would be incomprehensible. There may also be other applications, than 
education and endemic disease research, where invested capital would 
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have more health impact, such as the supply of clean drinking water and 
food secu rity. 
Nevertheless even in these circumstances our proposal has advantages 
over the present pharmaceutical patent system. The patent is by design 
restrictive of the establishment of local industries and expertise through 
both the property sovereignty function statement831 and the knowledge 
feudalism function statement.832 For a determinant player in the 
pharmaceutical industry to permit a country to develop a national 
pharmaceutical manufacturing and research industry would be to allow a 
potential threat to be established. Even if the fledgling industry catered to 
markets outside of the established companies' ambit there would be 
potential for that industry to eventually usurp parts of established 
pharmaceutical markets. This is as always reinforced by the lessons 
learned following the World Wars, the development of the Swiss 
pharmaceutical companies, and even the Italian pharmaceutical industry. 
In all cases the ability to absorb and exploit the knowledge of industries in 
other countries permitted these companies to begin manufacture, build 
expertise and then become global competitors. 
5.2.11 Utilising Potential 
Since intellectual property became an essential component of University 
science research funding and resources were diverted to establish 
intellectual property transfer offices the amount of documented knowledge 
631 See 3.1. 
632 See 3.2. 
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transfer from UK universities has increased. Many of the UKs world-class 
research universities have seen their research commercialised thus 
forming high-technology clusters around departments.833 Following 
funding changes in Higher Education the UK suffered a large reduction in 
its supply science graduates, however incentives are being taken to renew 
numbers in some disciplines. That these graduates are of good quality 
relative to competitor nations and available at reasonable cost is a major 
attraction to research and development investment in the UK.834 
Moreover, it is clear that along with foundations, hospital research facilities 
and public sector research agencies, that universities are responsible for 
discovering and financing the majority of the most innovative and health 
significant medicines.835 Thus, they would be able to adopt and benefit 
from my proposed system with rapidity. 
"Private firms alone, in seeking to maximise their returns. will 
undertake less research than is socially optimal. .. 636 
833 Sainsbury Review. The Race to the Top: A Review of Government's Science and 
Innovation Policies. [HMSO October 2007] 5 
834 Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness Task Force. Competitiveness and 
Performance Indicators 2005. 8 
635 ABC News May, 29th 2002. Available from: 
<http://abcnews.go .com/onair/ ABCNEWSSpecials/Pharmaceuticals _ 020529 _pjr _feature. 
html> (Accessed 4th January 2004) (ABCNews.com page has moved or no longer exists.) 
836 Sainsbury Review. The Race to the Top: A Review of Government's Science and 
Innovation Policies. [HMSO October 2007] 23 
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Masters and doctoral students could provide a cheap and highly skilled 
research support community. Together with the openness and 
interlinkage within the research community, this would have immediate 
impact on knowledge generation and the acquisition of expertise. 
Furthermore, it would contribute to an enhancement in the teaching of 
science and technology at lower levels, especially where the disciplines 
were related to medicines and pharmaceutical technologies. 
"Demand for science, technology, engineering and mathematics 
(STEM) skills will continue to grow. The UK has a reasonable stock 
of STEM graduates .... "837 
Moving research back into universities, making it open and having the 
funds available to increase the number of researchers will improve job 
prospects for STEM graduates and may create an increased interest 
earlier in the education chain. 
Systems of prizes and accolades could be implemented for breakthrough 
research leading to a scientific discovery, but it is not necessary. Since 
pharmaceutical knowledge is a public good and the database provides a 
forum for that knowledge generation, storage and retrieval all discoveries 
immediately enter into a global knowledge commons. 
837 Sainsbury Review. The Race to the Top: A Review of Government's Science and 
Innovation Policies. [HMSO, October 2007] 6 
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U[A]ny information obtained ... should, from the welfare point of view, 
be available free of charge (apart from the costs of transmitting 
information). This insures optimum utilisation of the information but 
of course provides no incentive for investment in research.,,838 
In practice all markets have inherent incentives for research this is true 
even when the market is not formalised or acknowledged; these include 
lower production costs, the ability to perform new tasks, access or creation 
of a new market, greater efficiency. However, incentives directed at the 
act of discovery, providing all unfavourable incentive generation is 
avoided, may facilitate knowledge sharing. 
It has to be remembered that researchers are not just cogs in an 
innovation mechanism, they are people with interests, complexities and 
ambitions. Advancement within research institutions will hopefully be 
based on merit, which should provide some incentive. 
In addition history supports Taussig's assertion that u ... the race of 
contrivers and inventors does obey an inborn and irresistible impulse.,,839 
This is an experience that is already apparent in the research laboratory, it 
is just that under the pressures imposed by privatising pharmaceutical 
838 Arrow, K. J., "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," R. R. 
Nelson (eds.) The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors 
[Princeton University Press, 1962, New York] 616-617 
839 Taussig, F. W. Inventors and Money-Makers [Macmillan, 1930. New York] 21 
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knowledge priorities are shifted with a consequence for inventiveness and 
working relations. 
If there were to be rewards for researchers, these could be based an 
assessment of literature produced by researches with respect to date. 
The first to disclose an important hypothesis in a manner that makes it 
persuasive as a hypothesis will be awarded a prize. If a researcher laid 
down an important part of the framework, but did not make the 
breakthrough they will be eligible for some share of the prize if not the 
prize itself. Prize could be of two parts consisting of financial reward and 
public accolade. Since the prize is awarded only after the knowledge 
provided by the hypothesis has been utilised successfully in the production 
of a result. The difficulty will be the breakdown of a discovery into discrete 
parts and then an assessment of each parts importance to the integrity of 
the thesis. 
Scientific hypothesis would be available to be used by public research 
centres all over the world. These centres would be connected via fully 
accessible research intranet and database (the 'Commons'). All nations of 
the world could pay for these research centres as a proportion of GOP. 
Where they would be established would need to take into account 
resource access, e.g. availability of technical knowledge, transport and 
communication connectivity. Other factors such as corruption, 
infrastructure costs and civil stability are also important. Resources should 
be maximised, with as little waste as possible. 
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Closer interrelation between universities for research and hospitals for 
conducting clinical trials should be organised with relation to research 
centres. Postgraduate students conducting research into the life sciences 
could be employed part time. This would subsidise their own research 
expenses, provide low cost skilled labour and create a new generation of 
researchers for the centres. Universities, government laboratories and 
non-profit research institutions already play an essential part in developing 
new knowledge and knew embodiments of that knowledge. B4o 
The revenue to pay for the dramatic increase in government sponsored 
research would have to come from taxes, however considering that the 
costs of research and the price of pharmaceuticals would be 
phenomenally lower there may be no need for Significant increases in 
taxes. Indeed the median disposable income of the average citizen might 
increase despite a slightly raised tax rate. 
Moreover, if the new methodologies of research were successful then the 
resultant increases in employment and quality of life might permit 
redistribution of funds to other projects, further increases in research. or a 
reduction in taxes. Moreover individual and corporate income taxes cause 
far less distortion than excise taxes like the patent system. Some 
deadweight. such as marketing and lobbying. would be entirely eliminated. 
840 Nelson. R.. R.. US Technological Leadership: Where did it come from and where did it 
go? (1990) 19 Research Policy 119-132 
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5.3 Safer Medicines 
It is clear that the magnitude of rents from pharmaceutical patents 
incentive patent holders to create health risks. Market approval could be 
based on a requirement of sufficient disclosure, i.e. the information 
required by a good scientific paper describing experimental results, which 
would include sufficient instruction for other scientists in the field to repeat 
the experiment. Imposing such a requirement would serve several 
purposes. Since most research would be the issue of research institutions 
before being taken up by development centres, such as teaching 
hospitals, the practice of keeping clear experimental accounts that permit 
others to verify scientists' work is both good practice and the usual 
requirement of research beyond undergraduate level. For reasons of 
safety it is preferable that detailed unbiased clinical trial records are taken. 
The results from a particular phase test may also indicate other 
applications for the chemical, or highlight little known conditions where a 
greater degree of monitoring and caution are required. 
A sufficient disclosure requirement would also have Significance for 
pharmaceutical compositions and manufacturing processes that producers 
under the present system would desire to keep secret. As we 
described,841 even though a pharmaceutical product patent is taken early 
in the development of the pharmaceutical product, patents on the 
manufacturing of the product are usually taken much later, potentially 
841 Section 1.5 
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expanding the effective monopoly on the pharmaceutical. 642 A sufficient 
disclosure requirement would mean that all information necessary to the 
safety assessment of the pharmaceutical and its obtainment would be 
disclosed. The sufficient disclosure requirement would also ensure that the 
information discernable from a patent was available much sooner and in a 
form more convivial to technology transfer. 
With patents for pharmaceuticals abolished and with research and 
manufacturing disjoined, clinical trials could be undertaken by university 
research groups and teaching hospitals.843 Teaching hospitals are already 
responsible for the provision of much independent and sponsored clinical 
performance data for pharmaceuticals and the uptake of further reporting 
would create two important benefits. Firstly, because of the close 
interlinks between academic faculties and teaching hospitals, 
standardising reporting tools and databases would be expedited. 
Secondly, reporting would be more detailed and unbiased. Thereby 
permitting thorough monitoring of drug safety. 
842 For example Oseltamivir, where patents on synthesising shikimic acid from Chinese 
star anise lagged product patents on Oseltamivir by nearly a decade. This might have 
endured for longer but with the threat of a pandemic and an apparent shortage of supply. 
third parties saw an investment opportunity. See, US Patents: 5952375 (Oseltamivir 
1996); 6613552 (synthesis from star anise 2003); 6436664 (microbial synthesis 2002). 
843 For example in the UK Sheffield Teaching Hospital is notable for its trials on cancer 
drugs and Leeds Teaching Hospital for its clinical trials on Haematology products. 
Addenbrooke, Cambridge University's Teaching Hospital. currently has over 1000 
projects and 400 clinical trials in progress. 
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The present system is particularly concerned with the speed at which 
pharmaceuticals progress to the market, this rush is partially based on the 
need to make the medicines available, and partially because every 
moment that the medicines spend being sold is generates income. In 
conjunction with this regime of speeded approval is an unsatisfactory post 
approval surveillance.844 Elimination of pharmaceutical patents and 
clinical testing undertaken by teaching hospitals and public research 
institutions with full documentation made openly accessible in an online 
database would drastically improve the openness, and clarity of drug 
safety scrutiny. 
Moreover, there is no indication that conducting clinical trials in this 
manner would delay pharmaceutical approval. It is more feasible that the 
increased number of specialists available to supervise trials would lead to 
faster approval times. 
Post approval monitoring could be accumulated from data on all users of a 
medicine and uploaded onto the database making potential adverse 
indications more readily identified and loss of life kept to a minimum. 
Moreover, because every drug's full clinical history would be available to 
everyone, doctors would be able to make a fully informed decision as to 
which therapies would suit their patient. 
844 Online NewsHour: Drug Safety. Available at: 
<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/fedagencies/july-dec04/fda_11-23.html> (Last 
Accessed: 1 sl July 2009) 
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As drug safety is an extremely important failing of the current system 
improved impartiality and reporting of findings would be a considerable 
improvement. Open reporting in a standard reference database may also 
reduce the number of patients receiving incorrect diagnoses. This would 
reduce the instances of medication with the wrong medicines, which is a 
particular problem in some less wealthy countries, and lead to savings in 
all society's labour pools and resources. 
Currently, proprietor generated clinical safety data and FDA regulation is 
unsatisfactory and many proposals have been made to improve it. 845 
Foremost amongst these proposals is a legal requirement that 
pharmaceutical companies disclose to the public adverse effects as soon 
as they are discovered. Such a requirement would theoretically constitute 
a Significant improvement legislatively.846 But in practice if the penalty 
came in the form of a fine, would it be effective in prompting disclosure? 
Considering the pharmaceutical industry's past behaviour a fine would be 
insufficient deterrent and would in effect be deadweight transmitted to 
purchase of the company's pharmaceuticals. Criminal penalties might be 
more effective, but this is not a certainty. There is already a Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act in the UK and criminal 
measures against misadvertising neither has prevented loss of life arising 
845 National Public Radio, 'Experts Call for Changes to FDA Drug Approval' (Online 
Broadcast). Available at: 
<http://www.npr.org/templates/storylstory.php?storyld=6226295> (last Accessed: 1s1 July 
2009) 
846 Actions currently are based on product liability and tort law, such as clinical 
negligence. 
4'., _ .. 
from pharmaceuticals being marketed when it was known internally to the 
company marketing them that they increased mortality. Adoption of legal 
requirements to disclose adverse effects have often been raised, but so far 
no measures have been taken to ensure that adverse indications are 
reported.847 It is preferable that rather than tweaking a system that is 
skewed in its comportment towards profit in preference to safety, that a 
system promoting safety with little scope for distortion be adopted. 
Moreover, in the absence of the pharmaceutical patent, and in a system 
where the mechanisms of research, development and clinical trials are 
separated from manufacturing then a disclosure incentive function 
statement848 is unnecessary. 
847 For example Peter Juni, a clinical epidemiologist at the University of Berne and one of 
investigators responsible for revealing to the public the elevated cardiac infarction risk of 
Cox-2 inhibitors see, Dobson, R., and Lenzer, J., 'US regulator suppresses vital data on 
prescription drugs on sale in Britain' (June 12, 2005) The Independent. Available at: 
<http://www . independent. co. ukllife-style/health-and-fam ilies/health-
news/article493903.ece> (Last Accessed: 15t July 2009) 
848 See, Section 2.3. 
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Discussion 
"The welfare of the people shall be the supreme law,849 
We know that innovation occurs in the absence of a patent and that 
pharmaceutical innovation under a patent incentive is expensive. The 
balance between short run costs and long run sustainability of research in 
the Pharmaceutical Industry is skewed towards static efficiency. This is 
reflective of the diminishing numbers of new medical introductions. 
Governments, the main purchasers of medicines, pay many fold the cost 
of innovating a medicine within its purchase price. Therefore, we know 
there would be more money to spend on innovating other therapeutic 
breakthroughs in the absence of a patent. We are also aware that a 
significant proportion of pharmaceutical inventions, which are later 
characterised as constituting therapeutic breakthroughs, originate in public 
institutions or institutions heavily subsidised by Government. 
We know that scientific knowledge is essential to the development of new 
medicines and we know there is a growing trend for research scientists to 
withhold any knowledge that might have a practical application until they, 
their industrial partners, or their institutions secure a patent. Data sharing 
except within strict collaboration agreements is not practiced. 
849 Salus populi suprema lex esto. Cicero, De Legibus IIl.viii.8. 
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The swiftness at which community research products develop is 
astounding, when compared to the slow rate of therapeutic advancement 
in the pharmaceutical industry. Moreover, the quality and diversity that 
can be achieved in community research products surpasses the 
accomplishments of individual private firms and inter firm collaborations. 
Historical paradigms suggest the validity of reorganising pharmaceutical 
research to include larger populations of researchers, and to promote 
knowledge sharing, to improve pharmaceutical innovation productivity. 
Currently the cost of new medicines means that an enormous proportion of 
humanity are unable to afford the latest therapy regardless of the mortality 
of their condition. Health organisations avoid using more effective drugs 
because they are expensive leading to inefficient health outcomes and 
social cost. Drugs are not developed for conditions that afflict significant 
populations if those populations are poor. Patients have ongoing drug 
therapies changed or stopped as a result of monopolist price squeezing. 
Safety information and disclosed indications for medicines are unreliable 
leading to thousands of deaths each year. 
Marketing, lobbying, large dividends and legal expenses drain resources 
which might have been invested in innovation and jobs. Reduced 
medicine development and access to research inhibits national economic 
growth within the medical sector and has severe economic consequences 
for all employment sectors. 
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In addition to being expensive, pharmaceutical patents are an ineffective 
method of technology transfer. 
Despite the overwhelming number of empirical examples describing the 
detrimental effects of the current patent based system of pharmaceutical 
innovation, positive reform is sidetracked, insufficient or bought to argue 
for a stronger patent system. Assuming that politician's motivations for a 
pharmaceutical patent system are not related to personal assets or party 
funding then it is likely that they believe that a strong patenting system 
provides convenient inducement for private investment in research and 
development.85o Thus, stimulating technological progress and thereby 
improving health care and the welfare of their citizens. 
However, if the mechanism of innovation favoured retards innovation and 
the size of the incentive distorts the behaviour of the investor to harm 
society's natural persons, then that incentive has failed. Moreover, its 
existence is a travesty - a breach of the special relationship that 
government has with the people of its society. 
Moreover, considering the scale of the indicia and the frequency with 
which the disadvantages are manifested, it is doubtful that anyone could 
be unaware that the system is not working. Thus, we have to suspect that 
whilst pharmaceutical companies remain wealthy and their pockets 
850 Mazzoleni. R.. Nelson. R.. 'The benefits and costs of strong patent protection: A 
contribution to the current debate' (1998) 27 Research Policy 273-284 
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captivate politician's hearts, there will be no effective reform of the 
inefficient, retardative and unsafe method of generating new 
pharmaceutical therapies that the pharmaceutical patent system 
engenders. As things stand all the determinative players form an 
interlinked system of self-interest. 
Aside from personal investment, politicians have substantial dependence 
on pharmaceutical industry funding for party funds and personal 
campaigns. The pharmaceutical industry is dependent on legislative 
bodies for its rights and government agencies for enforcement of those 
rights. The morality of a pharmaceutical company is a footnote to the 
returns on shareholder capital. Rights over pharmaceuticals, including the 
function of human genes, will continue to wax until there is a crisis and a 
different self-interest perturbs the balance. By the time that arrives we 
may well be dead. In the meantime the unnecessary loss of longevity and 
quality of life will continue. 
"The way we use and protect knowledge and ideas has never been 
more relevant to everyone. New ideas are ... vital if we are to tackle 
global issues like climate change, shortages of resources and to 
develop better medicines.,,851 
It is malignantly paradoxical that knowledge, inexhaustible and a 
necessary requirement of technological advancement, should need 
851 http://www.ipo.gov.uk/career/career-workforus/career-workforus-vacancy/career-
workforus-vacancy-policy911.htm (Last Accessed: October 2008) 
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defending or guarding, especially when it could convey the ability to 
significantly improve lives globally. That use of knowledge is the chosen 
tool for retarding the access and availability of medicines is deplorable and 
darkly ironic. 
APPENDIX 1 
Summary of Signified Characters 
q>A presupposes the advantage of the patent system as a source of 
innovation incentive, compared to the absence of such a system. It 
holds that without the patent system the incentive for innovation will 
be insufficient to meet minimal community requirements. 
q>A1 is the compound distortion of the assumption that without the patent 
system the incentive for innovation will be insufficient to meet 
minimal community requirements and that without the patent there 
would be no disclosed innovation 
q>B holds that inventors perform research leading to non-rivalrous 
inventive steps 
q>B1 the longer the duration of a patent the greater the magnitude of 
incentive and thus, the greater the number of potential inventors 
persuaded to innovate 
q>B2 the larger the breadth of entities capable of being patented the 
greater the domain of inventors to which the patent system provides 
incentive 
q>c assumes that an economic return is the most important incentive for 
inventive activity to occur 
q>C1 assumes inventive activity occurs for the ability to perform new 
tasks, more effective performance, lower production cost, renown, 
the natural creativity of humankind, a rent in the innovation, patent 
circumvention, and altruism 
429 
cpD the inventor and patent holder are the same natural person, or 
group of natural persons 
cpE Serendipitous invention, it is not a necessary condition for invention 
incentive, but it is a sufficient condition 
cpF that the invention may have more applications than the inventor 
anticipated 
<pG reinvestment of resources gained from an earlier invention, this is 
envisaged as a magnitude expressed as a proportion of the return 
on the earlier invention 
pA where a firm dominates a given market in the absence of rivalrous 
potential there is a tendency towards inventive indolence 
pB where competitive potential exists regardless of the limited number 
of rivalrous firms there is still incentive to innovate more rapidly than 
if there were no potential competitive provider to that given market 
pC increasing the fraction of the community exposed to knowledge of 
the invention increases the number of useful embodiments of the 
invention that might be discovered 
A inventive activity 
AI inventive activity as a result of the invention incentive function 
statement 
wP is the cost of duplicated research and development project 
expenditure on existing technology 
WoP is the cost of creating an additional forum or providing the 
necessary training so that duplicated research and development 
project expenditure on existing technology tends towards zero. 
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Invention incentive function statement: <pA.<pB.<pC.<pD::> }..I 
Disclosure incentive function statement: <pA1 :J <pF .pc 
Investment Incentive function statement: <pC1.<pC:J}.. 
Organised derivative innovation function statement: }..([<pG]>[<pF +pB+pC]) 
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APPENDIX 2 
Survey on the Statistical Significance of Research Sources in 
Industry and University Pharmaceutical Research Environments. 
820 questionnaires were addressed to researchers connected with 
pharmaceutical research in universities, biotech companies and 
pharmaceutical laboratories in the UK, France, USA and Canada. 221 
completed questionnaires were returned (27 per cent). 156 declined to 
take part (19 per cent) and 396 did not respond (48 per cent). 47 replies 
(6 per cent of questionnaires) were discounted because they provided 
conditional responses, did not complete all sections of the questionnaire, 
or requested further information that may have lead their responses. 
Although this survey provides some substantively important relations, the 
sample is small and may if a much larger population was examined be 
shown to be statistically insignificant. I was unable to identify the total 
population of pharmaceutical researchers in the sampled countries and 
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